Is pro-VVAT in the same category as anti-MMR?

williamgrogan

Discredit, lie and misrepresent

Obviously I am entitled to discredit someone who puts forward “evidence” that is untruthful. Someone who does this cannot, unless they withdraw the lie, be taken seriously in future.

This is why Wakefield’s study is now discredited. He lied by omission. He left out information that is regarded as crucial and therefore his study was undermined. He didn’t strictly speaking tell a lie but he did lie by omission.

When the anti-eVoting people keep putting about anecdotal evidence that upon investigation turns out to be untruthful then they too are discredited.

Can you refer me to where I lied?

Misrepresent?

I might add your one liner adds little in terms of addressing the points I have been making for the last few days. They are nothing but silly insults.

ecksor

Originally posted by williamgrogan
Either I didn't or you are mis-quoting. Please point to where I said this.

http://www.boards.ie/vbulletin/showthread.php?s=&postid=1277193#post1277193

williamgrogan

At any pointin this rather long-winded and rambling debate will WG be forced to actually address the details and points of MMR and VVAT themselves and show us his alleged anaolgies in the two, rather than just trying to discredit people he sees as associated?

This thread is taking a funny turn.

I make serious accusations that certain statements are effectively lies and at the very least gross distortions of the truth. I have specifically asked whether or not those of you opposing eVoting stand by them and not one of you has addressed this point.

Syke, do you think either Gilmore or Sergeant were truthful in their statements?

Do you Shane?

This is an important point. It is central to my contention that anti-MMR people lie by putting forward anecdotal stories that upon examination are seen to be lies and so do the anti-eVoting groups and individuals. It is essential to the anti-eVoting groups that they obtain evidence that eVoting is unreliable. There have now been millions of votes cast via eVoting. No evidence yet of any major problems. Plenty of stories doing the rounds that are lies though.

ecksor

Originally posted by williamgrogan
You cannot justify banning someone on a forum for spurious reasons.

If you feel they are spurious then again I say you should discuss it on the Feedback / Suggestions forum.

You banned me, or so you said, for calling those opposing eVoting, Luddites. I still think, and I am entitled to my opinion, that that is the main problem.

You are entitled to your opinion. You were even allowed to express it. You were warned not to keep spamming the discussion with that repeated assertion since you weren't arguing your case for that opinion and confessions about your ignorance of the system under discussion lead me to believe that you weren't in a position to back up your assertions. Therefore I concluded that you were merely being a disruption.

I think a forum that argues the high values of democracy should be very careful about banning someone

Have I argued about the high ideals of democracy? As far as I recall I've been arguing the suitability of the system for its intended purpose (and mentioned democracy where this has been relevant to that suitability). My political beliefs are not the topic for discussion.

and especially not because they previously asked the moderator in another thread to stop blubbering. I realise that comment was badly taken by you.

That comment reflects upon you, not me. Again, if you have a complaint about partial moderation then you should take it to the Feedback / Suggestions forum.

You see banning free speech AND claiming high ideals smells of hypocrisy.

Every forum on this site is subject to moderation. Your definitions of free speech aside, I don't recall claiming high ideals and they are not relevant to the requirement of a VVAT in the e-voting system.

ecksor

Originally posted by williamgrogan
It is essential to the anti-eVoting groups that they obtain evidence that eVoting is unreliable. There have now been millions of votes cast via eVoting. No evidence yet of any major problems.

And you appear to be opposed to a method which would help to provide such evidence.

williamgrogan

The reason I call myself a Skeptic (I don’t really but lets simplify things) is because the various Skeptics associations seem to have similar positions on matters that I have.

Sorry to bore everyone with this but……….

I was answering a point where someone said, “…you call yourself a Skeptic”. The word “really” also contributes to the sentence. The “really” relates to the bit below.

I don’t “call myself” anything. I don’t “call myself” an Atheist, even though I am an Atheist. In fact I am quite adamant about that.

I clearly say that I am “of one” with Skeptics in the above sentence. I am a Skeptic but I don’t “call myself” a Skeptic. If you said to me “what are you”, I won’t say I’m a Skeptic (at least generally not). In fact when asked that question I generally say, “I’m a human”.

PS

I’m impressed with that show of memory and I do accept the sentence is ambiguous. I hope that clarifies the matter.

ecksor

That does clarify.

I'm reminded of Through the Looking Glass

"The name of the song is called 'Haddocks' Eyes.'"
"Oh, that's the name of the song, is it?" Alice said trying to feel interested.

"No, you don't understand," the Knight said, looking a little vexed.
"That's what the name is called. The name really is 'The Aged Aged Man.'"
"Then I ought to have said 'That's what the song is called'?" Alice corrected herself.

"No, you oughtn't: that's quite another thing! The song is called 'Ways and Means': but that's only what it's called, you know!"
"Well, what is the song, then?" said Alice, who was by this time completely bewildered.

"I was coming to that," the Knight said. "The song really is 'A-sitting on A Gate': and the tune's my own invention."

ShaneHogan

Hi William - Thanks for clarifying that when accusing me of an untruth, you were actually referring to an incomplete statement and a difference of opinion over what 'huge' means in this context.

OK - Let me try a third time on the point that you don't seem to get - I speak for myself, no-one else. I'm not going to engage with you on anything Eamon G or the Greens or the Pope or Osama said on this topic. I'm not going to engage with you as to whether anti-Evoting people are same as anti-MMR's or anti-smokers or anti-roy keane or my Aunty Noreen. I'm choosing not to engage with you on these points for the sole reason that I don't like your style - I find it to be aggressive, bullying, inconsistent, trolling, vague - well, I could go on, but life is too short. Any other conclusion that you come to regarding my reasons for not commenting on these matters (as even an apprentice skeptic could tell you) is completely unsupported by any data, i.e. it is a figment of your overactive imagination.

If you expect anyone to take your assertion about PC's and the ICS seriously, you will need to produce something a bit stronger than 'I was on the committee at the time'. I too was active in the ICS around those times and I don't recall any policy which resisted PC's.

You are again choosing to ignore the fact that the details of the returning officer's late reconciliation had not emerged at the time that the statements in question were made. You are operating with 20/20 hindsight - you are not looking at the snapshot of information that was in the public domain at the time that those statements were made.

Your ability to ignore the bits of the evidence that don't suit you would embarrass any real skeptic.

Regards - Shane

williamgrogan

Sir, the fact that you have dragged your Aunty Noreen into this proves you are a cad!

