The nature of knowledge

roosh

Hey, I was having a discussion, about the nature of knowledge, and thought that this section of boards could be a fruitful place to discuss it further. I'm sure there already exists, a great body of philosophical writings on this topic, so even to be pointed in the direction of such writings would be beneficial. If there are any who can offer there own input, or even their own understanding of those philosophical works, as the pertain to the issue, that would also be great.


The contention is, that knowledge can only be acquired through direct, personal experience, and that a clear distinction can be made between information and knowledge.

It is also contended that one can know information, that is, know a piece of information, in the form of facts, figures, pictures etc., but that knoweldge of that information does not equate to knowledge of the truth [or validity of the information].

Further from that, one can "possess" knowledge of a piece of information [which is actually true], without "possessing" knowledge of the actual truth. For example, a traveller could visit a primitive tribe, in a very remote part of the world, and tell the leader of the tribe: "London is the capital city of England". The traveller could then leave, and one of the tribes-people could ask the leader, what the traveller had said. The tribal leader could reply, verbatim, that "London is the capital city of England".

In this case the tribal leader knows the information, in the form of the sentence "England is the capital city of England", however, he does not know whether or not this is true. In order to verify the validity of the statement, he would need to experience this for himself.

This is more to demonstrate the difference between information and actual knowledge.


A further description of how knowledge can only be acquired through direct personal experience, is that of Sexual intercourse. If we take the example of a hormonal 15yr old boy, who is still a virgin, but who spends quite a lot of time amassing information about sex, both through scientific means and less scientific means....on the internet.....or in magazines.....or by hiding in his neighbours bushes*.

The boy amasses so much information, that he is the playground expert. This however does not amount to knowledge of the act of sexual intercourse. This can only be acquired through partaking in the act, and indeed, much of the information that the boy has acquired, requires his "gittin' some", in order to verify the information that he has acquired.


A further example, one that is quite common, is the tasting of honey. One can have as much detailed information as exists, the most colourfully articulate descriptions, scientific and otherwise, about the taste and texture of honey, about its chemical make-up, etc. , but one cannot know what it tastes like until one tastes it for oneself.

Joe1919

mangaroosh wrote: »

The contention is, that knowledge can only be acquired through direct, personal experience,........
.................A further example, one that is quite common, is the tasting of honey. One can have as much detailed information as exists, the most colourfully articulate descriptions, scientific and otherwise, about the taste and texture of honey, about its chemical make-up, etc. , but one cannot know what it tastes like until one tastes it for oneself.

I am thinking of Bill Cullen on the Pat Kenny TV show a few months ago and he seems to be saying that a few weeks work experience selling apples in Moore Street markets is better than any business degree.

To a certain extent he is right. Everything we learn in school is second or third hand. We learn (in school) the thoughts and experiences of mainly dead men.

However, 'no man is an island'. It could be argued that there is no such thing as an individual human being. Our essence i.e. what we are is necessarly social, because even as individuals, we think in terms of language and so our individual thoughts and experiences are not completly our own but are shaped by the language and society and culture we live in. We operate as a network.( Our minds software (so to speak) is not our own).

On the other hand, we do need at least some personal first hand experience to make sense of our second hand reports of experiences that we hear and read about..

One version of this problem has been discussed by Frank Jackson who wonders whether a colour blind lady (Mary) could ever know what colours are like from second hand descriptions.

'Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal cords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence ‘The sky is blue’. [...] What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a color television monitor? Will she learn anything or not?'

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mary%27s_room

This sort of reminds me of the (very) sentimental and spiritual song by Charlie Landsborough about the blind child asking 'What colour is the wind'.
Can one ever describe colours to someone who is born blind.?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fNJEJTrVZdY&feature=youtube_gdata

roosh

Joe1919 wrote: »

I am thinking of Bill Cullen on the Pat Kenny TV show a few months ago and he seems to be saying that a few weeks work experience selling apples in Moore Street markets is better than any business degree.

To a certain extent he is right. Everything we learn in school is second or third hand. We learn (in school) the thoughts and experiences of mainly dead men.

However, 'no man is an island'. It could be argued that there is no such thing as an individual human being. Our essence i.e. what we are is necessarly social, because even as individuals, we think in terms of language and so our individual thoughts and experiences are not completly our own but are shaped by the language and society and culture we live in. We operate as a network.( Our minds software (so to speak) is not our own).

On the other hand, we do need at least some personal first hand experience to make sense of our second hand reports of experiences that we hear and read about..

One version of this problem has been discussed by Frank Jackson who wonders whether a colour blind lady (Mary) could ever know what colours are like from second hand descriptions.

'Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal cords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence ‘The sky is blue’. [...] What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a color television monitor? Will she learn anything or not?'

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mary%27s_room

This sort of reminds me of the (very) sentimental and spiritual song by Charlie Landsborough about the blind child asking 'What colour is the wind'.
Can one ever describe colours to someone who is born blind.?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fNJEJTrVZdY&feature=youtube_gdata

apologies, the title of the thread is somewhat [unintentionally] misleading, as the contention is somewhat different from the thought experiment presented in Mary's room. The thread would be more correctly re-named, the acquisition of knowledge*, as opposed to the nature of knowledge. again, my apologies for that.



The contention is, that knowledge is only accessible through direct personal experience, as opposed to there being a non-physical element associated with knowledge.

Further, that information and knowledge are different,
that knowledge of a piece of information, does not constitute true knowledge [of what it is, that the information pertains to].

This is where the difference between belief and knowledge applies, as a person may know a piece of information, (in the form of a statement or figures) but they cannot know whether that information is true or false, without personal experience to verify or falsify the claim.

A person may believe a piece of information to be true, and it may transpire that it is indeed true, but they cannot know it to be true without personal experience to verify it.

Equally a person can believe a piece of information to be true, which is actually false. Again personal experience is necessary to verify or falsify.


With regard to the Mary's room experiment, and echoing Dennet's argument, Mary could not have known everything about colour (or a particular colour), without having actually experienced the colour(s).

Mary could have known* all the information, scientific and otherwise, there is to know about the experience of colour(s). That is to say, she could have conducted a great number of experiments, and could be able to repeat, verbatim, all the information that she knew. She could know information about what happens (to other people) when they see colour(s).

*please excuse the conventional use of the word know, in relation to knoweldge, as it is somewhat paradoxical to the point being made.

If we take the example of the blue sky.

While Mary has all the information about what happens to a person when they see the colour blue, Mary cannot possibly know that this information is correct, as she cannot possibly know that the information actually pertains to the colour blue, and not some other colour.

Mary can only believe, that the information she has, pertains to the relevant colours. For all Mary knows, the person who told her what the colour was, that she has been studying, could actually have been lying.

The only way that Mary can actually verify the information, and thereby shift the information that she has, from belief to knowledge, is through direct personal experience of the colours.

Even then however, Mary may not necessarily know what colour is blue, what colour is red, what colour is orange, etc., as people could still lie to her about what each colour is called. Again, this is where information is separate from knowledge.

Joe1919

There are different ways of looking at this. One way is by saying that in the first place all knowledge is subject to possible error and revision.
Indeed, it is often argued that there is no such thing as absolute knowledge. The best we have is probable opinion and belief. There is a long tradition of this scepticism e.g. Plato's cave where all we see are mere appearances or 'shadows' but never the 'thing in itself' (Kant).
In some instances (e.g. Gravity), we are aware of its presence and even have laws to measure its effects, although we do not really understand it and why gravitational force is so weak compared to magnetic force etc.

I see problems with the idea that all knowledge needs our own personal experience to verify or falsify. This would limit us. For example, how can I know whether a road map is true or false except perhaps by driving up and down every road on the map to check it out and this would be impossible? Would it not be better to accept that because the map has come with ordnance survey or AA approval it can be trusted much better than if I had tried to check this out for myself.

