God's complexity

Joe1919

Wicknight wrote: »

What would you call what is described in the Bible such as when it says that God is love, or that God is a jealous god?

Wicknight wrote: »

Ok.... that didn't actually answer my question.

'Indescribable' is my answer.

What these two links suggest is that we can not know what God is and all our descriptions of Him will be in terms of our own human concepts and hence will be inadequate. We cannot even name Him. 'The reason why God has no name, or is said to be above being named, is because His essence is above all that we understand about God, and signify in word.' (Article 1 & esp. reply to Objection 1.)

Hence all description of God in the Bible is also inadequate. He is indescribable. (His effects are only known.)

Zombrex

Joe1919 wrote: »

'Indescribable' is my answer.

What these two links suggest is that we can not know what God is and all our descriptions of Him will be in terms of our own human concepts and hence will be inadequate. We cannot even name Him. 'The reason why God has no name, or is said to be above being named, is because His essence is above all that we understand about God, and signify in word.' (Article 1 & esp. reply to Objection 1.)

Hence all description of God in the Bible is also inadequate. He is indescribable. (His effects are only known.)

What then is the point of describing him then? If when the Bible says God is love it doesn't mean "love", or when it says that God is a jealous god it doesn't mean "jealous", when it says God is "just" it doesn't mean just what do you suppose the point of those passages is then?

Joe1919

Wicknight wrote: »

What then is the point of describing him then? If when the Bible says God is love it doesn't mean "love", or when it says that God is a jealous god it doesn't mean "jealous", when it says God is "just" it doesn't mean just what do you suppose the point of those passages is then?

You could argue that the authors of the Bible used these words to try to describe the 'effects' of God rather than what God 'is in itself'.

Zombrex

Joe1919 wrote: »

You could argue that the authors of the Bible used these words to try to describe the 'effects' of God rather than what God 'is in itself'.

I'm not following what you mean, what decides the effects of God and based on what criteria?

Slav

Wicknight wrote: »

My understanding is that saying God is a... implies that God belongs to a set of things. My car is a car. There is a set of things call cars and my car belongs to this set. Even if my car was the only one left it would still be a car

To describe God as a something is to lessen the total nature of God, the something comes before God and then God is one of these things.

Those "things" are actually divine perfections so in the context of divine simplicity it's quite safe to assume that they are one of a kind. Therefore I don't see that distinction of "a thing" and "the thing" is of great importance when talking about divine perfections. For the purpose of defining simplicity it not of great help either - as I said for East it was also "the thing" but it did not prevent them to see God as "complex".

For divine simplicity it's only important how the perfections relate to God and to each other. It's considered that:

a) each divine perfection is identical to all others,
b) each divine perfection is identified with God's essence,
c) in God there is nothing but God's essence.

lmaopml

That's a good way of explaining it Slav. I think rather than 'complex' we view God's 'makeup' for lack of a better word...'incomprensible' in it's entirety to human beings. The idea of divine simplicity is really one philosophy of thought that - God 'is' God, and all 'being' entails from an omnipotent perspective - perfect spirit, perfect being, perfect love, justice, judgement etc. All the atributes 'are' God, rather than 'emotions' or 'parts' or 'causal' to his nature, or 'causal' to his love, justice etc.. He 'is'...all of those things, but not in a 'caused' or 'emotional' or 'made' way...In an eternal infinit way...

It's difficult to express properly - especially when you're only studying and learning - so I understand that it must be difficult for others to understand too when it's expressed by a learner like myself..lol...

Zombrex

Slav wrote: »

Those "things" are actually divine perfections so in the context of divine simplicity it's quite safe to assume that they are one of a kind.

Yes but one of a kind implies the kind (the set) exists.

Slav wrote: »

Therefore I don't see that distinction of "a thing" and "the thing" is of great importance when talking about divine perfections. For the purpose of defining simplicity it not of great help either - as I said for East it was also "the thing" but it did not prevent them to see God as "complex".

For divine simplicity it's only important how the perfections relate to God and to each other. It's considered that:

a) each divine perfection is identical to all others,
b) each divine perfection is identified with God's essence,
c) in God there is nothing but God's essence.

