Philosophy of Science.

Son Goku

I can't really say anything until the discussions gets started. Perhaps somebody could say something about the posts made by Playboy and me in the " Philosophy - A "real" subject??" thread.

Anyway, Discuss.

Sapien

Son Goku wrote:

I can't really say anything until the discussions gets started. Perhaps somebody could say something about the posts made by Playboy and me in the " Philosophy - A "real" subject??" thread.

Anyway, Discuss.

From a skimming of the latter part of the discussion it seems to me that there is very little to be added. It is difficult to explain the nature of the scientific process to those who have not been trained in it - and few scientists are equipped with the epistemological vocabulary to do so. With good reason - scientists have no need of epistemology. The reason science works is that it is above questions of inter-paradigm debate and commensurability. It is as epistemologically robust as any discipline can be - indeed that is what defines, or should define, a science. The philosophy of science is all very interesting, but is for the amusement of philosophers, and the utility of those who wish to explain science to the masses. Scientists themselves will get along just as well without it.

I am no philistine. I indulge in philosophy as much as the next intellectual narcissist. But I place no value on the discussion of the validity of science by philosophers. Ultimately, science cannot be intelligently discussed in any context but the substantive - and only scientists are in a position to do this.

Playboy

Just to pointout b4 we continue that the points of view I am putting accross here ane not mine - they are taken from a number of sources. I am not trying to win a debate, I am just interested in exploring the topic and getting a scientists perspective.

Son Goku wrote:

Initially none, but there is now observationally evidence of black holes.
Strong observational evidence of black holes.
And black holes could very easily have been disproved by observational evidence, so can Dark energy.

Van Frassen puts forward an important distinction between theoritical terms and unobservable entities. He admits that all of our knowledge is theory laden but thinks we can still draw a distinction between observable and unobservable entities. A computer is an example of an observable entity, an electron is unobservable. To see that a computer is a computer obviously requires some knowledge but to see the object itself does not. In anthropocentirc terms, what we can observe unaided is observable that which we cannot is unobservable. Cats, mice and cabbage are all thus observable. Also Planets in far off Galaxies are observable, even though our knowledge of them now is mediated by instrumnets becuase in principle we could observe them if we were close enough. Similar remarks apply to objects in the distant past, like dinosaurs. But DNA, viruses and electrons are unobservable since we can only ever observe or detect them with the aid of instruments. Would we able to observe dark matter and black holes without the aid of instrumnets if we were in close proximity?

Son Goku wrote:

In reality neither of those possibilities really happen.
That cycle has never truely occured in physics.

During the course of developing a paradigm, anomalies and unexplained results will appear. Normally this is just seen as more work for the scientist. If one scientist fails to solve one of these puzzles, then that tells against the scientist, not the paradigm. However, if these problems mount up, without solution, then this can generate a crisis.

During a crisis, scientists stop working on the well-defined puzzles of the paradigm and start to question its fundamental principles. (Is the earth really at the centre of the universe?)

Sometimes these suggestions will produce striking new successes (paradigms as exemplars). This will persuade a group of scientists (usually young men, according to Kuhn) to abandon the old paradigm and adopt a new one. If they continue to have success, they may convert the rest (or most of the rest) of the scientific community. This Kuhn calls a scientific revolution and it involves the replacement of not just of old theories, but old methods for investigating the world and old ways of seeing the world.

Science progresses (or evolves) like this:

paradigm ---> crisis ---> revolution ---> new paradigm

Could you point out the problem in this theory for me and why you think it is incorrect?

Son Goku wrote:

No they don't, they remain the same and woe betide any scientist who attempts to do otherwise.

Paul Feyerabend believed that the search for what was special about science was bound to fail. Either the theory would founder on examples from past science which failed to fit the methodology (inductivism, falsificationism) or would be so open-ended as to exclude nothing (Lakatos).

The only methodology that the great scientists from the past gave adhered to is: anything goes. Feyerabend uses Galileo as a case study.

Galileo and the telescope

Copernican theory predicts that the size of the planet Venus should vary markedly throughout the year as Venus’s distance from the Earth changes. However, when one views Venus with the naked eye, we do not see this variation. The story then usually goes something like this: Galileo showed that when Venus is viewed through the telescope, the expected variation in size is indeed observed thus producing a startling confirmation of Copernicanism.