Sorry, I have to go to bed, I operate on French time.

Will respond to the Alice in Wonderland contribution. It is probably the first sensible thing E. has said in months.

PS

Are you in favour of E. Gilmore being thrown out of the Labour Party then?

Victor

Originally posted by williamgrogan
It is essential to the anti-eVoting groups that they obtain evidence that eVoting is unreliable.

Ah, at last a substantial accusation.

If, by your own admission "anti-eVoting" = "pro-VVAT". I think I can honestly say that no pro-VVAT person I have come across *wants* to find errors - they want to be comprehensively reassured that there are no errors.

In my work, in construction, I have dealt with projects of up to about €55m, this sum typically made up of hundreds, if not thousands of individual calculations. To have a paper trail is almost essential, an audit trail is essential (try using a lap-top on the roof of a seven storey building on a rainy, blustery day, complete with spatters of plaster).

Construction is an adversarial business, quite simply because (a) there is a lot of money involved (b) it is legally and technically complicated (c) it draws from many disciplines. These lend themselves to errors occurring and to the parties (i) seeking recompense (ii) exploiting errors.

Now 30-40 years ago a quantity surveyor would have half his staff involved in merely adding, subtracting, multiplying, etc. vast numbers of, well, numbers. Today it's a much leaner operation, centred largely on computers, but not capable of completely escaping paper. My experience over the last ten years is that computers sometimes make errors, but more often that people make errors - they mistype, they misread, they presume and so on. But also, with earlier Pentium computers, you would get things like (I'm not sure if this is actually one) 86*37=3182.000000000001 a little bit like the error one gets from log tables an slide rules where apparently 2*2=4 and a bit.

Some of the time, there are corruptions in transferring from one format to another (e.g. word processor to spreadsheet, where a number might end up as text and while "included" in a total actually isn't)

All this has taught me to be cautious (not necessarily as far as wary) of computers. Is the computer doing what I intended it to do or just what I told it to do? Are all factors accounted for? Is what I intended it to do complete or am I making a fundamental mathematical (as opposed to arithmetic) error?

No, with regard to eVoting, I have yet to be reassured by its sponsors. Yes, they say they have done various tests on various parts. Yes, they have carried out various trials. Yes, no doubt they employ competent people to carry out their work. And this *mostly* reassures me.

However, as the sponsor of the project, the Minister is in the compromised position, much like the doctor in the MMR research case, of wearing two hats at the same time – sponsor of the project and Director of Elections for FF (FF being a party that has proven again and again, that it will abuse trust). That the Lord Mayor was dropped from the stage at the official opening for voicing doubts shows the manner in which the project is being run: “Close Ranks”. That the Minister had to hold a closed press conference and exclude his critics is well questionable in a democracy. Would it perhaps be, as he admitted to the photographers that day be because he himself is computer illiterate?

It is possible that eVoting will benefit FF marginally over other parties, based on anecdotal evidence of a small minority of FF votes inadvertently spoiling their votes. In that case I would welcome eVoting (assuming it won't introduce new methods of exclusion).

Now, the project was developed in a non-transparent manner (as unfortunately are many things in this country), but more than that, it took extreme measures for people to get information out of the Department - information that should have been routinely available. Now, my experience in life has been that if it takes extreme measures to get information from someone, then that someone has *something* to hide.

Further, there is an almost hysterical rejection of VVAT. Now what is there to be hysterical about? Surely the voting process is a relatively straightforward unemotional matter. It’s not like setting off young couple looking for a tax break to buy a house against health care for the elderly, is it? Or do we or don’t we cooperate with the Americans in Iraq? It is a straightforward technical process. All I want is a simple, straightforward explanation of how the system works, what its advantages are, what its weaknesses are, etc. Is this available to me? No. Instead we have a minister who reverts to bluster and name-calling*, again the reserve of a bully and / or someone with something to hide.

Finally, there is an apparently headlong rush into the change over. Now with any major project, one allows time for adequate study, review, comment, etc., to have a reserve, margin, contingencies, built-in redundancy and time to rectify mistakes and most importantly the ability to stand above the project and to say, “No this isn’t good enough”. Now in my experience in construction, I realise that many people** try to push the margins, not by taking a solid base of experience and expanding incrementally, but by excessive experimenting and reinventing the wheel, revolution instead of evolution. All to often it results in heartbreak, delays, cost over-runs, acrimony and an unhappy client. The eVoting project would appear to have too many of those features for me to be comfortable with. Instead, 6 weeks before the nationwide rollout of the project we are buying more machines at it would appear, to be a large multiple of the contract price.

All of the above make me extremely hesitant to put the “Victor stamp of approval” on the current implementation. VVAT would probably make me give that stamp.

* Ironic for the proponents of the project to accuse people of being luddites when their official website has no e-mail contact, they need people to remind them to update their website, they appear not to understand the Gregorian calendar and can’t spell-check or use a map.

** Take this to read that many construction designers are incompetent muppets (aside from being innumerate and dyslexic) out for glory in something that “looks nice” instead of something that works.[size]

williamgrogan

Victor, I agree with nearly everything you say in your last post, except your conclusion.

Your opening comments would indicate that you were going to present evidence that eVoting is unreliable. You didn’t.

I too worked in IT in construction and I agree that the fraud there is awesome.

The EDI company that was tasked with spreading the use of electronic data interchange didn’t have an email address until relatively recently either. I wonder is that why EDI is almost non existent?

Demanding VVAT with eVoting is the same as doing your valuations with the laptop and then repeating them manually with the old “dim” books (Is that what they were called?) just to make sure the programs are OK for evermore?

I’m still waiting on anyone to support the statements of the two TD’s. Do you agree that, “they were economical with the truth”, to use a well known euphemism? It’s not just these two statements but that these are proof of the point I am making that the anti-eVoting lobby are lying by omission and exaggeration just like the anti-MMR people. (Not to mention a certain charity that says thousands of Russian children need de-toxing in Ireland.)

williamgrogan

see how the slanted stories spread.......

http://www.dmeurope.com/default.asp?ArticleID=1541

Is this accurate?

However, a leaked report commissioned by the Irish government uncovered that the Nedap voting machines do not produce an “audit trail”.

Look at the meaning of the word "had" below. Is this true? It sounds like eVoting is now under threat.

The Irish government had planned to deploy these devices (also used by the Dutch) in elections for the European Parliament in June.

Was the information obtained under the freedome of information act, leaked?

However, a leaked report..

