Rebuilding Afghanistan

Manic Moran

There are already talks of making a "deal" (i.e pay them off) with the taliban. The Italians were onto something.

That will only work if the Taliban think that they won't achieve victory by maintaining their current course of action. If they think they can, then why should they bother to deal? Just keep fighting until NATO gives up and goes home, and they keep the whole enchilada to themselves. You need to be in a position of strength to get the other guy to sit down and negotiate with you.

And I don't acceed to the allegations that the Italians were paying off the lads near Surobi.

NTM

Fratton Fred

jank wrote: »

As I said this situation will not be solved by the number of soldiers on the ground, it has to be solved politically. There are already talks of making a "deal" (i.e pay them off) with the taliban. The Italians were onto something.

And what do you think the Taliban will do with these new found riches? up their campaign to take Pakistan? fund Al Qaeda to carry on slaughtering innocents?

Failure in Afghanistan is not an option in my opinion. The people of Afghanistan need to be given the security required to live their lives without the need for the Taliban and all that comes with them. If this requries additional troops thn so be it. Make the area safe, win hearts and minds and destroy the Taliban at their grass roots level, ie take away the reason why people join them in the first place.

ynotdu

So the date for the new election has been set for Nov 7th.It seems Senator Kerry was not just in Afghanistan on a'fact finding'mission,rather with an offer from the White House 'that could not be refused'.It was a bit sick watching Karzai joking during the announcement flanked by Kerry and a representitive of the UN.over a million votes considered 'dodgy'
The month of the last election saw more coalition forces killed than in any other month since the war began.

It seems like putting the chicken before the egg to have the election before an increase in troops:eek:.
what is going to be SO diffrient about this election given that it seems the situation has not moved on since the first one?'.It seems it can only lead to further deaths corruption and intimidation in the run up to polling day.

Even given the fact that the Afghan winters are so harsh and 100,s of villages get cut off until spring,it makes no sense.
It seems a reckless move not to wait till spring and with a far higher number of troops in the country.
Idiots!:mad:

OS119

ynotdu wrote: »

Even given the fact that the Afghan winters are so harsh and 100,s of villages get cut off until spring,it makes no sense.
It seems a reckless move not to wait till spring and with a far higher number of troops in the country.
Idiots!:mad:

OTOH, given that the election was so dodgy - NATO and the UN have effectively accused Karzai of being a crook - can you wait around for 6 months for a new election with him at the helm, i think not.

ynotdu

OS119 wrote: »

OTOH, given that the election was so dodgy - NATO and the UN have effectively accused Karzai of being a crook - can you wait around for 6 months for a new election with him at the helm, i think not.

America allowed a man into the White house who had lost an election for four years, and a further four were his re-election cannot be disputed.

It is not a matter of Kharzi or Abdullah being' crooks'
It is a matter of how best to save lives alround.
The UN were at his side today when he so 'graciously'accepted another election:rolleyes:

as safe as anybody can be in Afghanistan HE will{thanks to troops}
the same troops who's lives HE&others has placed in danger.

And You seem to have missed the point.How can these Elections be any more trusted than the 1st one? almost nothing on the ground has changed enough to guarante this 'new' election will be any less corrupt.

jank

Fratton Fred wrote: »

And what do you think the Taliban will do with these new found riches? up their campaign to take Pakistan? fund Al Qaeda to carry on slaughtering innocents?

Failure in Afghanistan is not an option in my opinion. The people of Afghanistan need to be given the security required to live their lives without the need for the Taliban and all that comes with them. If this requires additional troops thn so be it. Make the area safe, win hearts and minds and destroy the Taliban at their grass roots level, ie take away the reason why people join them in the first place.

I am afraid that is a very simplistic way of looking at it. Ye guys are going on about not letting them win and at the moment NATO are doing that. But you cannot occupy a country indefinitely. It is a stalemate at the moment. More troops will not do anything to change the status quo. The taliban will just go and fight in Pakistan.

What is victory for NATO? The taliban can keep on fighting for the next 10 years if they want to. I dont see NATO being there for the next 10 years.

The whole thing is a mess, NATO should never have gotten involved in the first place. Go after Bin Laden sure, but regime change is very easy on paper.

The whole thing is utterly pointless.

ynotdu

jank wrote: »

I am afraid that is a very simplistic way of looking at it. Ye guys are going on about not letting them win and at the moment NATO are doing that. But you cannot occupy a country indefinitely. It is a stalemate at the moment. More troops will not do anything to change the status quo. The taliban will just go and fight in Pakistan.

What is victory for NATO? The taliban can keep on fighting for the next 10 years if they want to. I dont see NATO being there for the next 10 years.

The whole thing is a mess, NATO should never have gotten involved in the first place. Go after Bin Laden sure, but regime change is very easy on paper.

The whole thing is utterly pointless.

NO a country should not be held indefinatly,but the quickest way out is a Democratic Govt with the respect of it's Army!The correctness or moral right to have gone into Afgha has already been beaten to death.
the reality now is what has to be dealt with.IMO controlling Pakistan is not what the Taliban want,they want Afghanistan&when they had it they ran possibly the most oppressed Country on Earth!Women had to wear burcha's,girls could not go to school,every terrorist was welcome to their training camps,they corrupted the Koran to make suicide bombings a virtue to the easily lead.they are really crazy people and were before NATO intervened.

You cant disasociate Al quada from the taliban,they are BLOOD-brothers.My guess is if bin laden is still alive the various secret services know exactly were he is and track him.killing him would just create a new leader of aq and be someone new to watch{better the devil you know}

since troops are dying anyway,let it be for a reason and put an overwhelming force in or else withdraw and follow America's vice President,Joe Biden's idea of a hit&run base from a secure base.

normally i would be in favour of political solutions but reading Afghanistans history they never got their act together.

a civil war is usually the 'solution' to a divided Country,but in Afgha's case there are too many tribes&it is not even a Country in the normal sense of the word.

Manic Moran

ynotdu wrote: »

America allowed a man into the White house who had lost an election for four years,

And the story gets greater with every telling... It used to be just "The biased Supreme Court cut the process short and decided arbitrarily in his favour." No recount after the fact gave the opposition victory.

