That which is inherently good (a consequentialist view)

Slouch

I was thinking about consequentialism when I was out on a walk today (specifically utilitarianism) and the problem of determining which consequences can be deemed to be good. I used to consider myself a utilitarian, but when it's taken to its logical extreme in the belief that happiness is the ultimate good, it just gets downright creepy. I have a hard time believing that dumbing down a society with pleasure inducing psychedelics on a constant basis is morally desirable. It also occurs to me that the idea that happiness is inherently good is merely an assumption, which is advocated only because it is desirable to an individual and presumably the thing which is most desirable.

Of course, whether this is given equal weight to each individual or not varies across the different schools of consequentialism (not all of which, I recognise, place happiness as the end all and be all of ethical concerns). However, the problem with any consequentialist school of thought is as follows: How do you determine those goals or qualities which are inherently good in themselves and worth pursuing for their own sake. Of course happiness is a worthwhile pursuit, but are there really no other qualities which are worth pursuing for their own sake? Are knowledge and freedom merely tools which we should use to attain greater happiness, or are there other goals which are desirable for their own sake?

Of course, this isn't something you can actually know. My question is rather is "what do you believe and on what grounds?". Of course, I am looking specifically for answers from people who consider themselves consequentialists, but I would still like to hear some answers from a deontological perspective.

raah!

Is it not a logical necessity for somethign that is "inherently good" of it's own accord, to be "inherently good" arbitrarily?

I would also say that consequentialist theories have a problem in predicting outcomes.

Slouch

I have just realised that I made a linguistic error here, since I meant intrinsically good, rather than "inherently good" (which I'm told means good for something). Nevertheless, I think you understood my meaning anyway.

Before I address your question:"Is it not a logical necessity for something which is inherently good of its own accord to be inherently good arbitrarily"?, I would like to check something. If I was to frame it as "is it not a logical necessity for something which is intrinsically good to also be inherently good"?, would it still be the same question. If so, I would answer yes since the thing is an end in itself. However, if by "inherently good arbitrarily" as in being good from the perspective of a particular individual, then I simply don't know.

Sorry, but I need you to clarify your meaning before I continue. I'm not exactly used to the precision required for philosophical discussion. Apologies for anything I say that seems somewhat inconsistent.

Sardonicat

Great topic, Slouch! Can I ask you if you are limiting your definition of happiness to "pleasure"?

Slouch

Sardonicat wrote: »

Great topic, Slouch! Can I ask you if you are limiting your definition of happiness to "pleasure"?

Honestly hadn't thought about it but I suppose we should. Happiness is probably too vague a concept for this discussion. However, if one feels this is insufficient, I would ask them to define happiness and the aspects of it (intellectual, physical or otherwise) on their terms. We can then decide if it is a more agreeable term.

Goduznt Xzst

I would consider myself a consequentialist, the eudaimonic type.

What you appear to be getting hung up on here is the objective stance of pleasure being good and pain, inversely, being bad. You are also assuming the consequentialist has taken an agent-relative stance. When in reality, most rational consequentialists assume an agent-neutral stance.

You also need to draw a distinction between something that has value morally and something that has general value. Morally concerning oneself with increasing personal happiness has nothing to do with the motivations a person may have for also increasing humanities level of knowledge and/or freedom.

Ergo, an altruist who gains personal satisfaction from increasing the happiness in the lives of others would be considered an agent-neutral consequentialist.

Slouch

Goduznt Xzst wrote: »

I would consider myself a consequentialist, the eudaimonic type.

What you appear to be getting hung up on here is the objective stance of pleasure being good and pain, inversely, being bad. You are also assuming the consequentialist has taken an agent-relative stance. When in reality, most rational consequentialists assume an agent-neutral stance.

You also need to draw a distinction between something that has value morally and something that has general value. Morally concerning oneself with increasing personal happiness has nothing to do with the motivations a person may have for also increasing humanities level of knowledge and/or freedom.

Ergo, an altruist who gains personal satisfaction from increasing the happiness in the lives of others would be considered an agent-neutral consequentialist.

I would personally consider the only school of consequentialism I actually mentioned (utilitarianism) to be very much an agent-neutral philosophy. I cannot give you something that has moral value since I don't know how to calculate the moral value of something without objectively determining an end which is intrinsically good. This is beyond my capacity and that is essentially the point.

raah!

