Basis of morality

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

Hmm. The border between single-celled and multicellular life is not quite so simple - and not anywhere near that level.

You'll understand that what I'm fishing for is if you've just moved a arbitrary barrier out to some new arbitrary point - wondering after the objective reason why an organism should be reduced in moral importance by the loss of one cell.

Scofflaw wrote:

Why does that lack not imply equality between organisms, as it does between humans?

Because, in fairness, its not just the absene of difference between races but the presence of similarity that makes the proposition within humans more reasonable, bearing in mind that morality is a human feature. I know this brings us back along a line we've been, but that reasoning still strikes me as valid. Animals can never be more that objects on which morality acts. Even if we are put in the position of exercising rights on behalf of a minor, say, we are at least doing it from a position where one human can be hoped to appreciate how another human might feel.

If we are exercising powers on behalf of a mouse, all we can do is whatever a human thinks is appropriate for a mouse. Hence the provision of rights is somewhat illusionary. Again, while I take it we just disagree, I simply do take it as read that criteria in assessing the position of a mouse and a man differ greatly. But if you are not willing to accept the illustrative example that the objective feature of no speech has different implications for people and mice, I don't see a common basis to be able to advance that line of thought.

I suppose I don't feel the injection of quantification really reduces doubts in this situation. It just moves them up the line. So instead of David Duke saying 'blacks are not equal', he says 'blacks are equal, but like mice they need to be handled appropriately'. The real action simply happens in that qualitative zone - which potentially means that morality is meaningless. I just haven't studied enough yet to make that determination.

Scofflaw wrote:

Nah. I'm human - I'd rescue the human. I'm just not claiming it's the best moral decision (yet).

Your reliance on common sense, precedent and argument is to be applauded - because its all we've got, really.

Scofflaw wrote:

I suspect that I may be able to argue from a position of initial equality to produce inequality in this case, if I'm ever let

I'm most anxious to let to. In your own time, obviously.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

You'll understand that what I'm fishing for is if you've just moved a arbitrary barrier out to some new arbitrary point - wondering after the objective reason why an organism should be reduced in moral importance by the loss of one cell.

Sure - after all, I can hardly complain about your subjective dividing lines while upholding my own - after all, that's what I'm accusing you of vis-a-vis the racist.

A multicellular organism is not reduced in moral importance by the loss of one cell unless we're using a cellular basis for life - which we are forced to when comparing single-celled and multicellular organisms.

Schuhart wrote:

Because, in fairness, its not just the absene of difference between races but the presence of similarity that makes the proposition within humans more reasonable, bearing in mind that morality is a human feature.

Again, though, this is just a question of which similarities you consider important. For some people, skin colour is not an unimportant dissimilarity.

Schuhart wrote:

I know this brings us back along a line we've been, but that reasoning still strikes me as valid. Animals can never be more that objects on which morality acts. Even if we are put in the position of exercising rights on behalf of a minor, say, we are at least doing it from a position where one human can be hoped to appreciate how another human might feel.

I think that when we're dealing with very basic rights (not to be killed, not to be caused pain), we are hardly guilty of pathetic fallacy by ascribing a preference for avoidance of those things to other organisms. Aside from anything else, it is easy enough to test such things - does a mouse attempt to avoid pain, or not?

Schuhart wrote:

If we are exercising powers on behalf of a mouse, all we can do is whatever a human thinks is appropriate for a mouse. Hence the provision of rights is somewhat illusionary. Again, while I take it we just disagree, I simply do take it as read that criteria in assessing the position of a mouse and a man differ greatly. But if you are not willing to accept the illustrative example that the objective feature of no speech has different implications for people and mice, I don't see a common basis to be able to advance that line of thought.

Well, not quite. The point I was making in repect of speech was that there are dissimilar condiitons in speech between human beings, so that if it is incorrect to ascribe equality between man and mouse based on the lack of similarity, it is equally incorrect to ascribe such equality to humans. There are also many different views on what it means to be human.

Consider, for example, deaf people. You may or may not be aware of this, but a cochlear implant at an early enough age can mean a child does not grow up to be a deaf adult. Now, there are quite a lot of deaf adults who feel that this is wrong. Their image of what being human means is different from yours - why is it wrong?

Schuhart wrote:

I suppose I don't feel the injection of quantification really reduces doubts in this situation. It just moves them up the line. So instead of David Duke saying 'blacks are not equal', he says 'blacks are equal, but like mice they need to be handled appropriately'. The real action simply happens in that qualitative zone - which potentially means that morality is meaningless. I just haven't studied enough yet to make that determination.

Morality is meaningful insofar as it tells the individual human being whether an action is 'wrong' or 'right' - and 'wrong' and 'right' are only meaningful in terms of morality. Whether we make such decisions on a subjective basis, or an objective one, the result is meaningful in that it changes our actions. By changing our actions, morality changes reality - which is certainly meaningful enough for me.

The question of whether we use an objective or subjective basis for our morality is irrelevant to the meaning of morality.

