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Belief without evidence argument
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Thanks for responding. Also, I'd like the same disclaimer for my postsAtomicHorror wrote: »Ok, forgive me if the following is crap. It's late and my mind is fried.
I find it very difficult to reason about what the probability of the existence of a non interventionist higher power (aka 'vague god') outside the universe, might be. The best I can do is really to say that I can't estimate the probability - it could well be infinitesimal, but for all I know its .7AtomicHorror wrote: »You may well have a point, though in terms of evidence and the vague God I've always taken the line that the lack of evidence allows us to dismiss on the basis of negligible likelihood of existence. Not impossibility but improbability so significant as to be no different in practical terms.
You employ a probabilistic argument here, basically saying that we need evidence for improbable (ie complex) things, and therefore it's reasonable to ask for evidence of such deities.We have no reason to doubt the objective reality or induction. They are not complex notions. But a God, or a non-testable spaghetti monster or non-detectable orbital teapot are all complex concepts. Without appropriately weighted evidence for them or their influence, it is irrational to assume their existence. The likelihood of their existence is negligible and can be dismissed on that basis.
But can we really apply the same reason to something that exists outside the universe, as we would to the orbital teapot?
We can check some orbits for teapots, we have telescopes that show us volumes of space nearby (I know the teapot is too far to see in its orbit, but ones in nearer orbits would be easier to spot). Fundamentally, from what we know of our universe so far, highly ordered complex structures like teapots don't tend to just occur in orbit around space, based on our (assumed) inductive reason applied to the knowledge of the universe we've observed (through our assumed perceptions).
But we've nothing like that to work from when we make comments about deities that may or may not exist outside the universe. We have nothing surely that allows us to make judgments about the probability of their existence.
We can chose to believe they are improbable, but that puts us in no better state than the theist who chooses to believe in the existence of god as an axiom.
So can we really say we can deny their existence on the basis of improbability and lack of evidence? I'm not sure...
I can definitely accept the merits of an argument that says it's not useful to reason about things outside the universe that we have no information about; and that we should just not worry about them - but that's not a particularly strong argument that's going to convince a theist, particularly one who thinks the belief in such a god is useful.
And I'm not sure I can accept the rationale of the stronger argument that demands evidence for these things, again, while believing in other things that there is no evidence for.0 -
Saying senses are a priori is somewhat sidestepping the argument; some people would genuinely say a sense of god is a priori too - not everyone senses it, but not everyone can see either.Maybe you need to go and look up existentialism
Seriously, it is a convincing argument. There is a world of difference between accepting as evidence something that is universally experienced, recognized and relied on. Our senses are the evidence. They are a priori - without them there is nothing.
It's hard to argue against this, as having insufficient evidence, which is my point.
I'm not saying I'd live by these positions - I am examining a particular line of reason. But just because I wouldn't live by the conclusions of a particular line of argument doesn't mean the argument isn't something I'd take very seriously in order to understand it better, or perhaps examine if I should change things. The fact that I won't instantly follow the results of an argument isn't in itself a refutation of the argument.It is quite disingenuous to compare the collective and universally acknowledged evidence of all our senses with the personal sensory claims of random individuals. Of course it's true that on some level one is no more reliable than the other, but I have a simple test for this kind of argument: if you wouldn't live by it - and you've already said you wouldn't - then don't rely on it for a philosophical defence. To do so is ultimately empty posturing because you don't even believe it yourself.
Well, it's only a straw man if I've misrepresented Dawkins' position, which I'm not aware of doing. I'm pretty definite that he's included non-interventionist gods in his argument (see my previous quote) and I'm pretty sure he's hammered people who believe in such gods on the basis of a lack of evidence.In the end your argument is a straw man. You interpret Dawkins as saying people shouldn't believe in a non-interventionist, deist kind of god without evidence, but I think you've called it wrong. The issue isn't whether people should or shouldn't believe or disbelieve in such a god, but that it's pointless and irrelevant to do so. People can believe in one if they want, but why exactly would they want to?
