Basis of morality

Zillah

I'm not quite sure I understand. Help me out here:

1 - The system of morality you describe has "all organisms are equal" as a founding principle.
2 - The system results in some organisms having perpetually enfeebled rights which leads to them not being equal.

Scofflaw

Zillah wrote:

I'm not quite sure I understand. Help me out here:

1 - The system of morality you describe has "all organisms are equal" as a founding principle.
2 - The system results in some organisms having perpetually enfeebled rights which leads to them not being equal.

The system of morality has "all organisms are equal" as an initial principle, which is based on the assumption that there is no a priori way of determining superiority. It's not an independent assumption.

Following through logically from this, we find that some organisms are not in fact equal. Clearly, the initial principle that all organisms are equal is incorrect.

So, if we feed this back into the system, we derive the idea that there is a class of organisms with enfeebled rights, because they are not equal by virtue of their modus vivendi.

Does this alter the starting assumption that there is no a priori way of determining superiority? No, it doesn't, because it's not a priori - it's derived from the system, and the system asserts only an initial equality.

I assume you see this as contradictory, because there's an assertion of equality, and an assertion of inequality. The latter flows from the former, though - one is a starting assumption, the other is a derived result that means we have to modify our initial assumption.

There are certain types of problem that involve determining the values of a system of interconnected objects - a good example would be determining groundwater potential. Initally, we do not know any of the values. We assume, therefore, initially, that they are equal - even though the solution to the problem will involve the determination of their inequality. This is the same type of problem.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

you mean that the mouse (or other human, come to that) benefits from your morality, whether they themselves are moral or not? Isn't that rather the point?

I also feel some significance comes from the mouse not being moral in any meaningful sense (so long as we are accepting a common sense view of rodent intellectual life). That’s what I mean by morality givers and takes – possibly other words would be better, but I think the picture that we are not equal moral beings is reasonably clear. As I said, it does not automatically follow that the mouse has no rights. Maybe, (purely speculating) because of its very dependence, the mouse should have superior rights to mine. All I’m pointing out is there does seem to be a feature in the mix that suggests mice and humans are not equal in moral terms.

Scofflaw wrote:

Now, if you claim no rights whatsoever, then you need allow none to others - is that your claim?

I think that’s the core of what I’m saying (although I stress I’m not dogmatic – these views are really works-in-progress). Hence the basis of morality would just be a combination of human empathy, which only partly applies to non-humans, and self interest, which also only partly applies to non-humans. I'm not saying that's necessarily a bad thing - we've as much right as a putative god to set down what is a coherent morality. But I wonder if there's anything more to it than that. I don't see where moral rights and obligations come out of physical reality.

However, I would also query the basis on which we state that non-uniform entities have equal moral rights. I can see potential common sense arguments for saying all members of each species have equal rights compared to other members of that species. I can’t, on the face of it, see an argument for saying all species have equal rights. It would seem that species unaware that they have any rights are, necessarily, unequal – just as humans unable to exercise their rights must have them exercised on their behalf. When that lack of awareness is systemic (as Zillah would similarly seem to point out) it must have a relevance to this question of equality. After all, a human lacking mental capacity is a special case. We deem the ‘normal’ human to have such rights and simply extend that to say that a human permanently or temporarily lacking ‘normality’ should not give up their rights. However, a normal mouse will simply lack capacity. Every single one of them. I feel this does have a significance to the question.

The incapacitated human will always have empathy and community self interest to fall back on (assuming that to be the basis of morality) - i.e. a combination of it being upsetting to see a fellow human in trouble and an appreciation that we would all like strangers to be good to us if we find ourselves dependant on their charity. But a stray cat that we find wounded? 'Off to be put down, poor thing, its really a kindness.'

Scofflaw wrote:

Then apply the argument to civil engineering, if you prefer.

If we apply it to civil engineering, then I’m in the clear as in this case the person will be saying ‘damn good idea to have steps here, because I need to go up’. Hence, they are engaging with the engineering.

Scofflaw wrote:

Are you entitled to act immorally towards those who are themselves immoral?

Not necessarily, but surely the point is that immoral people are still moral beings – they’ve just decided to be evil. But a rat that spreads leptospirosis is doing neither good nor evil – it’s just having a wee in the river.

Scofflaw

Essentially, then, your argument is that we need not ascribe equal rights to all creatures, because they are not equally capable of morality.

OK - now this assumes that "moral capability" is, from the point of view of my system, a means of determining superiority a priori.

So, can you prove that moral capability is a "valid basis for determining superiority"?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

we need not ascribe equal rights to all creatures, because they are not equally capable of morality.

That’s probably the key point, as this is the feature that suggests inequality in the moral context. They are objects on which morality acts, and not actors. Humans are (generally) both moral actors and objects on which morality acts. The best we can do for animals is suggest they might qualify for the same rights as incapacitated humans. However, even that seems to stretch the idea of equality as we are saying perfectly healthy mouse = sick human.

Scofflaw wrote:

can you prove that moral capability is a "valid basis for determining superiority"?

I probably can’t prove that moral capability is a valid basis for determining superiority, but it does look reasonable to say its a basis for saying things are not equal - whatever the consequences that flow from that. Bear in mind I'm willing to speculate (although, admittedly, really only speculate) that a mouse’s dependency on humans for morality could be used as an argument that it deserves higher rights than morality ‘givers’.

Now, you can say a moral system should treat all livings things as if they are equal, even if they are not. But I don’t see what that is based on, other than an arbitrary human decision.

I’ve a feeling that, ultimately, this may hinge on whether the Universe comes with an in-built morality that exists even in the absence of humans, in which case our goal is presumably just to discover something that’s already a property of things. Alternatively, maybe morality only exists when humans start saying ‘we really should distinguish between stuff that’s good and stuff that’s bad’, in which case we are inventing rather than discovering. I tend (at present) to go with the idea that morality is something we invent rather than discover.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

Now, you can say a moral system should treat all livings things as if they are equal, even if they are not. But I don’t see what that is based on, other than an arbitrary human decision.

The requirement that we treat everything equally in the matter of rights stems from the lack of a good basis for assigning superiority and inferiority in the matter of rights. In the absence of such a basis, how else can we treat them but as equal?

I don't think the moral capacity of the 'other' is a good basis for determining their rights, as assigned by the person being moral. At best, it's arbitrary - and at worst, it is based on the notion of reciprocality, which collapses morality back into self-interest.

So, as before, how does one justify moral capacity of the other as a basis for me assigning rights to them?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

So, as before, how does one justify moral capacity of the other as a basis for me assigning rights to them?

But capacity seems to have a very direct impact on the assignment of rights. Take a practical example. People deemed to have lost their senses may well be confined against their will. We may deem this to be in their own interests - that we haven't actually deprived them of rights, we are just making the decisions we feel they would make for themselves if rational. But the plain fact of the matter is we only assign direct control to them of the rights we feel they can exercise.

There's also a need to consider the other side of the coin - obligations. What moral obligations can a mouse fulfil? If we find that adults in democracies have a moral obligation to vote, how can that be assigned to mice? If I accuse a rat of spreading plague, how is its moral right to have its side of the case heard to be exercised?

In fact, lack of capacity would seem to make some rights simply irrelevant. So, indeed, it would actually seem to say that humans and other creatures are not equal in moral terms as at least some moral rights require capacity to exercise them and others (possibly all others) would fall to be exercised on behalf of the creatures rather than by them, hence meaning their enjoyment of those rights is unequal as they will only ever experience what we think they want rather than what they want themselves.

PS Just one aside – are we operating on the basis that morality is something humans invent, or something that already exists that we are simply discovering?

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

But capacity seems to have a very direct impact on the assignment of rights. Take a practical example. People deemed to have lost their senses may well be confined against their will. We may deem this to be in their own interests - that we haven't actually deprived them of rights, we are just making the decisions we feel they would make for themselves if rational. But the plain fact of the matter is we only assign direct control to them of the rights we feel they can exercise.

Covered by the derangement clause. In the absence of mental competence, we are obliged to act in the best interests of the person (and society) - because they have rights. Same goes for anything we consider to be mentally incompetent, but that has rights - its possession of rights requires us to act in its best interests as much as we can determine them. In addition, all 'passive' rights (not to be tortured, for example) remain.

Schuhart wrote:

There's also a need to consider the other side of the coin - obligations. What moral obligations can a mouse fulfil? If we find that adults in democracies have a moral obligation to vote, how can that be assigned to mice? If I accuse a rat of spreading plague, how is its moral right to have its side of the case heard to be exercised?

Reciprocity again....or anthropocentrism? It would clearly be foolish to assign mice moral obligations they cannot possibly fulfil. But who has asked us to?

