Moral relativism as it pertains to individualism

Hellm0

Hi there,
Something I have been contemplating recently is the connection between the individual and the state, or, more accurately, the requirement for an ostensibly objective social concept of morality and how this can clash with an individualistic/consumerist society.

In so much as free will is bound by the necessity for "normalization" of behavior within social groups, in what way can this concept of uniformity leak into the participants concept of identity? Given that we are all victims of the narrative complex, and so are prone to re-writing our past to fit present circumstance, identity is indeed open to change based purely upon social pragmatism. Of course, this may be "bad faith", or the denial of free will, but, in so much as it serves our unconscious desires, one may assume that adherence to social conventions may not be justifiably be said to be an act of bad faith.

That said, we live in a consumerist society. Identities are pre-packaged and sold to us as lifestyle products, and this is where I have a bone to pick. Many of us are aware of the double sided nature of social interaction, that, in order to "fit in" we must alter our behavior or the way we speak etc. This is not too dissimilar from so called "Double think", ala George Orwell 1984. Though most of us engage in this kind of behavior, it rarely results in much leakage of these assumed identities into our real concept of identity.

My theory goes however that materialism is far more seductive, as the results are tangible. The procurement of identity reinforcing products may, eventually, lead to the belief that "you are what you own". I guess what I'm getting at is; in a consumerist society, is the emphasis placed upon individual identity(and the constant pursuit of gratification) degrading the socially bonding concept of objective morality.

Does having greater purchasing power lead to moral relativism?

Joe1919

One argument that could be made is that consumerism is more a 'means' than an 'end' and that much of modern consumerism is ultimately more 'social' activity than individual acts of 'hedonism'. (e.g Jean Baudrillard idea that commodities form a kind of (social) language http://mockingbird.creighton.edu/english/worldlit/teaching/SRP435/baudrillard.htm )

If you agree with this, much of what motivates the excesses of materialism and consumerism could possibly be considered as a way of forming groups and as a sort of 'social bonding' and that this doesn't really change anything about the difficulty of trying to show that some type of moral realism exists. After all, tribe/group/order/class/clan/family/trade/religious identities must always have existed in the past and most ideas of morality take place within the context and values of these identities and social groups.
What I'm trying to say is that having money and consuming money in a certain way (i.e on certain schools for children, living in certain up-market houses, going to up-market restraunts etc) could be considered as a social activity in terms of selecting the group or 'tribe' that one wants to live or be with. (along with their customs and morals)

Offalycool

Moral relativism, hmmm.

I favour Hannah Arendt's view that it is a symptom of process thinking, or behaviour. If one is open to action with others, one is open to possibilities. If one is focused on results one is motivated by a sense of necessity. If we can be open to unintended outcomes, we can always take circumstance into account, we can take others into account. If one is driven by the end, by necessity (or determinism), one is a slave to ones end and bulldozes others to one side to realise an end, the ethical relation to others does not come into account. The excuse here is that it cannot be any other way, "its not me taking your house, its the bank!" To be ethically relative is to only take others into ethical account when it suite ones aims (which is to say, not to account for them ethically at all). On the other hand, to be open to possibilities with others through action, is to be open to unintended outcomes, therefore it is non-determinant, and ethical, insofar as it takes others into account.

Joe1919

Offalycool wrote: »

Moral relativism, hmmm.

....To be ethically relative is to only take others into ethical account when it suite ones aims .....

I just wondering (please excuse me if I'm wrong) if your confusing psychological egoism with ethical relativism.

Psychological egoism or egotism is the view that humans are always motivated by self-interest... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychological_egoism

Ethical relativism is the doctrine that there are no absolute truths in ethics and that what is morally right or wrong varies from person to person or from society to society. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/194016/ethical-relativism

Moral realism states that 'Moral statements are the sorts of statements which are (or which express propositions which are) true or false....... independent of our moral opinions, theories, etc. ... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism

Offalycool

I could be. I have found that philosophers generally don't agree on the meaning for "ethics" and "morality" all the time. For me, "ethics" deals with present circumstance, to be ethical is to be open to the objections or suggestions of others, "Morality" on the other hand, is for me, imposed from beyond those present at any given moment, and is deterministic because it tells us what to do, regardless of circumstance. I don't think I am suggesting that people are motivated by self interest, even if they behave in a deterministic way. More that such an approach to life is generally a passive approach. The end is beyond my control so to speak, hence the slave mentality of the banker who repossesses the house for the bank because the necessity of banking demands it of him.

EDIT: Just to clarify: I wrote before that to be non deterministic is to be ethical insofar as we are open to others.
Then I said that to be passive is to be deterministic because of the acceptance of a necessary view of events, beyond our control.
The difference between these two approaches is that in the former, we act in accordance with a reality we believe we can't change. In the latter, we act with others with a view to possibilities, without necessary outcomes. (which is not easy I admit)

Joe1919

Its a while since I read Arendt but one thing I remember is her 'action theory' and she seems to indicate (influenced by the extentialists?) that our lives are not passive but always open to possibilities through action. (vita active).

Anyhow, I would consider Arendt to be a moral relativist in the sense that for her, Morality does not come from reason but from judgement and our ability to communicate these judgements to others.
'The criterion for judgment, then, is communicability, and the standard for deciding whether our judgments are indeed communicable is to see whether they could fit with the sensus communis of others.' "It is by virtue of this idea of mankind, present in every single man, that men are human, and they can be called civilized or humane to the extent that this idea becomes the principle not only of their judgments but of their actions."
(5.4) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arendt/

In this respect, she is similar to Protagoras 'man is the measure of all things' (including morality) and Rorty's idea of solidarity and intersubjectivity as being the only objective standard.

Incidenty, I'm not taking sides in the moral realism versus relativism debate. I would like to be able to defend moral realism but its very difficult to defend and at times one is left with the feeling that in certain respects, morality is perhaps only a myth in that when it is broken down, it is no different to the combination of pragmatism , prudence, pity, pride, custom and habit. Perhaps Nietzsche is right.

Offalycool

Correct, but we can live passively as animal laborans and homo faber. Her influences would be, as far as I can remember, Aristotle, Aquinas, Nietzsche and Heidegger among others.

Nietzsche is right about moral relativism IMO. But I don't believe imposing another morality is the answer (although imo his master/slave distinction is useful, if not as he intended it.) Arendt's view of action is preferable to Nietzsche's for me. With Arendt, we are encouraged to be open to posabilities, to acknowledge our conscience that arises from others, our humanity. Nietzsche would have us evolve into superior beings, with a view to the 'best' morality, which is individual power over oneself and weaker others. He once wrote "It is my fate to have to be the first decent human being... Only after me will there be grand politics on earth"