Senator Kerry was not just in Afghanistan on a'fact finding'mission,rather with an offer from the White House 'that could not be refused'

I don't believe that for a second. As I said, the recount was inevitable, and we've known it for weeks.

And You seem to have missed the point.How can these Elections be any more trusted than the 1st one? almost nothing on the ground has changed enough to guarante this 'new' election will be any less corrupt.

I've gotten snippets of the IEC's plan, it's a little less ambitious than the last one. I think this tally is going to be less suspect than the previous one.

More troops will not do anything to change the status quo. The taliban will just go and fight in Pakistan.

That works in our favour. Pakistan has a lot of troops, and right now the Pakistani government appears to be a tad irked.

The taliban can keep on fighting for the next 10 years if they want to. I dont see NATO being there for the next 10 years.

Not to the same strength, no. This is a generational problem, not until today's more educated kids grow up to become adults in a country with some infrastructure and some of the older mob die off will there really be an overall improvement in Afghan governance. 'Victory', such as it is, is basically a holding action until this occurs. Over time, the burden of this holding action is going to shift from NATO to Afghanistan, but I think it will be about another ten years at least before the cultural balance point is reached.

NTM

Manic Moran

On an entirely different note, we appear to have adopted a sniper. Round went through one chap's cap.

Somewhat annoying.

NTM

concussion

That's jolly unsporting old bean!

citizen_p

at least it wasnt thorough his breches



but seriously....single shot id say yeah.....get the whirly bird out to hunt for him next time....with all the technology on an apache you'd think hed be found in no time.

concussion

Mousey- wrote: »

with all the technology on an apache you'd think hed be found in no time.

I'm sure he went from this



to this



pretty quickly.

Manic Moran

Urban area. Best thing we've got to deal with him is a couple of sniper teams of our own. Besides, this isn't Apache country. We've got Kiowas down here.

I am reminded somewhat of the "Village Sniper" skit on Youtube.

NTM

Local-womanizer

Manic Moran wrote: »

Urban area. Best thing we've got to deal with him is a couple of sniper teams of our own. Besides, this isn't Apache country. We've got Kiowas down here.

I am reminded somewhat of the "Village Sniper" skit on Youtube.

NTM

I've read that them Kiowas have some impressive radar technology.

Have you got to work with them much?

Edit: MM,are the ISAF forces doing anything to curb the growing of opium in A-stan?I have seen in documentaries that the ISAF forces are happy to let it go on,so as to keep the locals on side,not sure if there was much truth in it.

Just asking as I seen this on the BBC website: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8319249.stm

citizen_p

any documentary i seen they just left it....its the people way of life. growing corn wouldnt bring in much compared to opium me thinks, even at the original very low source price.

Local-womanizer

Mousey- wrote: »

any documentary i seen they just left it....its the people way of life. growing corn wouldnt bring in much compared to opium me thinks, even at the original very low source price.

True,but look how much it brings in for the Taliban.

Its a delicate balance I suppose,leave it be and keep the locals on side or put a stop to it,piss off the locals and put a dent in the Talibs income.

ynotdu

only problem there is the Taliban set themselves up as the 'Moral police'even down to what people done in the bedroom.
They did/do not seem to have any problems with the 'morality'of being drug pushers though!

Taliban=Drug pushers.I wonder how their 'wise men' would respond to that?:)

Manic Moran

Local-womanizer wrote: »

I've read that them Kiowas have some impressive radar technology.

No radar on a Kiowa as far as I know. They have an observation mast on top of the rotors, which has a fairly good thermal imager. However, it's designed for looking out over treetops and mountainsides at tanks four miles away, not for looking for people underneath. It's why there was so much dispute over where to put the optics on the now-cancelled Kiowa replacement, the ARH: The mast-mounted sight is better for conventional warfighting, but if you want to look down in towns etc, you need a chin mount. Kiowas basically fly around with the doors removed and the pilot/co-pilot looks down.

Have you got to work with them much?

Most everyone prefers to work with a Kiowa over an Apache, as the pilots are a lot more helpful. They'll get down right close to whatever needs checking out, whilst Apaches stay at 4,000 feet and four miles away. About the only time you prefer an Apache is after the shooting starts, they have a bigger gun and more ammo.

Edit: MM,are the ISAF forces doing anything to curb the growing of opium in A-stan?I have seen in documentaries that the ISAF forces are happy to let it go on,so as to keep the locals on side,not sure if there was much truth in it.

We're not exactly doing DEA sweeps and raids. It's far too much hassle for what is, frankly, limited benefit. However, there are plenty of initiatives to get the locals to farm something other than opium, for example the ground in our area is good for Saffron, which has a higher profit margin than Opium, just the farmers need to be trained on how to grow the stuff. We're doing that.

NTM

Fratton Fred

If anyone saw BBC question time last week, an Afghani on there said that the destroying of opium crops caused a lot of ill feeling towards ISAF because the farmers saw it as just taking away their livelyhood.

From what I have heard, it is a change in tactics by ISAF, rather than destroy the crops, do what MM says and get them to grow better crops that are as profitable. Safron is worth a fortune I believe and if they can grow it should bring a lot of income into the country. The Taliban will hate that.

tricky D

op piece, fwiw, fyi......


http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20091020_us_challenge_afghanistan

The U.S. Challenge in Afghanistan


Graphic for Geopolitical Intelligence Report

By George Friedman and Reva Bhalla

The decision over whether to send more U.S. troops into Afghanistan may wait until the contested Afghan election is resolved, U.S. officials said Oct. 18. The announcement comes as U.S. President Barack Obama is approaching a decision on the war in Afghanistan. During the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign, Obama argued that Iraq was the wrong war at the wrong time, but Afghanistan was a necessary war. His reasoning went that the threat to the United States came from al Qaeda, Afghanistan had been al Qaeda's sanctuary, and if the United States were to abandon Afghanistan, al Qaeda would re-establish itself and once again threaten the U.S. homeland. Withdrawal from Afghanistan would hence be dangerous, and prosecution of the war was therefore necessary.

