Czech president compares EU to Soviet Union

Kama

Scofflaw wrote:

It's not normally considered subordination unless you have no say in the group's decisions.

I'd regard low effective 'voice' as sufficient criteria for subordination, as stricto sensu inferiority, which was the 'small state-big state' argument used so effectively. Again, definitional contestation and slippage.

It's not as good as making EU law subject to Bunreacht in terms of allowing national preferences to be enforced, but unfortunately that's unworkable.

I am reminded of the properly Hegelian concept of tragedy, as the clash of two rights; making EU subject to Bunreacht is unworkable, yet for a national constitutional-fundamentalist, making Bunreacht subject to EU is unacceptable. (I'm not one, but I appreciate the position as firmly and authentically held, rather than being necessarily a 'reactionary' or 'ignorant' position). The first is a logistical and legal quagmire (for an integrationist), the second is a betrayal of the state-national project (for a nationalist), and I don't see them as easily reconciled.

nesf wrote:

your average anti-Lisbon diatribe it's not exactly comparable to the more sober setting of a European Politics lecture.

Agree again; anti-Lisbon discourse is in general a populist mode and rhetoric, and as with basically any populist-agitation propaganda it names an enemy, and attempt to construct a 'people' in opposition to it. Whereas a European Politics lecture (and imo the social-political tendencies with which is predominantly composed of people sympathetic to European integration, and its participants tend to identify more with the project as being in their interests.

On these lines, the class split on the Lisbon issue was quite significant, much as it was in the French constitutional precursor. James Wickham, Jean Monnet Professor TCD made this point at the Lisbon2 (non)debate with d'Estaing, that the European elite basically shot itself in the foot; by stripping social rights in line with neoliberal policy for 20-odd years, they robbed themself of the popular support needed, and reaped what they sowed.

This leads to essentially my main concern with the project, less the content, more the approach, the handling, the method; distancing of representation, engineered avoidance of referenda, technical management of the democratic process to produce an 'approved' result, and the critiques on these lines: 'technocracy', 'managerialism', etc.

As Scofflaw has repeatedly said, the EU is responsible to the states, and the states responsible to the people. Yet as shown in Lisbon's results, the preferences of the political representatives differs significantly from the preferences of their constituents on this issue, demonstrated by the near-absence of support for a No by parties, and the strong support by the 'popular will' of a 'No' in referendum; the doubling of a second-order representation as a decrease in the representativeness of representation, or more polemically the tendency toward oligarchy over democracy.

Rightly or wrongly, the EU is being plausibly represented by the populist appraches as being a project without popular democratic legitimacy; and call me a stickler, but I do think that for Europe as a project to legitimately progress, integrate, etc, it needs popular legitimacy. I'm what they pejoratively term a 'democratic fundamentalist' on that: European integration by circumnavigating this I would 'consider harmful', ethically, pragmatically, viscerally.

D'Estaing, in closing, spoke of the lack of any spirit or faith in the European project among the Irish; I reckon us to be a representative scapegoat here for a broader problem. I would submit that the blame for this is shared by the leadership as much as the populace, and is less-than-bolstered by dry debates on the legal minutiae. 'No' contained a far stronger emotional message first time round, and won, whereas Lisbon 2.0 seems likely to be a contest of who can scare the electorate more, and to be frank, this seems a ignominious and unhealthy birth to a European order.

It is on these lines that I am quite in support of Wickham's 'Modest Proposal'; a non-binding pan-European referendum, as an indicative measure of support or its lack, which is a milder form of the suggestion by Habermas for a pan-referendum at an earlier date. Legally meaningless, symbolically rich, yet I suspect politically unlikely to happen, due to fear of a 'unsatisfactory' result. I can only speak for myself, but in the event of a strong Yes in such a 'referendum', I'd follow in sympathy.

Note this is not a 'rational' approach, but one based on solidarity and a sense of togetherness and (comm)unity. Which, to my mind, would be a Europe worth supporting and believing in.

nesf

Kama wrote: »

I am reminded of the properly Hegelian concept of tragedy, as the clash of two rights; making EU subject to Bunreacht is unworkable, yet for a national constitutional-fundamentalist, making Bunreacht subject to EU is unacceptable. (I'm not one, but I appreciate the position as firmly and authentically held, rather than being necessarily a 'reactionary' or 'ignorant' position).

