10 REAL reasons to vote NO to Lisbon

Freeborn John

1. Increase of power to the European Parliament

Increasing the power of the EU Parliament does not make the EU more democratic. It just means the EU Parliament is more powerful. The EU Parliament has less democratic legitimacy than the institutions (national governments and parliaments) who give up the power under Lisbon that is given to the EU Parliament with a nett loss to democracy.
Increasing the powers of the EU Parliament since 1979 has been accompanied by the growing feeling that the EU is undemocratic. Lisbon simply perpetuates a policy which is known to have failed.

2. Permanent President of the European Council [Article 15, TEU]

The president of the EU Council has informal powers which make him the decisive figure at EU summits. He is the only person to know the negotiating position of all the heads of government (gained through the one-on-one so-called ‘confessionals’). Therefore he is the only one to know the range of possible agreements and can use this unique information to steer the EU Council towards the possible agreements he favours and away from those he personally opposes. Separating such a powerful behind-the-scenes dealmaker from the national governments creates a powerful EU figure independent of nation-states who will stand above heads of governments as the most powerful politician at EU summits.

3. New powers of oversight for national parliaments [Article 12, TEU]

The only powers worth that name in law-making are the powers to propose, ammend or block and national parliaments have none of these under Lisbon. Oversight is not a power; nor 'access to information'. The EU Commission is free to proceed with its legislative proposals even if national parliaments object to them. Furthermore national parliaments can only object on one ground (subsidiarity). This new power of oversight is pure fig-leaf to disguise that national parliaments (together with you the voters who elect them) are the main losers of Lisbon with national parliaments gradually losing their power to legislate as they are obliged to remove all national laws that conflict with any legislation enacted by the EU under Lisbon in the future.

4. More clearly defines the competences of the Union & Enshrines the principal of subsidiarity [Article 5, TEU]

Lisbon is not clear. It is was written to be as unclear as possible. Subsidiarity is not new and has never worked because the EU institutions that have been the poacher of our political powers (the ECJ and now EU Commission) get to act as gamekeeper and decide if they are taking powers they should not. They are set up as the judge of cases in which they are the defendant, and will not find against themselves.

5. Introduces simplified revision procedure [Article 47, TEU]

This is undesirable, giving federalists from the Commission and EU Parliament a seat in negotiations to increase their own power. It also makes it more difficult for voters in most EU countries (where the politicians try to avoid referendums on EU topics) to increase EU powers arousing public debate and controversy that occurs when EU treaties are signed.

6. Increase the Unions foreign policy ability

EU representatives that you cannot influence should not be able to speak in your name on the world scene, not sign undemocratic treaties binding on all the member-states that you cannot stop.

7. Creates new Citizens Initiative [Article 11, TEU]

This is the equivalent to petitioning a medieval king for favours. The EU Commission will use ‘citizen initiatives’ that ask for greater EU powers as PR for measures it would like to advance anyway. And it is free to ignore anything else that does not suit its institutional self-interest in 'more Europe'.

8. Charter of Fundamental Rights becomes legally binding [Article 6, TEU]

The Charter of Fundamental Rights adds no new useful new rights which are not already in the European Convention on Human Rights (a body independent of the EU). It does however give the ECJ jurisdiction over criminal law which will be used in the time-honoured tradition by the ‘politicians in black robes’ of the ECJ to use their judicial rulings to build an EU criminal law system that replaces national systems.

9. Energy and the Environment become greater EU competencies [Article 4 & 194, TFEU]

Environment has been an EU competence since the Treaty of Amsterdam. It has not been used to solve global environmental problems as it was claimed it would, but has been used to interfere in national issues such as the rules to be followed when collecting waste from outside people’s houses. A new EU energy policy is being sold to Russophobes in Eastern Europe as a way to confront the Russian bear, but the reality is that it will be used in the EU itself to take unpopular decisions at EU level, such as setting targets that mandate the building of nuclear power stations, that you will not be able to stop.


10. If you cannot say NO to Lisbon now, then you will never be able to say NO to the EU again.

It is awful to allow the precedent to be established that democracy is reduced to repeating votes until the politicians get the answer they want.

turgon

Sorry, but the title says 10 real reasons to vote No to Lisbon. Where exactly are they?

The Recliner

Freeborn John wrote: »

It is awful to allow the precedent to be established that democracy is reduced to repeating votes until the politicians get the answer they want.

There is no precedent here, we have had reruns of votes on constitutional changes before

ei.sdraob

Freeborn John wrote: »

1. Increase of power to the European Parliament

Increasing the power of the EU Parliament does not make the EU more democratic. It just means the EU Parliament is more powerful. The EU Parliament has less democratic legitimacy than the institutions (national governments and parliaments) who give up the power under Lisbon that is given to the EU Parliament with a nett loss to democracy.
Increasing the powers of the EU Parliament since 1979 has been accompanied by the growing feeling that the EU is undemocratic. Lisbon simply perpetuates a policy which is known to have failed.

how is giving more power to the directly and democratically elected representatives of the people by the people, undemocratic?