After Obama took office, it became necessary to define a war-fighting strategy in Afghanistan. The most likely model was based on the one used in Iraq by Gen. David Petraeus, now head of U.S. Central Command, whose area of responsibility covers both Afghanistan and Iraq. Paradoxically, the tactical and strategic framework for fighting the so-called "right war" derived from U.S. military successes in executing the so-called "wrong war." But grand strategy, or selecting the right wars to fight, and war strategy, or how to fight the right wars, are not necessarily linked.
Afghanistan, Iraq and the McChrystal Plan

Making sense of the arguments over Afghanistan requires an understanding of how the Iraq war is read by the strategists fighting it, since a great deal of proposed Afghan strategy involves transferring lessons learned from Iraq. Those strategists see the Iraq war as having had three phases. The first was the short conventional war that saw the defeat of Saddam Hussein's military. The second was the period from 2003-2006 during which the United States faced a Sunni insurgency and resistance from the Shiite population, as well as a civil war between those two communities. During this phase, the United States sought to destroy the insurgency primarily by military means while simultaneously working to scrape a national unity government together and hold elections. The third phase, which began in late 2006, was primarily a political phase. It consisted of enticing Iraqi Sunni leaders to desert the foreign jihadists in Iraq, splitting the Shiite community among its various factions, and reaching political -- and financial -- accommodations among the various factions. Military operations focused on supporting political processes, such as pressuring recalcitrant factions and protecting those who aligned with the United States. The troop increase -- aka the surge -- was designed to facilitate this strategy. Even more, it was meant to convince Iraqi factions (not to mention Iran) that the United States was not going to pull out of Iraq, and that therefore a continuing American presence would back up guarantees made to Iraqis.

It is important to understand this last bit and its effect on Afghanistan. As in Iraq, the idea that the United States will not abandon local allies by withdrawing until Afghan security forces could guarantee the allies' security lies at the heart of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. The premature withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, e.g., before local allies' security could be guaranteed, would undermine U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. To a great extent, the process of U.S. security guarantees in Afghanistan depends on the credibility of those guarantees: Withdrawal from Iraq followed by retribution against U.S. allies in Iraq would undermine the core of the Afghan strategy.

U.S. Gen. Stanley McChrystal's strategy in Afghanistan ultimately is built around the principle that the United States and its NATO allies are capable of protecting Afghans prepared to cooperate with Western forces. This explains why the heart of McChrystal's strategy involves putting U.S. troops as close to the Afghan people as possible. Doing so will entail closing many smaller bases in remote valleys -- like the isolated outpost recently attacked in Nuristan province -- and opening bases in more densely populated areas.

McChrystal's strategy therefore has three basic phases. In phase one, his forces would fight their way into regions where a large portion of the population lives and where the Taliban currently operates, namely Kabul, Khost, Helmand and Kandahar provinces. The United States would assume a strategic defensive posture in these populated areas. Because these areas are essential to the Taliban, phase two would see a Taliban counterattack in a bid to drive McChrystal's forces out, or at least to demonstrate that the U.S. forces cannot provide security for the local population. Paralleling the first two phases, phase three would see McChrystal using his military successes to forge alliances with indigenous leaders and their followers.

It should be noted that while McChrystal's traditional counterinsurgency strategy would be employed in populated areas, U.S. forces would also rely on traditional counterterrorism tactics in more remote areas where the Taliban have a heavy presence and can be pursued through drone strikes. The hope is that down the road, the strategy would allow the United States to use its military successes to fracture the Taliban, thereby encouraging defections and facilitating political reconciliation with Taliban elements driven more by political power than ideology.

There is a fundamental difference between Iraq and Afghanistan, however. In Iraq, resistance forces rarely operated in sufficient concentrations to block access to the population. By contrast, the Taliban on several occasions have struck with concentrations of forces numbering in the hundreds, essentially at company-size strength. If Iraq was a level one conflict, with irregular forces generally refusing conventional engagement with coalition forces, Afghanistan is beginning to bridge the gap from a level one to a level two conflict, with the Taliban holding territory with forces both able to provide conventional resistance and to mount some offensives at the company level (and perhaps at the battalion level in the future). This means that occupying, securing and defending areas such that the inhabitants see the coalition forces as defenders rather than as magnets for conflict is the key challenge.

Adding to the challenge, elements of McChrystal's strategy are in tension. First, local inhabitants will experience multilevel conflict as coalition forces move into a given region. Second, McChrystal is hoping that the Taliban goes on the offensive in response. And this means that the first and second steps will collide with the third, which is demonstrating to locals that the presence of coalition forces makes them more secure as conflict increases (which McChrystal acknowledges will happen). To convince locals that Western forces enhance their security, the coalition will thus have to be stunningly successful both at defeating Taliban defenders when they first move in and in repulsing subsequent Taliban attacks.

In its conflict with the Taliban, the coalition's main advantage is firepower, both in terms of artillery and airpower. The Taliban must concentrate its forces to attack the coalition; to counter such attacks, the weapons of choice are airstrikes and artillery. The problem with both of these weapons is first, a certain degree of inaccuracy is built into their use, and second, the attackers will be moving through population centers (the area held by both sides is important precisely because it has population). This means that air- and ground-fire missions, both important in a defensive strategy, run counter to the doctrine of protecting population.

McChrystal is fully aware of this dilemma, and he has therefore changed the rules of engagement to sharply curtail airstrikes in areas of concentrated population, even in areas where U.S. troops are in danger of being overrun. As McChrystal said in a recent interview, these rules of engagement will hold "Even if it means we are going to step away from a firefight and fight them another day."

This strategy poses two main challenges. First, it shifts the burden of the fighting onto U.S. infantry forces. Second, by declining combat in populated areas, the strategy runs the risk of making the populated areas where political arrangements might already be in place more vulnerable. In avoiding air and missile strikes, McChrystal avoids alienating the population through civilian casualties. But by declining combat, McChrystal risks alienating populations subject to Taliban offensives. Simply put, while airstrikes can devastate a civilian population, avoiding airstrikes could also devastate Western efforts, as local populations could see declining combat as a betrayal. McChrystal is thus stuck between the proverbial rock and a hard place on this one.