This is something we agree on, even though I firmly disagree with the position it's one of those rational "No" positions that are unfortunately not common enough among those I chat to who say they voted No. Then again I've little time for arguments of "I voted No because I didn't understand the question". I'd be a bit of a hard liner about it being people's own responsibility to inform themselves on this issues which is not a common view from what I can make out.

Kama wrote: »

Agree again; anti-Lisbon discourse is in general a populist mode and rhetoric, and as with basically any populist-agitation propaganda it names an enemy, and attempt to construct a 'people' in opposition to it. Whereas a European Politics lecture (and imo the social-political tendencies with which is predominantly composed of people sympathetic to European integration, and its participants tend to identify more with the project as being in their interests.

On these lines, the class split on the Lisbon issue was quite significant, much as it was in the French constitutional precursor. James Wickham, Jean Monnet Professor TCD made this point at the Lisbon2 (non)debate with d'Estaing, that the European elite basically shot itself in the foot; by stripping social rights in line with neoliberal policy for 20-odd years, they robbed themself of the popular support needed, and reaped what they sowed.

This leads to essentially my main concern with the project, less the content, more the approach, the handling, the method; distancing of representation, engineered avoidance of referenda, technical management of the democratic process to produce an 'approved' result, and the critiques on these lines: 'technocracy', 'managerialism', etc.

As Scofflaw has repeatedly said, the EU is responsible to the states, and the states responsible to the people. Yet as shown in Lisbon's results, the preferences of the political representatives differs significantly from the preferences of their constituents on this issue, demonstrated by the near-absence of support for a No by parties, and the strong support by the 'popular will' of a 'No' in referendum; the doubling of a second-order representation as a decrease in the representativeness of representation, or more polemically the tendency toward oligarchy over democracy.

Rightly or wrongly, the EU is being plausibly represented by the populist appraches as being a project without popular democratic legitimacy; and call me a stickler, but I do think that for Europe as a project to legitimately progress, integrate, etc, it needs popular legitimacy. I'm what they pejoratively term a 'democratic fundamentalist' on that: European integration by circumnavigating this I would 'consider harmful', ethically, pragmatically, viscerally.

D'Estaing, in closing, spoke of the lack of any spirit or faith in the European project among the Irish; I reckon us to be a representative scapegoat here for a broader problem. I would submit that the blame for this is shared by the leadership as much as the populace, and is less-than-bolstered by dry debates on the legal minutiae. 'No' contained a far stronger emotional message first time round, and won, whereas Lisbon 2.0 seems likely to be a contest of who can scare the electorate more, and to be frank, this seems a ignominious and unhealthy birth to a European order.

It is on these lines that I am quite in support of Wickham's 'Modest Proposal'; a non-binding pan-European referendum, as an indicative measure of support or its lack, which is a milder form of the suggestion by Habermas for a pan-referendum at an earlier date. Legally meaningless, symbolically rich, yet I suspect politically unlikely to happen, due to fear of a 'unsatisfactory' result. I can only speak for myself, but in the event of a strong Yes in such a 'referendum', I'd follow in sympathy.

Note this is not a 'rational' approach, but one based on solidarity and a sense of togetherness and (comm)unity. Which, to my mind, would be a Europe worth supporting and believing in.

The problem of course being that quite often referendum results come down to who can shape the mob mentality best. Referendums aren't fought and won on the issues by serious minded people interested in accurately criticising each others positions. Could we even infer anything from a referendum result in such a case? Might we have national issues unrelated to the EU, like a hated Government party contributing to a bigger No vote like we had in the first Lisbon Treaty here? How do you separate this out and should this influence discussions at EU level? What about widespread misinformation being spread by either side? Does either happening at a national level in some part of the EU invalidate the EU-wide result? Is it a per-head or per country referendum and if one why not the other? Etc.

Scofflaw

Kama wrote: »

It's not normally considered subordination unless you have no say in the group's decisions.

I'd regard low effective 'voice' as sufficient criteria for subordination, as stricto sensu inferiority, which was the 'small state-big state' argument used so effectively. Again, definitional contestation and slippage.

I can see that point, and it might be the case if the EU actually worked by the QMV method. However, QMV isn't really used any more than vetoes are - what happens is consensus, which requires everybody on board.

Kama wrote: »

It's not as good as making EU law subject to Bunreacht in terms of allowing national preferences to be enforced, but unfortunately that's unworkable.