You are going ot have to define what you mean by "identical" and "in God" in those sentences, because I suspect you are not using them the way I would understand them.

Slav

lmaopml wrote: »

That's a good way of explaining it Slav. I think rather than 'complex' we view God's 'makeup' for lack of a better word...'incomprensible' in it's entirety to human beings. The idea of divine simplicity is really one philosophy of thought that - God 'is' God, and all 'being' entails from an omnipotent perspective - perfect spirit, perfect being, perfect love, justice, judgement etc. All the atributes 'are' God, rather than 'emotions' or 'parts' or 'causal' to his nature, or 'causal' to his love, justice etc.. He 'is'...all of those things, but not in a 'caused' or 'emotional' or 'made' way...In an eternal infinit way...

Yes, I guess that's pretty much it. The only thing I would add is that all these attributes are the same thing (not saying that I agree with it but according to Thomism). Otherwise there would still be a way to see God as composite.

Slav

Wicknight wrote: »

Yes but one of a kind implies the kind (the set) exists.

My point is that when talking about absolute something we are not interested in the its kind or whether it exists or not.

You are going ot have to define what you mean by "identical"

'Identical' in philosophical meaning of the term which is quite unambiguous. Simply speaking, 'being identical' is 'being the same'.

and "in God"

Ok, I'm puzzled here as I don't think I can reduce it any further. Let's rephrase the whole thing:

"in God there is nothing but God's essence" = "God is identical to His essence"

Joe1919

Here's a good primary source from the Dominican Fathers on Aquinas view of God. http://dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdePotentia.htm#7:1

What Aquinas has to say is profound. He seems to say that the only essence that God has is his existence. (Q. VII: Article II, 'Is God's Essence Or Substance the Same As His Existence? ............ I answer that in God there is no distinction between existence and essence.' )

Now there are two ways one could interpret what God is from this. The first is that God is the infinite, he is everything simply. His essence is infinite and his existence is infinite simply.

The second way is to interpret God as a 'no-thing'. He exists as pure nothingness; a 'thing' without essences, other than it is a no-thing.

Hence is could be argued that God is simply 'all' or simply 'nothing'. But then, to a Christian, there may not be a huge difference between 'all' and 'nothing' since everything is created from nothing, 'creatio ex nihilo', except of course the creator itself, who simply IS.

Hence God, in itself, is a sort of 'nothingness', as all 'things' (as are known to us) have essences that are not the same as their existences.

In this way, we could have the ultimate and perfect in Divine simplicity. God is an infinite and perfect no-thing, the no-thing from which everything is created from and simply IS the cause of all this.

Morbert

Joe1919 wrote: »

Here's a good primary source from the Dominican Fathers on Aquinas view of God. http://dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdePotentia.htm#7:1

What Aquinas has to say is profound. He seems to say that the only essence that God has is his existence. (Q. VII: Article II, 'Is God's Essence Or Substance the Same As His Existence? ............ I answer that in God there is no distinction between existence and essence.' )

Now there are two ways one could interpret what God is from this. The first is that God is the infinite, he is everything simply. His essence is infinite and his existence is infinite simply.

The second way is to interpret God as a 'no-thing'. He exists as pure nothingness; a 'thing' without essences, other than it is a no-thing.

Hence is could be argued that God is simply 'all' or simply 'nothing'. But then, to a Christian, there may not be a huge difference between 'all' and 'nothing' since everything is created from nothing, 'creatio ex nihilo', except of course the creator itself, who simply IS.

Hence God, in itself, is a sort of 'nothingness', as all 'things' (as are known to us) have essences that are not the same as their existences.

In this way, we could have the ultimate and perfect in Divine simplicity. God is an infinite and perfect no-thing, the no-thing from which everything is created from and simply IS the cause of all this.

But what does "infinite and perfect no-thing" mean? A null set and an infinite set are very different things because "infinite" and "no-thing" imply very different things. And "perfect" implies some benchmarking standard God is being compared to.

While it could be argued that infinity and no-thing are simple because their properties are well defined by mathematicians, how would we apply these simple concepts to a being that does things from creating the universe to answering prayer?