When the Luddites win....

http://www.tynetees.tv/_lab/news/news_headlines.asp?newsitemid=6505&type=news

williamgrogan

I didn't know there was a roadshow to demonstrate the new and highly accurate eVoting machines.

see here for towns & dates

http://www.electronicvoting.ie/english/roadshow.html

RainyDay

No reaction to today's events, William - Cat got your tongue?

davros

Clearly the Independent Commission waited for wg to go on holidays before releasing its report

williamgrogan

Nice of you to miss me.

I is on holidays in Memphis, TN. Big Blues event.

I have read the report and will comment. It sounds like they couldn't think of a good reason to shelve it but shelved it anyway just to be on the safe side. Hopefully they won't set up a commission to investigate the reliability of air travel or it will be suspended using the same logic.

PS

I too am waiting on a reply to my question, whether the comments by the two TDs were in effect lies.

ShaneHogan

Originally posted by williamgrogan
I have read the report and will comment. It sounds like they couldn't think of a good reason to shelve it but shelved it anyway just to be on the safe side.

Congratulations, William - this is just your best one yet. One can only assume that the hot sun in Memphis has either gone to your head or is glaring so much on your screen that you couldn't actually read the report. Either that or you display an amazing ability to ignore the facts which you don't like - so much for the importance of skepticism and looking at the hard data.

Just for the record, in case you missed the many, many reasons why this system cannot be implemented,

- The so-called 'security hardened' PC's proved quite easy to break into.
- There has been insufficient integrated end-to-end testing, and none of this testing has been done independently.
- The commission found one bug in the count software (and they had let than two months to review it).
- The actual version of the software intended to be used for the June elections was still not available to the commission for review/testing, so no-one (not you, not me, not Nedap and not Dept of Environment) can speak with any certainty about the reliability of this version.

Looks like it is time to retire gracefully on this one, William....

williamgrogan

I am just back and will reply in detail after I catch up with my work. However, ………

The so-called 'security hardened' PC's proved quite easy to break into.

as easy as a ballot box? Most of the security is human related and is at least as good as the existing security associated with the manual ballot box.

There has been insufficient integrated end-to-end testing, and none of this testing has been done independently.

The Space Shuttle was first launched without end to end testing. End to end testing is just more testing. If the sub systems were tested then all end to end testing does is more testing of the interfaces and a further improvement in reliability from say 99.990% to 99.991%. It is you lot brought up this point. That doesn’t mean that it’s essential. End to end testing was carried out in the “dry run” in the last elections where everyone using the system expressed satisfaction with it. The commission did stress that the software passed all tests and that they had confidence it did record and count the votes accurately.

The commission found one bug in the count software (and they had let than two months to review it).

Minor as I understand it. Do you know what this bug was exactly?

A point that has not been made up to now is that you lot have been saying that from a statistics point of view the software with 200,000 lines of code must contain bugs and I agree. There is however a major point that has not been made. Software can contain thousands of bugs that will never actually cause a problem or if they do the problem will not effect the outcome or if it does it will only effect the outcome in a trivial way or a “cosmetic” bug. Many bugs are omissions of tests for events that will never occur, e.g. maybe there is a bug that means if there are 32767 candidates that the 32767th will not have his vote counted. It is a bug but as there is never going to be 32767 candidates then it will never matter. I think this is a very important point because we are only concerned with bugs that affect the outcome.

The actual version of the software intended to be used for the June elections was still not available to the commission for review/testing, so no-one (not you, not me, not Nedap and not Dept of Environment) can speak with any certainty about the reliability of this version.

It is not necessary or practical to do a total system test after a minor version change in any system, as I am sure you well know.

Finally I am totally opposed to VVAT and my first reading of the report, which I did point out was not a careful study, does not indicate support for VVAT despite overwhelming support from those making the submissions.

ecksor

Originally posted by williamgrogan
Finally I am totally opposed to VVAT [..]

I thought you were opposed to paper.

williamgrogan

I've a foot of f*****g paper on my desk after my trip not to mention 1000 emails. Go away.........



PS

Yes, I have no problem with electronic audit trails I have one in my system.

ecksor

Originally posted by williamgrogan
Yes, I have no problem with electronic audit trails [..]

And you've even said that you'd have sympathy if the campaigners for VVAT were looking for an electronic VVAT, rather than a paper one. Can you provide an example of a non-paper based VVAT that has stood up to scrutiny?

ShaneHogan

Originally posted by williamgrogan
Yes, I have no problem with electronic audit trails I have one in my system.

Any electronic audit trail for an eVoting system is not worth the paper its not written on. Any attack on the vote data simply has to also attack the audit trail.

as easy as a ballot box? Most of the security is human related and is at least as good as the existing security associated with the manual ballot box.

You miss the point. Any attack on a ballot box would impact maybe 1% of the votes of a constituency. It would also be effectively impossible to disguise an attack on a ballot box. If you wanted to 'stuff ballots' or replace the contents of the ballot box, you would need to either know exactly how many votes went into the box originally or have sufficient time to count the papers before replacing them. The chances of doing this undetected given that ballot boxes are under Garda supervision and are frequently checked by the election agents of the candidates and are in the public view once they arrive at the count centre.

By contrast, anyone who gets access to the count centre PC has the entire vote database at their discretion. It would be a relatively straightforward matter to load a piece of attacking software (maybe by popping a CD in the drive and using autorun to activate it - don't even need to touch the keyboard – or by connecting a pen drive to the USB port) which simply updates the vote details in the Access database to ensure that one candidate/party wins. Such an attack (if carried out effectively) would leave no trace – no-one would know that the attack had happened. Hence the huge danger of having an insecure PC controlling the count.

The Space Shuttle was first launched without end to end testing.

Actually, you’ve just sparked a memory of John Craven’s Newsround showing the Shuttle being carried up to height on the back of a specially adapted Jumbo Jet and then ‘set free’ to test its landing capability – Would that count as an end-to-end test? Well, I don’t really know enough about Space Shuttles to comment. I do know that comparisons to Space Shuttles and banking systems are just not relevant.

End to end testing is just more testing. If the sub systems were tested then all end to end testing does is more testing of the interfaces and a further improvement in reliability from say 99.990% to 99.991%.