Schuhart wrote:

In fact, lack of capacity would seem to make some rights simply irrelevant. So, indeed, it would actually seem to say that humans and other creatures are not equal in moral terms as at least some moral rights require capacity to exercise them and others (possibly all others) would fall to be exercised on behalf of the creatures rather than by them, hence meaning their enjoyment of those rights is unequal as they will only ever experience what we think they want rather than what they want themselves.

Again, there is no requirement for us to assign rights that cannot be exercised. Nor is this evidence of superior capacity, since there are 'rights' that we could arbitrarily assign to other organisms that cannot be exercised by human beings (not rooting incautiously, perhaps).

Schuhart wrote:

PS Just one aside – are we operating on the basis that morality is something humans invent, or something that already exists that we are simply discovering?

Er, on the basis of the one I posited at the beginning of the thread. I'm pretty sure I made it up. I have no idea where such a discoverable morality could possibly come from.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

its possession of rights requires us to act in its best interests as much as we can determine them.

But surely all we've done is not so much granted them the same rights as us, but granted them rights mediated by us. That might amount to generous moral treatment, but its not equality.

Scofflaw wrote:

Again, there is no requirement for us to assign rights that cannot be exercised. Nor is this evidence of superior capacity, since there are 'rights' that we could arbitrarily assign to other organisms that cannot be exercised by human beings (not rooting incautiously, perhaps).

I suppose this is where I'm getting lost. On the one hand, you are asserting equal rights. On the other, you seem to recognise that the array of rights that we might grant humans would need to be tailored for other creatures. Once there's a need to tailor then surely the 'equality' concept is compromised, because we're acknowledging that the same morality doesn't actually apply or, in other words, moral treatment of other creatures differs from moral treatment of humans - they aren't equal. Whether that inequality implies one to be superior to the other might be debated, and we might still arbitrarily decide to treat other creatures generously. But I don't see how equality can still be asserted.

Scofflaw wrote:

Er, on the basis of the one I posited at the beginning of the thread. I'm pretty sure I made it up. I have no idea where such a discoverable morality could possibly come from.

That's fine.



.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

But surely all we've done is not so much granted them the same rights as us, but granted them rights mediated by us. That might amount to generous moral treatment, but its not equality.I suppose this is where I'm getting lost. On the one hand, you are asserting equal rights. On the other, you seem to recognise that the array of rights that we might grant humans would need to be tailored for other creatures. Once there's a need to tailor then surely the 'equality' concept is compromised, because we're acknowledging that the same morality doesn't actually apply or, in other words, moral treatment of other creatures differs from moral treatment of humans - they aren't equal. Whether that inequality implies one to be superior to the other might be debated, and we might still arbitrarily decide to treat other creatures generously. But I don't see how equality can still be asserted.

Equality!=similarity.

You and I are probably of different heights - which of us is superior? We are probably of different ages - which of us is superior? We may be of different intelligence - which one of us is superior?

You can choose to make moral capacity the basis for discrimination, if you want to. However, you'll never be able to measure it, which makes it rather useless. You can make assumptions - all non-humans are morally incapable, for example - but they're just assumptions about something you can't measure, almost certainly mediated by your own prejudices, which moves the marker from 'useless' to 'probably harmful'. Given you can't measure moral capacity anyway, why not assume that black people have less moral capacity than white?

This is the essence of my argument for an initial assumption of equality being necessary - that there is no valid a priori basis for determining superiority - nothing measurable that is meaningful, and nothing meaningful that is measurable. If you cannot determine superiority, why are you assuming it?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

Equality!=similarity.

But if you've agreed that mice are just too stupid to exercise some rights and hence are excluded from them, too stupid to take on moral obligations and too stupid to be able to exercise their rights directly, surely the argument that mice and humans are similar in the context of morality is shown to be false?

Hence, its not that I'm assuming superiority. Its just that the flaws of your assertion of equality come to light when we actually try applying it. Hence, it can no longer be maintained that equality must be used in the absence of anything to suggest dissimilarity relevant to the moral context, as dissimilarity is both demonstrated and agreed between us. Hence, the boot moves to the other foot and you need to identify a quality of similarity not readily apparent at present.

What is this quality of similarity that, say, a mouse has that brings them within the scope of human determined morality? I simply don't see it.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

But if you've agreed that mice are just too stupid to exercise some rights and hence are excluded from them, too stupid to take on moral obligations and too stupid to be able to exercise their rights directly, surely the argument that mice and humans are similar in the context of morality is shown to be false?

I'm not trying to assert similarity.

Schuhart wrote:

Hence, its not that I'm assuming superiority. Its just that the flaws of your assertion of equality come to light when we actually try applying it.

You're not attempting to apply equality - you're attempting to apply similarity.

Schuhart wrote:

Hence, it can no longer be maintained that equality must be used in the absence of anything to suggest dissimilarity relevant to the moral context, as dissimilarity is both demonstrated and agreed between us. Hence, the boot moves to the other foot and you need to identify a quality of similarity not readily apparent at present.

I'm not trying to assert similarity.

Schuhart wrote:

What is this quality of similarity that, say, a mouse has that brings them within the scope of human determined morality? I simply don't see it.

I'm not trying to assert similarity.

Schuhart, all you have shown is that mice and men are dissimilar. You now need to argue your way from there to showing that mice and men should be unequal. You have asserted that assumed dissimilarity in moral capabilities is a basis for inequality, but you haven't shown it.

Should human beings with dissimilar moral capabilities be treated differently by the law? If so, why? If not, why not?

somewhat repetitively,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

You have asserted that assumed dissimilarity in moral capabilities is a basis for inequality, but you haven't shown it.

I’m not sure that captures the situation. We’ve both accepted that difference in capability makes certain rights and probably all obligations irrelevant, hence equality in the sense of, well, equality simply doesn’t exist in the moral sphere. In particular, wiping the slate clean of any moral obligations without seeing any equality implications seems rather inexplicable. A dependency relationship can be interpreted in any number of ways, but equality doesn't strike me as one of them without some justification being provided.

What you’re left with is an argument that humans should be benevolent towards other creatures possibly on a similar basis to incapacitated humans, but that’s not equality.

I know you may be feeling a frustration from repetition, but to be honest at my end I do see a flaw in what you've proposed and I don't see your responses addressing it.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

I’m not sure that captures the situation. We’ve both accepted that difference in capability makes certain rights and probably all obligations irrelevant, hence equality in the sense of, well, equality simply doesn’t exist in the moral sphere. In particular, wiping the slate clean of any moral obligations without seeing any equality implications seems rather inexplicable. A dependency relationship can be interpreted in any number of ways, but equality doesn't strike me as one of them without some justification being provided.

What you’re left with is an argument that humans should be benevolent towards other creatures possibly on a similar basis to incapacitated humans, but that’s not equality.

I know you may be feeling a frustration from repetition, but to be honest at my end I do see a flaw in what you've proposed and I don't see your responses addressing it.

I can see that. Interestingly, from my end, all I can see is an assertion of a flaw, not the proof.

Remember that I am only asserting a scheme that I can apply. It is of no interest to me whether the mouse can apply it, or even another human being of different moral capability. This is my moral scheme.

I accept that mice and men are dissimilar, I accept that they are presumably dissimilar in moral capability, I accept that identical rights and obligations do not apply.

However, all that tells me is that I would need to consider what rights and obligations are appropriate for mice as opposed to men. It doesn't tell me that mice have no rights, and appears to provide no basis for such a judgement.

So, to repeat my question - should human beings with dissimilar moral capabilities be considered unequal before the law? If so, why? If not, why not?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

However, all that tells me is that I would need to consider what rights and obligations are appropriate for mice as opposed to men.

I know we may well end up circling again, but this is the very point that causes me a problem. You seem to assume 'appropriate' means the same as 'equal' in this context, whereas I see it as highlighting difference as 'appropriate' will mean different things depending on the context.

If 'appropriate' is being used in a context which is effectively 'you'll be as equal as I mean you to be', then it hardly seems worth the candle. I might deem it equal and appropriate to use animals for painful but useful experiments on grounds that, if the animals had the moral capability that I can exercise on their behalf, they would want to contribute to scientific advancement.

In principle, the same situation may apply to incapacitated humans. Appropriate treatment, but not equal treatment as equal treatment is simply not feasible.

I don't know if it helps, but I have a similar feeling to one I had on the topic of what gender equality means in the context of Islam (or, at least, Islam as seen by persons who post here). Similarly, the view being advanced on the other side was difference didn't mean inequality. If a woman is obliged to submit to her husband that is actually equal for a woman. Now, my own feeling is that a better description of the situation was that, in fact, that interpretation of Islam is really arguing for gender inequality, but with mutual respect.

I think that kind of thinking applies here. You are not really arguing for species equality, because its essentially meaningless. What you are arguing for is a sort of one way respect.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

I know we may well end up circling again, but this is the very point that causes me a problem. You seem to assume 'appropriate' means the same as 'equal' in this context, whereas I see it as highlighting difference as 'appropriate' will mean different things depending on the context.