I am reminded of the properly Hegelian concept of tragedy, as the clash of two rights; making EU subject to Bunreacht is unworkable, yet for a national constitutional-fundamentalist, making Bunreacht subject to EU is unacceptable. (I'm not one, but I appreciate the position as firmly and authentically held, rather than being necessarily a 'reactionary' or 'ignorant' position). The first is a logistical and legal quagmire (for an integrationist), the second is a betrayal of the state-national project (for a nationalist), and I don't see them as easily reconciled.

It's not really possible to reconcile them, I think. What I would say is that far fewer people are fervently nationalistic than one might expect. Nationalists tend to forget that nationalism itself is a constructed identity of relatively recent historical origin.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Kama

It's not really possible to reconcile them, I think. What I would say is that far fewer people are fervently nationalistic than one might expect. Nationalists tend to forget that nationalism itself is a constructed identity of relatively recent historical origin.

So far, so Benedict Anderson. Yet while my personal identity is also of 'relatively recent historical origin', and essentially a constructed, imagined fiction, it makes it no less (subjectively)true, or would make invalidating it no less painful; moreso for any shared commonality of identity. The integrated European identity is also of recent origin, and so on for any identity you wish to cite. I'd tend to think that the nation as a political signifier has greater latent strength than you, and notice that it is currently being used quite efficiently on these lines by self-same populist campaigns. The tendency to declare the death of states or nations has in both cases been somewhat premature.

I'm glad you accept the point that it is not a reconcilable position, and would further contend that a key failure is to create a (European) identity on a broad enough level to command popular support. It's propaganda eitherway, I consider the term quite neutrally, whether integrationist propaganda (as distributed by our State) or agitation propaganda (as by the 'No' groups). Theirs was better, tbh.

nesf wrote:

Then again I've little time for arguments of "I voted No because I didn't understand the question".

Yet when the question appears intentionally obscurantic, my tolerance for that argument increases. Dramatically. Lisbon was anything but reader-friendly, whether from motive or 'drift'.

The problem of course being that quite often referendum results come down to who can shape the mob mentality best.

You say 'mob mentality', I say 'popular will'? Again, the terms are loaded from the outset, n'est pas? But between the Scylla of a populist misunderstanding/distortion of perfect rational-utopian communication and the Charybdis of a technocratic managerialism, (which to my mind are mutually constitutive tendencies, nota bene), my bias falls to the first between these two. As said, democratic fundamentalism, what they call a 'deal-breaker'.

My impression of the principal 'Yes' voices on this forum, and elsewhere, is that they fall on the opposite side of this line, that the (potential or actual) tyranny of ochlocracy > the tyranny of technocracy. Much like Left-Right, I don't think these 'rational' preferences, but value-based positions with rationalizations as a tasty topping.

Does either happening at a national level in some part of the EU invalidate the EU-wide result? Is it a per-head or per country referendum and if one why not the other? Etc.

It would be A: non-binding and B: indicative, so the questions are pretty irrelevant. In formal-democratic terms, it would be a colossal waste and potential embaressment, hence why I said it's unlikely to occur. In symbolic and mythic terms, it'd mean a lot more than playing 'Ode to Joy'. :rolleyes:

nesf

Kama wrote: »

Yet when the question appears intentionally obscurantic, my tolerance for that argument increases. Dramatically. Lisbon was anything but reader-friendly, whether from motive or 'drift'.

I accept that point.

Kama wrote: »

You say 'mob mentality', I say 'popular will'? Again, the terms are loaded from the outset, n'est pas?

Loaded they most certainly are, I'm not sure if it's possible to avoid loaded terms in this.

Kama wrote: »

My impression of the principal 'Yes' voices on this forum, and elsewhere, is that they fall on the opposite side of this line, that the (potential or actual) tyranny of ochlocracy > the tyranny of technocracy. Much like Left-Right, I don't think these 'rational' preferences, but value-based positions with rationalizations as a tasty topping.

Well, fundamentally this is coming down to a question of why we have representative democracy rather than direct democracy on most issues. Something I imagine we fundamentally disagree on?

Kama wrote: »

It would be A: non-binding and B: indicative, so the questions are pretty irrelevant. In formal-democratic terms, it would be a colossal waste and potential embaressment, hence why I said it's unlikely to occur. In symbolic and mythic terms, it'd mean a lot more than playing 'Ode to Joy'. :rolleyes:

My point was this, any "No" (or "Yes") vote would be seized upon by the respective side as backing up their view even if it was obvious that the vote had less to do with the Lisbon treaty and more to do with some unrelated national issue.

How would this be useful?

Kama

nesf wrote:

Loaded they most certainly are, I'm not sure if it's possible to avoid loaded terms in this.