The example figures that you quote are meaningless. No piece of software developed in this way will ever be 100% accurate, so you will just never know when you are 90% done, or 99% done or 99.99% done. End-to-end testing does a lot more than testing of the interfaces. It tests how the entire holistic system is going to work in the real-life environment. For example, the ‘randomisation’ feature of the IES count software was disabled for all of the unit tests, so no-one really knows ho this works in real life. Proper end-to-end testing would clearly demonstrate the success or failure of this feature. End-to-end testing also serves to test the manual control processes which humans operate around the system For example, the difficulties with the paper forms used by election staff which went unnoticed until the 2002 trails would almost certainly have been picked up by any half-decent end-to-end test. It is patently obvious to any unbiased IT professional that the level of end-to-end testing carried out by the Dept (i.e. run two local authority ward counts through the system, and ignore the differences between the test results and the original manual counts) was grossly inadequate.

It is you lot brought up this point. That doesn’t mean that it’s essential.

Well, it doesn’t really matter what you think or what I think. What really matters is what the CEV thinks – and they clearly thought it important enough to highlight in their report.

End to end testing was carried out in the “dry run” in the last elections where everyone using the system expressed satisfaction with it. The commission did stress that the software passed all tests and that they had confidence it did record and count the votes accurately.

The trial run was a trial run, not a test. No-one knows what votes were entered into the system on that day, so no-one can speak with any authority as to how accurately the votes were counted. We can say that the results were broadly in line with expectations and with the manually-counted constituencies. But ‘broadly in line’ is just not good enough, given the importance of this system to our democracy. No commercial IT system would be installed on this basis (i.e. we didn’t really test all the bits together, but when we ran the first month’s accounts, they were generally in line with what we saw last year). I’d be fired if I attempted to go live with a system on that basis.

There is however a major point that has not been made. Software can contain thousands of bugs that will never actually cause a problem or if they do the problem will not effect the outcome or if it does it will only effect the outcome in a trivial way or a “cosmetic” bug.

It is possible that you are right here. It is also possible that you are wrong here, and that the remaining bugs in the system WILL cause problems and WILL effect the result. No-one knows for sure. What is clear is that the Dept & Nedap have been operating in an ‘iterative’ model, i.e. Nedap fix a few more bugs, Dept & ERS retest, Nedap fix a few more bugs, Dept & ERS retest. As a result, it is clear that they will just never finish – the software will never be 100% complete. There is no sound basis for implementing such a system in this environment.

It is not necessary or practical to do a total system test after a minor version change in any system, as I am sure you well know.

What minor version changes? How have you concluded that the bug fixes they are implementing are minor version changes? Unless you have specific inside information that has not been published elsewhere, you have no basis for this conclusion. Given the fundamental importance of this system, there is no excuse for issuing ‘minor version changes’ two months before the expected go-live date.

my first reading of the report, which I did point out was not a careful study, does not indicate support for VVAT despite overwhelming support from those making the submissions.

The CEV report does not go all out and state that VVAT is mandatory. However, they clearly considered VVAT important enough to be worthy of mention – despite that fact that it falls outside the narrow terms of reference which Cullen gave them. That speaks volumes. It also states that the absence of VVAT significantly raises the bar on the level of testing required. The Dept failed to leap over that particular bar.

You can try & do a King Canute and tell the tide to stop coming in, William – but it just hasn’t worked. The CEV tide has washed away you, Martin Cullen and the guys & gals in the Dept of the Environment.

Regards - Shane

PS Can I ask that in the interests of maintaining a civil debate, you refrain from referring to anyone or any group as ‘you lot’. It is just a bit impolite.

williamgrogan

What with jet lag and a mountain of paper I still don't have time to reply fully but I will.

However now that we have a "surprise" result in India after 700,000,000 voted using eVoting (and I suspect using a relatively primitive eVoting system) how long will it be before this "surprise" result is quoted by a TD in the Dail as evidence of the "many failures of eVoting"?

Victor

Originally posted by williamgrogan
However now that we have a "surprise" result in India after 700,000,000

O_o they were saying only 380m voted earlier.

williamgrogan

I stand corrected, there was in fact 670,000 electors.

I have since listened to RTE's 17:00 news where their reporter in India said the eVoting was a big success and commented that it was odd that a country of a billion people could introduce eVoting and our country with 4 million couldn't.

Apparently DRE's were dropped by parachute into some areas, how's that for end to end testing? Instruction leaflets on what to do were also dropped by plane.

Then again India is a leading software development centre so maybe there are fewer Luddites and old codgers there than here.

RainyDay

Any chance you could give the meaningless broad-brush generalisations a rest, William. There is no comparison between the Irish & the Indian systems. For a start, the Indians paid out about €100 per voting maching, by comparison to the €4k (IIRC) which Minister Cullen was happy to hand over. As Pat Rabbitte said, it's not the indians you have to worry about, it's the cowboys from FF & the Dept of Environment you need to keep an eye on.

williamgrogan

I think calling FF & the Dept of Environment cowboys is a broad generalisation. Don't you?

I think we have one of the most honest civil servants in the world.

So perhaps you could give the broad-brush generalisations a rest.

I had already said "...and I suspect using a relatively primitive eVoting system". Anyway you can't compare prices between India and here, e.g. a software engineer in India gets a fraction of what one is paid here.

RainyDay

Fair cop on the generalisations, William. Can we leave India to one side and focus back a little closer to home.

I was referring specifically to the hardware cost of the machines, not the supporting software. Any good reason why we needed to buy the Rolls Royce of voting machines?

Victor

Originally posted by williamgrogan
I think we have one of the most honest civil servants in the world.

Which one is the honest one?

williamgrogan

I notice that there is almost no mention of any anti-eVoting lobby or pro-VVAT argument in India. That's another similarity with the anti-MMR campaign. The anti-MMR lobby simply doesn't exist in many countries and then in others its big news. The uptake of MMR is very low in Ireland and the UK but very high in most other EU countries.

......... re the Anti-MMR Campaign

Well that's one out of the way!

Consumer Health Digest #04-21
Your Weekly Update of News and Reviews
May 26, 2004
Current # of subscribers: 9,103

IOM debunks alleged vaccine-autism link.

An Institute of Medicine (IOM) expert committee
has concluded that neither thimerosal nor the
measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine are
associated with autism and that the hypotheses
connecting them are not worth further study. The
committee report updates two IOM reports
published in 2001 that found no association but
recommended further research. Since that time,
five large epidemiologic studies conducted in the
United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and
Sweden have found no association between
thimerosal-containing vaccines and autism, and 14
large epidemiologic studies consistently showed
no association between the MMR vaccine and
autism.