---

To expand on an earlier point: Describing the flow of water into a cup requires many many scientific papers on continuum mechanics. The creation of the universe is written on a handful of pages. But this simply means our language is simple for the latter. It doesn't mean it actually is simple.

Joe1919

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence
Above is an interesting link on the scientific idea of 'Emergence', the doctrine that 'complex systems and patterns arise out of a multiplicity of relatively simple interactions'.

This theory would fit well with Aquinas. Things start with the simple. A computer can really only process 1 & 0, being & non-being, something is or is not, binary. From this binary comes the build up of the complex, bit by bit, byte by byte.

Aquinas was a philosopher as well as a theologian and (imo) would see God as the 'word'. 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God'.(John 1:1)
This 'word' that is God here refers to the simple, the Logos (word), the intelligence from which all thing come.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logos

Its interesting if you look at the progress of science. Science tries to reduce things back to its simpleness. The principle of parsimony, an attempt to reduce all matter back to simple particles or forces, negative and positive, (whose sum totals seem always to wander back to zero, that number that signifies nothingness, that nothingness from which all things come) .

Of course people try to attribute all kinds of convenient and personal type qualities to God. But this is done by a long way around and based on the idea that because God is infinite, (who is Reason itself and has Nature in itself etc) you can almost attribute anything on to this infinite being. (including non-being)

Finally, as regards mathematics, always remember that Maths in itself is only a conceptualisation, a way of visualization and quantifying 'what is' or 'what may be' or indeed 'what cant be' (irrational numbers etc.). Hence the word 'infinite' may mean the totality of 'actually' 'what is' or the potentiality of 'what may be' and this has led many to believe that infinity only exists potentially but not actually. (e.g. there are infinite possible worlds but only one actual world etc).

PS Zero could be said to be the most perfect number. But some Christians would probably disagree and say One or 'Unity' is more perfect, One being the Unity of all, the infinate or One that is God

Morbert

Joe1919 wrote: »

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence
Above is an interesting link on the scientific idea of 'Emergence', the doctrine that 'complex systems and patterns arise out of a multiplicity of relatively simple interactions'.

This theory would fit well with Aquinas. Things start with the simple. A computer can really only process 1 & 0, being & non-being, something is or is not, binary. From this binary comes the build up of the complex, bit by bit, byte by byte.

Aquinas was a philosopher as well as a theologian and (imo) would see God as the 'word'. 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God'.(John 1:1)
This 'word' that is God here refers to the simple, the Logos (word), the intelligence from which all thing come.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logos

Its interesting if you look at the progress of science. Science tries to reduce things back to its simpleness. The principle of parsimony, an attempt to reduce all matter back to simple particles or forces, negative and positive, (whose sum totals seem always to wander back to zero, that number that signifies nothingness, that nothingness from which all things come).

Of course people try to attribute all kinds of convenient and personal type qualities to God. But this is done by a long way around and based on the idea that because God is infinite, (who is Reason itself and has Nature in itself etc) you can almost attribute anything on to this infinite being. (including non-being)

Finally, as regards mathematics, always remember that Maths in itself is only a conceptualisation, a way of visualization and quantifying 'what is' or 'what may be' or indeed 'what cant be' (irrational numbers etc.). Hence the word 'infinite' may mean the totality of 'actually' 'what is' or the potentiality of 'what may be' and this has led many to believe that infinity only exists potentially but not actually. (e.g. there are infinite possible worlds but only one actual world etc).

While I agree that complicated phenomena emerge from simple beginnings, I don't see how this makes Aquinas's conjectures any clearer. The idea that God is an 'infinite and perfect no-thing', in otherwords, is still undefined. I normally understood perfection (in a Christian context) as completely living up to God's expectations (i.e. Never Sinning). I suppose we could get away with calling Jesus perfect, as there were things expected of him, which he lived up to. But there's still the issue of defining God as 'no-thing' and 'infinite'.

PS Zero could be said to be the most perfect number.

Why?

Slav

Morbert wrote: »

While I agree that complicated phenomena emerge from simple beginnings, I don't see how this makes Aquinas's conjectures any clearer. The idea that God is an 'infinite and perfect no-thing', in otherwords, is still undefined.