I don't think it's possible, no. But they can be either mitigated, or accentuated, depending on if we are being polemic or more moderate.

Well, fundamentally this is coming down to a question of why we have representative democracy rather than direct democracy on most issues. Something I imagine we fundamentally disagree on?

Rather than the hard universal of direct democracy being better/direct being the mob, or representative being necessary distance/representative being prone to capture or oligarchy, on this the particular case is the reliance and structuring of the formal-democratic process to avoid direct input, and repeat the disappointment of France etc.

Again, this is the approach I find...distasteful, and that bolsters and legitimates the 'No' argument that Europe is becoming a tyranny that seeks to circumvent la choise publique. Best defence aginst this charge would be to withdraw the support it's being given, but this would present the public with a strong opportunity to use it to criticise elites, of which they appear more than leery.

My point was this, any "No" (or "Yes") vote would be seized upon by the respective side as backing up their view even if it was obvious that the vote had less to do with the Lisbon treaty and more to do with some unrelated national issue.

How would this be useful?

Rhetorically, it would show that the 'technocrat' side pay at least lip service to the idea of popular legitimacy.
It couldn't hurt (or could it?)

Pragmatically, in the event that there is a clear 'Yes' from Europe as a whole, this undercuts the 'democracy' argument from the 'No' side. The lack or avoidance of referenda has been one of their main charges, one I'm quite sympathetic to. For ambivalent floaters like me, it would provide a 'herd' effect, and while the results could be disputed, it would be a definite improvement on both sides claiming to be speaking for 'Europe', when it suits them, and placing any words in it's inchoate mouth they like. So it would a a decrease in uncertainty from the current status...

More idealistically, it would be a symbolic gesture of European unity, speaking for all to hear.
And tbh, if it's good enough for Wickham and Habermas, it's good enough for me:

"The only way out I can see is a Europe-wide referendum. The governments – which control the process after all – have to recognize their own powerlessness and, this one time, "dare to use democracy." They have to rise above themselves and face the political parties of which they themselves are composed with the necessity of engaging in an open, Europe-wide campaign, a struggle for each and every vote in favour of, or in opposition to, an expansion and deepening of the European Union."

Opening the possibilities of a democratic engagement would be a risk, and I don't think it likely to happen.
But reducing the possibilities, as seems to me to be the tendency, replaces this risk with a depoliticised decline, politics-as-adminstration.

On the drawing-in of non-Treaty matters: like it or lump it, Lisbon will pull in non-Lisbon criteria, for all that we may bemoan this. Trust (or its lack) in elites, faith (or suspicion) in the direction of the European project, anger at economic management, all will feed in some manner into any vote. Moreso where the (formal) content is generally inscrutable, other non-formal issues will bleed in.

To move from there to the apparent position that democratic choice is somehow invalidated, and the need for more distanced representation, with a greater 'firewall' between the public and choice/power is all the greater, is a step too far in a self-reinforcing process: democracy is successively hollowed out, the agora shrinks further, and Europe is managed in the 'best interests' of the dirty, ignorant, irrational masses, by those 'qualified'.

This is not a project I would willingly support, either by action or inaction. I'd also note in passing that there is a pretty long genealogy of declaring the masses to be ignorant, and needing guidance or control, or their input to be limited, in the interests of 'efficient' governance, not all of it pretty. The general progress of democracy has been of the opening to, and enfranchisement of, greater portions of the population: justifications of its retrenchment read to me as reactionary regress, in a broad historical outlook.

And the same pragamtic point still stands: the more you talk of the irrationality and ignorance of the masses, quoting Caplan etc happily, the more you buttress and legitimate the argument that you are anti-democratic technocrats. All the 'this is why referenda are bad' arguments, which generally possess a certain arrogant and sanctimonious tone, looked at from the other direction are proof of the equal-and-oposite self-certain assumptions. Hence the general tenor of discussion: mutual accusations of 'populist morons' or 'bought shills'.

Yes, the pro-Lisbon side are predominantly better-educated, of a higher socioeconomic class, and the discourse reflects this, and 'No' is articulated in a populist mode, and typically has worse spelling. Doesn't make it 'right', eitherway, just means it's kinda a non-argument, swapping a better or worse class of slur.


So, the main question I'm asking here is:

If the current model of European integration lacks popular legitimacy, should it still proceed in its absence?
(I suspect this question to be entirely redundant, tbh, but we'll let it stand)

View

Kama wrote: »

So, the main question I'm asking here is:

If the current model of European integration lacks popular legitimacy, should it still proceed in its absence?
(I suspect this question to be entirely redundant, tbh, but we'll let it stand)

Well argued posts Kama, but I am not sure your question stands up to scrutiny.