Schuhart wrote:

Your reliance on common sense, precedent and argument is to be applauded - because its all we've got, really.

Well, from my point of view, it would be better to save them all, whereas you might not bother, having no moral impulse to do so.

Schuhart wrote:

I'm most anxious to let to. In your own time, obviously.

Unfortunately, I have to start from the basis of equality, so we aren't at the starting-line yet...

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

A multicellular organism is not reduced in moral importance by the loss of one cell unless we're using a cellular basis for life - which we are forced to when comparing single-celled and multicellular organisms.

But why the need to compare them? Is there not just a way of saying ‘that things animate, and hence within the definition’, and hence off you go regardless of single or multiple cells.

Scofflaw wrote:

does a mouse attempt to avoid pain, or not?

I think there’s no difficulty in establishing that mice feel pain, and even arguing that fact would suggest a need for benevolence from humans. But the array of situations just seems simply that – one of benevolence from humans. We never get into the kind of complexity that arises from the human situation, which (to my mind) is what inspires the concept of morality. We’re unlikely to consider, for example, the ethics of what to do if a monk decides on self-immolation as a protest. Should we stop him? Is it a sign of insanity? Does he simply have that right of self expression? I’m not trying to answer any of those questions here – just to illustrate that the human situation contains so much more than simple pain aversion.

Scofflaw wrote:

Their image of what being human means is different from yours - why is it wrong?

Its not wrong, and I take it this is similar to the idea that some people with disabilities would put forward to the effect that they are as they are, and should not be seen as incomplete because they don’t match to an ideal. But I think this again reflects the complexity of the human situation. A mouse without a tail is just a mouse without a tail. A human born without hearing and demanding that status to be respected, on the other hand, is effectively making a proposal that this is something that deserves a fair social status - there’s a social significance to this that is simply not present in the mouse’s case. (I’m not sure that I’m making this point well – but hopefully you’ll pick up that sense that even the demand that avoidable deafness should not be prevented suggests a complexity to the human experience.)

Scofflaw wrote:

The question of whether we use an objective or subjective basis for our morality is irrelevant to the meaning of morality.

I’d say same effect rather than same meaning. I’d suggest that the significance of an objective morality is different to subjective morality, as it suggests something has been developed that has some ‘value added’ that gives it a life of its own. (I don’t mean this to say such a morality exists – I’m not far enough into the topic to say anything useful on that.)

Scofflaw wrote:

Well, from my point of view, it would be better to save them all, whereas you might not bother, having no moral impulse to do so.

I’d say no compelling moral impulse – but I’d see no reason to gratuitously leave an animal to burn as if it was a piece of furniture.

Scofflaw wrote:

Unfortunately, I have to start from the basis of equality, so we aren't at the starting-line yet...

At the same time, if we’re making little progress getting to the starting line we could agree just to explore it for the sake of argument, like one of those Socratic dialogues.

“I was wandering around the Lidl in Athens, with Glaucon the son of Ariston, looking for some cheap chickens to sacrifice to the goddess, when I felt an obsequious cough from behind. I turned to see a slave I recognised as Scofflaw’s.

“My master would welcome your presence down in Mulligan’s for an earnest disputation,” he said.

I went there directly, and found him with Lysias and Euthydemus.

“Howya heads,” I said as I sat down beside them. “I hope this isn’t more of that ****e about all multicellular animals having the same rights.”

“Your mot obviously tells you everything,” replied Scofflaw darkly. “Are we ever going to get to step one with this thing, or are you going to insist on basing your morality on stories from the Woman’s Weekly Fiction Special?”

“Oh, go on then, ya bollix,” I said. “Amoeba of all countries unite, you have nothing to lose but your chains.”

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

But why the need to compare them? Is there not just a way of saying ‘that things animate, and hence within the definition’, and hence off you go regardless of single or multiple cells.

I don't want to end up in a position where the life of a single bacterium weighs as heavily as the life of a human - and therefore I seek a way of making that not so, while retaining an objective dividing line...

Schuhart wrote:

I think there’s no difficulty in establishing that mice feel pain, and even arguing that fact would suggest a need for benevolence from humans. But the array of situations just seems simply that – one of benevolence from humans.

Actually, benevolence from me, since this is the basis of my personal morality. But then morality is benevolence - anything else is self-interest.

Schuhart wrote:

We never get into the kind of complexity that arises from the human situation, which (to my mind) is what inspires the concept of morality. We’re unlikely to consider, for example, the ethics of what to do if a monk decides on self-immolation as a protest. Should we stop him? Is it a sign of insanity? Does he simply have that right of self expression?

Indeed, and you know, some of us like to start with the simple stuff and work up to the complex?

However, assuming that the monk is in his right mind (not deranged), then the answer is very simple - he has that right.

Schuhart wrote:

I’m not trying to answer any of those questions here – just to illustrate that the human situation contains so much more than simple pain aversion.

Sure, and we either try to make a moral judgement, or not. I feel I have a sound basis for making them.