Its also the case that someone else (e.g a doctor) may have better experience and knowledge than our own in certain matters and its possible that we may value and trust his experience greater than our own.

Furthermore, can we even trust our own experience? We can error ourselves by presuming that the way I experiences things is the same as you would experiences a similar thing, just like Wittgensteins 'beetles in a box'.
http://www.philosophyonline.co.uk/pom/pom_behaviourism_wittgenstein.htm

Much scientific research and knowledge is aquired as part of a large group and the information is collective and shared. Knowledge in this way builds up in layers, with each new development giving an impulse to a newer set of questions. This calls for a certain amount of trust but errors and problems will eventually surface if there is a lack of 'coherence'. We see this in the case of many beliefs that have become in-coherent with modern views.
Some philosophers (e.g Hegel) argue that all consciousness and language came about in this way.
I will leave the last few words to Isaac Newton ....

"If I have seen a little further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants."

Joe1919

mangaroosh wrote: »

The contention is, that knowledge is only accessible through direct personal experience, as opposed to there being a non-physical element associated with knowledge.

PS...... One solution to this problem could be in the use of the word 'knowledge'.
It has been argued that this word 'knowledge' is not univocal but has several meanings and is used in several different ways. e.g.

1 'Know-how' as in a skill, art or craft.
2 Knowledge of facts, such as science (knowledge by descriptions).
3 Knowledge by acquaintance.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knowledge_by_acquaintance

Your have a good argument (that knowledge is only accessible through direct personal experience) imo if by 'knowledge' you are only using the word in the limited case of (3) Knowledge by acquaintance' .

roosh

cheers for the links, and taking the time to respond. I'm not overly familiar with most of the philosophical concepts that abound, or the various arguments from the more famous philosophers, so apologies if this is just going over old ground.


Forgive the somewhat rigid nature of the post, the points being made were developed more organically through discussions, so I'm putting them down here for posterity, so that they may be challenged.


There are a number of contentions, in no particular order:

That knowledge is absolute, that is it is not possible to know something that is false. One can however believe [to be true] something that is false.

That knowledge cannot be expressed in language or numbers, meaning that no amount of information can ever be a substitute for experience. An experience can however be described, but the description of the experience is not the experience itself, and is separate from (but dependent on) it. A description of an experience is such that it can act as a guide to someone else, having a [potentially] similar experience.


That all knowledge must be knowledge by acquaintance, including knowledge of facts (knowledge by description) and know-how.

With regard to knowledge of facts (by description) and "Know-how", it is necessary to examine what is actually known. This in part relates to Bertrand Russels criticism of the equivocal use of the word know (as per the wiki link you posted). Where there is an important distinction between knowledge and belief, that can often get overlooked, particularly with regard to knowledge by description.

Whith regard to knowledge by description, we can take the example of either Mary or the person who has never tasted honey (henceforth "honey taster"), and explore it further. In both cases - Mary and the honey taster - the individual has knowledge by descripiton, or more simply they have information about the relevant experiences.

The issue is, that neither of them know whether the information is true or not. What they actually know, is information, that is, they know a set of statements, a set of statistics, colourful descriptions (pardon the pun), etc. What they actually know, is words, or sentences.

The information that both have could just as easily be false, as it could be true. The indiviudal who has knowledge by description can simply either choose to believe the information is true, or they can choose to believe it is false. They are likely to do this based on the faith they have in the sources they receive the information from.

Even this information that they have, they have had to acquire through direct personal experience of the information. That is, they had to read it, learn it, think it, etc.

The same applies to "know-how", which [I presume] is knowledge gained through experience, without necessarily expressing it in the form of information.


As you mention with regard to the scientific community, and Newton's quote in particular, knowledge is acquired as part of a large group, that is the individual who acquires the knowledge can be categorised as being part of a group. Again, as you quite rightly point out, it is the information that is collective and shared. Information however is not knowledge, although one can know information - the information can however be false.

The peer review system of scientific enquiry is a great example of how personal experience is essential for the acquisition of knowledge - although many "scientifically minded" people might argue against the proposition.

If a scientist proposes a new theory, and claims that the experimental results support the claim, initially, only the scientist can know whether his claim is an accurate description of reality, or not. No one else has the ability to know whether the description is accurate or not, they can simply choose to believe, based on what they already know [through experience] or what they believe to be true.

Another scientist may then choose to carry out the experiment, to see if the claim is accurate. This scientist then has the ability to know whether or not the claim is accurate or not, based on its correspondence to his experience. He can report his findings, which other scientists can then choose to believe, or not.

This process can continue until half of the scientists have verified the claim, and support the contention that it is accurate. This may be deemed by the rest of the community to be sufficient, in order to accept the claim as being true, but they are still relying on their belief that all the other scientists are telling the truth, or are correct.

Joe1919

There is a problem if you try to pin down fully the meaning and idea of 'knowledge' or try to see anything 'absolute' when it comes to knowledge. The problem in the first place is that there has never been a satisfactory definition to the word 'knowledge'. It is often defined as " Knowledge = 'Justified True Belief" but this has run into problems from Plato to Gettier. e.g. Problems of justification, problems with truth, Gettier problem etc.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_justification
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

There is another problem in that: 1 The universe is infinite, 2 The human has limited intelligence that is finite, 3 A finite being (human) can not have infinite (and perhaps absolute) knowledge.

These problems in defining words like 'knowledge', 'truth', 'good', etc. have led some philosophers to re-examine the way we use language and words. When we are children, we learn language by listening to the 'use' of language. We use words without looking up dictionaries or looking for definitions by just observing how words fit into our use of the language. This idea has led to a sort of relativism and to Wittgenstein's famous statement that "the meaning of a word is in its use"

One view (Pragmatism) is to abandon the whole idea that we can have knowledge in the sense that this knowledge can be absolutely true or false but instead see knowledge in terms of 'beliefs that are useful'. If we have a view of the world and this view is useful and helps us survive as an individual or as a species, then this view has survival value in pragmatic terms. Hence what counts is not whether our view of the world is true or false but whether our view is useful and helpful to our survival or personal goals.

Now I accept some of what you are saying. For example, if someone (e.g a parent) dies, people often want to go and see that person dead for themselves and this 'first hand experience' of seeing the 'remains' helps them fully accept the reality of the death of the person and their loss.

However, one of the uses of knowledge is that it can be shared. If we restrict our idea that knowledge can only be seen in terms of our personal experiences, we end up with a very subjective idea of knowledge. For knowledge to be useful and shareable, it should contain some objectivity.

Its also the case that particular experiences in themselves are not very useful in terms of the accumulation of knowledge. What makes knowledge useful is when we move from the 'particular' to the general or 'universal' in a coherent way.
For example, when Newton sat under the tree and the apple fell on his head, Newton experienced a particular single event. There was nothing spectacular or interesting about this trivial 'particular' occurrence. It was only when Newton applied his imagination to this 'particular' occurrence and pondered on the universal nature of his experience (that items tend to fall to earth under gravitational force) that some useful and shareable knowledge came into being.

Don't forget that as humans, we have a very advanced language system and the capacity for empathy. We can share experiences.(to some extent). Our whole legal and political system is helped by the idea that people (and judges and juries) have the capacity of imagination and can imagine themselves in the other persons shoes and with the other person experiences. We do not have to suffer murder ourselves to understand what murder is about.

Hence I would argue that we don't need to suffer certain experiences to 'know' that these experiences are painful. We do not need to break our leg to 'know' that a broken leg can be painful and something to avoid. We can observe and learn from other people's experiences and mistakes, and 'know' that these observations (and second hand descriptions of experiences) are useful enough to count as 'knowledge'.