However, Feyerabend points out, to accept this as a confirmation of Copernicanism one would have to accept that telescopic observations were more accurate than naked-eye observations.

BUT
Telescopic data was known to produce artefacts and distortions. These can be ignored or corrected for in the case of terrestrial observations but we have no such method when we look to the heavens.

Galileo had no theory of the telescope which would allow him to distinguish real objects from mere artefacts.

So Galileo had no rational means of defending telescopic data and thus no way of upholding it as a confirmation of Copernican theory. He uses an unreliable instrument (the telescope) to back up a theory (Copernicanism) we already have reasons to think is refuted.

According to Feyerabend, Galileo prevails not because he respects the canons of methodology or he has a rationally compelling case but because of "his style and his clever techniques of persuasion, because he writes in Italian rather than Latin, and because he appeals to people who are temperamentally opposed to the old ideas and the standards of learning connected with them.” (Against Method, p. 141)

It is important to note that Feyerabend’s work is entitled Against Method, not against science. Galileo is a great scientist because he does not respect any methodological maxims.

Nevertheless, this negative assessment of scientific method leads Feyerabend to the conclusion that science is not special and the apparently special status it has in contemporary society should be challenged. Individuals should be liberated for an uncritical subservience to science in the same way they were liberated from an uncritical acceptance of religion.

Whatever your views on Feyerabend’s ideas about personal freedom, he presents an important challenge to the philosopher of science. A way of putting that challenge which is suggestive is as follows: all methodologies of science are refuted by evidence from history of science. This makes methodology sound a bit like a scientific theory, one which is to be tested against the history of science. Maybe that is the right way to think of it. Maybe philosophy of science can be conducted scientifically.

Could you please exactly explain the scientific method and why you think it has never changed. Also please point any problesm with what you see in the above

Son Guku wrote:

Again, there are a lot of logical reasons to adopt the new paradigm.

How it is that scientific terms get their meanings. What we see is in some sense dependent on what we believe. So we cannot build up meanings from some neutral observation language. All language is infected with theory. A common alternative idea, then, is that the meaning of a term depends upon the place of that term in our overall theory.

For example, consider the game of chess. The term ‘pawn’ refers to a particular kind of piece. What it is to be a pawn is dictated by the rules of chess; that is to say, the kinds of movements that piece is allowed to make and by its relation to other pieces on the board. Similarly, it is claimed that scientific terms get their meanings from the roles they play in the theory. (This is analogous to the functionalist idea that a mental state is what is in virtue of it relation to other mental states, its inputs and outputs.) Think for example how one might teach someone the meaning of the term ‘electromagnetic field’. A firm and precise meaning of that term can only be arrived at by teaching someone a great deal of electromagnetism and the role of the electromagnetic field in that theory.

Transferring this idea to Kuhn we might say that the meaning of theoretical terms is paradigm dependent. When there is a paradigm shift, the theoretical structures change; the methods of inquiry change; the standards of evaluation change. So the Aristotelian means something different by the term ‘planet’ to the Copernican.

Even if the terms seem syntactically and phonetically identical, scientists in different paradigms are speaking different languages. In fact, Kuhn sometimes says they are living in different worlds! Scientists working in rival paradigms have no neutral way to communicate the advantages and disadvantages of their respective theories.

There is one notion of incommensurability that is worrying: the idea that standards of evaluation are paradigm dependent. For example an Aristotelian thinks that naked-eye observations provide the most accurate data of how the world is. After Galileo, a Copernican thinks that telescopic data can provide more accurate information than unaided vision. Kuhn seems to claim that there is no paradigm-transcendent way to decide which is in some objective sense better.

Playboy

Sapien wrote:

It is difficult to explain the nature of the scientific process to those who have not been trained in it - and few scientists are equipped with the epistemological vocabulary to do so.

Is it difficult to explain becuase of the epistemological vocabulary or is it just difficult to explain becuase maybe there really isnt a coherent scientific process or method. You seem to have a great vocabulary Sapien .. why dont you have a go

Sapien wrote:

With good reason - scientists have no need of epistemology. The reason science works is that it is above questions of inter-paradigm debate and commensurability.

They might not need epistemology to carry out their work but do you not think the process of giving meaning and coherence to what scientists do is essential. Science is the leading discipline in our society and I think it is very important that we clarify and explain the methods, role and development of science.

