Basis of morality

JC 2K3

Wicknight wrote:

Why organisms?

Is the assertion that life has value over non-life an axiom?

The assertion that "value" exists is an axiom.

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

we have the right of self-defence.

I think the self defence angle is being well explored. The only thing I'd throw in is how self defence is a moral judgement as it is simply my self interest. Presumably, unless I'm absolutely browned off at existence, I'm going to engage in self defence. I wonder if morality is only revealed when it causes someone to do something that cannot be traced back to their own self interest. Otherwise it all seems to come back to justice being the interest of the stronger.

Scofflaw wrote:

I'm not sure those are moral systems - they appear to be legal systems. A legal system requires some form of enforcement, which a moral system does not.

How can personal morality be a social contract?

Certainly I came across those ideas in the context of discussion about the theoretical basis for political authority. I just wonder if there's any other basis for morality than what we collectively deem it to be, and (while I'm not dogmatic at all about this - I'm still exploring the topic and happy to take it where it comes) I would wonder if morality has a meaning outside of a social setting.

I know we hardly want to get lost in academic woolliness. But does morality mean anything more than doing right by other people? (with a possible extention to other life forms, although they are hardly equal partners in the transaction).

Zombrex

JC 2K3 wrote:

The assertion that "value" exists is an axiom.

Well value doesn't exist beyond the value we grant something.

Zombrex

Scofflaw wrote:

Not really - it's more the assumption that non-life has no 'intentions/desires/urges'.

cordially,
Scofflaw

does all life have "intentions/desires/urges"?

Scofflaw

InFront wrote:

Well lets combine both then. Take a country like Angola which is no stranger to famine, overpopulation, HIV and various other disease outbreaks like cholera. I think it has the highest child mortality rate in the world, at about 18%. HIV is at about 4%. Knowing the serious effect the weakest kids in that society are having on humanitarian relief, what is the moral problem posed by killing HIV children at birth? Or imposing abortion? Or imposed sterilisation upon those with HIV/ AIDS? They are a direct danger to the health of others, just like MRSA, and completely dependent upon other organisms.

Interesting. I think the essential questions are "is the desired result better than what will otherwise happen, and is there another way to achieve the desired result without killing?".

There are almost certainly routes around the problems caused by weakened children that do not require killing them. However, if there are not, then it is morally acceptable to kill those children, or impose abortion - sterilisation would be the least bad option, in the absence of a cure for HIV/AIDS.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Scofflaw

Wicknight wrote:

does all life have "intentions/desires/urges"?

I would say so, yes.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

I think the self defence angle is being well explored. The only thing I'd throw in is how self defence is a moral judgement as it is simply my self interest. Presumably, unless I'm absolutely browned off at existence, I'm going to engage in self defence. I wonder if morality is only revealed when it causes someone to do something that cannot be traced back to their own self interest. Otherwise it all seems to come back to justice being the interest of the stronger.

Hmm. If one insists on treating all organisms as having equal rights, it seems hard to say that this is simply the operation of the 'interests of the stronger'.

Schuhart wrote:

Certainly I came across those ideas in the context of discussion about the theoretical basis for political authority. I just wonder if there's any other basis for morality than what we collectively deem it to be, and (while I'm not dogmatic at all about this - I'm still exploring the topic and happy to take it where it comes) I would wonder if morality has a meaning outside of a social setting.

Again, that is to assume that morality applies only to humans. If you do so, then you cannot answer the question "is it immoral/evil to torture an animal to death for fun?".

Schuhart wrote:

I know we hardly want to get lost in academic woolliness. But does morality mean anything more than doing right by other people? (with a possible extention to other life forms, although they are hardly equal partners in the transaction).

For a given value of "other people".

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

Hmm. If one insists on treating all organisms as having equal rights, it seems hard to say that this is simply the operation of the 'interests of the stronger'.

Is self defence meaningful for a weaker creature? If it’s a choice between me and my tape worm, and I decide on grounds of self defence to expel it, does its right to self defence enter the equation at all? I suppose what it amounts to is I don’t see how the assertion of equal rights for all organisms converts into something meaningful.

Another thought coming to mind is just that morality seems to imply choice. Assume we have discovered what morality is for a moment. I can follow it and be good or ignore it and be bad. My tape worm presumably just hangs about in my body soaking up whatever it can without any consciousness of whether this is good or not. So in what sense is it a moral being?