Cannibal Ox

Knowledge as experience has to make one of two assumptions, either knowledge of a subject is objective and independent of us, or, knowledge as subjective, in which there exists infinite knowledges on infinite objects, none of which are true, and none of which are false. Both assumptions posit knowledge as independent of social relations. Knowledge, whether it's objective or subjective, is separate from the fields within which it arises. The psychiatrist uncovers neurosis, the priest reveals universal moral code, and the citizen founds the state.

Both views ignore power and it's relationship to knowledge, as well as the fields within which knowledge arises. Power in this sense is imbricated in relations, it is decentralized, it produces rather then negates, and it is relative. Power operates through discourses, which constitute discursive formations, sets of knowledge, which are in turn dependent on the particular social, political, historical, and cultural context in which they arise. Knowledge in this sense is never neutral and cannot be known through experience, but is rather constitutive and productive. The psychiatrist produces the neurotic, the priest produces the sinner, and the state produces the citizen.

In other words, you are a subject of knowledge, and your experience is the constitutive experience of knowledge, produced in, and through, you.

roosh

cheers Joe, I'm kind of learning as I go, with regard to the various arguments that have already been made. apologies about the length of this, but I was trying to transfer what "was in my head" to the post, but am not sure if I succeeded. I know that when I was thinking about it earlier, it sounded a lot clearer than it came out here - apologies for that.

the definition of knowledge
The idea of knowledge being a "justified true belief", was doomed from the start, as the Gettier problems make clear. The reason being that knowledge and belief are two entirely different "things". It would be somewhat like trying to define an apple in terms of an orange. While there may be some overlaps, they are essentially two completely different things (the nature of which is not presumed here).


There is another real issue when it comes to defining knowledge, however, not necessarily because it is difficult to define, rather that it is undefinable. Knowledge itself is beyond conceptual thought, that is, no amount of words can ever capture the true essence of what knowledge is. The OED online states that a definition refers to "the exact meaning of a word". So a definition is reserved for words. The issue however is, that the word knowledge is not knowledge itself, just as the word cup cannot be used to drink out of.



the use of language
Language and words are, at best, an approximation, a description that refer to something else, namely the thing that they [attempt to] describe. Language is also the means through which we attempt ot communicate our personal experience, without experience there is no language, but without language there is still experience.

It is indeed useful to examine how we use language, and what the nature of language is. I read in one of the links that you provided (at least I think it was in one of the links.apologies, can't find which one) that there have been arguments made that langauge and words are merely labels (am I correct in saying it is known as "anti-rationalism"?).
I'm not really familiar with many of the proponents of such an argument, except for Eckhart Tolle's explanation in "the Power of Now".

If we, as alluded to above, take the example of a "cup", we can explore the nature of the definition of a "cup" and how it relates to [in this case] the drinking utensil.

On one hand we have the dictionary definition of a cup, and let's pretend that this definition references all the scientific information on the nature of matter. On the other hand we have an actual cup.

Now, the definition we have of the word cup, may perhaps be flawless, in that it leaves nothing to the imagination. The issue is, however, that regardless of how accurate the definition is, it does not capture the true essence of what the Cup is, that is, the definition cannot be used to drink out of. As such, the definition is simply a conceptualisation of the object that is referred to as "a cup", while the cup itself is not conceptual, it exists, albeit potentially as an illusion.


Translation
Looking at how translation of [one] langauge [into another] works, we can see that personal experience is essential, otherwise language becomes redundant.

Sticking with the example of the "cup". We can see that the german word for "a cup" is "die (or eine) Tasse". Now if an english speaking person, with absolutely no german, were to speak to a german person, with absolutely no english (assuming no anglicanisation of the german language), and they were to say to the german person "the cup", the german person would not know what they were talking about. Likewise if the german person said "die Tasse", the english speaker would be equally none the wiser.

Now, if we imagine for a second that there is in fact, no such thing in existence as "a cup" or "die Tasse", then the possibility for either to get the point across, as to what they are trying to describe, is pretty much futile.

Luckily however, there does "exist" such a thing, and when they both find one and produce it, they may come to realise that they were both talking about the same thing. That what the word(s) "(die) Tasse" refers to, is the same object that "the cup" refers to. Without this experience of the cup, the translation is made impossible and communication is rendered futile.


"Things" themselves have no meaning, as meaning is reserved for words, as are definitions. This means that things cannot be defined, rather the labels that we apply to them, may perhaps be increasingly accurately described. This means that it is more our descriptions of [pieces of] knowledge, or information, that is subject to error and revision.

Similarly, the word knowledge is merely a label which attempts to describe what knowledge is, or rather our experience of knowledge. It is this description that is subject to error and revision, not the knowledge itself.

Knowledge vs Belief
Humans have a tendency for conceptualisation, as it is how our method of communication has evolved. The problem, as already mentioned, is that experience cannot be essentially conceptualised, that is, one cannot capture the essence of an experience in words and symbols, in such a way that another person can have the same experience, simply by becoming familiar with the conception.

To refer to the analogy of sexual intercourse, knowledge by description of sex, does not constitute knowledge of the act of sex. The description that a person knows of sex, could be inaccurate, and indeed, it can never capture the true essence of sexual intercourse - which must be experienced.

In this sense knowledge cannot be shared, or transferred. Information on the other hand can be, but again, information about something is not the same as knowledge of it. Knowledge by description becomes knowledge of description, which itself has to be experienced to be known.

As you mention, how we learn language is through observing (experiencing) how others around us use it, and we use words without looking up dictionaries or looking for definitions by just observing how words fit into our use of the language. There is a fundamental issue with this of course, which means that people can (and do) develop an inaccurate understanding of a language. This is where dictionaries can be useful.

To try and illustrate, a person (Edward) may be brought up to refer to [what most people call] a dog, as a cat. A person may then try to realy an experience they have later in life, where they and another person have witnessed [presumably] the same event, of three dogs walking across the road.

The two testimonies would differ, in that Edward would claim to have seen three cats, while his friend would claim to have seen three dogs. If they both witnessed the same event, then who is right?

The issue of course is with the conceptualisation of the experience. Essentially neither is right or wrong, because the labels of "cat" and "dog" are ultimately arbitrary, and both animals "exist" without the need to be labelled.

While Edward may believe that he has seen three cats, he cannot know that he has seen three cats, not least because he could simply be a brain in a vat, and the "cats"/dogs may not exist, but because the "animals" that he has seen, are neither cats nor dogs - those are simply the arbitrary labels that some people apply to them. (die Katze and der Hund in german)

The question then may be asked, can Edward know anything? The answer is yes, he can know what he saw. It is his conceptualisation of it, into "I saw three cats", that becomes false. Even if he says, "I saw three dogs", he cannot know that he is right, because this could be the matrix.

However, Edward can know his experience, free from conceptualisation. That is, without labelling what he has seen, even without applying the label "I have seen"


Conceptualisations of experience are what can be believed or disbelieved, and are what are subject to being true or false, while unconceptualised experience can be known.


This applies equally to scientific information. A hypothesis may be verified by every scientist in the world bar one, and the description of the results may be refined to such a degree that it is undisputed by anyone. This lone scientist can know all the information, all the results, every piece of information there is to know, about the experiment, including the personal testimonies of his most trusted and revered colleagues. All the information could be consistent, to such a degree that this lone scientist is convinced that it must be true.

He, however, still cannot claim knowledge that it is true. For all he knows, all his colleagues could be playing practical joke on him, his colleagues could simply be the manifestation of the software that is running in his particular brain, in his particular vat. He can however, choose to believe that the world he lives in is real, that his colleagues are real and that they are telling the truth. Still, he is limited to either believing or disbelieving the account.

If however, he carries out the experiment, he can verify the claims of his colleagues, and he has, at least, the opportunity to know whether they are telling the truth. If he carries out the experiment, he can verify their claims, and see do they match his personal experience.