Slouch wrote: »

I have just realised that I made a linguistic error here, since what I meant intrinsically good, rather than "inherently good" (which I'm told means good for something). Nevertheless, I think you understood my meaning anyway.

Ah well I had meant inherent in the sense that is the same as intrinsic, that is, that goodness was a part of the thing we are describing. When I said "of itself" I meant to specify that the goodness inherent in the thing was because the thing itself was good, not because it contained goodness as some separate attribute. That is, that there is not some component in the thing existing on it's own which can be called "Good". For example if I were to say that Happinness is inherently good of itself, I would mean that the whole thing is good, not that it is good because dopamine or somethign like that is good. Perhaps my grasp of the definitions of those words is off, but that is what I meant to convey by using them anyway.

Before I address your question:"Is it not a logical necessity for something which is inherently good of its own accord to be inherently good arbitrarily"?, I would like to check something. If I was to frame it as "is it not a logical necessity for something which is intrinsically good to also be inherently good"?, would it still be the same question. If so, I would answer yes since the thing is an end in itself. However, if by "inherently good arbitrarily" as in being good from the perspective of a particular individual, then I simply don't know.

I used arbitrarily in the sense that it would be good without reference to other things, just something decided by a person. Good without reason.

Sorry, but I need you to clarify your meaning before I continue. I'm not exactly used to the precision required for philosophical discussion. Apologies for anything I say that seems somewhat inconsistent.

Well it seems the confusion was caused by my loose usage of the words like inherent and arbitrary. But yes, by inherent I mean 'in the thing', and by arbitrarily I mean 'without justification'

Edit: Seeing as though I have my handy internet dictionary here, I think it couldn't hurt to post some definitions and other information.

inherent |ɪnˌhɪər(ə)nt| |-ˌhɛr(ə)nt|
adjective
existing in something as a permanent, essential, or characteristic attribute : any form of mountaineering has its inherent dangers | the symbolism inherent in all folk tales.

intrinsic |ɪnˌtrɪnsɪk|
adjective
belonging naturally; essential : access to the arts is intrinsic to a high quality of life. See note at inherent .

A quality that is inherent is a permanent part of a person's nature or essence (: an inherent tendency to fight back).

Intrinsic and essential are broader terms that can apply to things as well as people. Something that is essential is part of the essence or constitution of something (: an essential ingredient; essential revisions in the text), while an intrinsic quality is one that belongs naturally to a person or thing ( | her intrinsic fairness; an intrinsic weakness in the design).

Slouch

I think I understand now. If something is good in itself it must also be good without reference to anything else. Yes, certainly. It is almost tautology when I put it like that. The thing or things which are good in themselves and without external justification is exactly what I am searching for and, as you can see from my first post, I am unconvinced that pleasure is the one thing which deserves to have this status attributed to it.

Now, after having thought about my position overnight, I will elaborate my point with an analogy. Suppose I have the power to give all the people in the world pleasure for the full length of their natural lives, but it would mean that I had to take away their freedom of choice and all their ambitions to do it. Imagine then that half of the people accept such an offer, since to them it is most reasonable and choice is likely to be an illusion anyway. Now, suppose the other half reject this offer, wishing to maintain this freedom and continuing their lives as they were with all the misery and suffering, along with its joys and pleasures. They do not live for the sake of pleasure but to simply live life for life's own sake. However, I have have the power to force to live in a dreamlike state of everlasting pleasure whether they will it or not. I would accept granting this to the first half to be morally acceptable. However, I do not think it morally right to force this upon the second half who do not will it.

There is another issue here. Suppose I am given the knowledge in absolute certainty, without any reasonable doubt, that free will is merely an illusion and this second half merely wishes to preserve an illusion in their minds. Let us say there are even some who took this choice acknowledge free will to be an illusion, but still do not want to give up the idea of making choices for themselves. What if I can, in the state of pleasure which I have offered them, allow them to maintain their illusion of choice? If they still refuse, is it morally justified in this situation that I should force them into the "dream" as I will call it from now on for simplicity's sake.

This is slightly over-simplistic, but tell me if you think I have adequately illustrated my point. In writing this analogy it also occurred to me that life itself might be a candidate which is as deserving as pleasure of the title of intrinsic good. However, I then come full circle when I ask what life would be worth if it was neither pleasurable nor painful. Does it really have a value in itself? I cannot answer these questions and I do not expect anyone to be able to give me anything but their best guess. Whether or not my point was well made, I think this should at least get the discussion to kick off.