Scofflaw wrote:

Again, that is to assume that morality applies only to humans. If you do so, then you cannot answer the question "is it immoral/evil to torture an animal to death for fun?"

But I suppose what’s on my mind is that morality does largely (and possibly only) apply to humans. In what sense can we answer the question if it’s immoral/evil for a well fed domestic cat to torture an animal to death for fun. What is a moral cat, and how is that morality expressed?

Now, I suppose we can see morality in its application to humans might also involve choices that involve animals and even inanimate objects. Is it moral/evil for me to take more out of the resources of the world around me than I strictly need? But I’d take it that the ultimate reason for asking such questions is the impact on people around me.

Hence, maybe I shouldn’t torture animals for fun because it gives me a mindset that treats people with similar brutality. On the other hand, if torturing animals is therapeutic and spiritually refreshing, and empowers me to spend the rest of my time as a beacon of wholesome goodness to all around me, then presumably I should drown those kittens, and take my time over it.

Scofflaw wrote:

For a given value of "other people".

I don’t understand the point here.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

Is self defence meaningful for a weaker creature? If it’s a choice between me and my tape worm, and I decide on grounds of self defence to expel it, does its right to self defence enter the equation at all? I suppose what it amounts to is I don’t see how the assertion of equal rights for all organisms converts into something meaningful.

You're still thinking in terms of the enforcement of justice! If you choose to beat a mouse to death, you are being immoral. If the mouse defends itself, it is not being immoral. That it will be totally ineffective at doing so is not morally relevant to the question of self-defence.

How does the assertion of equal rights convert into something meaningful for the mouse? The answer would be if the immorality of your actions prevented you either directly or indirectly from committing them - and as far as I know, that's all any system of morality can do.

Schuhart wrote:

Another thought coming to mind is just that morality seems to imply choice. Assume we have discovered what morality is for a moment. I can follow it and be good or ignore it and be bad. My tape worm presumably just hangs about in my body soaking up whatever it can without any consciousness of whether this is good or not. So in what sense is it a moral being?But I suppose what’s on my mind is that morality does largely (and possibly only) apply to humans. In what sense can we answer the question if it’s immoral/evil for a well fed domestic cat to torture an animal to death for fun. What is a moral cat, and how is that morality expressed?

Good question, and I don't know how morality would appear to a cat. I am only seeking, after all, a formal system of morality that is useful to me. I can only act towards the cat as seems best to me, because I don't know how the cat views things.

(By the way, anyone who is not a cat-lover will answer the question for you.)

Schuhart wrote:

Now, I suppose we can see morality in its application to humans might also involve choices that involve animals and even inanimate objects. Is it moral/evil for me to take more out of the resources of the world around me than I strictly need? But I’d take it that the ultimate reason for asking such questions is the impact on people around me.

Well, I'd prefer 'organisms present and future' to 'people'.

Schuhart wrote:

Hence, maybe I shouldn’t torture animals for fun because it gives me a mindset that treats people with similar brutality.

Well, that's a first step. I would assert that you shouldn't torture animals for fun because you have no right to do so, and they have the right for you not to do so.

Schuhart wrote:

On the other hand, if torturing animals is therapeutic and spiritually refreshing, and empowers me to spend the rest of my time as a beacon of wholesome goodness to all around me, then presumably I should drown those kittens, and take my time over it.

Depends, I suppose, on whether you do more good than harm that way, from a strictly utilitarian perspective. It's hard to see how the same argument doesn't apply to torturing children if that's what turns you into Mother Teresa, though.

Schuhart wrote:

I don’t understand the point here.

You insist on viewing morality as applying only to humans, because only humans can apply it. Rather like saying that art only applies to artists, because only artists can apply it.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

If the mouse defends itself, it is not being immoral.

But I suppose what’s on my mind is morality is probably irrelevant to its considerations of its actions (if we’re willing to take a commonsense approach to the mouse’s reasoning powers). You are right to point out that we need to distinguish between what is moral and what is enforceable. But it seems to me that morality becomes something we bestow on mice, not something they partake in themselves. That seems to me to suggest there is an inequality between what morality means for me and what it means for a mouse.