One of his efforts at a solution has been to ask for more troops. The point of these troops is not to occupy Afghanistan and impose a new reality through military force, which is impossible (especially given the limited number of troops the United States is willing to dedicate to the problem). Instead, it is to provide infantry forces not only to hold larger areas, but to serve as reinforcements during Taliban attacks so the use of airpower can be avoided. Putting the onus of this counterinsurgency on the infantry, and having the infantry operate without airpower, is a radical departure from U.S. fighting doctrine since World War II.
Seismic Shift in War Doctrine

Geopolitically, the United States fights at the end of a long supply line. Moreover, U.S. forces operate at a demographic disadvantage. Once in Eurasia, U.S. forces are always outnumbered. Infantry-on-infantry warfare is attritional, and the United States runs out of troops before the other side does. Infantry warfare does not provide the United States any advantage, and in fact, it places the United States at a disadvantage. Opponents of the United States thus have larger numbers of fighters; greater familiarity and acclimation to the terrain; and typically, better intelligence from countrymen behind U.S. lines. The U.S. counter always has been force multipliers -- normally artillery and airpower -- capable of destroying enemy concentrations before they close with U.S. troops. McChrystal's strategy, if applied rigorously, shifts doctrine toward infantry-on-infantry combat. His plan assumes that superior U.S. training will be the force multiplier in Afghanistan (as it may). But that assumes that the Taliban, a light infantry force with numerous battle-hardened formations optimized for fighting in Afghanistan, is an inferior infantry force. And it assumes that U.S. infantry fighting larger concentrations of Taliban forces will consistently defeat them.

Obviously, if McChrystal drives the Taliban out of secured areas and into uninhabited areas, the United States will have a tremendous opportunity to engage in strategic bombardment both against Taliban militants themselves and against supply lines no longer plugged into populated areas. But this assumes that the Taliban would not reduce its operations from company-level and higher assaults down to guerrilla-level operations in response to being driven out of population centers. If the Taliban did make such a reduction, it would become indistinguishable from the population. This would allow it to engage in attritional warfare against coalition forces and against the protected population to demonstrate that coalition forces can't protect them. The Taliban already has demonstrated the ability to thrive in both populated and rural areas of Afghanistan, where the terrain favors the insurgent far more than the counterinsurgent.

The strategy of training Afghan soldiers and police to take up the battle and persuading insurgents to change sides faces several realities. The Taliban has an excellent intelligence service built up during the period of its rule and afterward, allowing it to populate the new security forces with its agents and loyalists. And while persuading insurgents to change sides certainly can happen, whether it can happen to the extent of leaving the Taliban materially weakened remains in doubt. In Iraq, this happened not because of individual changes, but because regional ethnic leadership -- with their own excellent intelligence capabilities -- changed sides and drove out opposing factions. Individual defections were frequently liquidated.

But Taliban leaders have not shown any inclination for changing sides. They do not believe the United States is in Afghanistan to stay. Getting individual Taliban militants to change sides creates an intelligence-security battle. But McChrystal is betting that his forces will form bonds with the local population so deep that the locals will provide intelligence against Taliban forces operating in the region. The coalition must thus demonstrate that the risks of defection are dwarfed by the advantages. To do this, the coalition security and counterintelligence must consistently and effectively block the Taliban's ability to identify, locate and liquidate defectors. If McChrystal cannot do that, large-scale defection will be impossible, because well before such defection becomes large scale, the first defectors will be dead, as will anyone seen by the Taliban as a collaborator.

Ultimately, the entire strategy depends on how you read Iraq. In Iraq, a political decision was made by an intact Sunni leadership able to enforce its will among its followers. Squeezed between the foreign jihadists who wanted to usurp their position and the Shia, provided with political and financial incentives, and possessing their own forces able to provide a degree of security themselves, the Sunni leadership came to the see the Americans as the lesser evil. They controlled a critical mass, and they shifted. McChrystal has made it clear that the defections he expects are not a Taliban faction whose leadership decides to shift, but Taliban soldiers as individuals or small groups. That isn't ultimately what turned the Iraq war but something very different -- and quite elusive in counterinsurgency. He is looking for retail defections to turn into a strategic event.

Moreover, it seems much too early to speak of the successful strategy in Iraq. First, there is increasing intracommunal violence in anticipation of coming elections early next year. Second, some 120,000 U.S. forces remain in Iraq to guarantee the political and security agreements of 2007-2008, and it is far from clear what would happen if those troops left. Finally, where in Afghanistan there is the Pakistan question, in Iraq there remains the Iran question. Instability thus becomes a cross-border issue beyond the scope of existing forces.

The Pakistan situation is particularly problematic. If the strategic objective of the war in Afghanistan is to cut the legs out from under al Qaeda and deny these foreign jihadists sanctuary, then what of the sanctuaries in Pakistan's tribal belt where high-value al Qaeda targets are believed to be located? Pakistan is fighting its share of jihadists according to its own rules; the United States cannot realistically expect Islamabad to fulfill its end of the bargain in containing al Qaeda. The primary U.S. targets in this war are on the wrong side of the border, and in areas where U.S. forces are not free to operate. The American interest in Afghanistan is to defeat al Qaeda and prevent the emergence of follow-on jihadist forces. The problem is that regardless of how secure Afghanistan is, jihadist forces can (to varying degrees) train and plan in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Indonesia -- or even Cleveland for that matter. Securing Afghanistan is thus not necessarily a precondition for defeating al Qaeda.

Iraq is used as the argument in favor of the new strategy in Afghanistan. What happened in Iraq was that a situation that was completely out of hand became substantially less unstable because of a set of political accommodations initially rejected by the Americans and the Sunnis from 2003-2006. Once accepted, a disastrous situation became an unstable situation with many unknowns still in place.

If the goal of Afghanistan is to forge the kind of tenuous political accords that govern Iraq, the factional conflicts that tore Iraq apart are needed. Afghanistan certainly has factional conflicts, but the Taliban, the main adversary, does not seem to be torn by them. It is possible that under sufficient pressure such splits might occur, but the Taliban has been a cohesive force for a generation. When it has experienced divisions, it hasn't split decisively.

On the other hand, it is not clear that Western forces in Afghanistan can sustain long-term infantry conflict in which the offensive is deliberately ceded to a capable enemy and where airpower's use is severely circumscribed to avoid civilian casualties, overturning half a century of military doctrine of combined arms operations.
The Bigger Picture

The best argument for fighting in Afghanistan is powerful and similar to the one for fighting in Iraq: credibility. The abandonment of either country will create a powerful tool in the Islamic world for jihadists to argue that the United States is a weak power. Withdrawal from either place without a degree of political success could destabilize other regimes that cooperate with the United States. Given that, staying in either country has little to do with strategy and everything to do with the perception of simply being there.