In a couple of months, there will be the European elections - bar a major political earthquake, the over-whelming majority of voters in the member states will vote for political parties (or politicans) that favour EU integration to a greater or lesser extent. Likewise, in the general elections in the member states, the majority of voters will back similar parties (or politicans).

As such, in the eyes of most voters and politicans across the member states, there is clear support for the EU and its objectives (one of which is to build on the exisiting treaties).

Remember, the constitutions of the other member states typically give their Parliaments explicit authority to conclude international treaties. It is solely the decision of their Parliaments (and their Governments which do the negotiating on a day-to-day basis) as to what they agree to in EU treaties.

Under their constitutions, therefore, sovereignity rests with Parliament. Control of Parliament = control of negotiating/concluding EU treaties. There is no questions (in their minds) that there is any "lack of popular legitimacy" in the process.

Their systems differ from ours, but faced with this, we essentially have three choices:
a) accept the differences and get over it,
b) attempt to persuade them that our system is more "legitimate" than theirs,
c) withdraw from the EU as there are fundamental differences between us and them.

In reality, that choice narrows down to a) or c). In the case of b), you'd find it a very tough sell to persuade voters, never mind politicans, in other member states that their constitutional provisions are inferior to ours. Most of them, would probably hold the view that our system is impractical in practise.

Therefore, given the above, which option would you prefer - a) or c)?

Scofflaw

View wrote: »

Well argued posts Kama, but I am not sure your question stands up to scrutiny.

In a couple of months, there will be the European elections - bar a major political earthquake, the over-whelming majority of voters in the member states will vote for political parties (or politicans) that favour EU integration to a greater or lesser extent. Likewise, in the general elections in the member states, the majority of voters will back similar parties (or politicans).

As such, in the eyes of most voters and politicans across the member states, there is clear support for the EU and its objectives (one of which is to build on the exisiting treaties).

Remember, the constitutions of the other member states typically give their Parliaments explicit authority to conclude international treaties. It is solely the decision of their Parliaments (and their Governments which do the negotiating on a day-to-day basis) as to what they agree to in EU treaties.

Under their constitutions, therefore, sovereignity rests with Parliament. Control of Parliament = control of negotiating/concluding EU treaties. There is no questions (in their minds) that there is any "lack of popular legitimacy" in the process.

Their systems differ from ours, but faced with this, we essentially have three choices:
a) accept the differences and get over it,
b) attempt to persuade them that our system is more "legitimate" than theirs,
c) withdraw from the EU as there are fundamental differences between us and them.

In reality, that choice narrows down to a) or c). In the case of b), you'd find it a very tough sell to persuade voters, never mind politicans, in other member states that their constitutional provisions are inferior to ours. Most of them, would probably hold the view that our system is impractical in practise.

Therefore, given the above, which option would you prefer - a) or c)?

That's well put. Kama's argument, followed to its logical conclusion, would suggest that nearly every piece of government activity worldwide is illegitimate, since virtually nothing that any government anywhere does has been given a popular mandate by referendum.

On an ongoing basis, if EU integration was not something the majority of European electorates wanted, there would be large Eurosceptical parties. The standard response to that is that people do't elect their governments on the basis of their views on Europe, which rather ignores the fact that it's perfectly possible for a political party to change its stance on Europe without changing it on anything else - and if opposition to integration were popular, more parties would do it.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Kama

While I owe you both a reply, I'm owed one first:

I asked a hypothetical - 'If the current model of European integration lacks popular legitimacy, should it still proceed in its absence?'

It's a pretty straight yes/no, and if somewhat rhetorical, a reply would've been appreciated. I did not state as a factual that it does or doesn't eitherway (while I would mention that such a question would be answered by the Habermas/Wickham proposal) but that it remains an open question. Hence, the need for a hypothetical; I assume that many of the pro-side would be in favour, so long as formal-representative procedure was followed. I'd like to know if this assumption is wannanted or not.

if EU integration was not something the majority of European electorates wanted, there would be large Eurosceptical parties...if opposition to integration were popular, more parties would do it.

Much as the Lisbon model of integration was supported by Irish political parties in proportional correspondence to the opinions of the electorate on the issue? :rolleyes:

Part of the argument against representation is the distancing of views of representatives from that of their constituents; assuming this degree of responsivity to popular 'demand' I don't think necessarily holds up.
Additionally, a Eurosceptic preference is less likely to be reflected in parliament, since this position is less likely to regard the institutions as legitimate, and show reduced participation.