I wonder will the UK Independent apologise. How many children will get sick and even become disabled because of its anti-MMR campaign?

dogs

Originally posted by williamgrogan
I notice that there is almost no mention of any anti-eVoting lobby or pro-VVAT argument in India.

You noticed did you ? You're on a lot of Indian tech-lists then ? You swung by on a recent jaunt from your adopted French village to Roches Stores, Cork ?

When you're done with the unfounded, unreferenced statements try google. It's been discussed on mailing lists there, this article mentions at least one of the objectors.

There's not much point me re-stating the technical facts of this. It hasn't worked yet. Let me try some other facts.

• You are a skeptic.
• You participate in democratic elections.
• These elections grant power and privilidge to a select few in our society.
• You grant implicit trust that these people will not abuse that power or privilidge specifically in the mechanism whereby they are elected.
• You grant implicit trust that a system without comprehensive end-to-end testing works as specificied, without error due to technical failure, human error or malicious intent.
• You are a skeptic ?

williamgrogan

Dogs reply to my post does not address the point I made. Instead he tries to slag me off in some way related to personal information I supply. I might add again that I use my name and not the name of another species. (Incidentally I got a reply from Roches Stores & the supplier of the “magnetic reflexology insoles”) and when I have the time will amuse you with it.)

The anti-MMR movement was only active in some countries. In others it simply was not an issue. To me this is evidence of the irrelevance of both “anti” arguments. The same seems to be the case with anti-eVoting. It is a big issue in the USA and Ireland and maybe Australia but nowhere else that I can see. It also seems that in Ireland we picked up the “virus/meme” from the English speaking USA. All this goes back to a few academics in America.

An RTE reporter specifically said that the eVoting had been a big success in India and pointed out that there was an overall acceptance of it. My Google newsalerts has delivered many articles from Indian newspapers and none of them indicates any anti-eVoting movement.

The same system as used here is in use in other EU countries and little or no anti-eVoting seems evident there either. The same incidentally can be said of Nuclear Power. France generates about 75% of its electricity by NP and after living for 6 years in France I saw no evidence of an anti-NP movement. That’s not to say there is none at all but it’s simply not an issue. Here, there are people that would die to stop it.

Its all an illogical fad.

RainyDay

Hi William - Rather than drawing broad-brush conclusions from such lightweight sources as "RTE reporter specifically said that the eVoting had been a big success in India and pointed out that there was an overall acceptance of it", why don't you go back and answer the detailed issues raised earlier, as you promised to do in this post.

williamgrogan

I will, it will take several hours to study the report and reply to it. I don't have several hours to spare at the moment. It is astonishing that as far as I can see no one else including the Government have made a substantial reply to the report or an analysis of it.

How is an RTE reporter who was in India to cover the election and who travelled around monitoring it a "lightweight source"? I would think he was a heavyweight source.

You don't address my point. In India and other EU countries the anti-eVoting lobby is almost non existent. This anti-eVoting “meme” seems almost exclusive to the USA and Ireland. The anti-MMR campaign was the same. So was the anti-GMO campaign. No problem in the USA, big problem in Britain.

Remember, I believe that the over the top reaction to and exaggerated fear of eVoting is Luddism, as is the anti-GMO, the anti-NP, anti-fluoridation and the anti-MMR movements. All share many common traits including an inability to access the actual risk and the consequences of failure. I have just ordered a book about “Great Battles in Technology”, which may throw some light on this issue. The author says that, “the success of technology is related to the determination of its proponents” (and presumably also to the determination of its opponents).

ecksor

As well as not addressing the apparent inconsistencies that I pointed out in my last post on this thread I have to draw attention to:

All share many common traits including an inability to access the actual risk ...

You didn't pursue your risk analysis earlier either once I commented on what I perceived were the shortcomings in your first attempt.

williamgrogan

Some more "lightweight" analysis of the Indian election.

"In praise of electronic voting" from an editorial by The Hindu, an Indian daily

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/NewsStory.aspx?section=Opinion&OID=51940

dogs

Originally posted by williamgrogan
I might add again that I use my name and not the name of another species.

I'm sure there's a Gathering card that covers this...

(Incidentally I got a reply from Roches Stores & the supplier of the “magnetic reflexology insoles”) and when I have the time will amuse you with it.)

Excellent, that is good, there's far too much sympathetic press about magnetic cures already ....and yet people also complain about the risk of cancer from electromagnetic fields from powerlines, microwaves, etc. I'm getting off topic but do post the letter sometime.

The same system as used here is in use in other EU countries

But it's not y'see. It's not the same system by a long way. Australia even went as far as publishing in their code, we've had to make do with two reviews. Government appointed reviews. There would be no bias in selecting who to review the project after sinking in excess of 40 million euros ?

williamgrogan

Interesting New York Time article

If election officials want to convince voters that electronic voting can be trusted, they should be willing to make it at least as secure as slot machines. To appreciate how poor the oversight on voting systems is, it's useful to look at the way Nevada systematically ensures that electronic gambling machines in Las Vegas operate honestly and accurately. Electronic voting, by comparison, is rife with lax procedures, security risks and conflicts of interest.

On a trip last week to the Nevada Gaming Control Board laboratory, in a state office building off the Las Vegas Strip, we found testing and enforcement mechanisms that go far beyond what is required for electronic voting. Among the ways gamblers are more protected than voters .......................

The full article is here

williamgrogan

An interesting article on the negative side of the Precautionery Principle in Spiked.

some extracts

'If everything we did had to be absolutely safe, risk-free, proven to have no adverse outcomes for anyone or anything, we'd never get anywhere. Buildings wouldn't go up, planes wouldn't get off the ground, medical breakthrough would come to a standstill, science would be stifled…. Shall I go on?'

{WG - I might add ... and eVoting}

....

Professor Sir Colin Berry is not a big fan of the 'precautionary principle', the idea that scientists, medical researchers, technologists and just about everybody else these days should err on the side of caution lest they cause harm to human health or the environment. Berry is one of Britain's leading scientists;

....

'Almost no new technology can be assured to be risk-free. If your position is that you don't accept any incremental risk, you are in effect saying no to all new technologies, whether it be a better anaesthetic, a better car, a better aeroplane, a safer environment for children - in fact anything worth having.'

complete article

The reason I bring this up is that it is another similarity between the anti-MMR debate and anti-eVoting.

I have already said that there we can expect some small problems with eVoting but that they will be resolved and the system would evolve. The commission even said they believed that the system would work and also said that deciding to shelve it was easier than proceeding. This is the Precautionary Principle at its negative worst.