:cool:

Freeborn John

ei.sdraob wrote: »

how is giving more power to the directly and democratically elected representatives of the people by the people, undemocratic?

:cool:

Democracy is more than elections; the people doing the voting have to be part of a society which would agree to live under their majority and this is not remotely the case across Europe. The EU Parliament has less democratic legitimacy that national parliaments and governments, but the increased power given to the EU Parliament comes at their expense with a net loss to democracy as a whole.

If giving more power to the EU Parliament was the answer to the EU democratic deficit then it would have been solved already because every treaty since the parliament was 1st directly elected in 1979 has done that. Instead we see that over this exact same period the feeling has been growing that the EU is undemocratic. In other words, it is known that the EU Parliament has been a failure over 30 years in giving democratic legitimacy to EU decision making, but Lisbon carries on with this failed policy regardless.

It is said that the definition of stupid is carrying on doing things that you know do not work. Lisbon is a stupid treaty for gicing the EU more powers when it is known that this does not make the EU more democratic in the eyes on the citizens of member states.

ei.sdraob

Freeborn John wrote: »

Democracy is more than elections; the people doing the voting have to be part of a society which would agree to live under their majority and this is not remotely the case across Europe. The EU Parliament has less democratic legitimacy that national parliaments and governments, but the increased power given to the EU Parliament comes at their expense with a net loss to democracy as a whole.

If giving more power to the EU Parliament was the answer to the EU democratic deficit then it would have been soved already because every treaty since the parliament was 1st directly elected in 1979 has done that. Instead we see that over this exact same period the feeling has been growing that the EU is undemocratic. In other words, it is known that the EU Parliament has been a failure over nearly 30 years in giving democratic legitimacy to EU decision making, but Lisbon carries on with this failed policy. It is said that the definition of stupid is carrying on doing things that you know do not work. Lisbon is a stupid treaty for gicing the EU more powers when it is known that this does not make the EU more democratic in the eyes on the citizens of member states.

some strong words there and more buzzwords

do you have any evidence and facts to support and backup your opinion?


i realize you are a new member here, but please observe the high standards of posting on this forum, backup your opinion by links and evidence like these members do

since you started this thread the onus of proof is on you, for reference on how to make an impact see the "10 real reasons to vote YES thread"

which is backed up by facts and a lively debate ensured

.

Freeborn John

ei.sdraob wrote: »

some strong words there and more buzzwords

do you have any evidence and facts to support and backup your opinion?

This is also the opinion of leading political scientists studying the EU, such as Giandomenico Majone, as outlined in the following publication.

http://www.amazon.com/Dilemmas-European-Integration-Ambiguities-Pitfalls/dp/0199274304

What is your alternative explanation for the phenomena that increasing the powers of the EU parliament over 30 years has simultaneously been accompanied by the growing feeling that the EU is undemocratic?

ei.sdraob

Freeborn John wrote: »

This is also the opinion of leading political scientists studying the EU, such as Giandomenico Majone, as outlined in the following publication.

http://www.amazon.com/Dilemmas-European-Integration-Ambiguities-Pitfalls/dp/0199274304

What is your alternative explanation for the phenomena that increasing the powers of the EU parliament over 30 years has simultaneously been accompanied by the growing feeling that the EU is undemocratic?

phenomena?

* phenomena requires observation
* observation leads to data being collected
* data gets analysed and the "phenomena" is confirmed/denied

once again since you the one claiming that there is a "phenomena that increasing the powers of the EU parliament over 30 years has simultaneously been accompanied by the growing feeling that the EU is undemocratic"

where is the data and studies to backup your theory?


please read the following article
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method

Scientific method refers to a body of techniques for investigating phenomena, acquiring new knowledge, or correcting and integrating previous knowledge. To be termed scientific, a method of inquiry must be based on gathering observable, empirical and measurable evidence subject to specific principles of reasoning. A scientific method consists of the collection of data through observation and experimentation, and the formulation and testing of hypotheses.

Define the question
Gather information and resources (observe)
Form hypothesis
Perform experiment and collect data
Analyze data
Interpret data and draw conclusions that serve as a starting point for new hypothesis
Publish results
Retest (frequently done by other scientists)

so once again wheres is the scientific studies of this phenomena you claim, on which your opinion rests

Scofflaw

Freeborn John wrote: »

This is also the opinion of leading political scientists studying the EU, such as Giandomenico Majone, as outlined in the following publication.

http://www.amazon.com/Dilemmas-European-Integration-Ambiguities-Pitfalls/dp/0199274304

What is your alternative explanation for the phenomena that increasing the powers of the EU parliament over 30 years has simultaneously been accompanied by the growing feeling that the EU is undemocratic?

That's largely driven by expectations, I think. It's a good historical rule that when the people have had no input to government, they expected none, but when they were given some they demanded more. However, the phenomenon isn't restricted to the EU - I think you'll find that people feel there is an increasing 'democratic deficit' in Irish politics, for which, personally, I blame the Whip system.