Scofflaw

Kama wrote: »

While I owe you both a reply, I'm owed one first:

I asked a hypothetical - 'If the current model of European integration lacks popular legitimacy, should it still proceed in its absence?'

It's a pretty straight yes/no, and if somewhat rhetorical, a reply would've been appreciated. I did not state as a factual that it does or doesn't eitherway (while I would mention that such a question would be answered by the Habermas/Wickham proposal) but that it remains an open question. Hence, the need for a hypothetical; I assume that many of the pro-side would be in favour, so long as formal-representative procedure was followed. I'd like to know if this assumption is wannanted or not.

My answer is that the question is impossible to answer meaningfully without defining what is meant by "popular legitimacy".

If "lacks popular legitimacy" means "with a majority of Europeans actively against it as opposed to either supporting or acquiescing" then the answer is indeed a simple No.

If, on the other hand, it means "in the absence of referendum results in favour in every country for every aspect of the current form of integration, then the answer is Yes, since that's an unrealistic requirement.

If you define "popular legitimacy" as including approval by representatives, then no answer is necessary, since no integration will go ahead without their approval.

If you define "popular legitimacy" as excluding approval by representatives, then we have an entirely different discussion to hold, because by doing so you define nearly every action of legitimately elected democratic governments as "lacking popular legitimacy" - a position which I hope you can see opens up a rather broader discussion.

Kama wrote: »

Much as the Lisbon model of integration was supported by Irish political parties in proportional correspondence to the opinions of the electorate on the issue? :rolleyes:

Part of the argument against representation is the distancing of views of representatives from that of their constituents; assuming this degree of responsivity to popular 'demand' I don't think necessarily holds up.
Additionally, a Eurosceptic preference is less likely to be reflected in parliament, since this position is less likely to regard the institutions as legitimate, and show reduced participation.

Well, see remarks above - if one is going to claim that the actions or preferences of elected representatives are illegitimate by virtue of their 'distance' from those of their constituents, then we have to accept as a corollary that most democratic government is illegitimate most of the time. I suspect most people would not agree with such a position, despite the humorous rolling eyeballs.

I've pointed this out elsewhere, but there is no requirement that the views or intentions of representatives be entirely congruent with those of their electors. It is entirely legitimate, for example, for a representative to prefer abortion to be freely available, and to work towards that end - and the same is true of an entire party, even if they are elected by an electorate that is opposed to it. As long as a representative acts within the law, then they are free to work towards having the electorate change their minds - indeed, it's hard to imagine that we would have had much civic progress if this were not the case.

That, obviously, feeds back into the whole issue of "respecting the vote". There is simply no requirement whatsoever that the government follow the expression of the will of the people at referendum in formulating policy as long as they are bound by the legal consequences of the expression of the will of the people at referendum. The latter is democracy - the former would be populism.

So, to come back to your question - I can't answer it unless you're willing to define what you mean by "lacks popular legitimacy".

cordially,
Scofflaw

Kama

The latter is democracy - the former would be populism.

From the 'other' position, the first is circumscription by any available means of direct choice from what is (imho) the nearest, closest expression of said choice by the people, while the former is democracy, a word with much rhetorical capital. Hence the de-constitutionalization/crypto-constitutionalization that Lisbon was born from, the necessity to avoid this populist threat.

'Democracy' here is defined by you as precisely this limitation; expressed preference is not even indicative, and that to take it as such would be the scourge-and-slur of 'populism'. Following Ranciere, we might say that 'a good democratic government is one capable of controlling the evil called democratic life'; corral and manage choice, remove it if possible, and trust in apathy or acquiescence of the middle-ground coupled with a Yes well-funded in political capital.

The EU enjoys a broad but vague support, but much as the No vote can be dissected into its components (as with our 'guarantees'), this could be unpicked between those who advocate a supra-nationalist position (as in your comment about consitutional-fundamantalists being a rump minority), and those who lean further toward a inter-nationalist position (generally represented as regressionist and implicitly fascist, but of wider palatability than the BNP and le Pen). 'Integration' unifies these as a stance, but not without strain.