Sapien wrote:

The philosophy of science is all very interesting, but is for the amusement of philosophers, and the utility of those who wish to explain science to the masses. Scientists themselves will get along just as well without it.

I disagree .. I think philosophy of science is for far more than just the amusement of philosophers. Kuhn for example has a Phd in Science (Quantum mechanics afaik) and he seesm to take it fairly seriously. I'm not debating whether or not scientists will get along fine without the philosophy of science. The status of science in our society is important and special. We should take care to examine science from inside and outside the discipline in order make sure that the development of our society is going where we want it to go and not just dragged around at the heal of discipline which has no other purpose than to increase knowledge.

Sapien wrote:

I am no philistine. I indulge in philosophy as much as the next intellectual narcissist. But I place no value on the discussion of the validity of science by philosophers. Ultimately, science cannot be intelligently discussed in any context but the substantive - and only scientists are in a position to do this.

This is quite an elitist attitude then. Philosophers have nothing to contribute to science and science is a law unto itself that those not answer to anyone but itself. Everyone who isnt a scientist but interested in the development of our society can just shove off?

Son Goku

But DNA, viruses and electrons are unobservable since we can only ever observe or detect them with the aid of instruments. Would we able to observe dark matter and black holes without the aid of instruments if we were in close proximity?

A black hole certainly.
Dark Matter is a different matter.(groan!)

It is technically here on Earth, but how we detect it would be the same as how we detect electrons and DNA.
It only interacts in ways which are outside our senses.

paradigm ---> crisis ---> revolution ---> new paradigm

Could you point out the problem in this theory for me and why you think it is incorrect?

To be fair it isn't incorrect, just not the whole story.

We definitely shift and replace old ways of seeing the world and start tackling problems from a new angle when we are in the domain of the new paradigm.
So I will always come at a classical mechanical problem thinking in terms of Lagrangians and Hamiltonians, even though I know Quantum Field Theory governs them ultimately.
I can't think of big systems quantum mechanically, at least not without great effort.

Also even today the biggest area of research in physics is condensed matter physics, which uses quasi-classical effects, even though our most advanced theories are well beyond it.
The paradigm shifts for specialities, but never truly the subject as a whole.

(There is a lot more to this and I might be lacking on the explanations in places.)

Could you please exactly explain the scientific method and why you think it has never changed. Also please point any problems with what you see in the above

It hasn't changed much in the last hundred years at least.
I've read papers from the late 19th century from Heavyside and others and found the community working in a very similar way.
Unfortunately I've don't really have anything else to say.
It hasn't change because Heavyside's paper could be published today and nobody would notice it as odd. (Except perhaps they'd wonder why somebody is talking about vector potentials.)

Transferring this idea to Kuhn we might say that the meaning of theoretical terms is paradigm dependent. When there is a paradigm shift, the theoretical structures change; the methods of inquiry change; the standards of evaluation change. So the Aristotelian means something different by the term ‘planet’ to the Copernican.

Even if the terms seem syntactically and phonetically identical, scientists in different paradigms are speaking different languages. In fact, Kuhn sometimes says they are living in different worlds! Scientists working in rival paradigms have no neutral way to communicate the advantages and disadvantages of their respective theories.

Again, I'll be boring, but this really doesn't happen.
Kuhn makes a convincing case for how it may happen, but I've seen people come together from two extremely different theoretical backgrounds and discuss the merits of their individual theories.
What allows them to communicate like this, I don't know.
Get a String Theorist and one working in loop quantum gravity and they can discuss the merits of background independence or dependence in each others theories.

I've never really met two scientists living in two different worlds.
I don't have an argument for why that’s the case, but it's just an observational fact.;)

What I'm getting at is a lot of these problems aren't really problems.
A very common objection I get from philosophers is that by working on classical mechanics and quantum mechanics at the same time I am preforming a kind of doublethink.

What I'd say is, I know that quantum mechanics is more fundamental, but at this scale classical mechanics encompasses what I'm discussing.
I can talk about momenta and position, because they do exist at this level.

However that isn't to say there aren't interesting philosophical puzzles in physics.
(Gravity and quantum decoherence for one, another would be "What is the Lagrangian?" or my personal favourite "What do the Feynman diagrams mean?")

Sapien

Playboy wrote:

Is it difficult to explain becuase of the epistemological vocabulary or is it just difficult to explain becuase maybe there really isnt a coherent scientific process or method.