A similar argument was made with MMR, because Wakefield claimed their was a small chance of a link between MMR and Autism he suggested stopping the MMR.

PS

I met a radiographer at a function last night who has an Autistic child and she suspected that it might have been caused by MMR. I reassured her it wasn’t. What’s amazing is that radiographer’s are scientifically trained, they are supposed to have a strong Physics background!

I just spotted another related article.

Science, risk and the price of precaution

In the run-up to spiked's conference Panic Attack: Interrogating our obsession with risk, taking place at London's Royal Institution on Friday 9 May, we asked 40 members of the international scientific community to list what significant discoveries and achievements would have been limited or prevented, if science at the time had been governed by the precautionary principle that dominates science today.


Between them, respondents came up with an A-Z of historic achievements that would have been thwarted by the precautionary principle:

here

RainyDay

Originally posted by williamgrogan
The commission even said they believed that the system would work

Please confirm exactly what section/comment from the CEV report you are referring to here?

williamgrogan

On the basis of its investigations and its review of expert reports, submissions received and other relevant information, the Commission has noted the following in relation to the chosen system:

the physical layout of the system is straightforward, contributing to ease of use by both voters and election officials;

the system eliminates many inadvertent voter errors as well as the need for subjective judgment by returning officers;

the system was deployed in pilot tests at previous elections and a referendum in Ireland;

a system designed and manufactured by the same suppliers is in use at elections in the Netherlands and Germany;

testing carried out by experts retained by the Commission on a significant sample of the voting machines deployed to returning officers confirms that the system can accurately and consistently record voter preferences;

testing of the counting software carried out by experts retained by the Commission using voting information from pilot tests during previous elections in Ireland confirms that it accurately counted the votes recorded at these elections;

parallel testing of the counting software program carried out by experts retained by the Commission using a large number of sample data sets and a similar counting programme developed for the Commission confirms that it can accurately count votes in most situations, including unusual or difficult electoral situations;

miniature end-to-end testing of the system carried out by experts retained by the Commission confirms that it can accurately record and count the votes in the context of multiple simultaneous elections;

That's a lot of confirmation!

........

The Commission wishes to emphasise that its conclusion is not based on any finding that the system will not work, but on the finding that it has not been proven at this time to the satisfaction of the Commission that it will work.

Is this not The Precautionary Principal at work?

What the commission said is that, "within the timeframe", they had not been able to satisfy themselves. What “timeframe” is required to be 100% certain, infinity?

Another important type of sentence is, “it is impossible for anyone to certify its accuracy”. Correct. This will always be the case and this is what is meant by over reliance on the Precautionary Principal.

They said that it was easier to say no than yes and even acknowledged this. I think this point is the most important in the report. It can be interpreted as, “we have studied it in detail and tested it, it looks like it will work, it works elsewhere but our gut feeling is to say no.”

Wakefield made the same point as do those that oppose Fluoridation of water, or the anti-GMO movement, we cannot be sure that it won’t cause a problem so do nothing. As a consequence we have an increase in Measles, less food and rotten teeth. Do nothing means no progress and the decision of the commission means at best delayed progress with the move to eVoting. As a consequence of the commission's decision another 2% of the electorate did not have their votes accurately counted in the recent elections.

I wonder if we set up a similar commission and asked them to confirm for a fact that evolution was how life got on earth, what would they say? By their own logic, they would have to say, “well it looks fairly certain but we have to conclude it’s still just a theory.”

I also detect a sense of annoyance that they had great difficulty in getting access to the source code and obviously, relations between the commission and the suppliers were very poor.

I did say that I would accept the report of the commission but I meant that if they said that they had concluded that it won’t work I would accept it. They didn't say that.

They said it would work but couldn’t be sure. How sure is needed?

This is the central point. It would also affect any similar decision, e.g. whether or not Ireland such switch from the environmentally destructive burning of fossil fuel to Nuclear Power. Even among those of you who support NP, could you say that it is 100% safe? No of course not.

Nothing is, and this is another similarity between the anti-eVoting lobby, Luddism and the general anti-technological movement. In the article I quoted above, the point is made that doing nothing, as the commission recommended, can be worse because you are not 100% sure than doing something. In this case 2% of the votes were not counted.

It is of enormous importance to the future of humanity that progress is not hindered by commissions who by their own words take the easy option and do nothing. It's often referred to as “a safe pair of hands”. Safe pairs of hands never achieved anything. I see this as a major problem and one that is getting worse.

PPS

They spelt computer program incorrectly, they spelt it programme.

PS

Just like the Space Shuttle, Cassini, now about to fire its engines and break into Saturn orbit had no end to end testing.

RainyDay

Hi William - I'm starting to get increasingly skeptical about your real commitment to sketicism. Isn't skepticism all about being based on evidence?

Your quotes from the CEV report are all very interesting, but none of them support your earlier comment of "The commission even said they believed that the system would work". This is a forward-looking statement, i.e. predicting a future outcome. The commission never said any such thing. All the statements you quote from the CEV are present or past tense, not future. This is a subtle but important distinction. For a skeptic, I'm really dissapointed that you choose to jump to conclusions which suit your argument, rather than looking at the actual evidence.

These quotes are selective in the extreme. You pulled the 1 page of positive comments from a 28 page report. The other 27 pages are generally negative, just to put it in context.

Another important type of sentence is, “it is impossible for anyone to certify its accuracy”. Correct. This will always be the case and this is what is meant by over reliance on the Precautionary Principal.

This is just ludicrous - Read the 1st half of the sentance which you conveniently omit;

As the software version proposed for use at the forthcoming elections is as yet unknown, it is impossible for anyone to certify its accuracy

The reason why it is impossible to certify its accuracy is not the Precautionary Principal or any other interesting philospical point. It's far more concrete than that. The reason why the CEV found it impossible to certify the accuracy of the system was because it didn't exist at the time of their report. The version of software to cope with the referendum along with the local/euro elections just didn't exist.

Please stick to the facts here.

williamgrogan

It’s amazing that like so many other people holding such views you spent a large part of your last email trying to insult me. I think that always says a lot. I have to be selective, there are 28 pages. I am quite happy to debate every last sentence in it. You ask me to stick to the facts and then say, “I'm starting to get increasingly skeptical about your real commitment to sketicism”. I brought up a perfectly valid line of argument and linked the Precautionary Principle to the recommendation of the commission and rather than admit this is valid you foam at the mouth.