In my view, Lisbon 1 was somewhat radicalizing in this regard, and supra-nationalism appeared weaker than was hoped. Nations (right or wrong, imagined or not) still inspire loyalty, while an inchoate European 'identity' does not; it is premature to sing eulogies for the nation-state. This to me came out with the Czech artwork/stunt/hoax: the dirty obscenity of nationality in the home of supranationalism.

Now, in regard to legitimacy, and its variants...

1: Then I can assume your support for a proposal a la Wickham, that we might accurately know the numbers of the Pro, the Anti, and the Apathetic? Or do you perhaps mean the weaker form, that the 'No' has not organized and seized power, ergo it is weaker, as the mob has not seized buildings?

2: I note you load the statement against, as 'every little detail' to referendum. Perhaps you might specify the basis on which it is 'unrealistic' to seek the assent of each country internally? Political-pragmatic unrealistic, unmanageable, in that it seems likely that it would fail to pass?

3: True, but trivial, and also the current status.

4: Not excluding, but not reduced to.

Contra you, I would argue that a representatives legitimacy declines or is diluted with loss of support. A 'Green' representative caught supporting an environmental criminal, a 'moral values' representative with the proverbial dead hooker or live boy, can be said to have lost legitimacy, although formally their situation has not changed.

Representatives have a role; before studying any politics, I naively assumed it was communicated by the name, that they represent; a number of people are also labouring under this misconception, see this disjunct, and call it 'corruption', 'elites', or the defeatist and apathetic, 'politics'. Again, the antagonistic gap between those who consider the role of politicians as being to lead the public, and those who consider they should serve them. Regardless of one's preference here (again a question of held values, notoriously inamenable to reason) I think you'll cede that for the former, trust is both required, and in short supply.

Against the more technical discussions, as is is probably clear from my posts, I regard Lisbon (and by extension, politics) as less a rational calculus, and more based on emotion and trust, or faith. Doubtless I'm wrong again, but I interpret the distancing from referenda as an attempt to mitigate this 'irrationality'. My criticism is that the political baby is aborted with the 'irrational' bathwater, leaing a 'rational', 'efficient' functioning, cleansing the mess of the democratic invention to a marginal, supplementary role.

View wrote:

a) accept the differences and get over it,
b) attempt to persuade them that our system is more "legitimate" than theirs

I don't see this as simply 'Us Against Them'; similar concerns about the inferiority of Lisbon as a regime in relation to national-constitutionalism (as are routinely trashed on these boards) were raised by the judges at Karlsruhe Consitutional Court...on loss of national competencies, flexibility clauses, shifts from unanimity to majority, etc. So I don't think it's 'Bunreacht Uber Alles', no...

JonnyMaguire

I would have to agree with the czech fella.

After all the lisbon treaty does contain the reintroduction of the death penalty.

(a) Article 2(2) of the ECHR:

"Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article
when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully
detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection."

(b) Article 2 of Protocol No 6 to the ECHR:

"A State may make provision in its law for the death penalty in respect of acts
committed in time of war or of imminent threat of war; such penalty shall be applied
only in the instances laid down in the law and in accordance with its provisions…"



Yes in black and white, as stated in the treaty.

Hitman Actual

JonnyMaguire wrote: »

I would have to agree with the czech fella.

After all the lisbon treaty does contain the reintroduction of the death penalty.

(a) Article 2(2) of the ECHR:

"Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article
when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully
detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection."

(b) Article 2 of Protocol No 6 to the ECHR:

"A State may make provision in its law for the death penalty in respect of acts
committed in time of war or of imminent threat of war; such penalty shall be applied
only in the instances laid down in the law and in accordance with its provisions…"

Yes in black and white, as stated in the treaty.

Agree with "the czech fella" on what points? There's nothing in his speech relating to the death penalty. Just as there's nothing in your post as regards to Lisbon and the reintroduction of the death penalty. Article 2 of the ECHR specifically pertains to the Right to Life, except in the three cases stated (relating to self defense, actions in quelling public unrest, etc). And your selective quoting of Protocol 6 is interesting. Did you skip over Article 1 of Protocol 6, which states:

wrote:

Article 1 – Abolition of the death penalty
The death penalty shall be abolished. No-one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed.

Article 2 of Protocol 6 states that a country may introduce the death penalty for war crimes. It's nothing to do with a mass re-introduction of the death penalty.

Amd finally, most (all?) EU countries are already subject to the ECHR through the Council of Europe, Ireland having actually been one of the original members in 1950. The Lisbon Treaty changes nothing. In fact, the EU has always been one of the most vocal opponents of the death penalty. A quick search will tell you that, here's one such statement.

sink

JonnyMaguire wrote: »

I would have to agree with the czech fella.