So I don't see any misrepresentation there.
You can definitely say my argument isn't very interesting or constructive, perhaps because what dawkins was saying is trivially or obviously wrong, but that's not the same as a straw man.
If, in fact, you are right that misinterpreted and misrepresented Dawkins' position, then you'd be right that it's a straw man, and that I should go and move onto more interesting questions such as you examine there.
I think some people take a sense of comfort from the idea that the world was created by a higher being, even if that higher being does not intervene in the running of the universe. Perhaps this is all part of the higher beings plan, perhaps through some process, when we die, the higher being copies some part of us out of this world and puts us in another (completely without interfering with the running of this world). I don't want to get sidetracked on the likelihood of those - just wanted to give an example of a non interventionist god that some might find useful - all this is non interventionist, and yet is very close to the beliefs of people I've talked to (non interventionist, but with an afterlife).It only makes any sense or serves any purpose to believe in an active, interventionist god who intrudes into this universe, and that - as you acknowledge - is where evidence is required. And this of course is exactly the kind of god nearly all religious people do believe in because such a belief has an impact on their lives.
Well, as I've just said, it could serve a purpose to some people.On the other hand, the god you propose, leaving no trace in this universe, is located utterly in the realm of speculation. I don't have the God Delusion to hand but I think all Dawkins is really doing is pointing this out - he's saying that to invoke such a god serves no purpose.
Again, it might provide comfort to some believers. Or it might not.Since there's no evidence for it, such a belief is simply futile. You could of course say the same about believing in the physical universe on the evidence of your senses, but if you're at that point you should probably be thinking about tying yourself a noose or going out shopping for strong drugs.
My point was that you can't really attack people that believe in such on the absence of evidence - least, not as far as I can see.
I choose to believe in the reality that's out there, so I'm likely to try and enjoy it a while longer...0 -
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Well all of it really. All the evidence suggests the world we perceive is real. What evidence is there that the world isn't real? As far as I know there isn't any.
I don't see it like this.
If we start from a position of no knowledge, I don't see how we can get to a position where we can claim that what we perceive is real and out there beyond our perceptions. Or, more correctly, I don't see a way of doing this, thats based on evidence.
Instead of starting from a position of no knowledge, the only reasonable thing to do is to start from a position where we believe our perceptions do convey us information about a real world that's out there.
Why not also include a sense of god in that starting position too?What do you mean you have no evidence for this? I would have said you have no evidence but this.
If you take your sensory perceptions to be evidence for the existence of the world, then, yes, we have nothing but evidence for it.
But how did you get there? What enables you to take your sensory perceptions as evidence for the existence of the world? How do you know they aren't wired to a computer system?
You have no evidence based reason to prefer one hypothesis above the other, yet you do.
I'm not saying it's wrong to do so - but I am asking that it be acknowledged that this is done without evidence.
Where does this evidence come from? That the world is real? Surely you must conclude we have no more evidence that is it real than that it is not?The only evidence we have available to us is that the world is real and exists outside of our minds. We can imagine that this isn't true, that we are some how being tricked by say a Matrix like computer, and we have no evidence that this isn't true (invoking the negative, as I said), because by its very nature such a simulation would be designed to only provide evidence that made it appear like the world was real. In other words it would be a trick.
So again, whether the world is real or an elaborate illusion, the only evidence we have is that the world is real.
Your argument only works if you assume the correctness of your senses.
But you assume this correctness without evidence.Yes, because that is the only evidence we have. You are introducing a hypothesis and saying we have no evidence that this isn't true, because by its very nature such an situation as detailed in your hypothesis is designed to deceive.
My response is that you are getting ahead of yourself. Instead of asking what evidence do we have that the hypothesis isn't true, ask what evidence do we have that it is. What evidence do we have that the world is imaginary?
Look, I can't show the world is imaginary, any more than you can show the world is real.