The best argument against fighting in either country is equally persuasive. The jihadists are right: The United States has neither the interest nor forces for long-term engagements in these countries. American interests go far beyond the Islamic world, and there are many present (to say nothing of future) threats from outside the region that require forces. Overcommitment in any one area of interest at the expense of others could be even more disastrous than the consequences of withdrawal.

In our view, Obama's decision depends not on choosing between McChrystal's strategy and others, but on a careful consideration of how to manage the consequences of withdrawal. An excellent case can be made that now is not the time to leave Afghanistan, and we expect Obama to be influenced by that thinking far more than by the details of McChrystal's strategy. As McChrystal himself points out, there are many unknowns and many risks in his own strategy; he is guaranteeing nothing.

Reducing American national strategy to the Islamic world, or worse, Afghanistan, is the greater threat. Nations find their balance, and the heavy pressures on Obama in this decision basically represent those impersonal forces battering him. The question he must ask himself is simple: In what way is the future of Afghanistan of importance to the United States? The answer that securing it will hobble al Qaeda is simply wrong. U.S. Afghan policy will not stop a global terrorist organization; terrorists will just go elsewhere. The answer that U.S. involvement in Afghanistan is important in shaping the Islamic world's sense of American power is better, but even that must be taken in context of other global interests.

Obama does not want this to be his war. He does not want to be remembered for Afghanistan the way George W. Bush is remembered for Iraq or Lyndon Johnson is for Vietnam. Right now, we suspect Obama plans to demonstrate commitment, and to disengage at a more politically opportune time. Johnson and Bush showed that disengagement after commitment is nice in theory. For our part, we do not think there is an effective strategy for winning in Afghanistan, but that McChrystal has proposed a good one for "hold until relieved." We suspect that Obama will hold to show that he gave the strategy a chance, but that the decision to leave won't be too far off.


This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to www.stratfor.com

ynotdu

Pakistan
www.chinaview.cn 2009-10-23 00:43:38 Print


ISLAMABAD, Oct. 22 (Xinhua) -- Hundreds of suspects were arrested in Pakistan as police cracked down upon attacks launched by militants across the country, local TV channel reports Thursday.
Two alleged terrorists were arrested Thursday evening from Pakistan's capital of Islamabad, according to local TV ARY News.
One suspect, 70, was captured from Sector I-9 in Islamabad with makeshift suicide jackets attached with his waist, while another was arrested with 800 rounds of bullets strapped to his body. Police also seized maps of main installations of Islamabad and many weapons.
It was yet to be ascertained which site in the capital the bomber had planned to hit. Police have shifted the suspects to a local police station under strict surveillance for further investigations, the channel added.
After a series of attacks in the federal capital, Islamabad police, after tightening the security cover in the city, have started combing exercise in the slum as well as jungle areas and also arrested 80 suspects, police source said earlier Thursday.
He said that leaves of policemen had been canceled and were instructed to remain vigilant against the suspects. The slum areas at Dhok Kashmirian, Mira Jaffer, Mira Badia, Golra, I-11 and other areas are being searched for the arrest of suspects.
The Anti-terrorist squads (ATS) have been deployed to ensure foolproof security around the important buildings and sensitive installations in the city. The contingents of ATS would also patrol in various sectors and would conduct surprise checking.
Meanwhile, the police spokesman said that security in Islamabad has been tightened and suspected persons and vehicles are being checked. Policemen on horse backs have started patrolling in jungle areas as well as rough routes.
He said that massive operation has been started against the beggars. Policemen in their respective police stations and traffic staff would arrest the beggars.
Islamabad police have also appealed the citizens to cooperate with police and inform Rescue 15 or police stations in case of observing any suspect.
Keeping in view the rising security threats, the Supreme Court of Pakistan has also deployed Rangers, commandos and special police guards in and outside the court premises in Islamabad. According to a court press release issued Thursday, no one would be allowed to enter the judges block without prior permission from the special police guards.
Besides, the private channel Dunya News quoting police sources reported that 115 suspects were arrested during the search operation in different areas of Rawalpindi, the garrison city near Islamabad, and most of the arrested persons are Afghanis or tribalmen from Bajaur and Khyber tribal agency.
Karachi police also arrested three suspected persons including a Saudi citizen.
Three unknown armed miscreants riding motorcycle opened fire on an army jeep early Thursday morning leaving two military personnel including a brigadier dead. Security are beefed up at all exit and entry points in Islamabad after the attack.
Two days earlier twin blasts occurred in a university in the capital, leaving at least nine people dead and dozens injured.
Pakistani Federal Interior Minister Rehman Malik said Tuesday that Pakistan is in state of war and the extremists want to destabilize the country with their attacks.
Pakistani security forces launched military operation in South Waziristan tribal agency bordering Afghanistan in early Oct. 17 morning. The army said that about 30,000 soldiers are in place to take on an estimated 10,000 hard-core Taliban militants in the lawless area.

ynotdu

Thats not to say I agree with him that Kerry was just there on a 'factfinding mission' along with the Secetry Generals of the UN Rep,Ambasadors from all the Countries who oppose a troop presence{well at least Their own troops:)}

Senator Kerry bringing an offer to Karzai 'He could'nt refuse'would have plenty of precedence{check out Henry Kissingers career for starters:)}
add to that Pakistans new found crackdown on terror then i think the whole thing was pre-arranged.

I know you said troops have been preparing/expecting a run-off for over a month now,but it seems to me Kharzai needed a nudge or nineteen!:)

{He seems 'nice' but is a twat IMO.}

ynotdu

trickD thats quite an article and i DID read it all:)
McChrystal's ideas as he admits are very high risk,Taliban changing sides one by one.he could be right that it Might happen,but it seems unlikely in my humble opinion.much more likely it's true that the Taliban will both flee to isolated areas were they can be hit by airstrikes but also mingle in centers of population to divide&conquer coalition forces,as it states he is aware of.
The mentions of withdrawl from Iraq&Afgha as being seen as 'weakness'in the Muslim world i think is proably the key to what's happening.
There does not seem to be a 'good' time for obama to decide on a withdrawl,leaving now would be a disaster and trying to wait for a second term could well cost him that very second term.
in the meantime it is the troops who seem to be piggy in the middle.
Jeez i dont know how they can keep their morale up.
what a mess:(

Manic Moran

in the meantime it is the troops who seem to be piggy in the middle.