Neither. It is difficult to explain because vocabulary of any kind is inherently limited in a way that mathematics is not. Science only has need of words when interfacing with the less efficient aspects of the human mind. To resort to language instantly establishes paradigm.

They might not need epistemology to carry out their work but do you not think the process of giving meaning and coherence to what scientists do is essential.

Fie unto this language of yours! What do you mean by meaning? What do you mean by coherence? Do you mean by these things ethics? That is all I can think that you could meaningfully mean. If it is ethics then this is no discussion at all. Ethics has nothing to do with how science works, but what it is set to work on. Pah!

We should take care to examine science from inside and outside the discipline in order make sure that the development of our society is going where we want it to go and not just dragged around at the heal of discipline which has no other purpose than to increase knowledge.

Again, ethics. Science merely enables. There are no bad genetically targeted viruses, only bad genetically targeted virus wielding people. Let's not.

This is quite an elitist attitude then.

I can afford to be elitist. You're just jealous.

nesf

Sapien wrote:

Fie unto this language of yours! What do you mean by meaning? What do you mean by coherence? Do you mean by these things ethics? That is all I can think that you could meaningfully mean. If it is ethics then this is no discussion at all. Ethics has nothing to do with how science works, but what it is set to work on. Pah!

I think the statement has relvance to an individual understanding or level of comfort with science but science itself, for the most part, doesn't need philosophy to function (though you could argue that it does in areas of uncertainty where a causal agent has not been conclusively identified, i.e. in biology sometimes).

bonkey

Playboy wrote:

Also Planets in far off Galaxies are observable, even though our knowledge of them now is mediated by instrumnets becuase in principle we could observe them if we were close enough. Similar remarks apply to objects in the distant past, like dinosaurs. But DNA, viruses and electrons are unobservable since we can only ever observe or detect them with the aid of instruments. Would we able to observe dark matter and black holes without the aid of instrumnets if we were in close proximity?

Isn't this just using sophistry to form a distinction?

If you will allow qualifies such as "If we lived millions of years ago" (regarding dinosaurs) or "if we were living somewhere in space" (for remote planets etc.), why not also allow qualifiers such as "if we had better eyesight and other inbult mechanisms of detection"?????

It seems like you are drawing an arbitrary distinction beween inferences - the distinction effectively boiling down to "if things were different, this would be directly observable", and you're then deciding what things are allowed to be different bsaed on whether or not you think something counts as observable or not.

In other words, the conclusion appears to be driving the reasoning, rather than the other way around.

However, Feyerabend points out, to accept this as a confirmation of Copernicanism one would have to accept that telescopic observations were more accurate than naked-eye observations.

Correct.

BUT
Telescopic data was known to produce artefacts and distortions.

Also correct.....but tangential. This doesn't preclude the telescopic observations from being more accurate, it simply limits the maximal theoretical increase in accuracy.

Galileo had no theory of the telescope which would allow him to distinguish real objects from mere artefacts.

But using the scientific method (or a precursor thereto), he could conclude that while the telescope was not entirely accurate, it was more accurate then the human eye.

So Galilo had no rational means of defending telescopic data

Yes, he did. Its the same rational means of defending anything else scientific. Observations made match within an acceptable degree of accuracy those which are expected, and those which can later be verifiable. Once one has made a sufficient body of observations, predictions, and verifications, one has a model on which all subsequent behaviour can be based on.

Not only that, but your argument ignores a basic precept of scientific methodology. One predicate of all theories is that a theory stands only as long as the assumptions upon which it is founded are not subsequently shown to be false. This was as true of Galileo's theories as anyone else's.

He uses an unreliable instrument (the telescope) to back up a theory (Copernicanism) we already have reasons to think is refuted.

If its refuted, its no longer a theory. "Reasons to think its refuted" is a non-scientific classification.

You're also ignoring that science is not about truth, but about modelling. A theory is not about telling us absoltues about how things work, but rather about providing a model which will mirror observation within limits.

According to Feyerabend, Galileo prevails not because he respects the canons of methodology or he has a rationally compelling case but because of "his style and his clever techniques of persuasion, because he writes in Italian rather than Latin, and because he appeals to people who are temperamentally opposed to the old ideas and the standards of learning connected with them.” (Against Method, p. 141)

Galileo prevails because time has shown his model to have been correct, within the limits of accuracy available to him.

Galileo is a great scientist because he does not respect any methodological maxims.