No, I'm saying that because there is no valid basis for inequality, there is no basis for assuming any organism has no rights if any other organism does. However, because every organism is dissimilar, identical rights are inappropriate.

In the absence of knowing what rights a mouse would choose, all we can do is note what the mouse prefers to avoid - death, pain, starvation/privation - and assert that those are the minimal rights we can ascribe to a mouse.

Schuhart wrote:

If 'appropriate' is being used in a context which is effectively 'you'll be as equal as I mean you to be', then it hardly seems worth the candle. I might deem it equal and appropriate to use animals for painful but useful experiments on grounds that, if the animals had the moral capability that I can exercise on their behalf, they would want to contribute to scientific advancement.

In principle, the same situation may apply to incapacitated humans. Appropriate treatment, but not equal treatment as equal treatment is simply not feasible.

You are, I think, using 'equal' and 'similar' interchangeably.

Schuhart wrote:

I don't know if it helps, but I have a similar feeling to one I had on the topic of what gender equality means in the context of Islam (or, at least, Islam as seen by persons who post here). Similarly, the view being advanced on the other side was difference didn't mean inequality. If a woman is obliged to submit to her husband that is actually equal for a woman. Now, my own feeling is that a better description of the situation was that, in fact, that interpretation of Islam is really arguing for gender inequality, but with mutual respect.

Clearly, the assertion that the woman is subordinate to her husband is a statement of inequality. For a start, it suggests that the basic rights of the woman are subordinate to the basic rights of the man - that killing your wife to prevent infringement of your honour is a morally acceptable outcome, for example.

Schuhart wrote:

I think that kind of thinking applies here. You are not really arguing for species equality, because its essentially meaningless. What you are arguing for is a sort of one way respect.

Well, given that from the beginning I have said that this is my moral system, which I apply to the rest of the universe, the one-wayness would seem to be the case. However, equality in basic rights is far from meaningless.

I am arguing that all species are equal from my point of view, based on the assertions given. All are equally entitled to rights, but in most cases we can only ascribe rights based on presumption. All the rights I have suggested during the discussion are 'passive' rights - the 'right not be xxxxx', because I don't feel we can ascribe others.

So, let's be clear what I am stating: your 'right to life', which is probably the most basic right we can universally ascribe, is not superior to the 'right to life' of a mouse.

Let's take it from there - how does dissimilarity impact the statement above?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

Let's take it from there - how does dissimilarity impact the statement above?

Because the right to life only has meaning within human society, in which mice don't participate in any real sense.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

Because the right to life only has meaning within human society, in which mice don't participate in any real sense.

OK - that doesn't make any sense to me whatsoever. Having a right to life means that if I kill you, that is immoral, yes?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

Having a right to life means that if I kill you, that is immoral, yes?

Assuming you have no justification.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

Assuming you have no justification.

Agreed. We'll leave justification out for the moment.

So, having a right to life means that if I kill you without justification, that is immoral, yes?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Yes, that sound fine.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

Yes, that sound fine.

So, is it more immoral to kill a man, or a mouse?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

So, is it more immoral to kill a man, or a mouse?

The man, as the mouse isn't really encompassed by human morality to the extent of having an equivalent right to life. The man's right to life grows out of the invention of a network of social rights and obligations to which the mouse is not a party. The mouse is, at best, the recipient of some human moral charity.

(As an aside, I was actually trying to think of some bizarre situation where killing a mouse would be worse than killing a man but ended up in the realms of science fiction with a mouse that was the sole source of an antibody that could cure a virulent plague that threatened humanity with extinction.)

Sir Digby Chicken Caesar

what if it was the mouse from American Tail, and the man was hitler

and you were jewish..

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

The man, as the mouse isn't really encompassed by human morality to the extent of having an equivalent right to life. The man's right to life grows out of the invention of a network of social rights and obligations to which the mouse is not a party. The mouse is, at best, the recipient of some human moral charity.

(As an aside, I was actually trying to think of some bizarre situation where killing a mouse would be worse than killing a man but ended up in the realms of science fiction with a mouse that was the sole source of an antibody that could cure a virulent plague that threatened humanity with extinction.)

And there we part company. They are morally equivalent, but one is more palatable and acceptable.

Man's right to life, in your view, grows out of "the invention of a network of social rights and obligations" - a viewpoint which presumably describes the basis of your moral system, which is evidently different from mine.

No offence, but I wasn't asking whether you thought my system of morality was correct, but whether it was coherent, and whether there were any particularly ridiculous logical corollaries. Billions of theists, after all, will point out that the only possible basis of morality is the word of God.

On the other hand, I would be perfectly happy to have you describe how "the invention of a network of social rights and obligations" gives rise to a right to life. Is it not a rather orotund way of saying that we have the rights we are generally agreed to have?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Mordeth wrote:

what if it was the mouse from American Tail, and the man was hitler

Kill both, and let God sort them out?

Damn. I forgot we’re atheists. Guess we’ve to work it out ourselves.

Scofflaw wrote:

Man's right to life, in your view, grows out of "the invention of a network of social rights and obligations" - a viewpoint which presumably describes the basis of your moral system, which is evidently different from mine.

I don’t understand where you see the difference. Recalling what you said back in post 59

Scofflaw wrote:

Schuhart wrote:

: PS Just one aside – are we operating on the basis that morality is something humans invent, or something that already exists that we are simply discovering?

Er, on the basis of the one I posited at the beginning of the thread. I'm pretty sure I made it up. I have no idea where such a discoverable morality could possibly come from.

I took that statement to mean that we both accept that morality is a human invention, as the alternative (to me) seems to be that morality already exists and we need only discover it.

I don’t see how morality exists outside of human society, or how a right to life exists outside it. It’s wrong for you to kill me, as we’re both part of that same society with the same rights and obligations. It’s not wrong for the mouse to kill me, only unfortunate if it does so. Similarly, it’s not wrong if I kill the mouse but if I spent a lot of time seeking out mice with the sole intention of killing them, my sanity might be in question.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

Kill both, and let God sort them out?

Damn. I forgot we’re atheists. Guess we’ve to work it out ourselves.I don’t understand where you see the difference. Recalling what you said back in post 59I took that statement to mean that we both accept that morality is a human invention, as the alternative (to me) seems to be that morality already exists and we need only discover it.

I don’t see how morality exists outside of human society, or how a right to life exists outside it. It’s wrong for you to kill me, as we’re both part of that same society with the same rights and obligations. It’s not wrong for the mouse to kill me, only unfortunate if it does so. Similarly, it’s not wrong if I kill the mouse but if I spent a lot of time seeking out mice with the sole intention of killing them, my sanity might be in question.

Morality is a human invention. I am a human. I have invented a morality. See Post 1.

Or did you mean 'human' in the sense of 'anthropos' - Man, rather than man? I must say I don't agree - one human can invent a morality, which is then applied by that human. If that morality includes in its scope non-human organisms, human society is clearly not a requirement for morality.

Are you quite sure you're not unconsciously operating on the basis that there is such a thing as a 'correct' morality, or correct basis for morality?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

Morality is a human invention. I am a human. I have invented a morality. See Post 1.

Or did you mean 'human' in the sense of 'anthropos' - Man, rather than man? I must say I don't agree - one human can invent a morality, which is then applied by that human. If that morality includes in its scope non-human organisms, human society is clearly not a requirement for morality.

This works fine as caprice. There’s no reason why an individual cannot arbitrarily extend his personal morality to encompass non-humans, in much the same way as Caligula could make his horse a Consul. And if its purely a personal whim, I don’t see any need for third party confirmation.

Scofflaw wrote:

Are you quite sure you're not unconsciously operating on the basis that there is such a thing as a 'correct' morality, or correct basis for morality?

I suppose it depends on what you mean by ‘correct’. I’m certainly open to the idea that morality essentially boils down to an elaborate expression of human sentiment and self interest. If there is a general morality, i.e. a general reason why we should mutually respect each others lives, and not just personal whim, then I can’t see what alternative basis it could have apart from rationalising it as a sort of social contract. That said, I'm absolutely not dogmatic about this. It's just what I feel is probably the case, as best I can figure.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

This works fine as caprice. There’s no reason why an individual cannot arbitrarily extend his personal morality to encompass non-humans, in much the same way as Caligula could make his horse a Consul. And if its purely a personal whim, I don’t see any need for third party confirmation.I suppose it depends on what you mean by ‘correct’. I’m certainly open to the idea that morality essentially boils down to an elaborate expression of human sentiment and self interest. If there is a general morality, i.e. a general reason why we should mutually respect each others lives, and not just personal whim, then I can’t see what alternative basis it could have apart from rationalising it as a sort of social contract. That said, I'm absolutely not dogmatic about this. It's just what I feel is probably the case, as best I can figure.