See the lead story in Stars and Stripes, for example. (Stripes.com)

U.S. forces struggle with Washington’s perceptions and reality in Afghanistan

<Snip>

“Guys back in Washington need to get, I think, a better operational understanding, [of] what goes on here,” she said. “To separate the enemy from the population to make progress will take a really long time, and the administration really needs to understand that. Even more than in Iraq, to get to the point where they … they can build a government — which they can’t do now — [and] get rid of corruption, is going to take years.”

If the U.S. is not in this fight for the long haul, she added, “you may as well not waste the effort and not kill any more soldiers.”

<snip>

It doesn’t help that there is a growing perception in Afghanistan that the U.S. is not fully committed to a war that promises to last many more years, cost billions more dollars and kill many more American soldiers.

“The main problem we are seeing here is that everybody in power in the NDS [the Afghan intelligence agency] and the ANP [the Afghan National Police] are playing a delicate balancing game,” the official said. “They are uncertain of our will, our ability to stay here. They are helping us to a small degree.”

<Snip>

The officer involved in the detentions put it this way: “It’s very, very difficult, very frustrating, when you have a disconnect between the people who make the rules that you have to abide by and the reality on the ground — and criticism in the States as to the way things are done.”

<Snip>

“We are here to follow orders, to do a mission, but it is a lot more comforting to know the whole country is behind you,” Masengale said. “Sometimes it’s hard not to feel like a political pawn in a game of life and death.”

Such articles are not new. The truth to us here seems obvious. But then, we don't have to worry about trying to get re-elected. We only need to worry about our lives being wasted.

NTM

jank

Manic Moran wrote: »

Such articles are not new. The truth to us here seems obvious. But then, we don't have to worry about trying to get re-elected. We only need to worry about our lives being wasted.

NTM

Well was there ever a get out strategy?

Manic Moran

SGT Macey and SPC Steffey. (SGT Macey's the dog. Not sure how that chain of command works)


We had our first two KIA recently, as opposed to the vehicle accident shortly after we got here. Roadside bomb. Not part of our unit, they were attached to us, and got off the helicopter an hour before and straight into a truck. (We'd worked with them before, they weren't recent arrivals in theatre).

SPC Steffey arriving at Dover.


Not sure what will happen to the dog, the other KIA. (Body is treated as that of a soldier, at least until it gets to the US)

He was interviewed a week ago.
http://www.dvidshub.net/?script=news/news_show.php&id=40302

NTM

minidazzler

Poor fellow, my condolances to his friends, family and colleagues.

RIP.

pmg58

RIP

tricky D

RIP

ynotdu

Just like to add My RIP as well.It is so diffrient when you learn something about the person behind the uniform.
Two of My cousins are in the UK army,one of them served in Iraq and his best buddy lost his life to a roadside bomb.His mother gets great comfort from his Bebo page which without any armtwisting by her has become a shrine to him from his real life friends and his online friends.

obama was there today for the return of coffins from Afghanistan,something he has not done before,and Bush never did.
Tomorrow He is to meet with the Joint chiefs,hopefully something definative one way or the other about troop numbers will be decided.

Manic Moran

Halloween.

I'm dressing up as a civilian.

We've got spiders and pumpkins and whatever else all decking out the place, much as you would expect for the evening.

Interestingly, we also had our Halloween Barbequeue. It's 27C out here, I had visions of it being, well, if not snowing, at least colder than Ireland at this time of year. I forgot to bring my camera, but we had the benches and chairs out, we're all wearing our sun hats and sunglasses, music's going... Frankly, it was just a damned nice day.

Strange weather. The only reason the night feels chilly is that it's about ten degrees coolder than the daytime.

Second earthquake in about a week. 6.2 a few days ago, 6.0 a night or two ago. Didn't seem that bad, though. Kindof fun. Reminds me of home.

NTM

Manic Moran

We've got one group of opposition who really are very good at what they do. We've lost yet another MRAP. I've lost count, but I think we're on about seven vehicles destroyed beyond repair so far. (One or two of them might be re-buildable)

Starting to annoy us, now.

NTM

citizen_p

IED s ?
do many ambushs happen?

Manic Moran

IEDs. Direct fire engagements are not unheard of, but they tend to be fairly unpleasant for the opposition*, so it's not their preferred course of action.

Announcement that the elections are cancelled was well received around here. A crapload of reports which nobody is ever going to use will no longer need to be filed. We have other problems as it is.

NTM

*Unofficial regimental motto: "Find the bastards, and pile on". When they're shooting at you, you've found them.

ynotdu

The English Language version of France 24 showed troops engaging the Taliban today.From a strictly military point of view it was quite impressive.The troops were heavily armed and killed the local leader of the Taliban as well as twelve other Taliban.

Abdullah abdullah pulling out can only be a good thing IMO.
He said the run off would be as corrupt as the first election.
Analysts say He pushed it right down to the wire in order to get a senior posistion in Kharzai.s 'GOVT':rolleyes:

after obamas meeting with the joint chiefs the white house let it be known there would be no announcement about troop numbers until after the run off,it might be sooner now?

all the 'Leaks' from the WH is that troop numbers WILL be increased but some say by only 10,000,also when obama was at the 18 soldiers remains return to the US he was quoted{by the press:rolleyes:}as saying "this will influence my decision"
Yeah like soldiers in Afghanistan need these 'helpful' rumours and leaks:mad:

Manic Moran

The whole dithering process is pretty much not what we want, let alone leaks about simply 10,000 troops (Less than McChrystal's "high-risk" option).

This administration certainly hasn't figured out the 'perception' problem of their actions. Having Kerry standing in the photo-op of the announcement of the run-off didn't help matters at all around here either.

The troops were heavily armed and killed the local leader of the Taliban as well as twelve other Taliban.

They the ones in Kapisa? We're particularly interested in the Surobi mob.