The German judgement had some very worthwhile comments on the nature of the European Parliament. They described it as not properly democratic, because representation in it is unequal, but regarded that as acceptable because it doesn't form the government of the EU. Instead, the Parliament is a directly democratic institution intended to act both as a check on the Council and as a mechanism for citizen input. To hand it the governing of the EU would be incorrect, because as it is currently constituted, a majority in the Parliament need not represent a majority of the Union's citizens.

cordially,
Scofflaw

ei.sdraob

Scofflaw wrote: »

That's largely driven by expectations, I think. It's a good historical rule that when the people have had no input to government, they expected none, but when they were given some they demanded more. However, the phenomenon isn't restricted to the EU - I think you'll find that people feel there is an increasing 'democratic deficit' in Irish politics, for which, personally, I blame the Whip system.

The German judgement had some very worthwhile comments on the nature of the European Parliament. They described it as not properly democratic, because representation in it is unequal, but regarded that as acceptable because it doesn't form the government of the EU. Instead, the Parliament is a directly democratic institution intended to act both as a check on the Council and as a mechanism for citizen input. To hand it the governing of the EU would be incorrect, because as it is currently constituted, a majority in the Parliament need not represent a majority of the Union's citizens.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Scofflaw

i did some digging, the book is available for limited preview on google books

above is linking to the conclusion, after reading which it leads me to believe the op didn't read the said book, which was written in 2005 in the context of the constitutional treaty

cocoa

Freeborn John wrote: »

Instead we see that over this exact same period the feeling has been growing that the EU is undemocratic. In other words, it is known that the EU Parliament has been a failure over 30 years in giving democratic legitimacy to EU decision making, but Lisbon carries on with this failed policy regardless.

Is it just me or is there a jump in logic going on here? Democracy, last time I checked, was not defined by a 'feeling'... Also, if it's really 'known' then I'd expect there to be more than just feelings indicating that...

Scofflaw

ei.sdraob wrote: »

Scofflaw

i did some digging, the book is available for limited preview on google books

above is linking to the conclusion, after reading which it leads me to believe the op didn't read the said book, which was written in 2005 in the context of the constitutional treaty

I think you may well be right. A read of the conclusions suggests that Freeborn John has been rather hasty in believing that the book agrees with him. It suggests that the creation of a European federal state has failed, and is doomed to failure, a conclusion I wouldn't disagree with. I haven't read the book, obviously, but I similarly don't doubt that various ambiguities, pitfalls, and outright failures of the EU have indeed resulted from attempts to steer it in the direction of full political union.

What eurosceptics often fail to realise, I think, is that there is a large body of opinion that favours the EU as it is, neither becoming a centralised federal state, nor falling apart in a welter of nation-states - indeed, that both the eurosceptics and the federalists are fringe elements. Their paranoia about each other does tend to dominate the debate, but is probably not the dominant opinion.

cordially,
Scofflaw

ButcherBoiz

Is is difficult to discuss a history of European Democracy without first making clear the meaning of 'democracy'.

The origin of the term is from the Greek, demos, meaning mob, or 'rule by the mob. In the basic form, majority rule, if 51% of a people vote to, for example, reduce the income of a minority, or to unfairly tax a segment of the population, the decision may be considered ('democratically') valid. This is a point of definition, but is still valid today. If a majority with a collective of European countries vote or lobby so as to promote the larger segments (centers of power) within Europe, it can, if there is a basis in legislation, do so and any country that is unable to or simply does not constitute a power centre, is limited in that, without sufficient autonomy, it will be unable to assert constitution or basic concerns. This is the essence of the problem. The question is whether or not the safeguards (in law) are sufficient to properly protect all member states, especially with respect to competing economic interests.

Nobody here has all the answers. I also think mainstream scientific considerations are somewhat removed from the wider debates at the level of ethics.

Freeborn John

ei.sdraob wrote: »

Scofflaw

i did some digging, the book is available for limited preview on google books

above is linking to the conclusion, after reading which it leads me to believe the op didn't read the said book, which was written in 2005 in the context of the constitutional treaty

I never make dishonest statements, nor claims i cannot back up.

---

No Royal Road To Legitimacy (Majone 2005).

It is by now generally admitted that the direct election of the EP has hardly helped to expand the legitimacy basis of the EC/EU. What is perhaps not sufficiently appreciated is the strong negative correlation between the constant decrease in voters’ turn-out in European elections and the expanding powers of the EP. In 1979--when the only significant powers of the EP were the right to reject the budget, to amend it within certain limits, and to approve (or not) the annual accounts—the turn-out was 63 per cent. At the 1989 elections the turn-out was 58.5 per cent. By then a new legislative “cooperation” procedure had been introduced into various policy fields, with an enhanced consultative role for the Parliament. The EP was also given a veto over the accession of new member states and over the conclusions of agreements with associate states. The Maastricht Treaty extended the powers of the Parliament quite substantially. It gave the EP the right to vote on the Commission before it took office; empowered it to appoint a European Ombudsman and to establish committees of inquiry; and made formal provision for the Parliament to invite the Commission to present a legislative proposal, thus giving it a sort of indirect legislative initiative. Most importantly, Maastricht introduced a new legislative procedure, now known as co-decision, under which the EP and the Council are equal co-legislators in the 15 Treaty areas to which the procedure then applied. At the time, supporters of stronger EP powers argued that with more majority voting, as envisaged by the Treaty, the position of national parliaments was weakened, but that a greater role for the EP would nevertheless improve the democratic legitimacy of EU legislation. At the 1994 European elections, however, the turn-out dropped to 56.8. New powers for the EP were again added by the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties. In particular, Amsterdam extended the power of co-decision from 15 to 38 Treaty areas, but voters turn-out went below the 50 per cent mark: to 49.4 at the European elections of 1999, and 45.7 per cent at the elections of 2004.