I feel this consideration is present when you say

Scofflaw wrote:

I am only seeking, after all, a formal system of morality that is useful to me.

That seems to make morality a human thing, i.e. the function of morality is to guide individual human actions, including those in relation to other creatures.

Scofflaw wrote:

I would assert that you shouldn't torture animals for fun because you have no right to do so, and they have the right for you not to do so.

I suppose I’d query what the basis of that right is. If torturing the animal is good for me, and not harmful to any other human, what is the animal basing a right on?

Scofflaw wrote:

It's hard to see how the same argument doesn't apply to torturing children if that's what turns you into Mother Teresa, though.

I’d agree, but I think that threshold is already past. You know the kind of moral quandary that people like to pose – you can kill a tyrant, but only by planting a bomb that will also kill his largely blameless wife. Assume we agree the greater good is served by proceeding to kill them both. Then we just get into that George Bernard Shaw type of discussion about the exact price – the best time to plant the bomb is when the tyrant is visiting his wife and their newborn child in a maternity hospital. You’re going to take a few dozen totally innocent newborn children along too. And while he might be a tyrant, he’s not the worse tyrant who ever lived yadda yadda yadda. In principle, there is no difference between that quandary and someone torturing children because it turns them into Mother Teresa – it just the matter of what precise moral benefits justify what precise moral costs.

Scofflaw wrote:

You insist on viewing morality as applying only to humans, because only humans can apply it. Rather like saying that art only applies to artists, because only artists can apply it.

I’m not confident that analogy holds. Art applies to people able to engage with it at some level, even if only as a spectator and even if someone’s engagement is to feel art is a complete waste of time. Are mice even spectators to morality? If you lay poison to get a mouse out of your house, or drug him so that you can move him peacefully to a new home or just decide he has an equal right to share your roof I’m not sure the mouse is any the wiser. Its not that they think morality is a waste of time, either. They simply have no engagement with it (assuming, as above, we’re willing to accept a commonsense view of the intellectual life of mice).

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

But I suppose what’s on my mind is morality is probably irrelevant to its considerations of its actions (if we’re willing to take a commonsense approach to the mouse’s reasoning powers). You are right to point out that we need to distinguish between what is moral and what is enforceable. But it seems to me that morality becomes something we bestow on mice, not something they partake in themselves. That seems to me to suggest there is an inequality between what morality means for me and what it means for a mouse.

The mouses' morality is irrelevant to the morality of your actions.

Schuhart wrote:

I feel this consideration is present when you say. That seems to make morality a human thing, i.e. the function of morality is to guide individual human actions, including those in relation to other creatures.

That's correct.

Schuhart wrote:

I suppose I’d query what the basis of that right is. If torturing the animal is good for me, and not harmful to any other human, what is the animal basing a right on?

In which system of morality? In mine, its right is based on its equality to you. The morality of the animal does not enter the picture.

Schuhart wrote:

I’d agree, but I think that threshold is already past. You know the kind of moral quandary that people like to pose – you can kill a tyrant, but only by planting a bomb that will also kill his largely blameless wife. Assume we agree the greater good is served by proceeding to kill them both. Then we just get into that George Bernard Shaw type of discussion about the exact price – the best time to plant the bomb is when the tyrant is visiting his wife and their newborn child in a maternity hospital. You’re going to take a few dozen totally innocent newborn children along too. And while he might be a tyrant, he’s not the worse tyrant who ever lived yadda yadda yadda. In principle, there is no difference between that quandary and someone torturing children because it turns them into Mother Teresa – it just the matter of what precise moral benefits justify what precise moral costs.

Sure.

Schuhart wrote:

I’m not confident that analogy holds. Art applies to people able to engage with it at some level, even if only as a spectator and even if someone’s engagement is to feel art is a complete waste of time.

OK, let's consider architecture. A person can use architecture without ever 'engaging with it' - stairs go up, wall is here, archi-what?

Schuhart wrote:

Are mice even spectators to morality? If you lay poison to get a mouse out of your house, or drug him so that you can move him peacefully to a new home or just decide he has an equal right to share your roof I’m not sure the mouse is any the wiser. Its not that they think morality is a waste of time, either. They simply have no engagement with it (assuming, as above, we’re willing to accept a commonsense view of the intellectual life of mice).