After all the lisbon treaty does contain the reintroduction of the death penalty.

(a) Article 2(2) of the ECHR:

"Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article
when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully
detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection."

(b) Article 2 of Protocol No 6 to the ECHR:

"A State may make provision in its law for the death penalty in respect of acts
committed in time of war or of imminent threat of war; such penalty shall be applied
only in the instances laid down in the law and in accordance with its provisions…"



Yes in black and white, as stated in the treaty.

Hitman is correct but he missed the most fundamental mistake you made.

The ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights) is a document of the CoE (Council of Europe) which is a completely separate entity to the EU (European Union) and is not be confused with either the 'Council of the European Union' or the 'European Council' which are both EU institutions. We have been members of the CoE and signatories of the ECHR since 1950. That's 59 years, 27 years before we even became members of what was known as the EEC.

You are probably confusing the ECHR with the 'Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union' (CFR) which will be made legally binding by the Lisbon Treaty. It does not make all domestic laws legally bound by the CFR but rather only EU institutions and directives.

Hitman Actual

sink wrote: »

Hitman is correct but he missed the most fundamental mistake you made.

The ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights) is a document of the CoE (Council of Europe) which is a completely separate entity to the EU (European Union) and is not be confused with either the 'Council of the European Union' or the 'European Council' which are both EU institutions. We have been members of the CoE and signatories of the ECHR since 1950. That's 59 years, 27 years before we even became members of what was known as the EEC.

You are probably confusing the ECHR with the 'Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union' (CFR) which will be made legally binding by the Lisbon Treaty. It does not make all domestic laws legally bound by the CFR but rather only EU institutions and directives.

Yeah, I'm always mixing up the two as well as regards what actually happens through Lisbon. I really need to brush up on it, but it's one aspect of the Treaty that doesn't bother me, so I haven't put much time into it.

Scofflaw

sink wrote: »

Hitman is correct but he missed the most fundamental mistake you made.

The ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights) is a document of the CoE (Council of Europe) which is a completely separate entity to the EU (European Union) and is not be confused with either the 'Council of the European Union' or the 'European Council' which are both EU institutions. We have been members of the CoE and signatories of the ECHR since 1950. That's 59 years, 27 years before we even became members of what was known as the EEC.

You are probably confusing the ECHR with the 'Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union' (CFR) which will be made legally binding by the Lisbon Treaty. It does not make all domestic laws legally bound by the CFR but rather only EU institutions and directives.

JohnnyMaguire has also missed the point that like most EU states we are signatories to Protocol 13 of the ECHR, which abolishes the death penalty entirely without exception (which is why we removed it from the Constitution by referendum).

Honestly, I'm tempted to make a sticky of "Lisbon myths", and just shoot anybody who repeats one of them. There are bits of the treaty you can interpret one way or another, but there are also completely false factoids like this one.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Hitman Actual

Scofflaw wrote: »

He has also missed the point that...

You guys finished pointing out all my mistakes yet?

sink

Scofflaw wrote: »

Honestly, I'm tempted to make a sticky of "Lisbon myths", and just shoot anybody who repeats one of them. There are bits of the treaty you can interpret one way or another, but there are also completely false factoids like this one.

+1 to that.

Hitman Actual wrote: »

You guys finished pointing out all my mistakes yet?

Don't worry, the only reason I know this stuff is because someone made the claim and I knew it sounded wrong so I did a bit of reading. Otherwise it would be completely inconsequential and uninteresting.

Kama

Honestly, I'm tempted to make a sticky of "Lisbon myths", and just shoot anybody who repeats one of them. There are bits of the treaty you can interpret one way or another, but there are also completely false factoids like this one.

In your opinion, which parts are most liable to creative interpretation, if it's not against your interests?

Scofflaw

Kama wrote: »

In your opinion, which parts are most liable to creative interpretation, if it's not against your interests?

A conservative definition would be any bit that isn't open and shut like this death penalty nonsense. There are also, of course, completely false factoids like the idea that Lisbon commits us to spend a certain percentage of our GDP on defence - one can argue about exactly what "undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities" entails, but Lisbon contains no mention whatsoever of a figure.

As to which of the parts have been most creatively interpreted - probably the bits about market distortions, which has been used to justify claims from tax harmonisation to imposition of abortion.

That's not to say that I think many of the creative interpretations are tenable, but it is at least possible to advance some of them without being factually wrong.

cordially,
Scofflaw