Heavens - this is like arguing about 'metaphorical' with wolfsbane. What you're essentially saying there is that "personal morality" is a whimsical notion, and that you think there is a 'real morality' which is based on inter-human relationships.

It's nice that you say that you're not dogmatic about it, but everything you've said actually says that you are.

Come on, then - brass tacks: is "personal morality" meaningless?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

Heavens - this is like arguing about 'metaphorical' with wolfsbane.

Do I get the feeling that my drawing a parallel to a discussion on gender equality in Islam struck a bit of raw nerve?

Scofflaw wrote:

What you're essentially saying there is that "personal morality" is a whimsical notion, and that you think there is a 'real morality' which is based on inter-human relationships.

No, I'm saying an arbitrary inclusion of non-humans without a clear justification is whimsical. I'm also saying I'm not sure if there is a 'real morality' that cannot be traced back to human sentiment and self interest, but if there is I cannot see a basis for it other than as a human invention with no more (or less) justification than that implies. But I'm most certainly open to hearing an alternative proposal.

Scofflaw wrote:

It's nice that you say that you're not dogmatic about it, but everything you've said actually says that you are.

Does that 'everything' include the times I've explicitly said that none of what I'm saying is dogmatic, as my thoughts on morality are still a work in progress?

Scofflaw wrote:

Come on, then - brass tacks: is "personal morality" meaningless?

I don't know. All I feel is that you have not yet presented any argument that makes me feel your inclusion of animals is meaningful. I'm not suggesting that there's any obligation on you to explain yourself to my satisfaction, or that its impossible for you to do so. Just that you haven't yet.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

Do I get the feeling that my drawing a parallel to a discussion on gender equality in Islam struck a bit of raw nerve?

Er, no. The parallel would be meaningless to me, I think.

Schuhart wrote:

No, I'm saying an arbitrary inclusion of non-humans without a clear justification is whimsical.

The justification is that there is no basis for excluding them.

To require a justification for including them is a statement that they are initially excluded. What is the basis for that initial exclusion?

Let me draw a parallel for you here, because you're beginning to worry me: imagine that we are in the US in the days of slavery, and I asked you "what justification do you offer for including black slaves in your moral scheme?", what would your answer be? After all, they didn't take part in normal human society, and were generally thought to be morally incapable.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

Er, no. The parallel would be meaningless to me, I think.

Back to playing the ball, then.

Scofflaw wrote:

What is the basis for that initial exclusion?

We've sort of dealt with that. Because they don't form part of the social process that invented morality. Morality didn't arrive down on a plate. God didn't put it into the cosmic mix at the same time that he was fine tuning the Universal constants. Morality came out of humans saying 'what's a good life?' or similar questions. Animals cannot frame such questions, and so are simply excluded from participation in moral questions by their very nature. They can, at best, hope to receive some benevolence from human morality deciding independently to treat them with care.

I haven't seen anything that actually overcomes that point. The only response seems to be to state that individual whim can ignore all that, pretend 'appropriate' means the same as 'equal' and need provide no explanation of why this should be regarded as coherent. However, you then seem dissatisfied at your view being regarded as whim, which puzzles me.

Scofflaw wrote:

Let me draw a parallel for you here, because you're beginning to worry me: imagine that we are in the US in the days of slavery, and I asked you "what justification do you offer for including black slaves in your moral scheme?", what would your answer be? After all, they didn't take part in normal human society, and were generally thought to be morally incapable.

The answer to that is very simple, so there's no need to be worried. The perception that slaves were morally incapable was mistaken. My concern is that you seem to feel that blacks who were enslaved had the same capacity for moral reasoning as mice. This is strange to me.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

Back to playing the ball, then.

Poor misunderstood thing that it is...but the JCSkinnerism is not pleasing.

Schuhart wrote:

We've sort of dealt with that.

To neither of our satisfaction. It seems to be the vital point, so I don't see any option but to thrash it out.

Schuhart wrote:

Because they don't form part of the social process that invented morality.

No, no, no. This assumes that morality must be socially created, which I clearly don't agree with.

It is sheer bunkum to claim that morality only arises from social interaction. A morality invented by one person is exactly as valid as a morality derived from social contract, because aside from anything else, humans without personal morality could not possibly arive at a socially contracted morality.

Schuhart wrote:

Morality didn't arrive down on a plate. God didn't put it into the cosmic mix at the same time that he was fine tuning the Universal constants.

Good. We agree on that. The question then is "where does a system of morality come from?".

Schuhart wrote:

Morality came out of humans saying 'what's a good life?' or similar questions.

And that's your answer, but it doesn't exclude a single human being from inventing a system of morality.

Schuhart wrote:

Animals cannot frame such questions, and so are simply excluded from participation in moral questions by their very nature. They can, at best, hope to receive some benevolence from human morality deciding independently to treat them with care.

Under the conditions you have stated! Not under any others!

Really, Schuhart, this is quite exasperating. You have stated that morality arises from human interaction, and that it therefore excludes non-humans because they cannot take part in that dialogue. Now that's probably consistent, but completely irrelevant.

Schuhart wrote:

I haven't seen anything that actually overcomes that point. The only response seems to be to state that individual whim can ignore all that, pretend 'appropriate' means the same as 'equal' and need provide no explanation of why this should be regarded as coherent. However, you then seem dissatisfied at your view being regarded as whim, which puzzles me.

Arg. You haven't offered any reason whatsoever for your assertion that morality arises only from human interaction! All you've done is assert it - it's as much a whim as my adoption of my system...

You cannot say "there is no universally right morality" and then assert that a morality that does not use the basis you have chosen is incorrect. It doesn't work! You are not following yourself through!

Schuhart wrote:

The answer to that is very simple, so there's no need to be worried. The perception that slaves were morally incapable was mistaken. My concern is that you seem to feel that blacks who were enslaved had the same capacity for moral reasoning as mice. This is strange to me.

Do you know, I had assumed that you wouldn't fall into that particular error. I was clearly wrong, which is a pity. I am pointing out that your decision to exclude non-humans on the basis of "non-participation" applied equally to slaves, and the judgement that "blacks" were morally incapable was as arbitrary as your decision that non-humans are.

Your suggested moral stance, therefore, could never have led to abolition - to my mind, that makes it inferior to mine, which would.

Start from scratch:

1. there is no "objective" system of morality, outside ourselves, waiting for us to discover it like a law of nature
2. therefore, all systems of morality are of human origin
3. therefore, humans can invent moral systems
4. I have invented a moral system

Is this, or is it not, a moral system? If not, why not? Please indicate exactly which.

exasperated,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

You cannot say "there is no universally right morality" and then assert that a morality that does not use the basis you have chosen is incorrect. It doesn't work! You are not following yourself through!

I haven’t said that a morality that does not use the basis I have chosen is incorrect. I’ve said I cannot see any other basis – that is a considerable difference.

Scofflaw wrote:

Your suggested moral stance, therefore, could never have led to abolition - to my mind, that makes it inferior to mine, which would.

Rather a distortion of the situation, don’t you think?

As I understand it, the social contract approach is based on us moving from a notional state of nature into society. It’s not that I personally lived in a state of perpetual war, and then submitted to an absolute monarch ala Thomas Hobbes. It just that's how he would form an argument suggesting that submitting to an absolute monarch is what all right-thinking folk should do. Ditto for Locke’s more reasonable and tranquil state of nature, as a basis for his argument for why we might still find it useful to set down some kind of common agreement.

Hence, your objection is utterly meaningless. Once we identify moral capability in slaves, women, and any other excluded folk they are in – because we recognise the division is artificial. For this to be relevant to animals, we’d have to see that division as artificial too. So, as I said, you are rather left making the argument that a mouse and a black have the same capacity for moral reasoning.

Scofflaw wrote:

Is this, or is it not, a moral system? If not, why not? Please indicate exactly which.

It depends what you mean by ‘moral system’. If the term as you use it means a collection of statements based on individual whim, then certainly you have a moral system. If you expect the moral system to make sense to others then, as far as I can see, you don’t have one yet.

(I’ve a feeling that what you are doing is trying to broaden the definition of ‘moral system’ until it ceases to have meaning – a common technique you’ll have noticed yourself in many religious discussions here. It’s not dissimilar to the process you’ve commented on yourself where the definition of ‘God’ will be made elastic to overcome whatever immediate argument is being used to suggest the concept makes little sense, and afterwards snap back into shape as the deity who delivered this or that holy book.)

stevejazzx

It was only a matter of time until this happened!
Great thread btw.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

I haven’t said that a morality that does not use the basis I have chosen is incorrect. I’ve said I cannot see any other basis – that is a considerable difference.

Indeed. Considerably worse, unfortunately.