Back to the point.

All software is amended, most systems continuously. I made 500+ changes to my own system in the last 5 years. If I was to do an end to end complete test of my software for every amendment then an amendment would cost at least 50 times as much to do and would never happen.

This is more or less what the report suggests as necessary and this is because of their acceptance of the Precautionary Principle.

The sentence you quoted, “As the software version proposed for use at the forthcoming elections is as yet unknown”, is meaningless in this context. If it meant anything I can also say that the software that any future client of mine purchases from next week on will be unknown.

When a change is made to a system only that part of the system is ever tested unless it’s a very low level change when random tests would be done throughout the system. Only someone who knows nothing about software would demand a total end to end test of a system after every change.

Testing

I think that many people, and it looks like this includes the commission, literally do not know what testing means or implies. If you test something properly and it passes the test that tells you something concrete about what is being tested. They said they did these tests and the software passed. There are issues related to probability here. The software passed the test. The fact that there will be more changes doesn’t mean they can’t say that it is unreliable just that tests about the area changed are necessary and that the increase in unreliability is very small. The man in the street if told that a particular test meant that there was a 99% probability that something was true would still “feel” that it could still go wrong BUT would incorrectly estimate this with a higher probability than is true. The reverse is where people do the lotto and overestimate their chances of winning, if they understood that doing the lotto every week since the last ice age would still leave them with only a 50/50 chance of winning they might stop.

As to this quote, it is impossible for anyone to certify its accuracy, there are computer scientists that believe this to be the case. That eVoting will never be acceptable and they do base this on a philosophical argument. This is Luddism. To refuse a technology because it cannot be made 100% safe is most definitely taking the Precautionary Principle to extremes and if followed generally, and remember many do want this followed to extremes (e.g. anti-vaccination, anti-GMO, anti-NP etc.), then no future progress can be made.

RainyDay

Hi William - There are no real insults in my last post - just statements of fact and a few of my opinions. I'm not foaming anywhere - just pointing out the lack of consistency in your arguements. Are you still claiming that the CEV stated that " they believed that the system would work"?

I'm amused by your statement that "I am quite happy to debate every last sentence in it" - I presume you're a different William Grogan to the WilliamGrogan that I've been asking to respond in detail to the CEV report in detail since 13th May?

Testing is, of course, a question of degrees and professional judgement. It's not just about testing new versions - the CEV report clearly stated that insufficent end-to-end had not been done, even on the earlier versions.

I don't do complete end-to-end testing for minor changes to my systems either (though mind you, my systems don't decide who is going to run the country for the next five years). The CEV took the professional view (based on professional advice) that the significance of the change required to accomodate the referendum along with the other two/three elections was sufficient to justify complete re-testing. Of course, you are entitled to disagree with this view. Fortunately, the CEV don't agree with you.

And testing isn't the entire solution either - even if the system was tested to the nth degree to prove its accuracy under all possible scenarios, there are still huge security & control issues around the proposed solution, i.e. how do we know that the tested version of the software is the version running on the day? how do we prevent direct control over the MS Access database from outside the application?

williamgrogan

I'm amused by your statement that "I am quite happy to debate every last sentence in it" - I presume you're a different William Grogan to the WilliamGrogan that I've been asking to respond in detail to the CEV report in detail since 13th May?

That’s a question of when not whether. I’m busy.

And testing isn't the entire solution either

What was the point of the commission carrying out the tests they did then?

They presumably cost many tens of thousands of Euros. The tests confirmed that the software worked. Then the commission ignored the tests and shelved eVoting. Odd!

If the commission organised the tests then presumably they were not sloppy, useless and “unprofessional” tests but properly structured and carried out. These types of tests do put a certain lower limit on the unreliability of the software. The commission even emphasised that the tests were carried out on a large body of data and on many machines. If you do properly constructed extensive tests on many different machines and they pass then you can use these machines for the purpose they were constructed with a high degree of confidence that they will work. This is a scientific approach. To do the tests and still “not feel” confident is unscientific, humanlike I agree, but unscientific. Of course the commission are not scientists.

Furthermore the anti-eVoting lobby have claimed that the software was badly written and wasn’t properly tested but the testing helped refute those arguments. Even badly constructed software can function perfectly well. A simple top down program while inelegant and maybe hard to maintain can work with 100% accuracy. (I could go a bit further here and state that there are actually “fashions” in programming with certain techniques becoming popular and then in turn being replaced and not necessarily by something better.)

If the software was extensively tested and found to randomly lose 2% of the votes it would have been rejected. But that is the system we now fall back on because of the technological cowardice and “feelings” of the commission.

Here we are getting close to the nub of the problem. If the commission had enough time to do further end-to-end testing and the software passed that too, as I would now be very confident that it would, would that do? Would any amount of testing do? Probably not to the anti-eVoting lobby as no amount of testing will satisfy them. Might satisfy someone from a probability point of view but not overcome people’s “gut feeling” of insecurity. Even the daft VVAT concept with its random parallel counting is just more testing anyway.

If at the end of the day there is the slightest possibility that an error can occur then certain individuals do not want to take the risk – the serious downside of the Precautionary Principle.

The “HUGE security and control issues” are completely refuted by all election officials in the world whose opinion I have read. I have read dozens of comments by election officials in many countries and not one has expressed that this is a problem never mind a HUGE problem. To the best of my knowledge there is not a SINGLE case of such corruption after billions of votes have been cast. I think most people know that to corrupt an electronic voting system is several orders of magnitude more difficult than a manual system. That’s partly why I think eVoting was introduced in India.

All more security will do is decrease the possibility that corruption will occur further. I have no problem with this and would foresee that after future attempts to interfere or more weaknesses are found further security mechanisms would be introduced. However, 100% security is also impossible and non existent in all walks of life. Why should eVoting have 100% security? Demanding it is Luddism. The attempt to hold up technology with unreasonable demands, like a man walking in front of a car with a flag.

PS

It’s interesting that SF got by far the highest increase in votes. If we had voted via eVoting presumably the internet would now be buzzing with the “news” of a surprise result where a party doubled its vote in the first eVoting election in Ireland, a party that has a history of voting irregularities. No doubt that certain TDs would stand up in the Dail and claim this as evidence that eVoting was unreliable as they have done before.

ecksor

Oritinally posted by williamgrogan
Even the daft VVAT concept with its random parallel counting is just more testing anyway.