In fairness, I don't think Aquinas ever used the term "no-thing" (what's the Latin for it BTW?) in relation to God. He was a Christian monk, not a Buddhist one.


Joe1919, could you please clarify who came up with that second way:

Joe1919 wrote: »

The second way is to interpret God as a 'no-thing'. He exists as pure nothingness; a 'thing' without essences, other than it is a no-thing.

Joe1919

Aquinas always insisted that God could not be defined and could only be known by his effects. But it could be said what God is not (negative theology). God has no essence as such except that he exists.
So when we say 'God exists', we are really only saying 'that there is existence'.

I would agree with you that Aquinas never intended his doctrine to be read in a nihilist way but it can be compared (to some extent) to the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness. e.g. http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-ADM/james.htm

In terms of Gods simplicity, it could be argued that if God is simple, then he is perfectly simple. (because God enjoys every perfection). Now the greatest simplicity of all is 'nothing' or Zero. Therefore God is perfect nothingness.
('Nothing' in this sense is much easier to explain than 'something'. We use God to explain why something 'is' rather than why something 'is not'. We take the 'is not' as a default and simplier position. Indeed, it would be appear simplier for God to not create than for God to create, hence the idea that 'nothing' may be simplier than 'something'.)

Why is Zero more perfect than One? Well one argument is that numbers are signs that denote the quantity of existences but they say nothing essentially about what 'it is' that exists. So if I was a butcher and you asked me how much meat I had in stock and I replied 5, this would tell you very little because it could be 5 pounds or 5 kilos or 5 tonnes or 5 carcasses or whatever. But if I replied Zero, I would be giving you a better description because 0 or Zero in itself does not require any further significance in this case and you would know exactly what quantity I had. Hence the number Zero has greater significance and is more perfect as a sign than all other numbers except perhaps the 'Unity' of infinity.

Secondly, if for God his existence is the same as his essence, then nothingness would fulfil this requirement, as then God would have no essence as well as no existence.

Hence God, as such, has no existence (in an individual way), except for His effects. Perhaps this was the reason for the incarnation of God in the Christian faith. God was said to become embodied, he became an individual 'thing' (son of God) and continues his embodiment in the universal 'holy spirit' of the people of the church.

I agree that Aquinas does not use the term 'no-thing' but talks in terms of being/non-being, species etc. and that God isn't a member of any genus etc.

.'Therefore it is plain that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of Him: for a definition is from genus and difference; and the mean of a demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible to it as its principle, is clear from this, that a principle reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the principle of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But God is the principle of all being. Therefore He is not contained in any genus as its principle.'
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1003.htm#article5

I would think that Aquinas never intends God to be seen as 'nothing'. God has existence, but only as a Divine intelligence. But God is not an individual, as individuals need material existence and hence there is a 'nothingness' to God from this viewpoint. 'He is not contained in any genus as its principle'.

Slav

Joe1919 wrote: »

I would agree with you that Aquinas never intended his doctrine to be read in a nihilist way but it can be compared (to some extent) to the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness. e.g. http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-ADM/james.htm

He can be read many possible ways but the idea of God as a cosmic Buddha is not one of Aquinas and not a Christian one, so why bring it up?

In terms of Gods simplicity, it could be argued that if God is simple, then he is perfectly simple. (because God enjoys every perfection). Now the greatest simplicity of all is 'nothing' or Zero. Therefore God is perfect nothingness.

Again, I don't think divine simplicity in general and Thomism in particular suggest any gradation of simplicity. It's either simple or it's composite, it's as simple as that.
Next, the premise that the greatest simplicity is nothing or zero is arguable, at least within the theory of divine simplicity.

Hence God, as such, has no existence (in an individual way), except for His effects.

I'm not sure what is existence in an individual way but if we skip that bit it's actually the opposite of what Thomism says: there are no effects except for esse.

Perhaps this was the reason for the incarnation of God in the Christian faith. God was said to become embodied, he became an individual 'thing' (son of God) and continues his embodiment in the universal 'holy spirit' of the people of the church.

No, I guess in the Christian faith this view would be heretical at very least.