So, your morality has made no difference to the mouse? Surely not! Depending on your morality, and whether you choose to act morally, it is either dead, moved, or unaffected.

You seem to insist on a reciprocal, or contractual, element in morality - do you have a justification for it? Surely, as you said yourself, we can best judge morality when it does not coincide with personal interests - and a 'reciprocal morality' by its very nature would seem always to coincide with self-interest.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

I think we seem to agree that morality is essentially a human thing (I’m not trying to distort anything you’re saying here – I’m just trying to identify what needs investigation and what can be left behind).The question, as I see it, seems to be whether morality is something that has some kind of objective basis or whether it is simply a human affectation or arbitrary human construct.

Scofflaw wrote:

The mouses' morality is irrelevant to the morality of your actions.

Scofflaw wrote:

In mine, its right is based on its equality to you. The morality of the animal does not enter the picture.

Indeed, but presumably the mouses' ‘morality’, such as it is, is a different kettle of fish to mine. I’m a morality giver, and it’s a morality taker. That suggests that, in the specific context of morality, we are not equal.

That doesn’t necessarily mean I can do what I like with the mouse - in principle a human lacking mental capacity might be said to be in the same boat. But deeming the mouse to have equal rights seems to require explanation. The situation seems more to me that we are deeming lesser creatures to be worthy of protection, not saying that they are equal in any meaningful sense.

I know we can speed past the discussion that might be had about how mice and humans are not equal in the sense of being uniform, just as humans are not equal in the sense of being uniform. But how is this equality manifested that you see bringing in its train moral rights (but presumably not obligations)?

Scofflaw wrote:

OK, let's consider architecture. A person can use architecture without ever 'engaging with it' - stairs go up, wall is here, archi-what?

I’d suggest the person in that situation is using civil engineering, not architecture. Their engagement with architecture is deeming it to be worthless, as with the earlier art example. That's not the same as saying art/architecture is simply utterly beyond them. One the other hand, morality is presumably to mice as time travel is to humans.

Scofflaw wrote:

So, your morality has made no difference to the mouse?

Clearly it makes a difference to the mouse, but its just a morality taker without any knowledge of why its life has been impacted for better or worse by my choices. Its not equal to me in moral terms.

Scofflaw wrote:

Surely, as you said yourself, we can best judge morality when it does not coincide with personal interests - and a 'reciprocal morality' by its very nature would seem always to coincide with self-interest.

I’m not so much saying that morality must be reciprocal, so much as I don’t see a solid basis for it other than whatever we arbitrarily decide it to be. We might well arbitrarily decide that no reciprocation is necessary.

That said, I suppose a standard problem is trying to separate morality out from self interest. I’m mindful of how Mario Puzo’s Godfather is described as always offering his ‘friendship’ first, in situations where he seemed to have no selfish interest, just to develop a comprehensive network of people who owed him favours that might be called in as the need arose. I suppose what we can say is that there’s no reason why a moral act cannot also be good for us personally. But, indeed, we only really ‘see’ morality as a separate phenomenon when it cannot be explained by self interest.

Tar.Aldarion

As once was said(by me?), all life is equally precious, or equally worthless.
Ok, I don't have time to read the thread, but the first page was excellent!

Zillah

Scofflaw wrote:

That someone always has to travel in second class doesn't make them second-class.

If your moral system demands that they, by their nature, much always travel in second class, then I would very much say that thats makes them second class in your system.

Scofflaw

Zillah wrote:

If your moral system demands that they, by their nature, much always travel in second class, then I would very much say that thats makes them second class in your system.

Evidently you would. However, I think you'd need to do more than assert the equivalence.

First - have you ever travelled first-class on a plane? Train? If you haven't, do you think that makes you second-class - in the sense of having a second-class nature, or being a second-class person?

Second - the rights of an organism that attacks to live are not removed. They are opposed by a right of self-defence.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Zillah

Scofflaw wrote:

First - have you ever travelled first-class on a plane? Train? If you haven't, do you think that makes you second-class - in the sense of having a second-class nature, or being a second-class person?

Not a valid comparison. For it to be a valid comparison I would have to have a fundamental aspect of my being make it so that I would always be forced to travel second class, and never ever under any circumstances have the possibility of ever travelling first class, by dictate.

Second - the rights of an organism that attacks to live are not removed. They are opposed by a right of self-defence.