Hmm. I accidentally but a winking emoticon above this and now I can't remove it in the edit window...

raah!

I agree with you about it being a bad idea to nominate pleasure as being the sole arbiter of 'good'. As you've hinted at, a plentiful supply of heroin for everyone would be a moral ideal in this case.

As for looking for things good in themselves without external justification, it would depend on what oyu hope to acheive by uptaking such moral axioms. Do you wish to aproximate the traditional moral man? Or simply to be moral? In a relativistic landscape as this, you could decide that serving yourself only is the moral ideal.

I'd also like to point out, that free will is necessary for any kind of moral culpability, or even use of logic (this is not really a well established thing, but I can expand on that, and perhaps people can show me where it's wrong). And while I see determinism as an extremely strong argument, I am left with little choice but to reject it, for the sake of intellectual stability.

In response to asking about what is of moral value, I would ask why it is necessary to cling to traditional ideas of "good". Surely once we are in this territory of seeking moral absolutes those traditional ideas (the obvious ones, like being nice, not killing people) become no longer "good" but just things for which the word good was used as a description by other people. So a counter question; what reason have you to act morally at all? Why put effort into attempting to find moral absolutes when you are being guided by those pre-existing ideas. We can say these ideas, if they are not good (which we have assumed since we are searching for good, and I presume we all know about them), a merely put there by religion, government and our genetic makeup in order to control us.

Anyway, I like what you said about free will there, and I think you would enjoy reading "notes from underground" from Dostoyevsky, if you have not already, as it is always nice to see one's ideas echoed by great men.

Slouch

Now we move on to a deeper question. Is there really anything which can be considered to have the intrinsic quality of being good? If thee is no such thing then I suppose the idea of morality is immaterial as the quality of being good which we attribute to a thing is entirely subjective. It is entirely possible that what we call morality is purely the result an evolutionary function which has been useful in preserving the genetic code of the species. Perhaps it would explain why we seem to have a stronger degree of emotional attachment to other mammals (although we seem to care quite a bit about birds too) than any other group. It may also account for those cases where animals have taken care of human children (http://www.feralchildren.com/en/children.php?tp=0). Nevertheless, when I continue down this line of thought it just gets more confusing since there are numerous exceptions to this if you expect one species to be more attached to its closest cousins. There is then the question of how much we would have been socially conditioned (by governments as you put it) to develop an understanding of this concept which has become somewhat removed from its natural purpose.

The previous paragraph is just to give you a better understanding of my line of thought. After all, if that was the truth this discussion would also be entirely meaningless since we would be searching for that which does not exist. I simply must assume that there is an intrinsic good for talk of morality to have any meaning. However, I have another thought experiment I wish to conduct concerning the idea of free will.

In this experiment, we will assume a view of the world something like that which is expressed in the Hindu religion (also in the Abrahamic faiths to a lesser degree). Assume there are those beings which do have free will and those which do not. Both types of being are able to feel pain and pleasure of equal intensity to one another. They are both intelligent, but the actions of the unfree are (put in very simplified terms) nothing more than neurons responding to stimuli and, while their actions are incredibly varied, a stimulus having certain exact characteristics will produce an exact result. However the free type have some quality which allows them to make free choices. Whatever that quality may be is not the issue which I am concerned with at this point. These beings may choose to increase the pain or happiness of the unfree or even kill them. The unfree type may do the same but, as I say, it will only be the result of a response to certain stimuli. We have established that the unfree type bears no moral responsibility for its actions, but the free ones do bear responsibility for their own choices. However, can we make a moral judgement regarding the decision of one of these beings to cause joy or pain to one of the unfree type? If so, must we acknowledge that pleasure is intrinsically good? However, if that is our conclusion, we have already rejected the idea that it is the only good and then surely we must continue to look elsewhere for this quality of being good.

I could open a can of worms here by asking whether there is a universal quality of being good, but I doubt that issue is going to get solved on boards.ie of all places. Oh wait, I guess I just did open that can anyway

I've actually been meaning to read Dostoyevsky for some time, though I was going to go for Crime and Punishment first of all. I think I'll take your advice now. Sorry I don't think I addressed all your points in this post, but I felt the need to get this across. I am interested in hearing how the absence of free will would prevent the use of logic, since I've never heard that view before. Maybe you should open another topoc for it .