However, it does have the advantage, from my point of view, of resolving my exasperation. If you cannot accept the idea of a moral system based on personal invention rather than social contract, then there is little point in arguing the finer details of a moral system based on personal invention!

Schuhart wrote:

Rather a distortion of the situation, don’t you think?

Not at all. A morality based on social contract will find it immensely difficult to move away from accepted social norms - if slavery is an accepted social norm, how does a socially agreed morality overturn that acceptance?

Schuhart wrote:

As I understand it, the social contract approach is based on us moving from a notional state of nature into society. It’s not that I personally lived in a state of perpetual war, and then submitted to an absolute monarch ala Thomas Hobbes. It just that's how he would form an argument suggesting that submitting to an absolute monarch is what all right-thinking folk should do. Ditto for Locke’s more reasonable and tranquil state of nature, as a basis for his argument for why we might still find it useful to set down some kind of common agreement.

That is, once again, a basis for law, not morality. Law, obviously, cannot be based on personal whim (since it ceases to be law in so doing). Law, however, is not morality.

Schuhart wrote:

Hence, your objection is utterly meaningless. Once we identify moral capability in slaves, women, and any other excluded folk they are in – because we recognise the division is artificial.

Not at all. We can give them reduced rights on the basis that they have a reduced moral capacity - exactly as we do with children. How easy is it to argue that, say, women, have a reduced moral capacity? It's enormously easy, if that's what one wishes to believe - because the problem with using moral capacity as a measure is that it isn't one. There is no way of measuring moral capacity that can be universally agreed - it is, if anything, more of a social convention than anything else.

This is what I mean when I say that there is no valid method for determining superiority in moral terms - morality is not quantified.

Imagine, again, a society of theists who allow only reduced rights to atheists. What is their justification? That rejection of God is both evidence of, and leads to, moral incapacity. How do you prove your way out of that? Prove moral capacity in atheists? How exactly, when we're dealing with people who don't want to believe that? You've seen the difficulty we have persuading Creationists of well-established science, but your system would require us to persuade them that something unmeasurable is possessed in full measure by people whose lack of belief 'proves' the diametric opposite.

Schuhart wrote:

For this to be relevant to animals, we’d have to see that division as artificial too. So, as I said, you are rather left making the argument that a mouse and a black have the same capacity for moral reasoning.

Sigh. No, what I'm saying is that we can't measure it, and therefore cannot reliably establish the difference. If you believe that we can measure it, as opposed to simply ascribing it capriciously, please show me how - I'm all ears (well, eyes)!

That we can't measure moral capacity in any reliable and repeatable way makes it a very shaky basis on which to determine inclusion in a moral system - and leaves with no way of determining the difference in moral capacity between a mouse and a man but our own feelings and prejudices. That leaves you unable to persuade a white racist that a black person has the same moral capacity as a white person, or persuade a male chauvinist that women have the same moral capacity as men, because you can't measure it.

I know you will say that the difference in moral capacity between a mouse and a man is 'obvious', but history is littered with such claims - and the racist, and the chauvinist, and the theist, all claim the differences they 'see' are 'obvious'.

Schuhart wrote:

It depends what you mean by ‘moral system’. If the term as you use it means a collection of statements based on individual whim, then certainly you have a moral system. If you expect the moral system to make sense to others then, as far as I can see, you don’t have one yet.

Clearly it doesn't make sense to you, anyway - but perhaps that's because you don't accept personal thought as a basis for moral systems (for reasons that remain somewhat obscure).

Schuhart wrote:

(I’ve a feeling that what you are doing is trying to broaden the definition of ‘moral system’ until it ceases to have meaning – a common technique you’ll have noticed yourself in many religious discussions here. It’s not dissimilar to the process you’ve commented on yourself where the definition of ‘God’ will be made elastic to overcome whatever immediate argument is being used to suggest the concept makes little sense, and afterwards snap back into shape as the deity who delivered this or that holy book.)

Hmm. I've a feeling you're trying to narrow it to the point where only your conception of it can be right...

Personal systems of morality, based entirely on the whim of the person, are perfectly acceptable as moral systems, unless one believes, as you appear to, that they can't be.

Morality is a system for determining what's 'good', and what's 'evil', yes? There are then, to my mind, several general ways of basing such a system:

1. divine fiat (universal) - a book, or priesthood, tells you what God says is right
2. social contract (society) - a common morality is worked out between all persons in society
3. personal whim (individual) - a person works out a morality based on what they feel is wrong or right

The advantage of the first is that it is universal - you need never change your moral stance, since what God says is bad is bad. Unfortunately, it ties the importance of the moral system to it being the eternal truth, while the survival of the religion is actually tied to the social acceptance of that morality. Interpretation will therefore need to change while appearing to remain the same, as we have seen.

The advantage of the second is that it is automatically socially acceptable - and acceptance by society is the final arbiter of any moral system. The disadvantage is that it contains no mechanism for change, if it is the only system in pace - custom dictates morality, morality dictates custom.

The advantage of the third is that it is whimsical - that is, you can use any basis that seems right to you personally, and work logically or capriciously as you see fit. The disadvantage is that it may well create friction between the individual and their society or religion - but that is also the advantage, because this is the source of change in the social morality.

Take a man like Wilberforce the abolitionist, for example. Why did he decide slavery was immoral? Was it the then-current social morality? Clearly not, since that accepted slavery. Was it the Biblical morality? Clearly not, since as we know the Bible condones slavery, and many slave-owners justified their ownership Biblically.

We therefore have a puzzle, in your view - neither of the 'public' sources of morality explain Wilberforce's conviction that slavery was wrong. It therefore comes down to 'personal whim' - a whimsical morality that with some support and a great deal of persistence was imposed on society.

Personal morality is the basis of all morality, and the agent of change in social and religious morality - the leaven in the bread, if you like.

more cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

I know you will say that the difference in moral capacity between a mouse and a man is 'obvious', but history is littered with such claims - and the racist, and the chauvinist, and the theist, all claim the differences they 'see' are 'obvious'.

You are spot on. I see the racist, chauvinist, and theocrat as obviously wrong and don’t feel that their error opens the door to extending moral rights to mice or, for that matter, interesting fossils. What you are suggesting is that if someone makes a mistake, we have to make one as well.

Scofflaw wrote:

Personal morality is the basis of all morality, and the agent of change in social and religious morality - the leaven in the bread, if you like.

I think you’re confusing ‘whim’ with ‘thought’. ‘Whim’ is the PFJ deciding to fight for Stan’s right to have babies. ‘Thought’ is Socrates refusing to accept that he had corrupted the youth of Athens.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

You are spot on. I see the racist, chauvinist, and theocrat as obviously wrong and don’t feel that their error opens the door to extending moral rights to mice or, for that matter, interesting fossils. What you are suggesting is that if someone makes a mistake, we have to make one as well.

Nope. I'm saying that we have no way of distinguishing, except "feelings". You "feel" the theocrat is wrong, but can you prove it?

Schuhart wrote:

I think you’re confusing ‘whim’ with ‘thought’. ‘Whim’ is the PFJ deciding to fight for Stan’s right to have babies. ‘Thought’ is Socrates refusing to accept that he had corrupted the youth of Athens.

Again - how do you objectively distinguish them? Clearly you feel that one is ridiculous, and one is not, but "Schuhart thinks it's silly" is not a great basis for morality either - although, now I come to think of it, it's frequently the basis for religious systems as delivered by a Prophet...

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

You "feel" the theocrat is wrong, but can you prove it?

You know yourself that proof, in the final analysis, really just amounts to deciding that something is very improbable. So, yes, as we know there are arguments that suggest very strongly that a person would be wrong in believing that this or that God had handed us a book. It really just hinges on how ludicrous we’re willing to let things get. If we want, we can remove your first assumption in the OP and just operate on the basis that none of this is real and I’m imagining it all.

(In which case, I’m imagining that you are wrong. And very, very smelly.)

Scofflaw wrote:

Clearly you feel that one is ridiculous, and one is not, but "Schuhart thinks it's silly" is not a great basis for morality either - although, now I come to think of it, it's frequently the basis for religious systems as delivered by a Prophet...

In fairness, it’s not only down to me saying it’s silly. I just see a big leap between ‘equal’ and ‘appropriate’, and not filling that gap makes me feel what you are saying is whim. Pulling out George Bernard Shaw again, once we say ‘appropriate’ it becomes a matter of how low can you go.

And intellectual capacity isn’t the only thing that creates that gap. Is it rational to see a big need for me not to step on a spider, if his mate is just going to eat him? Say we accept animal life to be more perilous than ours, do we equally accept one of those perils to be medical research by humans? I just feel the contention that animals be given moral equality in the absence of any argument to the contrary runs out of steam fairly quickly, because there are actually reasonable arguments that need answering.

The principle needs justification. It’s simply not self-evident.