You ahve your tense mixed up, and this isn't just pedantry. Feyerabend is making assumptions about whether or not Galileo respected methodological maxims. Galileo isn't doing these things. We can't ask him or observe him. He did them long ago, and we can only look back.

However, it is beyond question that Galileo had at least the basic method that if the best existing model does not match the most reliable observatiosn which can be made, then either the model or the observations (or both) are wrong.

So why did Galileo not throw his telescope out because it didn't amtch the existing model? Well...now we're into the realm of supposition, not science.

Nevertheless, this negative assessment of scientific method leads Feyerabend to the conclusion that science is not special and the apparently special status it has in contemporary society should be challenged.

Individuals should be liberated for an uncritical subservience to science

There is no uncritical subservience in science, except for those who have the misguided belief that science is about truth rather than about modelling.

Whatever your views on Feyerabend’s ideas about personal freedom, he presents an important challenge to the philosopher of science.

No, he doesn't. Not from what I've seen.

He provides a welcome caution against people putting too much faith in the correctness of models beyond the level of surity we should really have in them, but thats about it.

all methodologies of science are refuted by evidence from history of science.

No, they're not. All methodologies of science are reliant on the basic premise that a model (theory) stands and falls on the assumptions upon which it is predicated. How strong those assumptions are is perhaps open to debate, and is often a point overlooked, but there is no refutation of this basic methodology.

Theories, by definition, are never proven. Feyerabend's (what a great name) work is a timely reminder that while we should not lose sight of this, we sometimes do. This, however, is not a failing of the scientific method, but rather of the manner in which fallible humans implement it at times.

How it is that scientific terms get their meanings.

How is it that names get people?

No...really....you're asking the question like I am - the wrong way around. Scientific terms are "coined" to explain meanings, not the other way around. We didn't talk about quanta for years, and then suddenlyu figure out what they are. We found (or theorised about stuff) and coined a term to specifically refer to it.

So the Aristotelian means something different by the term ‘planet’ to the Copernican.

And? Science makes this distinction anyway. If one is referring to "gravity", then context or explicit clarification is required to determine if we are talking about Newtonian, Relativistic, Quantum, Specific, or other form.

Scientists working in rival paradigms have no neutral way to communicate the advantages and disadvantages of their respective theories.

Not so. This would only be true if a scientist was only capable of understanding the meaning of a term under a single paradigm....which is not the case.

If, for example, I talk about digits, are you capable of understanding the two sentences:

1) He stuck his hand in the lawnmower and lost three digits
2) This is a three-digit number.

If you are, then you cannot suggest that terminology cannot be shared across contexts, and that as long as the context is clear there is no confusion about the meaning. Science is no different. One always qualifies (where relevant) which framework a term relates to.

For example an Aristotelian thinks that naked-eye observations provide the most accurate data of how the world is. After Galileo, a Copernican thinks that telescopic data can provide more accurate information than unaided vision. Kuhn seems to claim that there is no paradigm-transcendent way to decide which is in some objective sense better.

Surely this is simple to test?

One can derive a series of tests and determine if :

1) Depending on the situation, either the eye or the telescope will win out.
2) Regardless of the situation, one will always win out
3) Regardless of the situation, the two will always perform equally.

The issue comes in defining what constitutes "better", and the reason there's no objective answer is because there is no objective definition of this subjective term.

jc

Playboy

bonkey wrote:

Isn't this just using sophistry to form a distinction?

If you will allow qualifies such as "If we lived millions of years ago" (regarding dinosaurs) or "if we were living somewhere in space" (for remote planets etc.), why not also allow qualifiers such as "if we had better eyesight and other inbult mechanisms of detection"?????

It seems like you are drawing an arbitrary distinction beween inferences - the distinction effectively boiling down to "if things were different, this would be directly observable", and you're then deciding what things are allowed to be different bsaed on whether or not you think something counts as observable or not.

In other words, the conclusion appears to be driving the reasoning, rather than the other way around.

No. The distinction is more than mere sophistry. You are missing the point of the argument. The distinction is being made between what I can observe directly with my senses versus what I need instruments to observe. There are some problems with the argument though some of which are pointed out in Link 1.

Link 1
Link 2

Bonkey wrote:

Also correct.....but tangential. This doesn't preclude the telescopic observations from being more accurate, it simply limits the maximal theoretical increase in accuracy.