Of course all scientists could be simply brains in vats, that somehow interact with each other in a world of illusion, making any claims about their relative world [potentially] incorrect. However, none of the scientists have to make a claim about their experience. They simply do not need to conceptualise it, they can rest in the knowledge of what they have experienced.

While this may appear limiting, it is only so on the basis that to believe something, as opposed to knowing it, is limiting. This however, is not the case, because by relying on our belief and faith in the "experts" in various fields, we can free ourselves to do other things. Also, as has been mentioned, we may perhaps be brains in vats, or living in the matrix, without the potential for [certain kinds of] "knowledge", so the inability to share knowledge through information, is not limiting as such, it would be a reality of our relative world.


Empathy
As you mention, humans have an [relativey] advanced language system and have the capacity for empathy. However, there is an issue with regard to sharing experiences. We cannot necessarily share experiences, rather we can share our conceptualisations of what we have experienced. This may seem like splitting hairs, but it is an important distinction.

Indeed, our capacity for empathy is entirely based on our own personal experiences. If we have no frame of reference, based on our own experiences, then empathy is much harder, if not impossible. As you mention, we don't need to break our leg, to imagine that it is painful. However, we can only imagine pain, based on our own previous experience of pain. Even then, we cannot know the pain of breaking our leg, we can only imagine it, and approximate what it might be like - we cannot know what the pain is like.

To use another example, to illustrate this further. It is impossible for a man to know the pain that women [potentially] go through during childbirth, just as a woman cannot know what it is like for a man to be kicked in the nuts. Regardless of our abilities to imagine what it is like, we can never know the pain of the opposite sex, in these instances. We may empathise, with the fact that we believe it must be painful, but we cannot know just how painful it is. Indeed, childbirth, while it may appear absolutely excruciating, it may perhaps be tinged with some sense of enormous pleasure*, at the fact of giving birth to another human being.

*pleasure is no doubt the correct word, as I have very little power to imagine what this must be like.


the nature of existence
One thing that sometimes tends to get overlooked, is [part of] the nature of existence. If we assume for a moment that we are brains in a vat, living in the matrix, in Plato's cave (if I have understood correctly), etc. Then we can assume nothing about "the outside world". Even the conception of being brains in a vat, is potentially just a result of the software that is running.

Whatever "we" are could be completely beyond our perception. If we examine cogito ergo sum (~"I am thinking, therefore I exist"~), on an experiential level, and draw from buddhist philosophy, we can see that "I" am not thinking, "I" is the thought. We might perhaps say "there is thinking, therefore there is existence", but this thinking could be argued to be a property of the brain in a vat.

What we can however know is:
that there is, what is referred to as experience

If there is experience, then we can know, that there is the experience of, what is referred to as existence.

We can know that there is the experience of, what is referred to as sounds.

We can know that there is interpretation of sounds into what is known as words.

We can know that these "words" can be used to communicate experience.


As we know, I cannot possibly know that anyone else has experience, I can only speak for "my self". Even if I were the only one who is capable of experience, and everyone else is a zombie, then the statement can be made:
"there is existence".

The nature of existence may of course be subject to debate.

Now, I may not be able to know whether or not everyone else is a zombie, just as you or anyone else may not, but we can choose to believe that everyone else is capable of experience, and is not a zombie. I personally do this for the pragmatic reason that, if I were to attempt to contemplate the nature of existence, with me being the only sentient being, I may perhaps go crazy. I also believe that I can enjoy life better if I am not the only sentient being, so there are perceived and potentially useful benefits of this belief.


Of course, if I am not the only sentient being, then someone else may realise that they are capable of experience also, and therefore know, that there is experience - which would be an absolute truth.

How each of us can know this, is only through our own personal eperience, which appears to be the nature of existence, at least I can say that it is for me. Only you have the ability to know this for you, but we both potentially have access to the same absolute knowledge, through our own personal experience.

Joe1919

mangaroosh wrote: »

..... The reason being that knowledge and belief are two entirely different "things". ....
.

It could be argued that 'knowledge' and 'belief' are nearly the same. The difference is that when we use the word 'knowledge', we are giving these 'beliefs' a sort of extra 'power' (as perhaps the previous replier may be suggesting ?) by claiming that these 'beliefs' can be 'justified' and shown to be 'true'.
But who does the justification? Who decides what beliefs are accepted and what beliefs are not? The justification of beliefs is done by the powers that be (e.g. Scientific, political, intellectual, media, normative powers etc.)

Hence, the sceptics may have a point. The reason why there are so many problems defining knowledge is that 'knowledge' as such does not exist.
'Knowledge' as such is a fiction or perhaps just a word or idea that categorizes certain beliefs and opinions and gives them privilage over other beliefs.
When we use the word 'knowledge', we are really talking about 'beliefs' and 'opinions' that fit into our ( or the powers that be) way of thinking (coherent) and are desirable for this reason.

There are those that doubt if even first hand experience can count as knowledge. e.g. 'Myth of the Given'. etc
http://www.iep.utm.edu/epis-per/

Finally, I would never use the word 'absolute' when it comes to knowledge. Our intellects and our senses have their limits and hence all 'knowledge' must have its limits. (remember there cant be knowledge with a 'knower'.)
The Christians often argued this case in terms of truth.e.g. St. Thomas Aquinas argues that absolute objective truth is not possible for humans. 'Truth' is always subjective to some extent, as Aquinas says, it resides in the intellect.
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1016.htm
And since our intellect is limited, our truth is also limited. Absolute 'Truth' can only be found in an absolute intellect (eg God) and as there is no 'absolute human intellect', there is no 'absolute truth' for the human.

roosh

Cannibal Ox wrote: »

Knowledge as experience has to make one of two assumptions, either knowledge of a subject is objective and independent of us, or, knowledge as subjective, in which there exists infinite knowledges on infinite objects, none of which are true, and none of which are false. Both assumptions posit knowledge as independent of social relations. Knowledge, whether it's objective or subjective, is separate from the fields within which it arises. The psychiatrist uncovers neurosis, the priest reveals universal moral code, and the citizen founds the state.

Both views ignore power and it's relationship to knowledge, as well as the fields within which knowledge arises. Power in this sense is imbricated in relations, it is decentralized, it produces rather then negates, and it is relative. Power operates through discourses, which constitute discursive formations, sets of knowledge, which are in turn dependent on the particular social, political, historical, and cultural context in which they arise. Knowledge in this sense is never neutral and cannot be known through experience, but is rather constitutive and productive. The psychiatrist produces the neurotic, the priest produces the sinner, and the state produces the citizen.

In other words, you are a subject of knowledge, and your experience is the constitutive experience of knowledge, produced in, and through, you.

apologies, I missed your post. I hope I have understood it correctly.

with regard to the issue of knowledge as being dependent on social relations, or arising in certain fields and being influenced by relationships of power, would this not fall fowl of the idea, that we cannot actually know whether these social relations or fields of enquiry actually exist?

The psychiartrist, the priest and the state, may not exist, and so knowledge cannot be derived, in the sense expressed, from these social interactions.


Based on the explanation above however, it appears that there is a perception of knowledge that is very much linked to conceptual ideas and judgements. The issue however, is that knowledge is free from conceptualisation, and is not, therefore, "conceptualisable", to coin a phrase. It is therefore not subject to such conceptualisations such as true or false. It could be argued to be objective, depending on what is understood by the terms objective and subjective.

The issue arises with the tendency to conceptualise our experiences, and to equate these conceptualisations with knowledge, when in actual fact, they are simply relative descriptions of what we have experienced. The description of the experience, however, is not the experience itself.

Knowledge is the experience which gives "a person" something to conceptualise, knowledge however is not the conceptualisation, it is the experience, uncontrived and free from judgement or labelling.

I have heard a buddhist saying, which unfortunately I can't reference now, but will when I get the chance to ask someone, that says something like:

Leave the seeing in the seeing,
leave the hearing in the hearing,
leave the thinking in the thinking.