So there is no evidence based reason to prefer one hypothesis above the other.
The only way you see 'evidence' for your point of view is if you take your senses as real; but that's begging the question.
That's what I'm trying to say.
So it could be real, could be imaginary, since all the evidence we have for things comes from our senses, well, they aren't much help here, because they could be connected to the real world or the imaginary one, so we are in a position of no evidence.
We can choose to believe either.
I choose to believe the world is real, and not imaginary, because it's a more useful hypothesis for me to live my life by.
I don't claim to have evidence that backs this assertion up, but I do believe it.
I think this is very reasonable.Well I would have to see what Dawkins claimed to comment. Do you have a link?
I don't think it works like that.Again, as far as I'm concerned the only evidence we have is for the existence of the external reality, and no evidence to the contrary.
What you appear to mean by evidence for the existence of external reality is in fact evidence that we are not living in a super computer, or evidence that we are not all in some dream state, or evidence that I'm not in a coma imagining this conversation. Which again is what I mean by invoking the negative.
If we have a box, and you say the box is full of oxygen, and I say 'wait, what evidence do you have for that, it could be full of nitrogen instead' you can't turn around to me and say "You are asking me for evidence there's NOT nitrogen in it! That's invoking a negative!" and win the argument, proving there's oxygen in the box.
I'm not saying we are living in a super computer. I am merely saying we could be, and everything would fit.
I am saying that it's another hypothesis, which we have as much evidence for, as the hypothesis that our perceptions accurately reflect a world that's real.
I'm asking you to either provide evidence that the hypothesis that the perceptual world is real is true (don't think you'll get it because you have to assume your perceptions are true in order to do so), or concede that it's a position that is arrived at based on utility, rather than evidence (nothing wrong with this, imo).
See my last on this.rather than equating belief that the external world is real with belief in God, I would go the other way and say that belief in God is like belief that the world is in fact the Matrix. It is something we can hypothsis, something we can imagine, something that we can use our own perceptions in our own minds as "evidence" for (deja vu for example), but something we actually have no proper evidence for.
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Your reading may well be better than mine - if the book refers to one within this reality, then I apologise to the book and it's author; as it's clearly fine to ask for evidence of such.Why do you make the jump from non-interventionist god within this reality to a non-intervening god outside the confines of our reality? When I read The God Delusion I read it as a non-interventionist god within the confines of this reality and not what you’re proposing, but I'm open to correction.
The discussion is still interesting when applied to deists though.
Yes, I would agree this is a considerable and defining change. I would find it very hard to defend a non interventionist god which lives in our reality, or protect such from the requirement of evidence. From my understanding of religious teachings though, many do claim that their god is outside this reality (if interventionist)You've changed the argument considerably when you change the realm of ‘god’ from within our reality to outside our reality.
Yes, I completely agree with all of what you've just said.I would suggest the atheist only makes claims about this reality; as has already been pointed out, if this non-interventionist god does exist outside of our reality, then they might as well not exist as they do not tangibly influence our reality at all.This is exactly the point, there is no way to test for a non-interventionist god and therefore to most atheists I would say that it makes the point irrelevant. Should we really concern ourselves with things that we cannot test within this reality, let alone have no evidence for? The non-interventionist god outside this reality is only limited by our imagination - it could be a guinea pig, an old woman, a spaghetti monster... anything. With each consideration being equally plausible.
My only point is that you can't refute this god on the basis of a lack of evidence; but you can definitely attack on irrelevance etc.
I don't mean to claim anything more than that.
I'm only seeking to show that an attack on the non-interventionist god, on the basis of a lack of evidence, is pointless, or irrelevant, or wrong.
When I challenge the evidence for reality, I do so in challenging whether what our first interpretation of what our senses perceive is whats actually there.I follow you perfectly in your arguments, but I think my frustration with your argument comes from your assertion that there is no evidence for this reality. As Wicknight points out, there is evidence for this reality. So then you’re left questioning our senses themselves.