But they are perpetually suspended which is functionally identical to not having them.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

I think we seem to agree that morality is essentially a human thing (I’m not trying to distort anything you’re saying here – I’m just trying to identify what needs investigation and what can be left behind).The question, as I see it, seems to be whether morality is something that has some kind of objective basis or whether it is simply a human affectation or arbitrary human construct.

I wouldn't even be certain that it can be generalised to 'human'. The majority of people seem to live by whatever system was imposed on them when they were small.

Schuhart wrote:

Indeed, but presumably the mouses' ‘morality’, such as it is, is a different kettle of fish to mine. I’m a morality giver, and it’s a morality taker. That suggests that, in the specific context of morality, we are not equal.

Hmm. You've stepped from 'different' to 'non-existent' rather casually there. There isn't really a 'give' or 'take' here - you mean that the mouse (or other human, come to that) benefits from your morality, whether they themselves are moral or not? Isn't that rather the point?

Schuhart wrote:

That doesn’t necessarily mean I can do what I like with the mouse - in principle a human lacking mental capacity might be said to be in the same boat. But deeming the mouse to have equal rights seems to require explanation. The situation seems more to me that we are deeming lesser creatures to be worthy of protection, not saying that they are equal in any meaningful sense.

I know we can speed past the discussion that might be had about how mice and humans are not equal in the sense of being uniform, just as humans are not equal in the sense of being uniform. But how is this equality manifested that you see bringing in its train moral rights (but presumably not obligations)?

No, I am saying that there is no meaningful a priori sense in which they are inferior. If they are not inferior, then they must have rights equal to yours, because there is no reason that they should have less - so, if you are moral, then you must allow others all the rights you claim yourself.

Now, if you claim no rights whatsoever, then you need allow none to others - is that your claim?

Schuhart wrote:

I’d suggest the person in that situation is using civil engineering, not architecture. Their engagement with architecture is deeming it to be worthless, as with the earlier art example. That's not the same as saying art/architecture is simply utterly beyond them.

Then apply the argument to civil engineering, if you prefer. I think you'll find that there are people whom architecture is utterly beyond. There are undoubtedly people who are entirely incapable of scientific thought.

Schuhart wrote:

One the other hand, morality is presumably to mice as time travel is to humans. Clearly it makes a difference to the mouse, but its just a morality taker without any knowledge of why its life has been impacted for better or worse by my choices. Its not equal to me in moral terms.I’m not so much saying that morality must be reciprocal, so much as I don’t see a solid basis for it other than whatever we arbitrarily decide it to be. We might well arbitrarily decide that no reciprocation is necessary.

If you meet a human being who is immoral, or less moral than yourself, the same is true. You will make moral choices, he will not. Are you superior to that person? In such a way that he should have less rights than you? Are you entitled to act immorally towards those who are themselves immoral?

Schuhart wrote:

That said, I suppose a standard problem is trying to separate morality out from self interest. I’m mindful of how Mario Puzo’s Godfather is described as always offering his ‘friendship’ first, in situations where he seemed to have no selfish interest, just to develop a comprehensive network of people who owed him favours that might be called in as the need arose. I suppose what we can say is that there’s no reason why a moral act cannot also be good for us personally. But, indeed, we only really ‘see’ morality as a separate phenomenon when it cannot be explained by self interest.

Indeed.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Scofflaw

Zillah wrote:

Not a valid comparison. For it to be a valid comparison I would have to have a fundamental aspect of my being make it so that I would always be forced to travel second class, and never ever under any circumstances have the possibility of ever travelling first class, by dictate.

Hmm. Yes - the problem arises, however, because the HIV virus is an obligate pathogen on us. I have (a couple of posts back) allowed that those whose existence is entirely dependent on another has enfeebled rights, particularly where that dependence requires doing harm.

Zillah wrote:

But they are perpetually suspended which is functionally identical to not having them.

Functionally, yes. However, de facto is not de juro.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Zillah

Scofflaw wrote:

Hmm. Yes - the problem arises, however, because the HIV virus is an obligate pathogen on us. I have (a couple of posts back) allowed that those whose existence is entirely dependent on another has enfeebled rights, particularly where that dependence requires doing harm.

Right...so some creatures have enfeebled rights. Thats not equal.