Schuhart wrote:

Its not wrong, and I take it this is similar to the idea that some people with disabilities would put forward to the effect that they are as they are, and should not be seen as incomplete because they don’t match to an ideal. But I think this again reflects the complexity of the human situation. A mouse without a tail is just a mouse without a tail. A human born without hearing and demanding that status to be respected, on the other hand, is effectively making a proposal that this is something that deserves a fair social status - there’s a social significance to this that is simply not present in the mouse’s case. (I’m not sure that I’m making this point well – but hopefully you’ll pick up that sense that even the demand that avoidable deafness should not be prevented suggests a complexity to the human experience.)

Actually, it sounds like you're reiterating the point that what counts in your book is being human. I have no idea what being born tail-less means to a mouse, but, then, I don't actually know what it's like to be born profoundly deaf either. One may be more complex than the other, but I don't know which. I know that you and I appreciate the complexity of the human experience rather better, but that brings things down to ignorance and prejudice again.

Schuhart wrote:

I’d say same effect rather than same meaning. I’d suggest that the significance of an objective morality is different to subjective morality, as it suggests something has been developed that has some ‘value added’ that gives it a life of its own. (I don’t mean this to say such a morality exists – I’m not far enough into the topic to say anything useful on that.)

Not really, since as you yourself have pointed out, the basis for the objective morality is actually subjective - it's merely the working out that is rather more repeatable, and rather less subject to the operations of unconscious prejudice.

Schuhart wrote:

I’d say no compelling moral impulse – but I’d see no reason to gratuitously leave an animal to burn as if it was a piece of furniture.

Glad to hear it, ya dirty vitalist ya.

Schuhart wrote:

At the same time, if we’re making little progress getting to the starting line we could agree just to explore it for the sake of argument, like one of those Socratic dialogues.

“I was wandering around the Lidl in Athens, with Glaucon the son of Ariston, looking for some cheap chickens to sacrifice to the goddess, when I felt an obsequious cough from behind. I turned to see a slave I recognised as Scofflaw’s.

“My master would welcome your presence down in Mulligan’s for an earnest disputation,” he said.

I went there directly, and found him with Lysias and Euthydemus.

“Howya heads,” I said as I sat down beside them. “I hope this isn’t more of that ****e about all multicellular animals having the same rights.”

“Your mot obviously tells you everything,” replied Scofflaw darkly. “Are we ever going to get to step one with this thing, or are you going to insist on basing your morality on stories from the Woman’s Weekly Fiction Special?”

“Oh, go on then, ya bollix,” I said. “Amoeba of all countries unite, you have nothing to lose but your chains.”

Are we going for Socratic, or Joycean?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

I don't want to end up in a position where the life of a single bacterium weighs as heavily as the life of a human - and therefore I seek a way of making that not so, while retaining an objective dividing line...

Don't worry, my commitment to the Socratic dialogue means I'll leave that sit and pretend I didn't see it.

Scofflaw wrote:

Indeed, and you know, some of us like to start with the simple stuff and work up to the complex?

Sorry, I 've an intuitive personality type. Hence the extreme comfort at operating in an uncertain context.

Scofflaw wrote:

I know that you and I appreciate the complexity of the human experience rather better, but that brings things down to ignorance and prejudice again.

I'd just feel a lot happer assigning it all to ignorance and prejudice if I felt that somewhere there was a couple of mice debating whether or not humans had souls.

Scofflaw wrote:

Are we going for Socratic, or Joycean?

Fair point, that was a bit eclectic. Whatever suits your case.

Scofflaw

Schuhart wrote:

Don't worry, my commitment to the Socratic dialogue means I'll leave that sit and pretend I didn't see it.Sorry, I 've an intuitive personality type. Hence the extreme comfort at operating in an uncertain context.

I don't mind uncertain contexts - I do mind 'intuitive' judgements...

Schuhart wrote:

I'd just feel a lot happer assigning it all to ignorance and prejudice if I felt that somewhere there was a couple of mice debating whether or not humans had souls.

Again, that carries the suggestion that the only objects of morality can be those that are themselves moral. Is that not rather a bizarre claim?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Schuhart

Scofflaw wrote:

I don't mind uncertain contexts - I do mind 'intuitive' judgements...

Indeed, but they go together like love and marriage. Or something.

Scofflaw wrote:

Again, that carries the suggestion that the only objects of morality can be those that are themselves moral. Is that not rather a bizarre claim?

Bear in mind the context of that comment - you're reflecting how the fact that, being human, we can better appreciate the moral complexity of the human situation and may only be insulated from the true moral complexity of the mouse's situation. I'm just suggesting that signs of mice having an independent moral life would support the idea of them being in morally complex situations, but such is far from obvious. This particular thought isn't particularly commenting on whether the only objects of morality are things that are moral - its simply suggesting that there's little to suggest that mice have an equally complex moral life. In the context that I'm coming from, that obviously fits in with an amount of other perspectives. But is it fair to say that you don't have much evidence of mice having equivalent moral quandries?