(I think its reasonable to put in there that our brains interpret, at least somewhat, our senses).
I'm very much aware that I'm challenging it at that level, and it's at that level that I am saying there is no evidence.
Obviously, if I assume the accuracy and veracity of the interpretation of my senses, there is an abundance of evidence for the world - hence I am challenging the first obvious interpretation of the senses.
I think this feels a bit weaker.Where can this possibly lead? When I said “Outside of metaphysics, there's no real debate there.” I did not mean ‘My opinion is so awesome, shut up.’ I meant that there can be no debate using this reasoning as all positions are equally valid, and therefore, how can one have a reasoned debate?
Metaphysical and existential philosophers are happy to have debates that go nowhere, but if we are to be logical and reasonable when we enter a debate, it must be possible to argue each position. I know I’m repeating myself here, but I feel the point needs to be stressed – when we question the veracity of our senses, every position and possibility regarding our reality becomes equally true.
Is it really the case that because every possible position is equally valid, we must abandon the argument that brought us here?
Is it not possible to say 'Well, everything is equally valid, but let's choose a position we find useful to discuss things, indeed the position we commonly take in discussion, and in everything life, and work from there' and then from that position discuss the argument, acknowledging that the discussion we are having is based on this assumption that we made; indeed using the fact that we were forced to make an assumption to discuss how reasonable it is to make such assumptions?
I don't think you can attack the argument as built on a faulty foundation, as it doesn't try and prove it's foundation, it just assumes it.
I'd also like you to look at post #98 where I check out the same criticism in a different form. (or maybe just a similar one).
Do you find this convincing? Do you at least see what I'm getting at?
Basically, runs thus:
Look, can't assume anything.
Necessary to take a position, even though we've no evidence. (lets call it a axiom, given). We'll choose it on the basis of utility, and intuitive goodness, woo.
Ok, now, from that position:
Was it really necessary to take a position?
Yes it still was.
Ok, now we're here, can we attack people that take a position, that allows them believe in god, on the basis of having no evidence?
No we can't, because we did that.
Can we attack people that take a position, that allows them believe in god, on the basis that it's not useful, or intuitively good?
Yes we can.
As far as I can see, even though he obviously takes a position,with no evidence, Dawkins still attacks others those that do likewise with their existence of god, on the basis they have no evidence.
You could come now, and say that this can be used as an argument for anything... someone could use the same logic to believe in the teapot in orbit.
But here's the counter to that, the teapot in order directly conflicts with the position we have taken, as the position we have taken gives primacy to our senses, and the teapot directly conflicts with our senses (because its in this universe and our senses have furnished us with a lot of information about this universe).
This can only be used as an argument for other things that are outside the universe, as they don't conflict with our position, eg Gods (unless we make claims about whats also outside the universe when we take our initial position, that disallow external gods, but that would be no better that someone that makes claims that do allow external gods).
In the case where someone takes a position that's just the same as ours, but also believes the earth is flat, then we can accuse them of taking a position that embraces several contradictory axioms, as our perceptions have clearly shown us the earth is not flat, and we both have those in our position.
You can say that, and put (external, non interventionist) god in that category, and I'll be quite happy to agree - I'm only attack the atheists that attack the theists on scientific grounds.This is what I mean when I say that this metaphysical philosophy abandons evidence and logic. Surely a logical person concerns themselves only with questions that can be reasoned?
Yes, I very much follow this logic, said very similar things in my last few posts (which I wrote before reading yours)Allow me to confuse matters further. If you exist within this reality, and your brain which constitutes your consciousness exists within this reality, how can said consciousness make logical and reasoned statements about what exists outside of this reality, or indeed about the truth of said reality?
Agreed. My point is that this equally applies to those who claim a god outside the universe, and those who demand evidence of such god.If you exist within this reality then everything about you is coloured by that reality. Anyone who makes comments about this reality and what may lie outside it is putting ‘faith’ in their reasoning.