I'm not sure that I fully understand what you are saying here. Could you clarify it a bit more for me please.

Bonkey wrote:

But using the scientific method (or a precursor thereto), he could conclude that while the telescope was not entirely accurate, it was more accurate then the human eye.

This is exactly what is being contended. How does he reliably conclude this? If you think about he actually cant make that assumption becuase the only way of verifying it is through the use of the same instrument.

Bonkey wrote:

Yes, he did. Its the same rational means of defending anything else scientific. Observations made match within an acceptable degree of accuracy those which are expected, and those which can later be verifiable. Once one has made a sufficient body of observations, predictions, and verifications, one has a model on which all subsequent behaviour can be based on.

He had no means of verifying the accuracy of his observations. He was using an unreliable instrument to make observations which fufilled the expectations of his theory. He had no way of verifying the accuracy of these observations and thus no rational means to claim his theory's superiority over the other.

Bonkey wrote:

Not only that, but your argument ignores a basic precept of scientific methodology. One predicate of all theories is that a theory stands only as long as the assumptions upon which it is founded are not subsequently shown to be false. This was as true of Galileo's theories as anyone else's.

Yes Galileo was proven right eventually but at the time what rational reason was there to adopt one paradigm over another?

Bonkey wrote:

If its refuted, its no longer a theory. "Reasons to think its refuted" is a non-scientific classification.

Yes but we are talking philosophy as well as science here and that distinction is necessary.

Bonkey wrote:

You're also ignoring that science is not about truth, but about modelling. A theory is not about telling us absoltues about how things work, but rather about providing a model which will mirror observation within limits.

Where am I ignoring that?

Bonkey wrote:

Galileo prevails because time has shown his model to have been correct, within the limits of accuracy available to him.

Yes but again why adopt the paradigm at the time if the only way of verifying its accuracy is waiting for it to be confirmed in the future?

Bonkey wrote:

You ahve your tense mixed up, and this isn't just pedantry. Feyerabend is making assumptions about whether or not Galileo respected methodological maxims. Galileo isn't doing these things. We can't ask him or observe him. He did them long ago, and we can only look back.

Feyerband is making the assumptions based on the information that Galileo would have had available to him at the time. I think his point is that with the available information Galileo could not respect methodological maxims.

Playboy

bonkey wrote:

However, it is beyond question that Galileo had at least the basic method that if the best existing model does not match the most reliable observatiosn which can be made, then either the model or the observations (or both) are wrong.

But again the whole point of the Galileo example is that he could not prove that when observing the planets that the telescope was the more accurate method.

Bonkey wrote:

There is no uncritical subservience in science, except for those who have the misguided belief that science is about truth rather than about modelling.

There is an unhealthy perception in society though that science = truth. This is not the case and plenty of scientists are happy to let that misconception continue. Some scientists in my experience do in fact believe that science = truth.

Bonkey wrote:

No, they're not. All methodologies of science are reliant on the basic premise that a model (theory) stands and falls on the assumptions upon which it is predicated. How strong those assumptions are is perhaps open to debate, and is often a point overlooked, but there is no refutation of this basic methodology.]

Theories, by definition, are never proven. Feyerabend's (what a great name) work is a timely reminder that while we should not lose sight of this, we sometimes do. This, however, is not a failing of the scientific method, but rather of the manner in which fallible humans implement it at times.

Thats a good and refreshing point.

Bonkey wrote:

How is it that names get people?

No...really....you're asking the question like I am - the wrong way around. Scientific terms are "coined" to explain meanings, not the other way around. We didn't talk about quanta for years, and then suddenlyu figure out what they are. We found (or theorised about stuff) and coined a term to specifically refer to it.

Yes but theoretical entities get their meanings from the role they play in the theory. No atomic theory = no atom. There is no other way to attach meaning to a theoritical entity other than through the theory in which it plays a part.

Bonkey wrote:

And? Science makes this distinction anyway. If one is referring to "gravity", then context or explicit clarification is required to determine if we are talking about Newtonian, Relativistic, Quantum, Specific, or other form.

Incommesurability isnt that simple. Just becuase you clarify that there are different contexts doesnt mean there isnt difficulty in communicating differing concepts of essentially the same entity.

Bonkey wrote:

Not so. This would only be true if a scientist was only capable of understanding the meaning of a term under a single paradigm....which is not the case.