Which basically means allow the experience to be, without making judgements or applying labels.

To put it in the context of the Psychiatrist, it would be where the Psychiatrist is just present with the patient, where he hears what the patient says, where he feels his own reactions, where he sees the patient, and experiences whatever there is to experience.

If this is done without labelling the patient as a patient, without labelling the behaviour as neurotic, without any such labels or conceptions, then this unlabelled experience is knowledge. The conceptualisations and judgements that follow, are beliefs and opinions about the experience.

The same applies for the patient, the priest, and the citizen.

Joe1919

mangaroosh wrote: »

.....How each of us can know this, is only through our own personal eperience, which appears to be the nature of existence, at least I can say that it is for me.....

PS You might like to look at Phenomenology, which is the study of the structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view. Questions about concepts such as 'knowledge' can be set aside [bracketed out] and you can just get on with describing the experiences and trying to make sense of them without getting bogged down in metaphysical type problems.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/

roosh

Joe1919 wrote: »

It could be argued that 'knowledge' and 'belief' are nearly the same. The difference is that when we use the word 'knowledge', we are giving these 'beliefs' a sort of extra 'power' (as perhaps the previous replier may be suggesting ?) by claiming that these 'beliefs' can be 'justified' and shown to be 'true'.
But who does the justification? Who decides what beliefs are accepted and what beliefs are not? The justification of beliefs is done by the powers that be (e.g. Scientific, political, intellectual, media, normative powers etc.)

Hence, the sceptics may have a point. The reason why there are so many problems defining knowledge is that 'knowledge' as such does not exist.
'Knowledge' as such is a fiction or perhaps just a word or idea that categorizes certain beliefs and opinions and gives them privilage over other beliefs.
When we use the word 'knowledge', we are really talking about 'beliefs' and 'opinions' that fit into our ( or the powers that be) way of thinking (coherent) and are desirable for this reason.

There are those that doubt if even first hand experience can count as knowledge. e.g. 'Myth of the Given'. etc
http://www.iep.utm.edu/epis-per/

Finally, I would never use the word 'absolute' when it comes to knowledge. Our intellects and our senses have their limits and hence all 'knowledge' must have its limits. (remember there cant be knowledge with a 'knower'.)
The Christians often argued this case in terms of truth.e.g. St. Thomas Aquinas argues that absolute objective truth is not possible for humans. 'Truth' is always subjective to some extent, as Aquinas says, it resides in the intellect.
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1016.htm
And since our intellect is limited, our truth is also limited. Absolute 'Truth' can only be found in an absolute intellect (eg God) and as there is no 'absolute human intellect', there is no 'absolute truth' for the human.

some fascinating reading in those links - seriously lad, cheers. The duck/rabbit thing, although I had seen it before, was, for want of a better word, illuminating, with the philosophy surrounding it.

Knowledge and belief are indeed, very nearly the same. They are so close to being the same that the difference can often be overlooked, or missed entirely. This is largely due to the habitual nature of the mind.

The two are so similar because a belief is based on knoweldge. When we experience something the mind is so quick to conceptualise what we have experienced, that we often "think over the experience". There are however, two separate "things" here. There is the experience, and there are thoughts about the experience i.e. the conceptualisation, the judgment, the opinion, etc.

The conceptualisation represents the belief, based on the knowledge. For example, if I report that I experienced a cat walk across the road today, that is a conceptualisation of what I experienced. The issue with conceptualisations is that there is an implied absolute nature about them. If I say, that I saw a cat walk across the road today, it implies a belief in the existence of the cat, the road, walking, today, and of course the "I" that saw it.

However, if I choose not to report the event to anyone, and simply become aware of my own conceptualisation, without necessarily believing it to represent what is referred to as reality, then there is no belief which is subject to justification. Yet, I can still have knowledge of my experience.
The idea of justification then applies to the belief, as opposed to the knowledge. It is the conceputalisation of the knowledge, which is either believed or disbelieved, and that is subject to justification.


The duck/rabbit image is a very interesting one, and goes to show the power of language over our perception, and indeed how our perception can be affected by the coneptual framework through which we often tend to view the world.

When we are asked what the image looks like, the conceptualisation of "duck" automatically appears. It does however subside again, and we can be left simply observing the image, without thinking that it looks like a duck. The thought, that the image looks like a duck, may spontaneously and habitually arise in the mind, but it can also subside. Sometimes we may look at the image, think it looks like a duck, then get lost in thought while still looking at the image. Sometimes there can be a realisation that we are lost in thought, and the thought process is interupted, and the image is experienced again, without the conceptualisation that it looks like a duck. But then the thought may arise again spontaneously.

Of course, then it is suggested that the image looks like a rabbit looking up, and we see the image and think that it does indeed look like a rabbit. But that thought too can subside, and we may be left looking at the image, without the concept of rabbit. The same thing can happen again, that the thought "Rabbit" arises, we get lost in thought, but it is realised and we return to the image, without the conception of "rabbit".

How the two "different" images are perceived however, is as a result of focusing on a different part of the image. It is however possible to relax the gaze and not focus on anything in particular, and to become aware of our experience, where conceptual thoughts arise, but fade away once we become aware of them. The image is percieved neither as a duck nor a rabbit, but as part of an overall sensory experience.

If that sensory experience is left "unjudged" or free of conceptualisation, then we are left in a state of knowing.


With regard to sceptic proposition that there is no such thing as knowledge, this can be refuted by the fact that we know there is experience. If we can, and do, know that there is experience, then what is referred to as knowledge exists.

As for knowledge being absolute, that is perhaps debatable, as it would involve conceptualising what is essentially non-conceptual. However, as we know that there is what is referred to as experience, then we know that there is what is referred to as existence. We can therefore know that there is existence. The fact that there is existence could perhaps be described as a principle which is universally valid, which would make it, in philosophical terms, absolute - according to the OED description anyhow. Although, that is probably not the definitive source on the issue.

roosh

Joe1919 wrote: »

PS You might like to look at Phenomenology, which is the study of the structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view. Questions about concepts such as 'knowledge' can be set aside [bracketed out] and you can just get on with describing the experiences and trying to make sense of them without getting bogged down in metaphysical type problems.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/

cheers lad, some seriously interesting discussion and articles. will check the article out in the coming days

Joe1919

mangaroosh wrote: »

.
.......However, as we know that there is what is referred to as experience, then we know that there is what is referred to as existence......

' to be is to be percieved' ....but we run into the problem of idealism i.e. All that exists are perceptions and we can never get beyond them.

Also, we may run into problems of optical illusion. e.g. We percieve the moon as larger on the horizon but this phenomena is only an illusion. i.e. The enlargment of the moon does not exist. (it only appears to exist)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moon_illusion

Similarly, if you look up at the sun long enough, you will experience the phenomena (appearence) of the sun dancing (as in Knock or Fatima).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miracle_of_the_Sun

Joe1919

PS.... One area in Epistemology that is worth looking is part played by 'concepts' in our interpretation of experiences.
It has been argued that we always interpret experiences with reference to some type of 'categories' or 'conceptual scheme' or 'background' or general framework and it is this that gives shape to our experiences.
http://www.answers.com/topic/conceptual-scheme
http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/thebackground.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transcendental_idealism

An analogy is often made to the computer and the necessity for some type of 'bootstrap' or basic input output subsystem (BIOS) firmware to get the processes started.

Slightly connected to this is the argument as to what degree these initial 'concepts and categories' are innate or whether we are a total 'blank slate' on birth. Naom Chomsky and Steven Pinker seem to support views in favour of some type of innateness.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steven_Pinker

Eastern philosophy often seems to be critical of this and seem to encourage us to experiencing the experience without contaminating the experience with unnecessary concepts and theories and not seeing things as they are. e.g. F S C Northrop speculated that Eastern Thought deals with the world as an 'undifferentiated aesthetic continuum' That is, reality is all connected and unified, not separated into distinct objects.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F._S._C._Northrop

Isaiah Berlin divided thinkers into two categories: hedgehogs, who view the world through the lens of a single defining idea and foxes who draw on a wide variety of experiences and for whom the world cannot be boiled down to a single idea
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Hedgehog_and_the_Fox

roosh

cheers lad, looking forward to getting through all them!