I agree that Aquinas does not use the term 'no-thing' but talks in terms of being/non-being, species etc. and that God isn't a member of any genus etc.

I see the only legitimate use for the term "no-thing" in Thomism as an apophatic statement that God is not a thing as we know things in the created world. Everything else looks like a stretch for me.

I would think that Aquinas never intends God to be seen as 'nothing'. God has existence, but only as a Divine intelligence. But God is not an individual, as individuals need material existence and hence there is a 'nothingness' to God from this viewpoint. 'He is not contained in any genus as its principle'.

To be honest, I still don't see a point introducing "nothingness" in definition of divine simplicity. Augustine and Aquinas managed to explain simplicity without it and this definition is shared almost universally by Western Christianity. Do you see that definition somehow incomplete, flawed or ambiguous? Or you are just building another theory on top of Thomism?

Joe1919

Slav wrote: »

He can be read many possible ways but the idea of God as a cosmic Buddha is not one of Aquinas and not a Christian one, so why bring it up?

Again, I don't think divine simplicity in general and Thomism in particular suggest any gradation of simplicity. It's either simple or it's composite, it's as simple as that.
Next, the premise that the greatest simplicity is nothing or zero is arguable, at least within the theory of divine simplicity.

I'm not sure what is existence in an individual way but if we skip that bit it's actually the opposite of what Thomism says: there are no effects except for esse.

No, I guess in the Christian faith this view would be heretical at very least.

I see the only legitimate use for the term "no-thing" in Thomism as an apophatic statement that God is not a thing as we know things in the created world. Everything else looks like a stretch for me.

To be honest, I still don't see a point introducing "nothingness" in definition of divine simplicity. Augustine and Aquinas managed to explain simplicity without it and this definition is shared almost universally by Western Christianity. Do you see that definition somehow incomplete, flawed or ambiguous? Or you are just building another theory on top of Thomism?

Sorry, it was you that mentioned the Buddhist Monk in #215, hence my mention.

But anyhow my reason for introducing the idea of 'Divine nothingness' is that variations of this was discussed by others such as Dionysius the Areopagite, Eriugena (and slightly later Meister Eckhart) and so no doubt Aquinas was aware of this doctrine and it is an important doctrine historically, and its an important factor in the discussion of Gods complexity, which is the subject of this particular thread.

Aquinas links particularity with the material or the composite, hence there is no 'particular' (I used the word individual) God as such.
Aquinas mentions Gods effects on several occasions e.g.
'Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us.' St.1.q2.a2

My short commentary on the Trinity is important in that the Christian God is unique (I think) in terms of the incarnation, the 'word made flesh' so to speak and it is this that adds some complexity to the Christian God, in terms that the Christian God, on the one hand been simple but on the other been embodied in Christ and to some extent his successors.

Aquinas' Divine simplicity is possibly only a step away from Divine nothingness.

As regards 'building theories', a lot of time has passed since Augustine and Aquinas and I see no reason why what they had to say cant be re-examined in the light of new revelations. (& scientific discoveries etc.)

PS One of the things most admirable about both Augustine and Aquinas was there spirit and determination to argue their case using very rational arguments. I am thinking especially in terms of Aquinas' summa contra gentiles, his arguments against the gentiles and his insistence that his conception of 'God' could stand up and be seen to be rational. He uses all sources, including Jewish (Mainonides), Muslim (Averioes) and pagan (Plato/Aristotle etc) to plead his case. He did not have access to Eastern Philosophy.
But, where has this spirit gone from Christianity? The gentiles have moved on with new arguments but Christianity is at times stuck in the past. I am sure if Aquinas was alive today, he too would have moved on and would have no problems in bringing into his theology new concepts and new philosophy to defend the rationality of his view.

Slav

Joe1919 wrote: »

Sorry, it was you that mentioned the Buddhist Monk in #215, hence my mention.

That's exactly why I mentioned it: the "divine nothingness" sounds Buddhist, not Christian.

But anyhow my reason for introducing the idea of 'Divine nothingness' is that variations of this was discussed by others such as Dionysius the Areopagite, Eriugena (and slightly later Meister Eckhart) and so no doubt Aquinas was aware of this doctrine and it is an important doctrine historically, and its an important factor in the discussion of Gods complexity, which is the subject of this particular thread.