NTM

ynotdu

Hi Manic i could not find a good source to confirm it was in Kapisa.
I do know the particulor French troops stayed in place behind sandbags all through the night expecting retaliation and got their balls froze off.No Taliban retaliation came though.You proably already have it but here is a direct link to France 24.Quite legal and within boards rules. http://www.france24.com/en/

Manic Moran

Well, we've lost another MRAP. I think that's seven in the last two months, and one Huskey.

NTM

Manic Moran

Another IED today. In a nice change, it's one of the few we've found before it blew up. It was called in by a local.

Local security forces also rolled up a couple of interesting characters with bomb-making equipment, it seems, in the same area. We might be denting one of the opposition cells.

NTM

gizmo555

The US ambassador to Afghanistan has dramatically intervened in the debate about troop reinforcements, warning President Obama against committing tens of thousands of extra troops to the country.

Karl Eikenberry, a retired army general who commanded US forces in Afghanistan from 2005-2007, detailed his concerns in two classified cables last week.

Mr Eikenberry's concerns reportedly focused on the behaviour of Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president recently re-elected for a five-year term in a poll tainted by allegations of systematic fraud. He is said to have questioned Mr Karzai's suitability as a long-term strategic partner.

The warning has reportedly infuriated General Stanley McChrystal, the Nato and US commander in Afghanistan, who had asked for an extra 40,000 troops to avert a looming military defeat . . .

Read the rest here:

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/Afghanistan/article6913759.ece

Manic Moran

The man's trying to rearrange the deck chairs on the Titanic instead of trying to plug the leak and figure out the niceties later.

We all know that Karzai's not exactly the ideal partner, but from where I'm sitting, Karzai's something of an academic problem, whilst the taliban and related groups are very much an issue and don't much care who's in charge in Kabul either, unless it's themselves.

NTM

Irish_Nomad

Manic Moran wrote: »

The man's trying to rearrange the deck chairs on the Titanic instead of trying to plug the leak and figure out the niceties later.
NTM

That's an odd analogy to use since trying to plug the leak on the Titanic would have been a complete waste of time.

I'm surprised you place so little importance on concerns about the Afghan government. I thought that would be a key factor in determining your strategy. It seems to me that the US government has a genuine dilemma here - they certainly don't want to lose (or be seen to lose) in Afghanistan but with an ally that is untrustworthy/corrupt can they really be confident of an outcome that doesn't tie down large concentrations of troops for another 10-20 years ? If that is the prognosis is the US willing to pay the financial and human cost ?

If I were involved I would want them to take the time necessary and make the right choices even if that created some short term difficulties.

Manic Moran

Irish_Nomad wrote: »

That's an odd analogy to use since trying to plug the leak on the Titanic would have been a complete waste of time.

OK, fine... if you want to be pedantic. :P

He's treating the patient for his cancer when he's got a cut to the jugular.

I'm surprised you place so little importance on concerns about the Afghan government. I thought that would be a key factor in determining your strategy. It seems to me that the US government has a genuine dilemma here - they certainly don't want to lose (or be seen to lose) in Afghanistan but with an ally that is untrustworthy/corrupt can they really be confident of an outcome that doesn't tie down large concentrations of troops for another 10-20 years ? If that is the prognosis is the US willing to pay the financial and human cost ?

The point is that as people are arguing over who should be in charge by democratic elections, there are a bunch of people who we really don't like who don't plan on partaking in the elections at all. Or on giving the other groups time to settle their differences. A fundamental tenet of warfare is that 'good enough' now beats 'perfect later'. Or, as Patton put it, "A good plan, executed violently now, beats a perfect plan next week"

If I were involved I would want them to take the time necessary and make the right choices even if that created some short term difficulties.

The reality on the ground is that it doesn't matter who's in charge in Kabul, when you have villagers who are afraid to go out at night or who are being coerced into not co-operating by a bunch of thugs. The war is won or lost not in the Kabul version of the White House, or even in the hills of Pakistan. It's the people that count, and we simply can't provide the security that the people need. Put this in perspective. We're in Laghman Province. The place in square miles is about the same size as Kilkenny and Wicklow put together. It's got half as much population again as those two counties. And it's a hell of a lot more rugged. Take a guess as to how many troops are required to secure the place, then take a guess as to how many troops we have to try to keep the opposition from running amuck. Then tell me how our security situation could possibly be improved by the 'perfect' government in Kabul. (And by the way, the locals here like Karzai).

NTM

OS119

Manic, has your AO seen any repercussions from the incident in Helmand last week where the ANP chappy murdered the OMLT he was working with - anything from procedural changes to 'sideways glances'?

keep safe.

Manic Moran

No more than we've started treating muslim soldiers in our unit any differently since that little incident in Fort Hood. i.e. not at all.

No individual Afghan is any more likely to be a threat today than he was two weeks ago.

NTM

Irish_Nomad

Manic Moran wrote: »

He's treating the patient for his cancer when he's got a cut to the jugular.

This analogy is better but it implies that you are on the verge of losing if something isn't done immediately. Surely the situation isn't that dire ?

Or, as Patton put it, "A good plan, executed violently now, beats a perfect plan next week"

That's undoubtedly true as long as you are pursuing the right objectives. If you are, however, heading down the wrong road then getting there faster doesn't help.

The reality on the ground is that it doesn't matter who's in charge in Kabul, when you have villagers who are afraid to go out at night or who are being coerced into not co-operating by a bunch of thugs. The war is won or lost not in the Kabul version of the White House, or even in the hills of Pakistan.

Look, I have absolutely no military experience so I wouldn't attempt to debate tactics with you and I'm not questioning your expertise but it sounds as if you believe there is a purely military solution here regardless of the political situation. I thought the 2 were inextricably linked.

Manic Moran

it implies that you are on the verge of losing if something isn't done immediately.

It implies that the longer we wait, the harder it's going to be to end up at the same security situation. Opposition will have more time to create their own infrastructure, to further co-erce locals, to further discredit security force capabilites, to gain their own informants... We're not losing. We're just making life a lot more difficult for ourselves than we need to.

it sounds as if you believe there is a purely military solution here regardless of the political situation. I thought the 2 were inextricably linked.