Cannibal Ox

mangaroosh wrote:

The issue however, is that knowledge is free from conceptualisation, and is not, therefore, "conceptualisable", to coin a phrase. It is therefore not subject to such conceptualisations such as true or false. It could be argued to be objective, depending on what is understood by the terms objective and subjective.

If I understand you correctly, what you're suggesting would mean that knowledge of an object or subject is outside of human conception, it exists beyond human societies and regimes and, if that's the case, would have to be a universal truth that can be "experienced" (if it were possible to experience it) throughout time and space, and can only be accessed outside of abstraction.

I don't want to re-run the last post, and I'll do the concept part in the next part, but what I would say is that almost all human knowledge is culturally, politically, economically, and historically (in other words, socially) situated within particular regimes of truth. Those particular regimes of truth, which are located within the social, and take the form of discourses, imbricate knowledge with "truth" in the sense that, within those discourses, the mad, the heretic, and the citizen, are known and experienced within those discourses.

In other words, the psychiatrist knows the neurotic, but how the psychiatrist knows and categorizes the neurotic is framed within the particular social situ he or she finds themselves in. Knowledge then isn't beyond society, it is in society, and it produces the subjects which live within those societies.

The issue arises with the tendency to conceptualise our experiences, and to equate these conceptualisations with knowledge, when in actual fact, they are simply relative descriptions of what we have experienced. The description of the experience, however, is not the experience itself.

I'm not sure how experiences can escape conceptualization, particularly as they operate through language, which itself operates as an abstraction. Even if you don't absolutely deny the possible existence of an external reality, it's still impossible to escape abstraction, because everything remains an abstraction of an exteriority of the subject. Everything is framed within language, and language itself is an abstraction.

Knowledge is the experience which gives "a person" something to conceptualise, knowledge however is not the conceptualisation, it is the experience, uncontrived and free from judgement or labelling.

ah. Nothing is free from judgement or labeling It sounds like you're following a positivist paradigm, and trying to argue for the possibility of uncovering an objective reality that is entirely free from human subjectivity.

To put it in the context of the Psychiatrist, it would be where the Psychiatrist is just present with the patient, where he hears what the patient says, where he feels his own reactions, where he sees the patient, and experiences whatever there is to experience.

But the psychiatrist is never just present with the patient. What the psychiatrist is, and what the neurotic is, are framed within a specfic set of knowledge that is socially, politically, culturally, and historically situated, and which operates within the particular frames of those regimes of truth. Neither the psychiatrist nor the neurotic are outside of those regimes, and nor can they be.

If this is done without labelling the patient as a patient, without labelling the behaviour as neurotic, without any such labels or conceptions, then this unlabelled experience is knowledge. The conceptualisations and judgements that follow, are beliefs and opinions about the experience.

Let me put it another way, the experience of the "neurotic" would have to be extendable throughout time and space for it to be an absolute knowledge that could be experienced. But this isn't the case. The neurotic is located within the social context, and the experience, and knowledge of, the neurotic is subjectivized through that social context. It is impossible to escape categorization of the neurotic as neurotic. The word neurotic is an abstraction, a differential categorization of madness occurring within a specialized psychiatric discourse that is part of a specific regime of truth.

Joe1919

I came across this in a very short essay lately by George Santayana.

'The resources of the mind are not commensurate with its ambition. Of the five senses, three are of little use in the formation of permanent notions: a fourth, sight, is indeed vivid and luminous, but furnishes transcripts of things so highly colored and deeply modified by the medium of sense, that a long labor of analysis and correction is needed before satisfactory conceptions can be extracted from it. For this labor, however, we are endowed with the requisite instrument. We have memory and we have certain powers of synthesis, abstraction, reproduction, invention,--in a word, we have understanding. But this faculty of understanding has hardly begun its work of deciphering the hieroglyphics of sense and framing an idea of reality, when it is crossed by another faculty--the imagination. Perceptions do not remain in the mind, as would be suggested by the trite simile of the seal and wax, passive and changeless, until time wear off their sharp edges and make them fade. No ,perceptions fall into the brain rather as seeds into a furrowed field or even as sparks into a keg of powder. Each image breeds a hundred more, sometimes slowly and subterraneously, sometimes (when a passionate train is started) with a sudden burst of fancy. The mind, exercises by its own fertility and flooded by its inner lights, has infinite trouble to keep a true reckoning of its outward perceptions. It turns from the frigid problems of observation to its own visions; it forgets to watch the courses of what should be its "pilot stars." Indeed, were it not for the power of convention in which, by a sort of mutual cancellation of errors, the more practical and normal conceptions are enshrined, the imagination would carry men wholly away,--the best men first and the vulgar after them. ...'
http://grammar.about.com/od/classicessays/a/intellambition.htm

roosh

Cheers for that Joe, some excellent reading. Apologies for taking to so long to get back to this, but was engaged in another thread, and didn't take the time to read the links, until recently.

Joe1919 wrote: »

PS.... One area in Epistemology that is worth looking is part played by 'concepts' in our interpretation of experiences...

I was familiar with the notion of a "background", or conceptual framework affecting our perceptual representation of the "external" world, but that Northrop entry was a great insight - just ordered The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities (God knows when I'll get around to reading it).

The idea of a "background" or conceptual framework through which we view the world, is I would imagine, irrefutable. Whether the nature of this "scheme" is innate, or whether we acquire it, is a matter for discussion.

The idea of a BIOS firmware, that is the brain, would certainly make sense, insofar as we are born with a brain, the brain does not "emerge" as we learn. Such comparisons are however, as I'm sure you will agree, very limiting, in that the nautre of the BIOS firmware, is unlike any other man made invention. The capacity of the human brain is "infinitiel" greater than any contemporary computer. To an extent, however, the two notions can be combined, in that the BIOS firmware of the brain starts with a blank slate. The conceptual framework is then laid on top of this by learning through experience.

This conceptual framework though, does not necessarily remain fixed. In many cases - most likely all - we can, and indeed do, actively change the conceptual lense through which we view the world. We can learn and "unlearn" different things about the "world around us", we can train in different disciplines which enable us to make predictions about our environment, that become second nature. These are reflected by structural changes in the firmware of the brain. This, to a certain degree supports Searles concept of the biologically natural "background".

Inherent in this however, is an assumption, about the capacity of the human brain for realising reality, and therefore true knowledge. We might question, to what degree this BIOS firmware dictates, or impacts, the conceptual framework through which we view the world? While we know that we can change the conceptual framework, the changes are obviously limited to the capacity of the brain. The question then, is given that we know that we do not use the full capacity of the brain, can we say that the brain limits us from ever correctly perceiving reality? Of course, we cannot justifiably assume either way. A further question might be, to what extent is our conceptual framework limiting us from using the full capacity of the brain? With this we can of course work, as we are capable of changing our "conceptual goggles".

There are any number of places that we could start with, when attempting to change or clean our conceptual goggles. Luckily, a lot of work has already been done in this area, so we have the benefit of being able to "[stand] on the shoulders of giants".

If we start by "leaning" on Northrops concepts "by intuition" and "by postulation".

Firstly, they seem to to correspond somewhat to knowledge by acquaintance (intuition) and knowledge by description (postulation). The issue with this would be, again, that the knowledge by postulation, is merely a conceptualisation of knowledge by intuition, in that the postulation of blue as the frequency, or wavelength, in electromagnetic theory, first had to be investigated empirically, in order to be intuited. Where the postulation is done a priori, it merely forms a belief, which requires empirical verification, before it can be known to be an accurate description.