Whether it's another test or not isn't the point, the point is that it provides a method of audit after the fact. You have admitted that your problem isn't with providing a method of audit, but with the fact that paper is used for it.

So, to repeat my question again:

And you've even said that you'd have sympathy if the campaigners for VVAT were looking for an electronic VVAT, rather than a paper one. Can you provide an example of a non-paper based VVAT that has stood up to scrutiny?

williamgrogan

Can you provide an example of a non-paper based VVAT that has stood up to scrutiny

I am not going to design an Audit sub system for eVoting, unless someone pays me a few hundred grand. Not am I going to spend my time searching for one.

It’s quite obvious how one could construct a second parallel data collection and counting system supplied by say a different company including a second separate encrypted file with raw data that was separately tested and counted after the election. Actually NASA do this with the Shuttle software. Three separate computer systems fly the shuttle and process in parallel running 3 separate suites of software written by 3 separate companies in 3 different continents. I think there is some argument for this with a shuttle but none for a trivial non critical voting system. I might add that with all this overkill re system reliability it was 2 mechanical faults (which could be interpreted as NASA organisational faults) that brought down the shuttle and not a software fault. The same can be said of the Airbus. There have been several fatal crashes but none caused by a software bug. It seems to me that a software bug is unacceptable but a mechanical failure isn’t. In fact anyone supplying software to business can see this. A minor penny error in a computer program causes consternation but in a manual system errors in the thousands are acceptable. I also see it with computerised stock control versus manual stock control.

The systems do have some level of internal audit before and after the voting. The election officials use this as it is.

The reason that VVAT is called for has nothing to do with its stated purpose, it’s called for because paper is tactile and people are used to it. People simply prefer paper to electrons. The fact that those calling for VVAT have not apparently considered electronic audit is in itself proof of this. The clique that support Ms Mercuri are opposed to eVoting and even with VVAT most of them still oppose it which is why I say that it meets no need anyway. Some people and I agree with this, have said that if eVoting needs VVAT then eVoting cannot be acceptable.

Maybe there is no more elaborate non-paper based audit because no one sees a need for it. The election officials don’t and the eVoting companies don’t.

If a non-paper audit system was designed and implemented all it would achieve is an increase in reliability, not a guarantee of 100% security. From what, 99.9% to 99.91%. We always get back to this point. What is the level of security that is acceptable? The Precautionary Principle.

I think normal system testing and implementation by a professional computer company is sufficient and the anti-eVoting lobby think nothing is acceptable. That’s the difference. No amount of testing and nothing short of a complete parallel paper system will satisfy the Luddites. This has always been the case and always will be when new technology is introduced.

In a nutshell many people want 100% security and without it they do not trust technology. 100% security is impossible. Therefore no matter what is done they will not be satisfied.

RainyDay

Hi William - Let me try a 3rd time, as you seem to be ignoring this question - Are you still claiming that the CEV stated that "they believed that the system would work"?

I can't understand why you are worried about a possible CEV spend of tens of thousands in the context of the overall spend of 55 million by Minister Cullen, including several million on the PR campaign. Are you suggesting that the CEV shouldn't have done any testing? You are again being highly selective in your statement that "The tests confirmed that the software worked. Then the commission ignored the tests and shelved eVoting. Odd!" - Don't forget the other CEV findings, i.e. they were unable to test the actual version of the software that would be running in the live environment as it didn't exist at the time, the end-to-end testing which had taken place was deemed to be insufficient, and the absence of a VVAT significantly raises the standards and quality of other system testing that is required.

Again, I'm surprised that as a card-carrying skeptic, you place such confidence in "dozens of comments by election officials in many countries and not one has expressed that this is a problem never mind a HUGE problem". Surely any such comments are purely anecdotal - Did anyone actually ask the election officials the important question? It is just not true to say that "I think most people know that to corrupt an electronic voting system is several orders of magnitude more difficult than a manual system". With the proposed new system, it is possible for an election official to replace the entire vote database with a 'heres one I prepared earlier' using a single 'copy' command, by copying in a new Access .mdb file. It is just not physically possible to attack the entire set of manual votes in this way. Perhaps you can advise us of your proposed solution to this problem?

Just to confirm my position, I'm not against eVoting in principle (though I do have doubts about the value-for-money issue). I am against the proposed Nedap system, simply because I can't see any way that this eVoting system can be safely implemented without a paper audit trail. But I'm open to arguement - if you can advise how one can protect the Access .mdb file, that would be a great start.

ecksor

Originally posted by williamgrogan
I am not going to design an Audit sub system for eVoting, unless someone pays me a few hundred grand. Not am I going to spend my time searching for one.

Or you could merely take the proposed ones I mentioned earlier in this thread, although they're not around long enough yet to have 'stood up to scrutiny'.

It’s quite obvious how one could construct a second parallel data collection and counting system supplied by say a different company including a second separate encrypted file with raw data that was separately tested and counted after the election.

If you won't supply exact details of how exactly this would work then it's not obvious at all, which is why security protocols take so long to gain acceptance.

The reason that VVAT is called for has nothing to do with its stated purpose, it’s called for because paper is tactile and people are used to it. People simply prefer paper to electrons. The fact that those calling for VVAT have not apparently considered electronic audit is in itself proof of this.

Actually, the e-voting research community who are pro-VVAT does spend time investigating electronic audit, as you should know if you'd been reading the links supplied on this thread. Which is why I ask the question, how can you be so sure that there's a good electronic audit mechanism when you can't supply an example that hasn't been around for longer than a couple of years for the purposes of scrutiny.

If a non-paper audit system was designed and implemented all it would achieve is an increase in reliability, not a guarantee of 100% security. From what, 99.9% to 99.91%. We always get back to this point. What is the level of security that is acceptable? The Precautionary Principle.

You're arguing a quantitative risk based analysis again, despite not having presented one for the irish election system or how to go about doing one (you abandoned the attempt on this thread apparently). What assurance do we have that the accuracy is 99% and not 89% ? That's a genuine question which I'd like to see hard evidence in response to.

For the record I'm inclined to believe that the answer is closer to 99% than 89% and probably closer to 100% than 99% , if you assume smooth running of the system. However, I'm not sure how you go about measuring the risk over the course of several election uses assuming, for arguments sake, one failure per million and whether or not it has the potential to destroy voter confidence.

williamgrogan

Are you still claiming that the CEV stated that "they believed that the system would work"?

For the 3rd time.........

Goto{TestedAndWorks}