Turn-out in national elections exceeds that in European elections by as much as 30 percentage points. Participation is also much higher at European referenda, where people feel that their vote is practically relevant: in the French and Dutch referenda of 2005 on the Constitutional Treaty the turn out was 70 per cent and 63 per cent, respectively. In the European elections of 2004, the turn-out had been 42.8 in France and 39.3 in the Netherlands. In the build-up to the first direct elections many scholars as well as political leaders argued that elections to the EP would provide new legitimacy not only for this institution but for the entire integration process. Evidence from all the six European Parliament elections held so far shows that these expectations were ill-founded. The reason is probably to be found in the relation between legitimacy and effectiveness briefly discussed above. For the mass of European voters, if not for the political and intellectual elites committed to the integration process, the potential source of legitimacy represented by European elections is apparently insufficient to compensate the de-legitimating and destabilizing effects of decades of poor economic performance. A plausible inference is that it may be easier to increase the legitimacy of the EU by limiting the range of activities of the Union and strengthening the mechanisms of accountability by results than by encouraging popular participation through the EP
(Majone 2005).

Scofflaw

Freeborn John wrote: »

I never make dishonest statements, nor claims i cannot back up.

---

No Royal Road To Legitimacy (Majone 2005).

It is by now generally admitted that the direct election of the EP has hardly helped to expand the legitimacy basis of the EC/EU. What is perhaps not sufficiently appreciated is the strong negative correlation between the constant decrease in voters’ turn-out in European elections and the expanding powers of the EP. In 1979--when the only significant powers of the EP were the right to reject the budget, to amend it within certain limits, and to approve (or not) the annual accounts—the turn-out was 63 per cent. At the 1989 elections the turn-out was 58.5 per cent. By then a new legislative “cooperation” procedure had been introduced into various policy fields, with an enhanced consultative role for the Parliament. The EP was also given a veto over the accession of new member states and over the conclusions of agreements with associate states. The Maastricht Treaty extended the powers of the Parliament quite substantially. It gave the EP the right to vote on the Commission before it took office; empowered it to appoint a European Ombudsman and to establish committees of inquiry; and made formal provision for the Parliament to invite the Commission to present a legislative proposal, thus giving it a sort of indirect legislative initiative. Most importantly, Maastricht introduced a new legislative procedure, now known as co-decision, under which the EP and the Council are equal co-legislators in the 15 Treaty areas to which the procedure then applied. At the time, supporters of stronger EP powers argued that with more majority voting, as envisaged by the Treaty, the position of national parliaments was weakened, but that a greater role for the EP would nevertheless improve the democratic legitimacy of EU legislation. At the 1994 European elections, however, the turn-out dropped to 56.8. New powers for the EP were again added by the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties. In particular, Amsterdam extended the power of co-decision from 15 to 38 Treaty areas, but voters turn-out went below the 50 per cent mark: to 49.4 at the European elections of 1999, and 45.7 per cent at the elections of 2004.

Turn-out in national elections exceeds that in European elections by as much as 30 percentage points. Participation is also much higher at European referenda, where people feel that their vote is practically relevant: in the French and Dutch referenda of 2005 on the Constitutional Treaty the turn out was 70 per cent and 63 per cent, respectively. In the European elections of 2004, the turn-out had been 42.8 in France and 39.3 in the Netherlands. In the build-up to the first direct elections many scholars as well as political leaders argued that elections to the EP would provide new legitimacy not only for this institution but for the entire integration process. Evidence from all the six European Parliament elections held so far shows that these expectations were ill-founded. The reason is probably to be found in the relation between legitimacy and effectiveness briefly discussed above. For the mass of European voters, if not for the political and intellectual elites committed to the integration process, the potential source of legitimacy represented by European elections is apparently insufficient to compensate the de-legitimating and destabilizing effects of decades of poor economic performance. A plausible inference is that it may be easier to increase the legitimacy of the EU by limiting the range of activities of the Union and strengthening the mechanisms of accountability by results than by encouraging popular participation through the EP
(Majone 2005).

Interesting, but doesn't support the conclusion that the European Parliament is illegitimate. Monarchy is popular - does that make it legitimate? Indeed, dictatorships are often popular - does that make them legitimate? Iran has a huge turnout in its elections - is its government more legitimate than that of the UK?