There is a further issue, as regards the conceptualisation, that "Blue" and "the frequency/wavelength in EM theory" refer to the same "thing". While the latter may give rise to the former, through human perception, the concepts apply to completely separate "things", that is, the word blue, does not mean the frequency/wavelength in EM theory, it refers to "the sense of the sensed color". While the frequency/wavelength in EM theory, equally does not refer to "the sense of the sensed color", but rather the physical processes that give rise to the sense perception, and which have been empirically investigated.

The issue with conceptualisation is that, to quote Ralph Alan Dale's translation of the Tao Te Ching:

wrote:

Naming fragments the mysteries of life, into ten thousand things and their manifestations

Unfortunately I can't find a link for the quote, but it came from this book



There are a number of things which we can take from that, but if we start with the equation of blue and the the frequency/wavelength in EM theory, or indeed we can equally infer from Quantum Mechanics, that what we perceive through the senses, is not necessarily how reality exists. Study of visual perception shows that, what we see, is a representation in the mind are not necessarily the "things in themselves".

- They may perhaps be the things in themselves, but we cannot assume that they are -

Atomic theory or Quantuam Mechanics, more pointedly informs us, that what we see as the world around us (perceive through the ordinary senses) is an illusion. While reality itself may not necessarily be what has thus far been observed in QM, what we perceive through the ordinary senses, is merely a visual represenation of the sub-atomic world. With this "knowledge", we can redefine our conceptual framework, and with it the idea of "biological naturalism" or of the BIOS firmware model of knowledge, as we know that the brain itself is just a visual perception. In order to be considered, at least, not incorrect, the BIOS firmware model would need to explain the "emergence" of knowledge at the quantum level. Even then however, further findings could invalidate such a model.

Of course, the consequences of what we learn from Quantum Mechanics, impact more than just our "conceptual scheme" with regard to the model of knowledge, there are very real implications for the conceptual framework through which we view ourselves, and our own identity - that is, who/what we actually are. What the above illustrates, is that what we perceive as our human bodies, is little more than an illusion, i.e. we are not necessarily what we think we are. While this may seem pretty easy to comprehend, we need to ask ourselves, to what degree does our conceptual framework actually change upon becoming familiar with this idea?

Here the Buddhist caveat can be invoked (pardon the pun) to guide us:

wrote:

Do not mistake understanding for realisation, or realisation for liberation

This means, that more than a simple, conceptual understanding is required.

This of course raises an issue, that the "background" intended to address, namely, "how does one prevent an infinite regress in the interpretation of a rule or a representation?"
When it comes to basing our model of knowledge on entirely physical processes, we will be lead back to the fact, that what we perceive as the physcial world, is, as far as we can say for definite, a representation in the mind. On the other hand, we cannot say for definite that the mind is the result of physical processes.

It would seem therefore, that it would make more sense to examine the mind, when it comes to trying to determine knowledge, without recourse to physical processes. This of course does not circumvent the fact that we still view the world through a conceptual framework, it does, however, allow us to examine this conceptual framework on it's own merits. Again, luckily for us, there exists such disciplines, which have done a lot of work in this field already, on whose shoulders we can stand, namely the Eastern traditions.

Joe1919

Just some points and problems.

The idea that the conceptual schemes change seems reasonable and was part of Hegel's development of Kants philosophy. These changes may take place in our lifetime but can this change of conceptual scheme be transferred from one generation to another? It was once thought that this was possible (Lamarck) but no clear mechanism has been shown.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lamarckism

Donald Davidson also makes the point that communication and language is eventually possible between say Europeans and very isolated cut off tribes who one would suspect may have very different conceptual schemes and hence, the effect of conceptual schemes must not be a great as people think.
http://oolongiv.files.wordpress.com/2008/08/davidson_on-the-very-idea.pdf

These two arguments could possibly be refuted to some extent if we accept that large elements of conceptual schemes are fixed.

I would also be inclined to think that some elements of Taoism and Buddhism would tend to see life as illusory and be more intuitive.
http://www.uni-giessen.de/~gk1415/taoism.htm

This book may help.
http://books.google.ie/books?id=HjVQB03cVMMC&pg=PA171&dq=buddhist+philosophy+essential+readings+epistemology&hl=en&ei=SxVaTJ2pKZLu0wTT7qBh&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCkQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

Best of Luck on this very difficult subject..

roosh

Cannibal Ox wrote: »

If I understand you correctly, what you're suggesting would mean that knowledge of an object or subject is outside of human conception, it exists beyond human societies and regimes and, if that's the case, would have to be a universal truth that can be "experienced" (if it were possible to experience it) throughout time and space, and can only be accessed outside of abstraction.

This is pretty much correct, and is much more elegantly put than I could have put it. There is just one issue however, and that is the notion that this experience lies outside of human socities and regimes. This is very much true, but it could also be understood in the sense that it is universal to all human societies and regimes.

What this experience is, is experience itself, or perhaps more accurately, or rather, clearly, it is what is referred to as consciousness.

Cannibal Ox wrote: »

I don't want to re-run the last post, and I'll do the concept part in the next part, but what I would say is that almost all human knowledge is culturally, politically, economically, and historically (in other words, socially) situated within particular regimes of truth. Those particular regimes of truth, which are located within the social, and take the form of discourses, imbricate knowledge with "truth" in the sense that, within those discourses, the mad, the heretic, and the citizen, are known and experienced within those discourses.

In other words, the psychiatrist knows the neurotic, but how the psychiatrist knows and categorizes the neurotic is framed within the particular social situ he or she finds themselves in. Knowledge then isn't beyond society, it is in society, and it produces the subjects which live within those societies.

I would agree with the above, to the extent, that it is how we generally think about the formulation of knowledge. The issue however, lies with the assumption that what the above categorises is actually knowledge, as opposed to a set of beliefs.

The concept of a regime of truth, in the form of discourse, parallels quite closely the concepts of knowledge by description and the "background"/conceptual scheme. Where the truth regime represents the conceptual scheme (or framework) and the discourse represents knowledge by description.

It also highlights a particular issue, with regard to conceptualisation, in that, by conceptualising, we tend to imbue the concepts with a certain independent, existential quality. That is, by creating a concept, we almost attribute a physical existence to it. With regard to a truth regime, this can serve to obscure the true dynamics of what is being conceptualised.

What a truth regime actually represents, is a set of beliefs, as set out in discourses, that people might perhaps reach consensus on. The problem is, that there is no, necessarily universal, truth regime, but rather a number of competing paradigms within each field. Again, while there may be a certain minimum standard, agreed by consensus, this is subject to interpretation by each individual and is not necessarily adhered to mechanistically.

Our truth regimes, as is the case with our conceptual frameworks, are subject to paradigm shifts and challenging beliefs, and as mentioned are culturally and socially defined. This means that what we may "know" to be "true", another social group might "know" to be "false". Equally, what we "know to be true" today, we might "know to be false" tomorrow. The issue however, is that it is not possible to know something that is not true, we can only believe [to be true] something which is false.

A truth regime is, therefore, a set of cultural or social beliefs, as opposed to constituting actual knowledge. An important distinction however, is that the discourses can be known i.e. the information can be known, but this does not make it true.

Cannibal Ox wrote: »

I'm not sure how experiences can escape conceptualization, particularly as they operate through language, which itself operates as an abstraction. Even if you don't absolutely deny the possible existence of an external reality, it's still impossible to escape abstraction, because everything remains an abstraction of an exteriority of the subject. Everything is framed within language, and language itself is an abstraction.

Experiences don't necessarily operate through language, rather langauge is used to describe experiences. We do not need to conecptualise our experiences, despite the habitual tendency to do so. We can have an experience, which we might conceptualise, but we can equally drop the conceptualisation and remain in the experience.