Scofflaw

I have this feeling that you're really not answering my questions. I'm equally sure that's not deliberate, so one or the other of us currently has a firm grasp on the wrong end of the stick.

Schuhart wrote:

You know yourself that proof, in the final analysis, really just amounts to deciding that something is very improbable. So, yes, as we know there are arguments that suggest very strongly that a person would be wrong in believing that this or that God had handed us a book. It really just hinges on how ludicrous we’re willing to let things get.

That's a yes, then - you can't measure it, and you're simply hoping I'll agree.

Schuhart wrote:

If we want, we can remove your first assumption in the OP and just operate on the basis that none of this is real and I’m imagining it all.

Well, yes - that's the nature of an assumption. Buddhists would tend to agree with you, rather than me - and I don't claim that Buddhists are therefore immoral, so clearly it's possible to build an effective moral system on that basis as well.

Have you been operating on the assumption that I think the system I propose is a universal system? That it is right? That it is the only and exclusive system of morality? Absolutely not so.

Schuhart wrote:

(In which case, I’m imagining that you are wrong. And very, very smelly.)

Actually, I'm not at most fragrant right this instant, although 'smelly' is stretching it a bit.

Schuhart wrote:

In fairness, it’s not only down to me saying it’s silly. I just see a big leap between ‘equal’ and ‘appropriate’, and not filling that gap makes me feel what you are saying is whim. Pulling out George Bernard Shaw again, once we say ‘appropriate’ it becomes a matter of how low can you go.

And intellectual capacity isn’t the only thing that creates that gap. Is it rational to see a big need for me not to step on a spider, if his mate is just going to eat him? Say we accept animal life to be more perilous than ours, do we equally accept one of those perils to be medical research by humans? I just feel the contention that animals be given moral equality in the absence of any argument to the contrary runs out of steam fairly quickly, because there are actually reasonable arguments that need answering.

The principle needs justification. It’s simply not self-evident.

I seem to have keep repeating this - the basis for equality is purely and simply that there is no good basis for inequality.

When I say a good basis, I mean an objective, measurable, repeatable basis. Your judgements of moral capacity are subjective, as are mine, so neither are trustworthy.

In the absence of a good basis, we can treat them either (a) arbitrarily unequally, or (b) arbitrarily equally. Unequally seems immediately more "sensible", but we rapidly run into the problem of deciding exactly where on a scale everything comes. You can lump ('all humans equally capable'), or split('some humans more capable than others'), but every single judgement you make is arbitrary and discriminatory, even if you pretend to have some method of measurement (phrenology, maybe?).

You "know", and I "know", that there are differences, that organisms are not equal - but we cannot determine by how much, because we are just operating on our "feelings", subjectively, with no objective system of measurement. We can go nowhere from the decision that things are unequal that does not involve arbitrary decisions.

Until you can provide a repeatable, objective system of determining moral capacity (or any other measure you wish to use to determine inequality), you're simply exercising your prejudices.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

That's a yes, then - you can't measure it, and you're simply hoping I'll agree.

More just acknowledging that uncertainty is present in any statement. I’d actually pretty much stick by what I said already, and avoid just repeating it again.

Scofflaw wrote:

Have you been operating on the assumption that I think the system I propose is a universal system? That it is right? That it is the only and exclusive system of morality?

I’m see myself as satisfied at the idea of this being purely a whim, if that’s what you intend it to be. All that brings me into the picture is if you want that whim to be in some way validated as reasonable by some others.

Scofflaw wrote:

I seem to have keep repeating this - the basis for equality is purely and simply that there is no good basis for inequality.

When I say a good basis, I mean an objective, measurable, repeatable basis. Your judgements of moral capacity are subjective, as are mine, so neither are trustworthy.

I don’t know if this is a doorway that might get somewhere. Earlier you accepted the need for tailoring of morality as some principles will simply be irrelevant to animals and others will have to be exercised on their behalf (For example, do I take this wounded animal to be put down, or let it live on in discomfort. Which option would it choose?). Do you see that tailoring as something that is objective or something that is a matter of subjective judgement?

(Where I’m getting to is you either feel that process of tailoring is objective, in which case there are objective reasons for saying animals are not equal – otherwise we would not be talking about tailoring. Alternatively, you feel the tailoring just has to be done on the basis of best judgement, like pretty much everything else, in which case the objective, measurable, repeatable standard is simply an unnecessary block on the operation of normal, common sense argument.)

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

More just acknowledging that uncertainty is present in any statement. I’d actually pretty much stick by what I said already, and avoid just repeating it again.

Mmm. When one says "uncertainty" I prefer to see something like +/-10%, rather than "it's entirely subjective and we have no way of measuring it really".

Schuhart wrote:

I’m see myself as satisfied at the idea of this being purely a whim, if that’s what you intend it to be. All that brings me into the picture is if you want that whim to be in some way validated as reasonable by some others.

I have a whim of iron. It's a good assault - the idea that "we know there's inequality, therefore it can't be right to say things are equal". Unfortunately it falls down, because there's no way of measuring the inequality.

So, from my point of view, treating everything equally is not whimsical - it is the necessary result of being unable to measure inequality.

Schuhart wrote:

I don’t know if this is a doorway that might get somewhere. Earlier you accepted the need for tailoring of morality as some principles will simply be irrelevant to animals and others will have to be exercised on their behalf (For example, do I take this wounded animal to be put down, or let it live on in discomfort. Which option would it choose?). Do you see that tailoring as something that is objective or something that is a matter of subjective judgement?

Hmm. First, that's "tailoring of rights" I agreed to, not "tailoring of morality".

I think in most cases I would assume rights apply unless they are objectively impossible in application. Obligations are something my system currently doesn't give to anyone but me, since it's my personal morality.

Schuhart wrote:

(Where I’m getting to is you either feel that process of tailoring is objective, in which case there are objective reasons for saying animals are not equal – otherwise we would not be talking about tailoring.

You have gone back to confusing dissimilar with unequal. Do you genuinely see there as being no difference between the two?

All rights apply to all organisms equally is the starting point. The right to life requires, I think, no tailoring. Let's take the "right to not have pain inflicted". Where we would "tailor" that right is where it is inapplicable - which is to say, to organisms that don't feel pain (objectively - start from the assumption that they do, and show a complete lack of response to 'painful' stimuli). Strictly speaking, we are not tailoring the right, nor are we taking it away - an organism that cannot feel pain exercises the right by virtue of its nature.

Schuhart wrote:

Alternatively, you feel the tailoring just has to be done on the basis of best judgement, like pretty much everything else, in which case the objective, measurable, repeatable standard is simply an unnecessary block on the operation of normal, common sense argument.)

Nope. I decry the use of "normal, common sense argument" - in virtually every circumstance it is a cover for prejudice and thoughtlessness (not a personal remark!).

So - do you understand the idea that if you can't measure inequality, it makes little sense to use it as a basis for something?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

When one says "uncertainty" I prefer to see something like +/-10%, rather than "it's entirely subjective and we have no way of measuring it really".

Which is simply a regular feature of this reality. We are put into situations where judgements are required on the basis of what seems reasonable.

If reality is just something I’m imagining, I’ll try to dream a more quantifiable one. In the meantime, I think we have to work with what we’ve got.

Scofflaw wrote:

I have a whim of iron. It's a good assault - the idea that "we know there's inequality, therefore it can't be right to say things are equal". Unfortunately it falls down, because there's no way of measuring the inequality.

Surely it calls for a response that suggests the inequality is negligible. That’s what we do, for the sake of argument, in the case of humans traditionally excluded.

Scofflaw wrote:

You have gone back to confusing dissimilar with unequal. Do you genuinely see there as being no difference between the two?

There would be a difference if they related to two different things. If I said ‘giraffes are different to us, they’re much taller, so they can’t be equal’ you would be right to say this was a dissimilarity that was irrelevant to their moral standing. If, however, you admit to differences that require tailoring of rights, that does sound to be something that means a dissimilarity that impacts on equality in the moral context – otherwise why tailor?

Scofflaw wrote:

Strictly speaking, we are not tailoring the right, nor are we taking it away - an organism that cannot feel pain exercises the right by virtue of its nature.

I think this is best addressed by picking a situation where tailoring is required. Try the wounded animal example – how do you deem whether the animal wants to live in pain or die? Is that objective or subjective?

Scofflaw wrote:

So - do you understand the idea that if you can't measure inequality, it makes little sense to use it as a basis for something?

No, because ultimately nothing in this field can be measured. All you’ve said is no valid statement can be formulated on anything. All we can do in the moral context is make reasonable judgements. And noticing that humans are capable of doing difficult stuff with their heads and animals can’t isn’t so utterly speculative that we need to be that worried about its quantification. Just picture a cheery Pat Shortt culchie type surveying the human intellect, comparing it to mice and giving a cheery shout of ‘thems people is loads smarter, Missus’. That’s actually a precise enough measurement for our purposes.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

Which is simply a regular feature of this reality. We are put into situations where judgements are required on the basis of what seems reasonable.