Further, the fall in European election turnout is largely the result of expansion rather than anything else, which rather weakens a case built on it:

Member States |1979 |1984 |1989 |1994 |1999 |2004 |2009
Belgium |91.36 |92.09 |90.73 |90.66 |91.05 |90.81 |90.39
Denmark |47.82 |52.38 |46.17 |52.92 |50.46 |47.89 |59.54
Germany |65.73 |56.76 |62.28 |60.02 |45.19 |43 |43.3
Ireland |63.61 |47.56 |68.28 |43.98 |50.21 |58.58 |58.64
France |60.71 |56.72 |48.8 |52.71 |46.76 |42.76 |40.63
Italy |85.65 |82.47 |81.07 |73.6 |69.76 |71.72 |65.05
Luxembourg |88.91 |88.79 |87.39 |88.55 |87.27 |91.35 |90.75
Netherlands |58.12 |50.88 |47.48 |35.69 |30.02 |39.26 |36.75
United Kingdom |32.35 |32.57 |36.37 |36.43 |24 |38.52 |34.7
Greece ||80.59 |80.03 |73.18 |70.25 |63.22 |52.61
Spain |||54.71 |59.14 |63.05 |45.14 |44.9
Portugal |||51.1 |35.54 |39.93 |38.6 |36.78
Sweden |||||38.84 |37.85 |45.53
Austria |||||49.4 |42.43 |45.97
Finland |||||30.14 |39.43 |40.3
Czech Republic ||||||28.3 |28.2
Estonia ||||||26.83 |43.9
Cyprus ||||||72.5 |59.4
Lithuania ||||||48.38 |20.98
Latvia ||||||41.34 |53.7
Hungary ||||||38.5 |36.31
Malta ||||||82.39 |78.79
Poland ||||||20.87 |24.53
Slovenia ||||||28.35 |28.33
Slovakia ||||||16.97 |19.64
Bulgaria |||||||38.99
Romania |||||||27.67
Average EU turnout |61.99 |58.98 |58.41 |56.67 |49.51 |45.47 |43

While there has been a fall, the addition of the post-Communist Eastern European countries has been the cause of most of it - they are coming on board with turnouts of under 30% in many cases - there is certainly no fall dramatic enough to support a claim of illegitimacy, even if we assume that turnout determines legitimacy.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Freeborn John

Scofflaw wrote: »

Interesting, but doesn't support the conclusion that the European Parliament is illegitimate...

Decline in participation in elections to the EU Parliament is only a symptom of failure, not the cause of the phenomena that increasing the powers of the EP since 1979 has been simultaneously accompanied by the growth in the EU crisis of democratic legitimacy.

The root cause of the problem is that the EU Parliament has less democratic legitimacy than the institutions from which power is taken (national parliaments, and national cabinet ministers in the EU Council of Ministers) in order to give it more.

Elections to the EU Parliament are 2nd order (or 'mid-term') elections where most people vote on national issues. MEPs do not run on a program of government that they will implement should they win, because their legislative program is given to them by the EU Commision. Therefore voters do not know what the MEPs will do if they are returned to the EU Parliament. MEPs are also not represenatives of the people, but represnetatves of the political parties. If one resigns, dies, etc. there is no new election to appoint a replacement in most countries. For these reasons and more the EU Parliament has a weaker claim to democratic legitimacy than national parliaments or cabinet ministers. But cabinet ministers lose power to the EU Parliament when Lisbon gives the EU parliament co-decision with the Council of Ministers. And national parliaments lose power to the EU Parliament when the EU is given law-making authority in fields thar were previously decided by national legislatures. Therefore we see that more powers for the EU Parliament means less democratic legitimacy both for the EU and for the overall political process.

Scofflaw

Freeborn John wrote: »

Decline in participation in elections to the EU Parliament is only a symptom of failure, not the cause of the phenomena that increasing the powers of the EP since 1979 has been simultaneously accompanied by the growth in the EU crisis of democratic legitimacy.

The root cause of the problem is that the EU Parliament has less democratic legitimacy than the institutions from which power is taken (national parliaments, and national cabinet ministers in the EU Council of Ministers) in order to give it more.

Elections to the EU Parliament are 2nd order (or 'mid-term') elections where most people vote on national issues. MEPs do not run on a program of government that they will implement should they win, because their legislative program is given to them by the EU Commision. Therefore voters do not know what the MEPs will do if they are returned to the EU Parliament. MEPs are also not represenatives of the people, but represnetatves of the political parties. If one resigns, dies, etc. there is no new election to appoint a replacement in most countries. For these reasons and more the EU Parliament has a weaker claim to democratic legitimacy than national parliaments or cabinet ministers. But cabinet ministers lose power to the EU Parliament when Lisbon gives the EU parliament co-decision with the Council of Ministers. And national parliaments lose power to the EU Parliament when the EU is given law-making authority in fields thar were previously decided by national legislatures. Therefore we see that more powers for the EU Parliament means less democratic legitimacy both for the EU and for the overall political process.

That's a very weak set of arguments. It doesn't matter whether the MEP elections are mid-term in terms of national parliaments or not (and it varies from country to country). Voters do know what MEPs will do when they get to the Parliament - MEPs don't, indeed, usually have an active program of legislation (although the Parliament can call for legislation), but they can be expected to vote one or other way on issues arising - which is, let's face it, what the majority of TDs, and all opposition TDs, do in any case. The system of alternates is irrelevant - the same system is used here for Councillors - however, we don't use the list system, as you appear to think, and the choice of whether to do so is up to the each member state.