If, for example, I talk about digits, are you capable of understanding the two sentences:

1) He stuck his hand in the lawnmower and lost three digits
2) This is a three-digit number.

If you are, then you cannot suggest that terminology cannot be shared across contexts, and that as long as the context is clear there is no confusion about the meaning. Science is no different. One always qualifies (where relevant) which framework a term relates to.

There is a big difference here though. The example you give of digits is a word that has quite clearly two seperate and distinct meanings. Just to clarify the concept of incommensurability a bit - Link

Kuhn

The idea that scientific paradigms are incommensurable was popularized by the philosopher Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). He wrote that when paradigms change, the world itself changes with them (see esp. Chapter X of this book). According to Kuhn, the proponents of different scientific paradigms cannot make full contact with each other's point of view because they are, as a way of speaking, living in different worlds. Kuhn gave three reasons for this inability:

1. Proponents of competing paradigms have different ideas about the importance of solving various scientific problems, and about the standards that a solution should satisfy.
2. The vocabulary and problem-solving methods that the paradigms use can be different: the proponents of competing paradigms utilize a different conceptual network.
3. The proponents of different paradigms see the world in a different way because of their scientific training and prior experience in research.

In a postscript (1969) to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn added that he thought that incommensurability was, at least in part, a consequence of the role of similarity sets in normal science. Competing paradigms group concepts in different ways, with different similarity relations. According to Kuhn, this causes fundamental problems in communication between proponents of different paradigms. It is difficult to change such categories in one's mind, because the groups have been learned by means of exemplars instead of definitions. This problem cannot be resolved by using a neutral language for communication, since the difference occurs prior to the application of language.


Feyerabend

The philosophy of Paul Feyerabend was also based on the idea of incommensurability to a large extent. Feyerabend argued that frameworks of thought and thus scientific paradigms can be incommensurable for three reasons. His list of reasons is similar to that of Kuhn. However, Feyerabend first presented his notion of incommensurability in 1952 to Karl Popper's LSE seminar. Included in the group was Elizabeth Anscombe, Peter Geach, H.L.A. Hart and Georg Henrik von Wright Briefly put, Feyerabend's notion of incommensurability is as follows:

1. The interpretation of observations is implicitly influenced by theoretical assumptions. It is therefore impossible to describe or evaluate observations independently of theory.
2. Paradigms often have different assumptions about which intellectual and operational scientific methods result in valid scientific knowledge.
3. Paradigms can be based on different assumptions regarding the structure of their domain, which makes it meaningless to compare them in a meaningful way. The adoption of a new theory comes includes and is dependent upon the adoption of new terms. Thus, scientists are using different terms when talking about different theories. Those who hold different, competing theories to be true will be talking over one another, in the sense that they cannot a priori arrive at agreement given two different discourses with two different theoretical language and dictates.

According to Feyerabend, the idea of incommensurability cannot be captured in formal logic, because it is a phenomenon outside of its domain.

Son Goku

Playboy wrote:

Incommesurability isnt that simple. Just becuase you clarify that there are different contexts doesnt mean there isnt difficulty in communicating differing concepts of essentially the same entity.

I don't know if this is an applicable answer or not, but anyway.
Usually all scientists will be well versed in all the contexts and its very clear from the situation which is being discussed. You can't completely rule "a difficulty in communcating differing concepts of essentially the same entity", but again I've never seen it happen in real life.
Classical and Quantum Gravity are blatantly different, as is every different conception of a given entity in Physics and Chemistry.

3. Paradigms can be based on different assumptions regarding the structure of their domain, which makes it meaningless to compare them in a meaningful way. The adoption of a new theory comes includes and is dependent upon the adoption of new terms. Thus, scientists are using different terms when talking about different theories. Those who hold different, competing theories to be true will be talking over one another, in the sense that they cannot a priori arrive at agreement given two different discourses with two different theoretical language and dictates.

This is a very hypothetical problem, again just from my experience in Physics.
Take "TC Superconducting", there are two proposed explanations posited for it. Each expressed in a different theoretical language, yet when two people argue it they don't talk past eachother, both parties are well versed in the language of the other. Nobody will hold either theory to be true, they'll simply have a prefered theory. It isn't really of any importance that the parties arrive at an argreement.

I'll also point out one thing, very few scientists have the Ultra-Popperian view that all Science does is produce better and better models which conform more correctly to experimental results.