Sure; I remember wondering about this when I was a young kid, only found out its fairly trodden philosophical ground recently.Perhaps I wasn’t clear and I agree with rockbeers elaboration. I’m not arguing based on popularity, I’m arguing based on reasoned assessment of our senses.
If we take the colour blue as an example: It is possible that what I see as blue and what you see as blue are actually in fact two different colours. We cannot describe what ‘blue’ is.
I'm not so sure about this.However, on closer examination, we can conclude that any difference in our perception is unimportant. We both say the sky is ‘blue’. We both mix ‘blue’ and ‘yellow’ to make ‘green’. We both categorize the ‘idea’ of blue, and experience blue, in the same way, and therefore our perception does not matter.
People have a favourite colour, and make a lot of decisions based on such. It's conceivable that people fight over who gets the blue t-shirt, which may be totally dependent on their perception (maybe everyone's favourite colour is the same, in local terms, but there's disagreement about it in objective terms).
The difference in perception may have real world consequences, may start wars, therefore I don't think your argument stands?
We think we do, but we can't use that to prove our senses - that's using the trustworthiness of our senses (and what they tell us about each other) to prove the trustworthiness our senses.The same can be said for reality. It does not matter if our perception of reality is in fact ‘true’. We both experience it in the same way. Although it is possible that our senses aren’t trustworthy, we both experience reality in the same way using our senses and evidence.
Like, if I hear you telling me you see the same thing as me, is that an argument to trust my hearing? If this was all a simulation, you could just be a program designed to make me trust my senses, etc. (No, i'm not a paranoid nut to other readers, but it's relevant here).
I really don't think we have evidence for the trustworthiness of our senses at this level, just that its a useful assumption.
A god outside our reality though is immune to this argument, and it is this god I am concerned with.It is this common agreement on reality that makes theistic arguments flawed, as in order for us to agree with what they are saying we must change our perception of reality without any evidence to justify it. Reality is objective, 'god' is subjective.
I am going down the road of doubting the veracity of the senses, briefly, assuming the are true, and working from there, but remaining cognizant of that assumption and using it later.I agree that arguments from popularity and authority hold no ground, but that’s not the argument I was making. How is there a leap of faith in reality, when we do have evidence for reality? As I have argued already, to doubt the veracity of our senses themselves gets us nowhere, and in fact lends your consciousness itself the same credence you deny our senses.
If I didn't do this, I'd totally agree about the evidence for the world, but that's not my position.
I broadly agree.If god exists within this reality, then there must be evidence within this reality for its existence. If god exists outside of this reality, there should still be evidence of god if it interfers with this reality. If the god exists outside of this reality, and does not interfere in this reality, then we do not need to consider the existence of this god, as this god has no bearing what so ever upon our reality.
However, it's the last I'm concerned with here: "we need not consider the existence of this god, as this god has no bearing what so ever upon our reality"
I'm just out to show that this god can't be refuted on the basis of a lack of evidence, that's all.
But the atheist can only use this evidence after a leap of faith that grants them access to it.Again, they are not comparable leaps of faith. The atheist bases their position upon evidence within this reality.
I am afraid I do not.The theist bases their position on blind faith using no evidence from this reality. However, you are calling into question the evidence itself and the veracity of our senses. Do you see what I mean now when I say you’re not comparing like with like?
I see the leap of faith that grants access to our senses - that allows us to affirm their validity - as comparable to the leap of faith that allows a theist belief in god.
If I take the validity of the senses without evidence, how am I better than one who takes the existence of god without evidence?
I could claim the utility of the senses vs. the utility of god, but that is not a claim based on evidence, and further, I would find strong proponents of the utility of god to disagree with me (but I'm more concerned about the evidence bit).
Again, as I sit in my position of zero knowledge, I have no access to any evidence, until I make a leap of faith and trust my senses - how am I better than one who from zero knowledge, instead makes a leap of faith that trusts both his senses and his god?
