P1 :There is at least one true proposition.

Apperception

Background:
I intend to build a consistent philosophical system based on incremental propositions. It would be nice to have keen minds do quality control, but I'll settle for what I can get.

P1 :There is at least one true proposition.

Accepting this is necessary for any rational discussion, since it is the presupposed condition of any logical position.

Possible responses / objections:

1. Disagreement:
Inherently contradictory.

2. Problematic Sceptical Response:
That this proposition may, or may not be true.

=> This position is an example of the subject.

3. Redefinition request:
What is meant by P1?

P1, is nothing more than the necessary condition of the possibility for any proposition to be true.

In this sense it is a postulate of rational dialectics, which must be accepted if any position is to be presented.

Son Goku

Is the "one true proposition", whatever it is, different from P1.
i.e. is P1 the "one true proposition".

If it isn't P1, then what it is doesn't matter, it's a simple existence axiom.

As such maybe something like:

"P1 :There is at least one true proposition aside from P1."

(However I understand my suggestion is self-referential.)

Apperception

Son Goku wrote:

Is the "one true proposition", whatever it is, different from P1.

Normally the "one true proposition" is not P1, but in this case (this position) it just happens to be P1.

P1 is the implicit assumption in any expressed position , made explicit.

Accepting P1 is a formal pre-requisite for any expressed position.

If you wanted to assert that the pyramids are in Egypt, then you have to accept P1 before you can assert it.

If you wanted to assert the the pyramids are in Ireland, then similarly you have to accept P1 before you can assert it.

P1 is a rule of argument, or if you like, a postulate of rational dialectics.

It also means that absolute scepticism can never be argued.

e.g.
"There are no true propositions."
"True propositions are not possible."

P1 excludes the possibility of arguing these.

Note : P1 does not refer to any particular , and so is purely formal.

Professor_Fink

There is of course the possibility that P1 is false, and that you can only make some statement with a high degree of consequence. For example, the pyramids may not still be in egypt (maybe they mysteriously while I was writing this post)! Certainly you can say it with a high level of confidence, just as you can state P1 with a high level of confidence, but it is not necessarily true.

Professor_Fink

I meant to say 'confidence', not 'consequence' above, and 'mysteriously' should have been followed by 'disappeared'. D'oh. Guess I was tired.

davej

You may doubt the validity of a statement such as "the pyramids are in egypt", but doubting P1's validity implicitly (paradoxically) accepts its validity.

You need to assume the position of rationality to take *any* logical position. In order to assume such a position you must accept P1.

In this sense, P1 is not really a claim about what is or is not the case in the world, it's more an assertion about the "form" of rational argument..

davej

Professor_Fink

davej wrote:

You may doubt the validity of a statement such as "the pyramids are in egypt", but doubting P1's validity implicitly (paradoxically) accepts its validity.

You need to assume the position of rationality to take *any* logical position. In order to assume such a position you must accept P1.

In this sense, P1 is not really a claim about what is or is not the case in the world, it's more an assertion about the "form" of rational argument..

davej

That's not strictly true. It is quite possible to extend logic beyond a simple true/false scenario. One good example of this is quantum logic, where statements can be a coherent superposition of true and false.

What I was getting at was that P1 assumes a particular form of logic which may or may not be correct, and as far as we can tell, quantum logic describes our universe far better than classical logic.

davej

Prof_fink - you are confusing different domains of knowledge

What I was getting at was that P1 assumes a particular form of logic which may or may not be correct

In order for this statement you have made to be coherent, you must accept P1 - *regardless* of the content of the statement (i.e. even if the statement is referring to P1's validity).
For example, in the text quoted above you make the assertion "P1 assumes a particular form of logic which may or may not be correct" - you must accept that there is at least one true proposition if we are to take your assertion as being a rational position.

as far as we can tell, quantum logic describes our universe far better than classical logic.

This might be true and we can continue to gather empirical evidence to check, but this is a statement about what may or what may not be the case in the phenomenal world. As I stated in my previous post:

P1 is not really a claim about what is or is not the case in the world, it's more an assertion about the "form" of rational argument

You cannot refute P1. No more than you can deny/disprove that we need language in order to have this debate. The best you can do in either case is remain silent on the issue, in which case both assertions remain unrefuted.

davej

Professor_Fink

I'm not sure I accept that. It is quite possible that like in so many of these discussions the language I use trips me up, but the essence of my arguement is that it is possible to have a setup where no statement is either definetly true or definitely false.

If this is the case, then it is not necessary to accept P1. It may be very likely correct, but not necessarily so. That doesn't stop me from making inferences based on P1, but they will all be subject to a reasonable, but not necessarily correct, assumption that P1 is true.

This is not quite the same as debating whether we need language in order to have this debate, but rather a debate over whether the language used is sufficient to encapsulate all possible arguements.

Offalycool

Various attempts have been made in recent years to state the necessary and sufficient conditions for somebody to know a given proposition. There attempt can be given as such.

(A) S knows that P is true if: (i) P is true.
(ii) S believes P is true.
(iii) S is justified in believing that P is
true

For example, Chisholm has held that the following gives a necessary and sufficient condition of knowledge.

(B) S knows that P is true if: (i) S accepts P.
(ii) S has adequate evidence for P.
(iii) P is true.

Ayer has stated the necessary and sufficient condition of knowledge as follows.

(C)S knows that P is true if: (i) P is true.
(ii) S is sure that P is true, and
(iii) S has the right to be sure that P is true.

(A) Is false, (B) and (C) fail also.

Edit: This is the deduction of Edmund L. Gettier.

Suppose Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. Suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition:

(1) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Smiths evidence for (1) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end get the job, and Smith has counted the coins in Jones’s pocket ten minutes ago.

(2) The proposition entails the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Let’s suppose that Smith connects (1) and (2) and deduces (2) is dependent on (1), or Smith believes Jones will get the job because Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

(3) Smith is clearly justified in believing that (2) is true.

But imagine that unbeknown to Smith, he himself will get the job, not Jones. Also unknown to Smith himself is that he too has ten coins in his pocket.

Proposition (2) through to (1) is true, but not the way Smith envisaged.
(i) (2) is true.
(ii) Smith believes (2) is true;
(iii) and he is justified in believing (2) is
true.

(2) is true purely by virtue that there are ten coins in Smiths pocket, It is however clear that Smith is unaware that (2) is true because he does not know he has ten coins in his pocket. The basis of his belief is that Jones has ten coins in his pocket and the man with ten coins gets the job.