Scofflaw

Zillah wrote:

Right...so some creatures have enfeebled rights. Thats not equal.

Well, their inequality arises from a system that states there is no a priori way of determining inequality.

That the system produces inequality is not unacceptable - nor does it demonstrate any incoherence (because it is not an a priori determination). Indeed, in the cases you have chosen that demonstrate this, it would be far more ridiculous if the system continued to insist on exact equality. That the system is then capable of determining them unequal is rather pleasing.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Zillah

I'm not quite sure I understand. Help me out here:

1 - The system of morality you describe has "all organisms are equal" as a founding principle.
2 - The system results in some organisms having perpetually enfeebled rights which leads to them not being equal.

Scofflaw

Zillah wrote:

I'm not quite sure I understand. Help me out here:

1 - The system of morality you describe has "all organisms are equal" as a founding principle.
2 - The system results in some organisms having perpetually enfeebled rights which leads to them not being equal.

The system of morality has "all organisms are equal" as an initial principle, which is based on the assumption that there is no a priori way of determining superiority. It's not an independent assumption.

Following through logically from this, we find that some organisms are not in fact equal. Clearly, the initial principle that all organisms are equal is incorrect.

So, if we feed this back into the system, we derive the idea that there is a class of organisms with enfeebled rights, because they are not equal by virtue of their modus vivendi.

Does this alter the starting assumption that there is no a priori way of determining superiority? No, it doesn't, because it's not a priori - it's derived from the system, and the system asserts only an initial equality.

I assume you see this as contradictory, because there's an assertion of equality, and an assertion of inequality. The latter flows from the former, though - one is a starting assumption, the other is a derived result that means we have to modify our initial assumption.

There are certain types of problem that involve determining the values of a system of interconnected objects - a good example would be determining groundwater potential. Initally, we do not know any of the values. We assume, therefore, initially, that they are equal - even though the solution to the problem will involve the determination of their inequality. This is the same type of problem.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

you mean that the mouse (or other human, come to that) benefits from your morality, whether they themselves are moral or not? Isn't that rather the point?

I also feel some significance comes from the mouse not being moral in any meaningful sense (so long as we are accepting a common sense view of rodent intellectual life). That’s what I mean by morality givers and takes – possibly other words would be better, but I think the picture that we are not equal moral beings is reasonably clear. As I said, it does not automatically follow that the mouse has no rights. Maybe, (purely speculating) because of its very dependence, the mouse should have superior rights to mine. All I’m pointing out is there does seem to be a feature in the mix that suggests mice and humans are not equal in moral terms.

Scofflaw wrote:

Now, if you claim no rights whatsoever, then you need allow none to others - is that your claim?

I think that’s the core of what I’m saying (although I stress I’m not dogmatic – these views are really works-in-progress). Hence the basis of morality would just be a combination of human empathy, which only partly applies to non-humans, and self interest, which also only partly applies to non-humans. I'm not saying that's necessarily a bad thing - we've as much right as a putative god to set down what is a coherent morality. But I wonder if there's anything more to it than that. I don't see where moral rights and obligations come out of physical reality.

However, I would also query the basis on which we state that non-uniform entities have equal moral rights. I can see potential common sense arguments for saying all members of each species have equal rights compared to other members of that species. I can’t, on the face of it, see an argument for saying all species have equal rights. It would seem that species unaware that they have any rights are, necessarily, unequal – just as humans unable to exercise their rights must have them exercised on their behalf. When that lack of awareness is systemic (as Zillah would similarly seem to point out) it must have a relevance to this question of equality. After all, a human lacking mental capacity is a special case. We deem the ‘normal’ human to have such rights and simply extend that to say that a human permanently or temporarily lacking ‘normality’ should not give up their rights. However, a normal mouse will simply lack capacity. Every single one of them. I feel this does have a significance to the question.

The incapacitated human will always have empathy and community self interest to fall back on (assuming that to be the basis of morality) - i.e. a combination of it being upsetting to see a fellow human in trouble and an appreciation that we would all like strangers to be good to us if we find ourselves dependant on their charity. But a stray cat that we find wounded? 'Off to be put down, poor thing, its really a kindness.'

Scofflaw wrote:

Then apply the argument to civil engineering, if you prefer.