It's a feature of those parts of the universe that are either (a) subjective, or (b) not yet scientifically studied.

That the universe has some characteristics which are not easily measurable is not a feature that requires us to use those characteristics in a way that better suits a quantifiable characteristic - particularly if there are alternatives.

And of course, "what seems reasonable" varies far too much from person to person for it to be useful.

Schuhart wrote:

If reality is just something I’m imagining, I’ll try to dream a more quantifiable one. In the meantime, I think we have to work with what we’ve got.Surely it calls for a response that suggests the inequality is negligible.

Er, no. It calls for a response that suggests it's not measurable. I'm not sure how you step from "can't measure it" to "it's negligible"?

Schuhart wrote:

That’s what we do, for the sake of argument, in the case of humans traditionally excluded.

I'm not certain exactly what that statement says!

Schuhart wrote:

Sofflaw wrote:

You have gone back to confusing dissimilar with unequal. Do you genuinely see there as being no difference between the two?

There would be a difference if they related to two different things. If I said ‘giraffes are different to us, they’re much taller, so they can’t be equal’ you would be right to say this was a dissimilarity that was irrelevant to their moral standing. If, however, you admit to differences that require tailoring of rights, that does sound to be something that means a dissimilarity that impacts on equality in the moral context – otherwise why tailor?

Ah. In other words, there are differences that are relevant, and differences that aren't. Sure - I accept that. Unfortunately, as I said earlier, what is measurable isn't relevant, and what is relevant isn't measurable.

Schuhart wrote:

I think this is best addressed by picking a situation where tailoring is required. Try the wounded animal example – how do you deem whether the animal wants to live in pain or die? Is that objective or subjective?

Again, that's already in there. The animal has the right to life, but may be in too much pain for that to be palatable. It is unable to tell us its preference, so we have to guess. Essentially, the Terry Schiavo case (persistent vegetative state) - but when it involves animals, it is usually resolved in favour of killing, because people ignore the animal's right to life.

Hmm. Actually, there's no tailoring involved here, either. The animal has a right to life, and we will resolve the issue depending on how seriously we take that, just as we would with a human.

Another issue, maybe? The concept of tailoring, I should point out, came in when you were talking about obligations, not rights.

Schuhart wrote:

And noticing that humans are capable of doing difficult stuff with their heads and animals can’t isn’t so utterly speculative that we need to be that worried about its quantification. Just picture a cheery Pat Shortt culchie type surveying the human intellect, comparing it to mice and giving a cheery shout of ‘thems people is loads smarter, Missus’. That’s actually a precise enough measurement for our purposes.

Except that's a measurement of intelligence...which I would consider irrelevant to morality. Try another one - one where Pat Short stands in a field and shouts "them people is loads more moral, Missus!". Curiously, that doesn't seem as easy, does it?

Schuhart wrote:

No, because ultimately nothing in this field can be measured. All you’ve said is no valid statement can be formulated on anything. All we can do in the moral context is make reasonable judgements.

Perhaps a brief summary is in order? This is mine, so it is likely one-sided:

1. there are clearly differences in moral capacity between organisms
2. those differences are probably relevant in a moral context
3. unfortunately, you can't measure them

Now, my solution to this is to say we have to treat them all equally. Your solution is to apply a mix of common sense, precedent, and argument.

You dismiss my solution as whimsical. I dismiss yours as prejudice and ignorance masquerading as reason.

Is that a fair picture of where we are so far?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

That the universe has some characteristics which are not easily measurable is not a feature that requires us to use those characteristics in a way that better suits a quantifiable characteristic - particularly if there are alternatives.

I’m not sure that’s right – we are simply called on to make decisions in situations where information is not available and may even be unobtainable.

Scofflaw wrote:

Er, no. It calls for a response that suggests it's not measurable. I'm not sure how you step from "can't measure it" to "it's negligible"?

There’s no measurement that reduces thing to a figure that can be compared. It requires a qualitative judgement based on known characteristics. In this context, its really not that difficult. Unfortunately, that judgement would suggest the difference in capacity between humans and animals is considerable. Put another way, I think you know that the moment you agree that ‘not precisely measureable’ doesn’t mean ‘no useful statement can be made’, you know your case is lost.

Scofflaw wrote:

I'm not certain exactly what that statement says!

It says that there’s no number that can be calculated that, for the sake of argument, tells us someone has a mental illness that means they cannot be trusted to look after their own affairs. You can’t say ‘oh, this person scores 49% percent on the sanity index, we have to keep them confined until they score 50% + again’. It simply requires a judgement being made that whatever inequality exists is or isn’t material.

Scofflaw wrote:

The concept of tailoring, I should point out, came in when you were talking about obligations, not rights.

I’m open to suggestions of inconsistency, but I did a quick look back and post 58 seemed to be where I started mentioning that mice would have trouble with obligations, some rights not applying and others required to be exercised on their behalf. I don’t see what’s changed.

Scofflaw wrote:

Hmm. Actually, there's no tailoring involved here, either. The animal has a right to life, and we will resolve the issue depending on how seriously we take that, just as we would with a human.

Does it involve exactly the same criteria in formulating your guess? Presumably you have to make a judgement as to whether, if they could communicate to you, the animal and person would feel they had a life worth living. Would you use the same factors to assess the good life for a person and a mouse? To what extent would you judge the importance of the ability to speak in assessing the mouse’s quality of life?

Scofflaw wrote:

Except that's a measurement of intelligence...which I would consider irrelevant to morality.

If we both agree morality only exists because humans evolved enough intelligence to invent it, how is intelligence irrelevant to morality?

Scofflaw wrote:

Perhaps a brief summary is in order?

Its not too bad, I’d see it more as:

1. there are clearly differences in moral capacity between organisms
2. those differences are very probably relevant in a moral context
3. unfortunately, you can't measure them precisely but reasonable statements can still be formulated. However, inevitably for moral questions, judgement is required.

Your judgement is we have to treat them all equally, if no relevant inequalities can be identified. Unfortunately, there are clear pointers that relevant inequalities exist.

My solution is to apply a mix of common sense, precedent, and argument.

I dismiss your solution as whimsical. You dismiss mine as prejudice and ignorance masquerading as reason.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

I’m not sure that’s right – we are simply called on to make decisions in situations where information is not available and may even be unobtainable.

Yes, but we are not called on to either (a) try to erect a system of morality on that basis or (b) claim that such a thing is in any way systematic.

Schuhart wrote:

There’s no measurement that reduces thing to a figure that can be compared. It requires a qualitative judgement based on known characteristics. In this context, its really not that difficult. Unfortunately, that judgement would suggest the difference in capacity between humans and animals is considerable.

It certainly explains why they should not be called on to make moral judgements, but does not explain why they should have fewer rights.

Besides, to a racist, the difference in moral capacity between white and black is equally "obvious", and equally "considerable". Is there anything you can say to them other than "well, you're wrong, actually"?

The acceptance that there is no "measurement that reduces thing to a figure that can be compared" and that it "requires a qualitative judgement based on known characteristics" simply opens the door for poor judgements.

Schuhart wrote:

Put another way, I think you know that the moment you agree that ‘not precisely measureable’ doesn’t mean ‘no useful statement can be made’, you know your case is lost.

If only I'd said that, then. I don't think useful (i.e. usable) statements can be made - and that's essentially the difference here.

Schuhart wrote:

It says that there’s no number that can be calculated that, for the sake of argument, tells us someone has a mental illness that means they cannot be trusted to look after their own affairs. You can’t say ‘oh, this person scores 49% percent on the sanity index, we have to keep them confined until they score 50% + again’. It simply requires a judgement being made that whatever inequality exists is or isn’t material.

I believe that the basis of the test is actually whether they constitute a danger to themselves or others if released.

Schuhart wrote:

I’m open to suggestions of inconsistency, but I did a quick look back and post 58 seemed to be where I started mentioning that mice would have trouble with obligations, some rights not applying and others required to be exercised on their behalf. I don’t see what’s changed.

Sorry - trying to be helpful! I don't think my system as stated actually contains any obligations except that of accepting the rights of others. Can you come up with a right that actually needs to be tailored?

Schuhart wrote:

Does it involve exactly the same criteria in formulating your guess? Presumably you have to make a judgement as to whether, if they could communicate to you, the animal and person would feel they had a life worth living.

I imagine so.

Schuhart wrote:

Would you use the same factors to assess the good life for a person and a mouse?

Probably not. On the other hand, the same is true of humans.

Schuhart wrote:

To what extent would you judge the importance of the ability to speak in assessing the mouse’s quality of life?

Not at all important, I think. Is it important to someone dumb from birth? Is it more important to someone whose living depends on speaking? What about Trappist monks?