I cannot demonstrate there is no evidence for it; I can only ask what evidence there is that is for it.As has already been requested - can you demonstrate for us how there is no evidence for this reality?
I can provide alternate hypothesises that explain the senses, which should raise enough doubt, and hence show we require evidence or a leap of faith to believe in reality.
I demonstrate that there is no evidence of reality as commonly believed by calling into question the senses. Thats how I do it. Again, there's no evidence for the senses, we just assume them, with a leap of faith, comparable to that with which people assume god.Or can you only call into question whether our senses tell us the truth of reality?
I'm happy making that assumption, I find it very useful, but I don't defend it on the basis that I have evidence for it - how could I? And I think it is equally unreasonable to ask a deist to defend their god on the same basis.
Only evidence if you grant the senses/perceptions, which again, I say, where is the evidence for these perceptions and senses being accurate?This is what I mean when I say you’re being intellectually disingenuous; you keep repeating that there is no evidence of this reality when quite clearly there is.The *spooky voice* comment was my attempt at a joke – I think it’s funny when someone questions the validity of our senses.
I don't think the senses aren't correct - I just think that I don't have evidence for why I think that they are correct.
I think that they are correct because that's a useful position, rather than one backed by evidence, so similarly I can not challenge someone who assumes a deist god, based on lack of evidence.
Apologies, I was probably a bit tired and tetchyNo disrespect intended. (Perhaps my word use is too harsh, let me just say that I appreciate someone asking so many questions, replying to all the answers and then asking new informed questions. It’s the anti-thesis of what usually happens!)
Thanks for all the great replies, and the kind words.
Again, I probably misinterpreted your post - sorry for the attendant tetchinessThat’s not what I meant at all. My comment was born from this post:
Perhaps I should take this elsewhere, but bear with me for a second. Do you think that atheists are more likely to be bothered by existentialist/metaphysical philosophies such as the debate here? (I don’t exactly mean just because you’re saying atheists have faith in their senses.) Seeing as the atheist viewpoint in general is informed by the power of evidence and the lack of evidence for god. I would suggest that existentialist/metaphysical philosophers are highly likely to be agnostic.
From my perspective (and perhaps your question is more directed at other posters) I think that atheists, who consider themselves to have arrived at a position by reason, more so than some theists who are at that position due to faith, would be more inclined to entertain debate such as this: questioning whether the world view of atheists (in general) was solidly placed on evidence as claimed, or whether they made some assumptions too.
Also, the fact that I got thinking about these things when listening to Richard Dawkins, a prominent atheist (and proud claimant of the word) made me come here.
Ok, cool, gotcha.Although this argument frustrates me, I do find it interesting. I’m not asking people to say they think this argument is boring, stupid or something unhelpful like that - I’m asking if this argument unsettles them as it questions the very core of their viewpoint, whereas atheists merely disagree with the theistic viewpoint.
I personally think it should be more unsettling; a determined and (hopefully) reasoned argument should be a much harder thing to shrug off than someone claiming to believe in something they have no evidence for (note: we don't count non interventionist gods who are under discussion here, who require no evidence, lest I shoot myself in the foot)0 -
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Not quite relevant to demonstrating that religion is not irrational, but certainly helpful when seeing how useful religion is understanding the world.
Good thread, was hoping to comment earlier but it's gotten a bit too complex now for me.
Off topic, are you sure that gravity squeezes hydrogen atoms (surely nuclei) together? (And should it not be 'affect' rather than 'effect'?)
Anyway arguing over details will not reinforce or undermine our fundamental faith in science anymore than it will reinforce or undermine our fundamental worldview (religious or not). When faced with contrary facts, a believer will interpret them in a way consistent with their religion. A scientist will do likewise, but can explicitly alter their fundamental theory. The subtle difference is that the believer can alter their understanding of the fundamental theory. It's called growing in faith;)0 -
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