If we apply it to civil engineering, then I’m in the clear as in this case the person will be saying ‘damn good idea to have steps here, because I need to go up’. Hence, they are engaging with the engineering.

Scofflaw wrote:

Are you entitled to act immorally towards those who are themselves immoral?

Not necessarily, but surely the point is that immoral people are still moral beings – they’ve just decided to be evil. But a rat that spreads leptospirosis is doing neither good nor evil – it’s just having a wee in the river.

Scofflaw

Essentially, then, your argument is that we need not ascribe equal rights to all creatures, because they are not equally capable of morality.

OK - now this assumes that "moral capability" is, from the point of view of my system, a means of determining superiority a priori.

So, can you prove that moral capability is a "valid basis for determining superiority"?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

we need not ascribe equal rights to all creatures, because they are not equally capable of morality.

That’s probably the key point, as this is the feature that suggests inequality in the moral context. They are objects on which morality acts, and not actors. Humans are (generally) both moral actors and objects on which morality acts. The best we can do for animals is suggest they might qualify for the same rights as incapacitated humans. However, even that seems to stretch the idea of equality as we are saying perfectly healthy mouse = sick human.

Scofflaw wrote:

can you prove that moral capability is a "valid basis for determining superiority"?

I probably can’t prove that moral capability is a valid basis for determining superiority, but it does look reasonable to say its a basis for saying things are not equal - whatever the consequences that flow from that. Bear in mind I'm willing to speculate (although, admittedly, really only speculate) that a mouse’s dependency on humans for morality could be used as an argument that it deserves higher rights than morality ‘givers’.

Now, you can say a moral system should treat all livings things as if they are equal, even if they are not. But I don’t see what that is based on, other than an arbitrary human decision.

I’ve a feeling that, ultimately, this may hinge on whether the Universe comes with an in-built morality that exists even in the absence of humans, in which case our goal is presumably just to discover something that’s already a property of things. Alternatively, maybe morality only exists when humans start saying ‘we really should distinguish between stuff that’s good and stuff that’s bad’, in which case we are inventing rather than discovering. I tend (at present) to go with the idea that morality is something we invent rather than discover.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

Now, you can say a moral system should treat all livings things as if they are equal, even if they are not. But I don’t see what that is based on, other than an arbitrary human decision.

The requirement that we treat everything equally in the matter of rights stems from the lack of a good basis for assigning superiority and inferiority in the matter of rights. In the absence of such a basis, how else can we treat them but as equal?

I don't think the moral capacity of the 'other' is a good basis for determining their rights, as assigned by the person being moral. At best, it's arbitrary - and at worst, it is based on the notion of reciprocality, which collapses morality back into self-interest.

So, as before, how does one justify moral capacity of the other as a basis for me assigning rights to them?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

So, as before, how does one justify moral capacity of the other as a basis for me assigning rights to them?

But capacity seems to have a very direct impact on the assignment of rights. Take a practical example. People deemed to have lost their senses may well be confined against their will. We may deem this to be in their own interests - that we haven't actually deprived them of rights, we are just making the decisions we feel they would make for themselves if rational. But the plain fact of the matter is we only assign direct control to them of the rights we feel they can exercise.

There's also a need to consider the other side of the coin - obligations. What moral obligations can a mouse fulfil? If we find that adults in democracies have a moral obligation to vote, how can that be assigned to mice? If I accuse a rat of spreading plague, how is its moral right to have its side of the case heard to be exercised?

In fact, lack of capacity would seem to make some rights simply irrelevant. So, indeed, it would actually seem to say that humans and other creatures are not equal in moral terms as at least some moral rights require capacity to exercise them and others (possibly all others) would fall to be exercised on behalf of the creatures rather than by them, hence meaning their enjoyment of those rights is unequal as they will only ever experience what we think they want rather than what they want themselves.

PS Just one aside – are we operating on the basis that morality is something humans invent, or something that already exists that we are simply discovering?

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

But capacity seems to have a very direct impact on the assignment of rights. Take a practical example. People deemed to have lost their senses may well be confined against their will. We may deem this to be in their own interests - that we haven't actually deprived them of rights, we are just making the decisions we feel they would make for themselves if rational. But the plain fact of the matter is we only assign direct control to them of the rights we feel they can exercise.