To call MEPs "representatives of the parties" is an extraordinary piece of gibberish. All party candidates are "representatives of the parties" - to a lesser or greater extent they are proposed or endorsed by their party HQ - which means that the argument, in the form you have proposed it, applies to national elections as well.

Further, the suggestion that the list system is both unusual and inadequately democratic is startlingly parochial. List systems are used in national elections in quite a lot of EU countries, including those countries, like the Scandinavian countries, where one can hardly complain that democracy is ineffective.

From the various incorrect assumptions you've made, both about our system, and about the systems obtaining in other European countries, I assume you're born and based in England?

cordially,
Scofflaw

Freeborn John

Scofflaw wrote: »

Hm. You've simply assumed that national parliaments have greater legitimacy than the European Parliaments. On what basis, exactly?

A legitimate political institution is one that has the consent of the governed for the powers it exercises over them. There are different way that political institutions may be legitimated, of which democratic legitimacy is only one. For example judges an central bankers are not elected but derive a legitimacy from their expertise in the law, or being the best means to achieve a particularly policy objective, such as low inflation.

Democratic legitimacy (the approval of the people, or 'demos') is however the most important means of legitimizing political power in contested policy fields. In democratic societies the main political institutions derive their legitimacy from elections of the people. But this does not mean that 'the people' is any random collection of humanity. A nation is the strongest community that we have, being united by strong common sympathies (derived from a strong sense of national identity) which exist between its members, but not between them and other communities. The strong solidarity afforded by national identity is essential to decision-making by majority. Without it an outvoted minority does not accept to go along with the majority, but prefers to form its own political institutions to govern themselves instead. The Irish nation for example formed its own state in order to assert that it would not be governed by the Westminster parliament whose majority decisions would frequently be opposed by the majority of Irishmen. Thus decision-making by majority is something we see within nation-states worldwide but not at international level.

International organizations (including the EU Parliament) do not have a democratic legitimacy of their own. They exercise 'conferred powers' whose legitimacy ultimately derives from the citizens of their member-states. Since there is no nation-like solidarity to hold the international community together international organisations preserve their democratic legitimacy (when taking serious decisions) through the use of unanimous votes so that no member-state is forced to go along with policies that the majority of their nationals is opposed to. The EU began to shed its democratic legitimacy when moving away from unanimous votes in politically sensitive decisions, roughly beginning in the early 1990s with the Maastricht Treaty but accelerating more recently.

The EU Parliament is really a political paradox; an institution with conferred powers that imagines incorrectly that it has a democratic legitimacy of its own that would allow it take serious decisions by majority vote binding on 500 million people. No international parliament has ever had this. It was only because of the minor nature of the decisions it took part in until recently that its inherent lack of democratic legitimacy was masked. By giving EU institutions like the EU Parliament political power in contested policy areas we see it increasingly revealed as a body that lacks the democratic legitimacy necessary for the exercise of such powers. Everywhere in Europe we see the rightful owners of that political power (the peoples of Europe) refuse to consent in referendums to EU treaties that would empower institutions, including the EP, to exercise political power over them.

---

"In those countries where different races dwell together ... the power of the imperial parliament must be limited as jealously as the power of the crown, and many of its functions must be discharged by provincial diets". (Lord Acton, describing the parliament of the Austrian Empire in 1862)

Scofflaw

Freeborn John wrote: »

A legitimate political institution is one that has the consent of the governed for the powers it exercises over them.

That would seem to adequately fit the European Parliament, all of whose powers have been agreed to by either parliaments of referendum.

Freeborn John wrote: »

There are different way that political institutions may be legitimated, of which democratic legitimacy is only one. For example judges an central bankers are not elected but derive a legitimacy from their expertise in the law, or being the best means to achieve a particularly policy objective, such as low inflation.

Democratic legitimacy (the approval of the people, or 'demos') is however the most important means of legitimizing political power in contested policy fields. In democratic societies the main political institutions derive their legitimacy from elections of the people. But this does not mean that 'the people' is any random collection of humanity. A nation is the strongest community that we have, being united by strong common sympathies (derived from a strong sense of national identity) which exist between its members, but not between them and other communities. The strong solidarity afforded by national identity is essential to decision-making by majority. Without it an outvoted minority does not accept to go along with the majority, but prefers to form its own political institutions to govern themselves instead. The Irish nation for example formed its own state in order to assert that it would not be governed by the Westminster parliament whose majority decisions would frequently be opposed by the majority of Irishmen. Thus decision-making by majority is something we see within nation-states worldwide but not at international level.

International organizations (including the EU Parliament) do not have a democratic legitimacy of their own. They exercise 'conferred powers' whose legitimacy ultimately derives from the citizens of their member-states. Since there is no nation-like solidarity to hold the international community together international organisations preserve their democratic legitimacy (when taking serious decisions) through the use of unanimous votes so that no member-state is forced to go along with policies that the majority of their nationals is opposed to. The EU began to shed its democratic legitimacy when moving away from unanimous votes in politically sensitive decisions, roughly beginning in the early 1990s with the Maastricht Treaty but accelerating more recently.