Joe1919

Slouch wrote: »

Now we move on to a deeper question. Is there really anything which can be considered to have the intrinsic quality of being good?...........

I will put forward what I think are three possibilities for the 'good'. (subject/verb/object )
1 The subjective view of goodness as happiness.
2. The pragmatic view that good is a quality relative to the function/action of that thing. e.g. A knife is a 'good' knife if it 'cuts' well, a society is good if the people are sociable etc.
3 The objective view that goodness is something that is both flourishing and yet in harmony with the world.

My own view is that an attempt can be made to judge how just/moral/good a society is by using the above three characteristics. i.e.
1 How happy are the people?
2 How well does the society act/function?
3 Is it a harmonious (peaceful) society? Are the people flourishing/doing well?

The 'good' society tries to balance these three requirements to achieve an overall good. The really good (ideal) society manages to achieve all three of the above.

Slouch

Joe1919 wrote: »

3 The objective view that goodness is something that is both flourishing and yet in harmony with the world.

3 Is it a harmonious (peaceful) society? Are the people flourishing/doing well?

The 'good' society tries to balance these three requirements to achieve an overall good. The really good (ideal) society manages to achieve all three of the above.

What do you mean by flourishing? Flourishing economically or flourishing in some abstract or spiritual sense? Can something be flourishing without reference to one of these other things which are considered good?

Joe1919

Slouch wrote: »

What do you mean by flourishing? Flourishing economically or flourishing in some abstract or spiritual sense? Can something be flourishing without reference to one of these other things which are considered good?

The idea of 'flourishing' is a sort of natural and earthy concept. For example, an animal owner will know that their pet is doing well by the shine on their coat etc. Farmers know when cattle are 'thriving' and chewing their cud etc. Even owners of houseplants can make some judgement as to how well the plan is doing by their growth and flowering etc.

I am acknowledging the difficulty in determining the 'good'. (hence my use of words such as 'possibility' and 'attempt'). Nevertheless, one of the challenges that we have in life is in trying to determine what is good. We have no choice in this matter. We must choose. For example, many of us are parents or will end up being parents and will have to make choices about what's best for our children.
Its also the case that although we are often bewildered ( and suffer anxiety) in trying to know what's best to do, we do know what's worst to do. In other words we may not know the 'good' but we do know the 'bad'. For example, very few of us would like to live in a country suffering civil war or a famine. All we have to do is look at the tears in the faces of the people or their skin and bone to know that they are not 'flourishing'.

Hence I argue that although there is no clear formulae for the good (as Aristotle says), we do have some limited signs and indicators and one of the stories of our humanity has been one of stumbling along in the dark feeling for these signs.

raah!

Slouch wrote: »

However, can we make a moral judgement regarding the decision of one of these beings to cause joy or pain to one of the unfree type? If so, must we acknowledge that pleasure is intrinsically good? However, if that is our conclusion, we have already rejected the idea that it is the only good and then surely we must continue to look elsewhere for this quality of being good.

There would be no way for us to find an objective answer to this. Pleasure is pleasurable, but not necessarily good, pain is painful but not necessarily bad.

At the end of the day you must just decide, arbitrarily what you want to consider good, and then you must stick to that. For me this is the only kind of moral frame work which stands up to rationalising one's behaviours. Emotional reasons can then be cited for uptaking these moral axioms, reasons like "I love people so don't want them to be in pain".

I could open a can of worms here by asking whether there is a universal quality of being good, but I doubt that issue is going to get solved on boards.ie of all places. Oh wait, I guess I just did open that can anyway

Well i'm sure religious people could tell you that; yes there is, and it's what god says is good.

I've actually been meaning to read Dostoyevsky for some time, though I was going to go for Crime and Punishment first of all. I think I'll take your advice now. Sorry I don't think I addressed all your points in this post, but I felt the need to get this across. I am interested in hearing how the absence of free will would prevent the use of logic, since I've never heard that view before. Maybe you should open another topoc for it .

Not at all, very interesting points you've made. The absence of free will's effect on logic I am now having some doubts about. But I will open a thread to discuss this and give my own points about it aswell.