They are, but that doesn't mean that the one should, or even can, wait for the other. The best intentioned, most puritanical and reputable government in the world is pointless if it can't secure anything beyond the door of the provincial governor's compound because there are people with guns and explosives holding the population hostage. And unfortunately, fixing that bit takes a lot more time than firing some politician or administrator and putting a new person in his place. (Although I'm sure all the press conferences will take a couple of days). The capabilities we in the West take for granted in government are reliant on infrastucture which doesn't exist here. For example, roads. Yet road construction crews are being attacked routinely. What good is the perfect government if the roads it needs to govern and have an economy haven't been built yet?

It also doesn't mean that the political solution is one which requires an acceptable government style to the West. The Afghan government is not engaged in an insurgency against Washington. Wheeling/dealing/backscratching is a way of life here. I doubt we will ever get a corruption-free-government, and our yardstick for evaluating officials for now is 'acceptably corrupt.' On the other hand, when sorting out the insurgency it doesn't matter so much if the government is entirely corruption-free as long as it is accepted by the population and as long as it is capable of making deals with the opposition it needs to make peace with, and can kill/capture the people who are not inclined to compromise. The latter requires good security forces, and populations who have built up enough trust in the capabilities of the Afghan Security Forces and Coalition Forces that they can work for and with the goverment without risk of being killed. (see road workers, teachers, etc, plus second order effects such as wells not being dug, hospitals not being supplied, cash crops not being sold, and other such things which aren't happening while we wait for some magical administrative change.).

NTM

Irish_Nomad

Given the effects you describe "a cut to the jugular" seems like hyperbole.

Anyhow I think you misunderstand my point. I'm not suggesting that any change in military approach should wait until a 'perfect' political establishment is in place. I think that in order to determine their strategy the US govt. needs to be able to envisage an end state that includes a stable government capable of running the country and providing security with minimal assistance. Assuming they can visualise such a state they can set about a political strategy to achieve it and the military strategy must complement this.

On the other hand if they cannot see or cannot bring about an acceptable political end state (with or without Karzai) then no military strategy can bring success and some analogy about deckchairs on the Titanic might be appropriate.

gizmo555

Irish_Nomad wrote: »

I'm not suggesting that any change in military approach should wait until a 'perfect' political establishment is in place. I think that in order to determine their strategy the US govt. needs to be able to envisage an end state that includes a stable government capable of running the country and providing security with minimal assistance. Assuming they can visualise such a state they can set about a political strategy to achieve it and the military strategy must complement this.

In the absence of the perfect political establishment, this is what the US is actually doing. Mind boggling stuff . . .

. . .the US military's contractors are forced to pay suspected insurgents to protect American supply routes. It is an accepted fact of the military logistics operation in Afghanistan that the US government funds the very forces American troops are fighting. And it is a deadly irony, because these funds add up to a huge amount of money for the Taliban.

"It's a big part of their income," one of the top Afghan government security officials admits. In fact, US military officials in Kabul estimate that a minimum of 10% of the Pentagon's logistics contracts – hundreds of millions of dollars – consists of payments to insurgents.

. . .

The real secret to trucking in Afghanistan is security on the perilous roads, controlled by warlords, tribal militias, insurgents and Taliban commanders. The American executive I talked to was fairly specific about it: "The army is basically paying the Taliban not to shoot at them. It is Department of Defense money."

. . .

A veteran American manager in Afghanistan who has worked there as both a soldier and a private security contractor in the field told me, "What we are doing is paying warlords associated with the Taliban, because none of our security elements is able to deal with the threat."

. . .

The bizarre fact is that the practice of buying the Taliban's protection is not a secret. I asked Colonel David Haight, who commands the Third Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division, about it. After all, part of Highway 1 runs through his area of operations. What did he think about security companies paying off insurgents?

"The American soldier in me is repulsed by it," he said in an interview in his office at forward operating base Shank in Logar province. "But I know that it is what it is: essentially paying the enemy, saying, 'Hey, don't hassle me.' I don't like it, but it is what it is."

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/13/us-trucks-security-taliban

Manic Moran

Irish_Nomad wrote: »

Given the effects you describe "a cut to the jugular" seems like hyperbole.

I'm not sure how else to put this. Both are problems with terminal effects should they not be addressed. One is more pressing than the other.

Anyhow I think you misunderstand my point. I'm not suggesting that any change in military approach should wait until a 'perfect' political establishment is in place. I think that in order to determine their strategy the US govt. needs to be able to envisage an end state that includes a stable government capable of running the country and providing security with minimal assistance. Assuming they can visualise such a state they can set about a political strategy to achieve it and the military strategy must complement this.

We know this. But no matter what the military strategy is, there are going to be some basic fundamental necessities which are going to be required. They are currently not being met successfully, and it's going to take a few months between when the 'go' is given and when troop increases actually take effect. Why wait? Given the situation in our AO, I find it very hard to contemplate any sort of success without more boots-on-the-ground help. (And not just from the Army either)

On the other hand if they cannot see or cannot bring about an acceptable political end state (with or without Karzai) then no military strategy can bring success and some analogy about deckchairs on the Titanic might be appropriate.

You're missing the point. There are three different issues here.

1) That there is a security situation which is stable enough that whatever goverment is in charge can have an effect.
2) That the government in charge is accepted by the people and is capable of forging a peace between the opposition who are willing to talk, and defeating those who are not.
3) That the government in charge is accepted by the West.

#1 just ain't happening right now. Consider the military to be the arterial clamp on the jugular. It's not the long-term solution, only the surgery provided from the political side can fix things for the long term. Until that is done, the clamp is required and we're not going to get out of here before then. However, in order to conduct the surgery, you have got to stop the bleeding, and our clamp simply isn't strong enough.
As Gizmo points out, we have enough problems just securing our own lines of communication. There's a reason that McChrystal's "High-risk" option still requested an increase in 10,000 troops. The man's not an idiot. He knows as much as any keyboard strategist that a political solution is required. But he also sees that we simply aren't getting the complimentary job done on the ground with the assets that we have.

People seem to be focusing on #3. As long as the government is ideologically acceptable to the West (i.e. not extreme Islamist/pro-Al Qaeda etc), #3 is irrelevant given the government functions to a certain base level defined by #2. Figure out the fine points later, if you have to. You need #1 to have #2. You need #2 for #1 no longer to be resource-intensive. #3 is not actually all that important, barring some fairly fundamental aspects which most any Afghan goverment, be it Karzai or Abdullah, will have.

NTM