This is arguable. As far as Dionysius is concerned it's very unlikely to be the case as I don't think he even considered God as simple in the first place. However, it could be possible that some of his ideas (like 'being beyond being') were misunderstood by those who read him in Latin, I don't know.

Eriugena's writing were very controversial in the Catholic Church but I still cannot recall anything related to 'nothingness'. Would you point me out please?

Eckhart was not not very influential but still I don't think he ever said anything that would support "nothingness". The only way he might use it is to distinguish between God's being and creation being, something like Palamas' "if I exist then God does not" - but we would not count Palamas to be in "divine nothingness" camp, would we?

Aquinas mentions Gods effects on several occasions e.g.
'Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us.' St.1.q2.a2

The thing is, that according to Thomism God is potentially intelligible but not with the knowledge we have. For example, we cannot have a comprehensive knowledge of God's essence (which is identical with His existence in Thomism) but God can be known to us by His love, for instance (which is in turn is identical to His essence).

Aquinas' Divine simplicity is possibly only a step away from Divine nothingness.

I don't know, for me it's not obvious. In any way, "nothingness" has to be very carefully defined. If you want it to be based on Thomism then at least the definition should not created any difficulties in reconciliation it with Aquinas. For example, the aforementioned intelligibility: it needs to explain if nothingness is intelligible and why.

As regards 'building theories', a lot of time has passed since Augustine and Aquinas and I see no reason why what they had to say cant be re-examined in the light of new revelations. (& scientific discoveries etc.)

This is all very well but reading you post #221 one might think of the "nothingness" as of authentic Aquinas' teaching; hence the Morbert's reply I guess:

Morbert wrote: »

While I agree that complicated phenomena emerge from simple beginnings, I don't see how this makes Aquinas's conjectures any clearer. The idea that God is an 'infinite and perfect no-thing', in otherwords, is still undefined.

Joe1919

Re. Eriugena etc, I can't get you any primary sources but there no shortage of discussion on 'Divine Nothingness' with Eriugena. e.g.
http://www.jstor.org/pss/1201686
http://books.google.ie/books?id=sCybWs6CC9oC&pg=PA86&dq=eriugena+divine+nothingness&hl=en&ei=pKdxTI-4KIKVswb9kom6Bg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCYQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=eriugena%20divine%20nothingness&f=false
http://books.google.ie/books?id=7dYV9UJszlUC&pg=PA38&dq=divine+nothingness+Dionysius+the+Areopagite&hl=en&ei=m6pxTOKuGMaOswbp5ZS5Bg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CDgQ6AEwAzgU#v=onepage&q=divine%20nothingness%20Dionysius%20the%20Areopagite&f=false

I'm not trying to be provocative here. Aquinas makes a clear distinction between 'thing' and 'being'.

'To express this, the term thing is used; for, according to Avicenna," thing differs from being because being gets its name from to-be, but thing expresses the quiddity or essence of the being. There is, however, a negation consequent upon every being considered absolutely: its undividedness, and this is expressed by one. For the one is simply undivided being.' (Q1)
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeVer1.htm

Aquinas associates existence with 'being' and essence with 'things'. Now God as creator is pure existence or pure Being; whereas the world, which is an effect of God is a 'thing'.

Therefore God as 'pure Being' can not have any 'thinginess' (other than his existence) appropriated to Him in itself, as this would take from his purity of his Being and also his Unity.

To say that God is a 'thing' as well as a 'being' would also take from his simplicity as well as his unity.

Because God is not a 'thing', he is neither species nor genus and can never be defined, as Aquinas make clear.
'113. ......with the exception of the First Principle, which is infinitely simple, and to which, because of its simplicity, belongs the notion neither of the genus nor of the species, nor consequently definition.'
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/DeEnte&Essentia.htm

Hence, although I am in agreement with you that Aquinas avoids using the term 'Divine nothingness', there is nothing in his philosophy that appears to contradict this idea and indeed, as I interpret Aquinas, he does not believe God to be a 'thing'.