Cannibal Ox wrote: »

ah. Nothing is free from judgement or labeling It sounds like you're following a positivist paradigm, and trying to argue for the possibility of uncovering an objective reality that is entirely free from human subjectivity.

While we could make a case for objective experience, free from human subjectivity, we would need to address any assumptions about objectivity, human experience and subjectivity.

The issue however, is that experiences can be free from judgement and labelling. We can have an experience without labelling it. In fact, we can have an experience which we label, then we can drop the label and be left with the experience.

Cannibal Ox wrote: »

But the psychiatrist is never just present with the patient. What the psychiatrist is, and what the neurotic is, are framed within a specfic set of knowledge that is socially, politically, culturally, and historically situated, and which operates within the particular frames of those regimes of truth. Neither the psychiatrist nor the neurotic are outside of those regimes, and nor can they be.


Let me put it another way, the experience of the "neurotic" would have to be extendable throughout time and space for it to be an absolute knowledge that could be experienced. But this isn't the case. The neurotic is located within the social context, and the experience, and knowledge of, the neurotic is subjectivized through that social context. It is impossible to escape categorization of the neurotic as neurotic. The word neurotic is an abstraction, a differential categorization of madness occurring within a specialized psychiatric discourse that is part of a specific regime of truth.

The issue lies again in the conceptualisation. The neurotic and the psychiatrist are merely labels applied to individuals, which serve to obscure the truth as oppoes to conferring truth. The psychiatrist, is much more than simply a psychiatrist. They are a person, with a whole other set of conceptually described characteristics, as is the neurotic.

When we speak of regimes of truth, the true dynamic of such a concept is essentially language, which is used to describe experinces, situations, etc. and no one narrowly focused truth regime captures the entire picture.

Joe1919

It can be argued that the whole Western view of knowledge is flawed because their view of knowledge presumes an autonomous, free and independent 'knower' or 'self' or 'soul'.
It is argued that this 'error' started with Socrates, passed through the Hellenistic period and was fully embraced by Christianity, where every person contained an autonomous rational 'soul' or 'self' and was capable of independent moral judgement and was fully accountable for their actions and would be judged by God etc.
This view was also reinforced by Descartes meditations and cogito (that one could be certain that ones thought belong to the 'self') and continued into Kant.

However, Easter Philosophy seemed to have taken a different view with the 'no-self doctrine' (and the idea that we belong to a single reality) of the Upanishads and Buddhists.
http://books.google.ie/books?id=nuN9hJP2G-EC&pg=PA67&dq=philosophy+of+the+buddha+non-self+doctorine&hl=en&ei=MflbTM-AKaejsQbFw7WTAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CC0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

However, this idea (that there may not be a knower or self) never caught on in the west. Indeed, with the decrease in the influence of Christianity, the idea of the 'self' may have even increased more with the liberal thoughts of Locke etc and the economic thoughts of Adam Smith etc. (Enlightened self-interest, greed is good). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlightened_self-interest

But they were some who questioned the whole idea of the self such as Hume (who questioned everything) and Schopenhauer (who studied the Upanishads) or those that saw the self as evolving collectively or socially. (Hegel's absolute spirit etc ).
http://www.arrod.co.uk/essays/bundle.php

(Hegels thought had an influence on Marx and Richard Rorty among others, Schopenhauer influenced Wittgenstein).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Rorty

The Marxist website have an interesting link on this, describing a visit to a deaf-blind home and how the person is no more than a vegetable without social contact. http://www.marxists.org/archive/mikhailov/works/riddle/riddle4.htm

These ideas that the individual 'knower' (with a self) as a bearer of knowledge then could be said to have run into a little trouble.

The myth of the individual?

roosh

Joe1919 wrote: »

Just some points and problems.

The idea that the conceptual schemes change seems reasonable and was part of Hegel's development of Kants philosophy. These changes may take place in our lifetime but can this change of conceptual scheme be transferred from one generation to another? It was once thought that this was possible (Lamarck) but no clear mechanism has been shown.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lamarckism

Donald Davidson also makes the point that communication and language is eventually possible between say Europeans and very isolated cut off tribes who one would suspect may have very different conceptual schemes and hence, the effect of conceptual schemes must not be a great as people think.
http://oolongiv.files.wordpress.com/2008/08/davidson_on-the-very-idea.pdf

These two arguments could possibly be refuted to some extent if we accept that large elements of conceptual schemes are fixed.

I would also be inclined to think that some elements of Taoism and Buddhism would tend to see life as illusory and be more intuitive.
http://www.uni-giessen.de/~gk1415/taoism.htm

This book may help.
http://books.google.ie/books?id=HjVQB03cVMMC&pg=PA171&dq=buddhist+philosophy+essential+readings+epistemology&hl=en&ei=SxVaTJ2pKZLu0wTT7qBh&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCkQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

Best of Luck on this very difficult subject..

Joe1919 wrote: »

It can be argued that the whole Western view of knowledge is flawed because their view of knowledge presumes an autonomous, free and independent 'knower' or 'self' or 'soul'.
It is argued that this 'error' started with Socrates, passed through the Hellenistic period and was fully embraced by Christianity, where every person contained an autonomous rational 'soul' or 'self' and was capable of independent moral judgement and was fully accountable for their actions and would be judged by God etc.
This view was also reinforced by Descartes meditations and cogito (that one could be certain that ones thought belong to the 'self') and continued into Kant.

However, Easter Philosophy seemed to have taken a different view with the 'no-self doctrine' (and the idea that we belong to a single reality) of the Upanishads and Buddhists.
http://books.google.ie/books?id=nuN9hJP2G-EC&pg=PA67&dq=philosophy+of+the+buddha+non-self+doctorine&hl=en&ei=MflbTM-AKaejsQbFw7WTAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CC0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

However, this idea (that there may not be a knower or self) never caught on in the west. Indeed, with the decrease in the influence of Christianity, the idea of the 'self' may have even increased more with the liberal thoughts of Locke etc and the economic thoughts of Adam Smith etc. (Enlightened self-interest, greed is good). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlightened_self-interest

But they were some who questioned the whole idea of the self such as Hume (who questioned everything) and Schopenhauer (who studied the Upanishads) or those that saw the self as evolving collectively or socially. (Hegel's absolute spirit etc ).
http://www.arrod.co.uk/essays/bundle.php

(Hegels thought had an influence on Marx and Richard Rorty among others, Schopenhauer influenced Wittgenstein).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Rorty

The Marxist website have an interesting link on this, describing a visit to a deaf-blind home and how the person is no more than a vegetable without social contact. http://www.marxists.org/archive/mikhailov/works/riddle/riddle4.htm

These ideas that the individual 'knower' (with a self) as a bearer of knowledge then could be said to have run into a little trouble.

The myth of the individual?

cheers for the above, a welath of "knowledge".
"My own" thinking/experience, as opposed to being aligned with eastern philosophy and practice, would be increasingly shaped by it, hence the postulation of more intuitive knowledge, through experience.

I would agree that the Western view of knowledge is flawed, and in the context of conceptual schemes, it is the fundamental misconception of the self, which underpins our conceptual framework. To correct this misconception would be to fundamentally correct the conceptual scheme through which we experience the world.

With regard to the Lamarckian idea of passing on changes in conceptual schemes, this would probably be done in the same way in which they are acquired, through learning and indoctrination from childhood, where the parents of a child play a major role in shaping the childs "world view".

I must read Donaldson's article again, as I'm not sure I fully comprehended all of it, but the idea of starting from a primary assumption of belief about the other person, can in some way, I would say, be traced back to a more fundamental belief that we must hold prior to this, and that is a belief that the other person exists at all - brains in a vat and all that.

Of course eastern philosophy and practice can inform us as to the nature of our own existence and therefore the [potential] nature of others existence.