The EU Parliament is really a political paradox; an institution with conferred powers that imagines incorrectly that it has a democratic legitimacy of its own that would allow it take serious decisions by majority vote binding on 500 million people. No international parliament has ever had this. It was only because of the minor nature of the decisions it took part in until recently that its inherent lack of democratic legitimacy was masked. By giving EU institutions like the EU Parliament political power in contested policy areas we see it increasingly revealed as a body that lacks the democratic legitimacy necessary for the exercise of such powers. Everywhere in Europe we see the rightful owners of that political power (the peoples of Europe) refuse to consent in referendums to EU treaties that would empower institutions, including the EP, to exercise political power over them.

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"In those countries where different races dwell together ... the power of the imperial parliament must be limited as jealously as the power of the crown, and many of its functions must be discharged by provincial diets". (Lord Acton, describing the parliament of the Austrian Empire in 1862)

...and there we are again. The justification for your claim of illegitimacy of the European Parliament is that it's not a national one, and doesn't represent a national demos, and you admit of no other demos. As I've said before, that's simply a statement of your Credo. All your arguments boil down to a repeat of that Credo, for which you then adduce 'supporting arguments'.

Mind you, if you look at the German judgement, it explicitly recognises the European Parliament as an institution that represents the nation-states rather than a European demos:

cc) Against this backdrop, the European Parliaments factually remains, due to the Member State’s contingents of seats, a representation of the peoples of the Member States.

Perhaps you can think of some new ways to justify your view that the European Parliament is illegitimate. Personally, I distinctly recall voting for my MEPs, on the understanding that the persons thus elected would represent my interests at the European level. As far as I can see, they have the legitimacy to carry out that function by virtue of that vote. They don't have sufficient legitimacy to form the government of the EU, but then I don't want them to do so. You don't want them to do so either, but nevertheless you insist on measuring them by that yardstick.

cordially,
Scofflaw

Freeborn John

Scofflaw wrote: »

That would seem to adequately fit the European Parliament, all of whose powers have been agreed to by either parliaments of referendum.

But not by the primary sources of political power in a democracy, i.e. the people, as is shown by the 2005 referendum results in France and the Netherlands, the 2008 referendum defeat in Ireland, and the certain knowledge that many more nations would have rejected the EU Constitution / Lisbon treaty had they not been denied their say.

Freeborn John

Scofflaw wrote: »

...and there we are again. The justification for your claim of illegitimacy of the European Parliament is that it's not a national one, and doesn't represent a national demos, and you admit of no other demos. As I've said before, that's simply a statement of your Credo. All your arguments boil down to a repeat of that Credo, for which you then adduce 'supporting arguments'.

It is not simply my Credo. Every nation-state in the world is based on that 'Credo' too, and the trend in the world is to an increasing number of nation-states (up from ~60 in 1945 to 193 today) with all new states being democratic states being nation-states. The desire for self-governance is part of the human condition.

Freeborn John

Scofflaw wrote: »

Mind you, if you look at the German judgement, it explicitly recognises the European Parliament as an institution that represents the nation-states rather than a European demos:

Yes. The German constitutional court ruling was explicitly based on the same argument i am making here. The court said that the EU Parliament could only exercise conferred powers and was unable to derive a direct democratic legitimacy of its own. For this reason they objected to some measures of the Lisbon Treaty (for example the flexibility clauses, i.e. article 352 TFEU).

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"328. As regards the ban (in the Geramn constitution) on transferring blanket empowerments or on transferring Kompetenz-Kompetenz, the provision (Lisbon 'flexibility clause') meets with constitutional objections because the newly worded provision makes it possible to substantially amend Treaty foundations of the European Union without the mandatory participation of legislative bodies beyond the Member States’ executive powers ..."

http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html

Freeborn John

Scofflaw wrote: »

Personally, I distinctly recall voting for my MEPs, on the understanding that the persons thus elected would represent my interests at the European level. As far as I can see, they have the legitimacy to carry out that function by virtue of that vote. They don't have sufficient legitimacy to form the government of the EU, but then I don't want them to do so. You don't want them to do so either, but nevertheless you insist on measuring them by that yardstick.

There are two types of vote. One vote is required by the Irish nation to consent to the powers that the EU institutions wield. Such votes only occur in Ireland with many other nations having either voted against Lisbon or been denied their say. Therefore the legitimacy of the EU institutions is very much open to question.

The vote for members of the EU Parliament does not legitimize the powers of the EU Parliament; it only decides who the MEP is.

ei.sdraob

Freeborn John wrote: »

It is not simply my Credo. Every nation-state in the world is based on that 'Credo' too, and the trend in the world is to an increasing number of nation-states (up from ~60 in 1945 to 193 today) with all new states being democratic states being nation-states. The desire for self-governance is part of the human condition.

but EU is not a nation state, never was and never will be

you seem to completely miss the point of EU, and then you form an opinion on this flawed premise

ButcherBoiz

Come on lads, it comes across like ye are trying to brow-beat one another. Everyone has different opinions and the point is to try and find the middle ground. I am sure that in each of our daily lives we feel that there are too many people out there trying to tell us what to do or think.... keep up the debating, but relax! If you try and force a point the other side won't listen anyway!

oscarBravo

ButcherBoiz wrote: »

Everyone has different opinions and the point is to try and find the middle ground.