Covered by the derangement clause. In the absence of mental competence, we are obliged to act in the best interests of the person (and society) - because they have rights. Same goes for anything we consider to be mentally incompetent, but that has rights - its possession of rights requires us to act in its best interests as much as we can determine them. In addition, all 'passive' rights (not to be tortured, for example) remain.

Schuhart wrote:

There's also a need to consider the other side of the coin - obligations. What moral obligations can a mouse fulfil? If we find that adults in democracies have a moral obligation to vote, how can that be assigned to mice? If I accuse a rat of spreading plague, how is its moral right to have its side of the case heard to be exercised?

Reciprocity again....or anthropocentrism? It would clearly be foolish to assign mice moral obligations they cannot possibly fulfil. But who has asked us to?

Schuhart wrote:

In fact, lack of capacity would seem to make some rights simply irrelevant. So, indeed, it would actually seem to say that humans and other creatures are not equal in moral terms as at least some moral rights require capacity to exercise them and others (possibly all others) would fall to be exercised on behalf of the creatures rather than by them, hence meaning their enjoyment of those rights is unequal as they will only ever experience what we think they want rather than what they want themselves.

Again, there is no requirement for us to assign rights that cannot be exercised. Nor is this evidence of superior capacity, since there are 'rights' that we could arbitrarily assign to other organisms that cannot be exercised by human beings (not rooting incautiously, perhaps).

Schuhart wrote:

PS Just one aside – are we operating on the basis that morality is something humans invent, or something that already exists that we are simply discovering?

Er, on the basis of the one I posited at the beginning of the thread. I'm pretty sure I made it up. I have no idea where such a discoverable morality could possibly come from.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

its possession of rights requires us to act in its best interests as much as we can determine them.

But surely all we've done is not so much granted them the same rights as us, but granted them rights mediated by us. That might amount to generous moral treatment, but its not equality.

Scofflaw wrote:

Again, there is no requirement for us to assign rights that cannot be exercised. Nor is this evidence of superior capacity, since there are 'rights' that we could arbitrarily assign to other organisms that cannot be exercised by human beings (not rooting incautiously, perhaps).

I suppose this is where I'm getting lost. On the one hand, you are asserting equal rights. On the other, you seem to recognise that the array of rights that we might grant humans would need to be tailored for other creatures. Once there's a need to tailor then surely the 'equality' concept is compromised, because we're acknowledging that the same morality doesn't actually apply or, in other words, moral treatment of other creatures differs from moral treatment of humans - they aren't equal. Whether that inequality implies one to be superior to the other might be debated, and we might still arbitrarily decide to treat other creatures generously. But I don't see how equality can still be asserted.

Scofflaw wrote:

Er, on the basis of the one I posited at the beginning of the thread. I'm pretty sure I made it up. I have no idea where such a discoverable morality could possibly come from.

That's fine.



.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

But surely all we've done is not so much granted them the same rights as us, but granted them rights mediated by us. That might amount to generous moral treatment, but its not equality.I suppose this is where I'm getting lost. On the one hand, you are asserting equal rights. On the other, you seem to recognise that the array of rights that we might grant humans would need to be tailored for other creatures. Once there's a need to tailor then surely the 'equality' concept is compromised, because we're acknowledging that the same morality doesn't actually apply or, in other words, moral treatment of other creatures differs from moral treatment of humans - they aren't equal. Whether that inequality implies one to be superior to the other might be debated, and we might still arbitrarily decide to treat other creatures generously. But I don't see how equality can still be asserted.

Equality!=similarity.

You and I are probably of different heights - which of us is superior? We are probably of different ages - which of us is superior? We may be of different intelligence - which one of us is superior?

You can choose to make moral capacity the basis for discrimination, if you want to. However, you'll never be able to measure it, which makes it rather useless. You can make assumptions - all non-humans are morally incapable, for example - but they're just assumptions about something you can't measure, almost certainly mediated by your own prejudices, which moves the marker from 'useless' to 'probably harmful'. Given you can't measure moral capacity anyway, why not assume that black people have less moral capacity than white?

This is the essence of my argument for an initial assumption of equality being necessary - that there is no valid a priori basis for determining superiority - nothing measurable that is meaningful, and nothing meaningful that is measurable. If you cannot determine superiority, why are you assuming it?

cordially,
Scofflaw