Schuhart wrote:

If we both agree morality only exists because humans evolved enough intelligence to invent it, how is intelligence irrelevant to morality?

Because it is necessary but not sufficient. Highly intelligent psychopaths?

Schuhart wrote:

Its not too bad, I’d see it more as:

1. there are clearly differences in moral capacity between organisms
2. those differences are very probably relevant in a moral context
3. unfortunately, you can't measure them precisely but reasonable statements can still be formulated. However, inevitably for moral questions, judgement is required.

Your judgement is we have to treat them all equally, if no relevant inequalities can be identified. Unfortunately, there are clear pointers that relevant inequalities exist.

My solution is to apply a mix of common sense, precedent, and argument.

I dismiss your solution as whimsical. You dismiss mine as prejudice and ignorance masquerading as reason.

Hmm. It's more slanted than mine, because you've included in the "things we agree on" things we haven't agreed. The statement "inevitably for moral questions, judgement is required" applies to the application of moral judgement (and is therefore tautological), but does not apply to having rights, for which no judgement is required whatsoever.

And this statement - "Unfortunately, there are clear pointers that relevant inequalities exist. " is a reprise of statements 1 & 2 , placed in a context that makes your argument seem more respectable - I call spin!

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

Yes, but we are not called on to either (a) try to erect a system of morality on that basis or (b) claim that such a thing is in any way systematic.

Unfortunately, that’s exactly what we are called on to do. It’s a bugger, but I didn’t make the Universe, I just live in it. Unless I’m dreaming it all. But if it was a dream, I'd never have the wall that colour. Sorry, I did paint it that colour. Maybe it is all real after all.

Scofflaw wrote:

It certainly explains why they should not be called on to make moral judgements, but does not explain why they should have fewer rights.

Well, it does directly because many rights relevant to humans simply have no relevance to animals - like freedom to practice the religion of your choice. Other parts we can probably pursue in the context of tailoring.

Scofflaw wrote:

The acceptance that there is no "measurement that reduces thing to a figure that can be compared" and that it "requires a qualitative judgement based on known characteristics" simply opens the door for poor judgements.

Welcome to the human race, we've been so looking forward to having you.

Scofflaw wrote:

I don't think useful (i.e. usable) statements can be made - and that's essentially the difference here.

In the context, I’m afraid I see that as fence sitting.

Scofflaw wrote:

I believe that the basis of the test is actually whether they constitute a danger to themselves or others if released.

Which, I take it you agree, is just someone making a judgement. They don’t weigh you, measure your cranium and blood pressure and say ‘He’s a 1.03 factor risk to others and a 3.70 risk to himself. That’s no worse than a man with a skinful, he’s cleared for takeoff.’

Scofflaw wrote:

Can you come up with a right that actually needs to be tailored? …. Is it important to someone dumb from birth?

I’m just trying to judge the evasion level. Are you suggesting that you’d give the same weight to the lack of speech of a mouse as to a human born dumb?

Scofflaw wrote:

Because it is necessary but not sufficient. Highly intelligent psychopaths?

Not sufficient means irrelevant?

Scofflaw wrote:

I call spin!

Well the best way of making that spin evaporate is to fill in the yawning gap between ‘equal’ and ‘appropriate’. Unfortunately, a slide rule won’t help you do that.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

Unfortunately, that’s exactly what we are called on to do. It’s a bugger, but I didn’t make the Universe, I just live in it. Unless I’m dreaming it all. But if it was a dream, I'd never have the wall that colour. Sorry, I did paint it that colour. Maybe it is all real after all.

Crikey. We are called on to make moral judgements in an imperfect universe, without having convenient measures. We are not called on to assign rights or build moral systems on the basis of the convenient measures we don't have.

Schuhart wrote:

Well, it does directly because many rights relevant to humans simply have no relevance to animals - like freedom to practice the religion of your choice.

Actually, that's just a concomitant of the right to live without undue interference - it is not a separate right. And the right to live without undue interference applies to animals as well.

Schuhart wrote:

Other parts we can probably pursue in the context of tailoring.

I'd like to do a couple of thought experiments, but I'll put them in separate posts.

Schuhart wrote:

Welcome to the human race, we've been so looking forward to having you.

Cheap.

Schuhart wrote:

Scofflaw wrote:

I don't think useful (i.e. usable) statements can be made - and that's essentially the difference here.

In the context, I’m afraid I see that as fence sitting.

An odd view. I'd accept it as fence-sitting if I simply said, "and so we must do nothing", which I don't - I say "and so we must assume equality, and go on from there".

Schuhart wrote:

Which, I take it you agree, is just someone making a judgement. They don’t weigh you, measure your cranium and blood pressure and say ‘He’s a 1.03 factor risk to others and a 3.70 risk to himself. That’s no worse than a man with a skinful, he’s cleared for takeoff.’

True. However, this is again the making of moral judgements in an imperfect world, and irrelevant to a moral system from which we can derive rights.

Schuhart wrote:

I’m just trying to judge the evasion level. Are you suggesting that you’d give the same weight to the lack of speech of a mouse as to a human born dumb?

When having to decide whether it was important to quality of life in the context of making a moral decision? Yes.

Schuhart wrote:

Not sufficient means irrelevant?

It means "therefore not useful". Since it possible to be highly intelligent and entirely devoid of moral capacity, it would be extremely silly to use intelligence as a stand-in for moral capacity.

Schuhart wrote:

Well the best way of making that spin evaporate is to fill in the yawning gap between ‘equal’ and ‘appropriate’. Unfortunately, a slide rule won’t help you do that.

Hmm. You mean that if I convince you I'm right, you'll stop acting as if you're right? Well, I think I can understand that without a slide rule. The only problem is I'm not 'right', as such, and neither are you, at least in any meaningful sense.

(I'm slightly worried we're both finding this rather exasperating, and will be rude to each other in consequence, which I would be sorry to see. The exasperation is not, I think, the result of either of us being stupid, so let's not treat each other as if we were.)

cordially,
Scofflaw

Scofflaw

So. Thought-experiment 1. This has already been used in an abbreviated form, but I felt it wasn't followed properly, so I'd like to give it a whirl again.

Situation: somewhere like the Deep South of the US/apartheid South Africa. Society is deeply racist, holding blacks to be morally inferior to whites. Blacks have no rights in society, because they are not held to be morally capable. Indeed, they are not held to be fully human.

To do: argue why blacks should have rights equal to whites.

(I don't think this is a distortion of the historic position, or indeed the Stormfront position - if you have any conditions to add or change, please state them first)

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

Crikey. We are called on to make moral judgements in an imperfect universe, without having convenient measures. We are not called on to assign rights or build moral systems on the basis of the convenient measures we don't have.

So just where do I find a morality cake that I can cut thick moral slices off so that I can weight them?

Quite possibly morality doesn’t exist at all. But if it does, it can only be created from what we have.

Scofflaw wrote:

When having to decide whether it was important to quality of life in the context of making a moral decision? Yes.

Can I suggest that this seems to take us back into the whim zone? Because you seem to be simply closing your eyes to humans being different and more complex beings with different and more complex lives. Why is that relevant? Because it pretty comprehensively undermines the idea that equality can be assumed. (Yes, we are talking about a dissimilarity being so great that asserting its doesn’t impact on equality is just whim.)

On this specific issue (which is, you’ll understand, only one illustration) you seem to be stepping past the pretty clear difference that a mouse without speech is nothing unusual. Hence, there is simply nothing to see there. A human without speech has something that obstructs a human life. That’s not to say that this individual feature will make you discard that person’s life in isolation – possible you’ll decide ‘lack of speech was a burden this person had to carry – that means they are entitled to an extra break now that another would not get’. But it simply has a different relevance in the case of a human.

I know you can simply say ‘but that can’t be measured’ in the sense of quantified. Unfortunately, faced with such a clear qualitative difference that passes the Pat Shortt test, I’ll see that as a kind of ‘get out of jail free card’ that doesn’t actually address the point.

Scofflaw wrote:

It means "therefore not useful". Since it possible to be highly intelligent and entirely devoid of moral capacity, it would be extremely silly to use intelligence as a stand-in for moral capacity.

Its possible, but relatively rare, to be a psychopath. Does that really suggest that it is not a useful measure? Surely it’s just not a measure that is always correct.

Scofflaw wrote:

The exasperation is not, I think, the result of either of us being stupid, so let's not treat each other as if we were.

You are, of course, right. And very, very smelly and ugly too.

Scofflaw wrote:

To do: argue why blacks should have rights equal to whites.

Simple. Illustrate that they are, in fact, human like the rest of us and are being unjustly treated. Possibly in a manner that subsequent generations see, ironically, as almost comically racist. (I’ve ‘Uncle Tom’s Cabin’ in mind here.)