Not always. Where's the point in trying to find the middle ground between creationism and science?

Not everything is a matter of opinion.

ButcherBoiz

oscarBravo wrote: »

Not always. Where's the point in trying to find the middle ground between creationism and science?

Not everything is a matter of opinion.

This idea that only one side of a debate can be objective, rigorous, scientific, intellectual etc. while the other is the polar opposite is not convincing. Neither is the comparison you offer --creationism versus science is hardly relevant, comparatively, to a debate over a specific piece of political legislation.

Could I suggest, as a new starting point, that the No people ask themselves what are the disadvantages of rejecting the treaty, and that the Yes people do exactly the same, i.e. what are the disadvantages (in their considered opinions) of acceptance. Failure, of either side, to do this indicates fundamentalism, or of taking up either a far right, or a far left position. No proposal or political movement is perfect. Remember, the average voter will try to balance the two camps and will lean in one direction, eventually. All I'm talking about here is common sense, which the electorate possesses.

What is the point of a debate between people who have entered in to this with a fixed mindset? Do you guys really think that the thousands of people passing through this forum will subscribe to any one posters viewpoint? Or will they follow one set of premises to a (prescribed) categorical conclusion? Not is the real world!
:rolleyes:;)

OneArt

Freeborn John wrote: »

10. If you cannot say NO to Lisbon now, then you will never be able to say NO to the EU again.

Course I can. I can just move.

oscarBravo

ButcherBoiz wrote: »

This idea that only one side of a debate can be objective, rigorous, scientific, intellectual etc. while the other is the polar opposite is not convincing. Neither is the comparison you offer --creationism versus science is hardly relevant, comparatively, to a debate over a specific piece of political legislation.

It's always possible that a political debate can be objective and intellectual on both sides.

It's also possible that either side of such a debate can consist of blatant misinformation and lies. I see no reason to legitimise such tactics in the interest of balance.

There is a perfectly legitimate reason for opposing the Lisbon treaty: ideologically-pure nationalism - the belief that the nation-state is the perfect unit of legitimate governance, and that any supranational organisation is intrinsically wrong. It has been claimed that it is possible to be pro-EU and anti-Lisbon, but I haven't seen an honest expression of that position yet.

If people honestly think that Ireland would be better off out of the EU, fine - but I disagree. If people believe that we can craft an EU that perfectly serves our interests with no trade-offs, and that we should reject the Lisbon treaty because it doesn't achieve that fairy-tale reality, then I disagree with that view also, but I'm not going to accord it the courtesy of acknowledging it as a legitimate view.

ei.sdraob

ButcherBoiz wrote: »

This idea that only one side of a debate can be objective, rigorous, scientific, intellectual etc. while the other is the polar opposite is not convincing. Neither is the comparison you offer --creationism versus science is hardly relevant, comparatively, to a debate over a specific piece of political legislation.

Could I suggest, as a new starting point, that the No people ask themselves what are the disadvantages of rejecting the treaty, and that the Yes people do exactly the same, i.e. what are the disadvantages (in their considered opinions) of acceptance. Failure, of either side, to do this indicates fundamentalism, or of taking up either a far right, or a far left position. No proposal or political movement is perfect. Remember, the average voter will try to balance the two camps and will lean in one direction, eventually. All I'm talking about here is common sense, which the electorate possesses.

What is the point of a debate between people who have entered in to this with a fixed mindset? Do you guys really think that the thousands of people passing through this forum will subscribe to any one posters viewpoint? Or will they follow one set of premises to a (prescribed) categorical conclusion? Not is the real world!
:rolleyes:;)

actually bringing up creationism is quite relevant

since creationists completely ignore scientific method in order to further their agenda, why bother with scientific method when the answer for everything is "god did it"

this is sort of similar to a lot of Anti Lisbon reasoning, despite an overwhelming weight of evidence to the contrary all reason and logic seems to go out of window from the No supporters, with some of the reasons borderlining on conspiracy theories and others based on complete verifiable lies

ButcherBoiz

ei.sdraob wrote: »

actually bringing up creationism is quite relevant

since creationists completely ignore scientific method in order to further their agenda, why bother with scientific method when the answer for everything is "god did it"

this is sort of similar to a lot of Anti Lisbon reasoning, despite an overwhelming weight of evidence to the contrary all reason and logic seems to go out of window from the No supporters, with some of the reasons borderlining on conspiracy theories and others based on complete verifiable lies

That's a pretty extreme opinion you have there in relation to the varied reasons put forward for a no vote. I think the irish electorate voted based on common sense more than anything. Again, I would not get stuck on the whole scientific method argument. That's okay for the laboratory, but is not a clear basis for complex political and ethical issues. Science is stunning! But it wasn't common sense that built the nuclear bomb was it?!