RAF bombing of German cities

Manic Moran

Tony EH wrote: »

Then we are in agreement then? The Emporer didn't factor in US plans, so why remain deliberately silent, when not doing so would have meant a peaceful end to the war?

You're taking a different interpretation of the same words.

The Emperor's situation was irrelevant to the question of whether or not to drop the bomb. The emperor's situation was not irrelevant to the question on whether or not to have conditions on surrender.

The logical conclusion is that they reached a decision point in 1945 where they didn't want an end to the war until the atomic bomb(s) were used.

I'm not sure how you keep missing this. The position of the US Government in 1944 as stated by Secretary of State Hull was to not say anything about the Emperor. That was an active decision to be non-commital, it does not mean that no decision was taken. It was not a publicly declared rationale at the time, but it was still the thought process of the government.

But, it wasn't policy. That's MY point. It was nothing. The future of the wasn't discussed,

Discussed with who? It was discussed internally within the US government, and they concluded it was the best course of action to say nothing. Deliberately saying nothing is a policy. Not even deciding whether not not to say anything is not a policy.

so saying to the Japs that they had no designs on their Emperor wouldn't have been any skin off of anyones nose

Except for the domestic political reprecussions that were expected.

and the atom bomb wouldn't have been used. Of course, that assumes that the US actually wanted a peaceful end to the war. "Peaceful" meaning no A-Bomb.

You have an interesting definition of the word 'peaceful', then. Even after two A-Bombs, there was still enough opposition to a surrender that the Japanese military attempted a coup, it is quite likely that conventional fighting would have continued.

NTM

gbee

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

Was the RAF bombing strategy adopted as WWII progressed justified??

As history moves on a consensus questions this justification. Much of the later bombing was undoubtedly sheer terrorism and revenge, I can't be judgemental on that, and if I'd lost my family to German raids, I'd not have any compassion either.

Hitler was thought to have been working on a nuclear weapon, he was dabbling in something that made the allies think so, but in fact he was not making an A-Bomb. Some raids were made to stop this development ~ today they seem unjustified.

And we have political intrigue, just as a recent British PM falsified his own MI5 documents to justify another Iraq war, we have allegations of war warmongering from the British PM of the day, Churchill and the Bomber Command's [Sir]Arthur Harris. Churchill was effectively banished for his own pursuance of the war.

A recent statistic suggest that as much as 80% of all air dropped munitions during WWII, missed their targets.

Manic Moran

A recent statistic suggest that as much as 80% of all air dropped munitions during WWII, missed their targets

For strategic bombers, the ratio is about 99.9% missed. Even with ballistic computers in diving attack aircraft, by the Vietnam era you're still talking about only one in four landing where they're supposed to.

NTM

jonniebgood1

From link by R.Dub.Fusilier.

This is German Propaganda's view on the RAF bombing soon after the Hamburg attack:

It is psychologically understandable that the populace of areas under aerial attack, after the general confusion of a terrible night, get an entirely false impression of the damage, which leads to wild and exaggerated rumors about the extent of the casualties and damage.

As soon as the initial shock is over, investigations in the following days prove the first impressions wrong. Thus, the claims of “over 100,000 dead in Hamburg,” or of “tens of thousands” in other cities, are all false [the actual dead toll in Hamburg was around 50,000]. The same is true regarding rumors of heavy industrial damage.

...

Our opponent is making terror attacks against our civilian population in hopes of breaking the German people’s powers of resistance, thereby destroying Germany’s superior morale in this war.

This must be addressed particularly directly and clearly in all that our speakers say. The British always try to persuade the world that their attacks are aimed at German war production, but numerous enemy voices prove that their sole aim is to terrorize the German civilian population. Driven by Jewish hatred and the Jewish spirit, the British and the Americans are attempting to destroy the homes of our working people, their cultural landmarks, and thereby everything that is part of their life and routine.

This is even recognized and condemned in the neutral press. The Swedish military writer Colonel Bratt writes in “Stockholms Tidningen”:

“The air terror against the civilian population is inexcusable. One simply cannot defend bombing cities, incinerating, suffocating, or blowing up tens of thousands of people, and destroying the homes of hundreds of thousands of others. If the English claim, after all that has happened in Hamburg, Milan, and Berlin, that they are not making terror attacks aimed at the civilian population, they are deceiving themselves and others. Only glowing hatred or a propaganda that has left all reason behind can approve such terror. There is no way to reconcile claims that one is rescuing civilization, fighting for humanity, and resisting violence, while at the same time one is unleashing the inferno of aerial warfare against a civilian population.”

In the British weekly “Sphere,” we find a recommendation by English journalist Ferdinand Duchy, who advises that Germany’s destroyed cities never be rebuilt. The ruins should be declared off-limits. That would assure Germany’s total, final, and violent impoverishment. Later in the same article, we read:

“By the way, aerial attacks are the best way to educate the Germans. Can one imagine anything more effective than bombing terror?”

The “Sunday Times” of 15 August wrote:

“There are two events that, if they happen in Germany, will lead to a repetition of 9 November 1918: A defeat in the East, or increased bombing attacks. Should the latter hit the civilian population particularly hard, taking their homes and food from then, it will soon lead to this by affecting their morale.”

An instruction to their speakers

Each individual should and must be firmly resolved that there will never be another 9 November 1918 in Germany. Speakers must therefore constantly repeat the countless proofs of brutal Jewish destructive hatred. The plan of the Jew Kaufman, who wants to exterminate the entire German population by sterilization, the proposal of another Jew to deport all German children between the ages of two and six for “reeducation,” and the recent clear intentions of the British to leave all of Europe to the Soviets after victory, show us all what will happen if we do not stay strong and firm.

http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/rsi67.htm

jonniebgood1

Tony EH wrote: »

Em...no. At NO point in the war in Europe were the Russians EVER close to losing.

Just found this detail of interview given by Zhukov:

The Soviet Union nearly lost the war in 1941 and suffered from poor planning, according to Marshal Georgy Zhukov in the frank television interview that has been banned since it was recorded in 1966.

Zhukov, the most decorated general in the history of both Russia and the Soviet Union, admitted that Soviet generals were not confident that they could hold the German forces at the Mozhaisk defence line outside Moscow.

“Did the commanders have confidence we would hold that line of defence and be able to halt the enemy? I have to say frankly that we did not have complete certainty.

“It would have been possible to contain the initial units of the opponent but if he quickly sent in his main group, he would have been difficult to stop,” he told the interviewer, the Soviet writer Konstantin Simonov.

http://www.infiniteunknown.net/2010/05/05/top-soviet-commander-ussr-came-close-to-defeat-by-nazi-germany/

Elmer Blooker

pwd wrote: »

Dresden was an atrocity.

Why was it an atrocity? There was a war on.
A quote from Antony Beevor's "Berlin, The Downfall" (p 83)

"The fact that there were 180 V-Bomb attacks on England that week, the highest number so far, did little to soften the planners' hearts"

Anyway there was a much bigger air raid on Berlin on Feb 3 1945, 10 days earlier.

Morlar

Elmer Blooker wrote: »

Why was it an atrocity? There was a war on.
A quote from Antony Beevor's "Berlin, The Downfall" (p 83)

"The fact that there were 180 V-Bomb attacks on England that week, the highest number so far, did little to soften the planners' hearts"

Anyway there was a much bigger air raid on Berlin on Feb 3 1945, 10 days earlier.

Berlin was arguably a military target. Just because 'there was a war on' doesn't mean that 'during war there are no atrocities' which appears to be the logic you are employing. Dresden had no military infrastructure and was known to contain very large numbers of fleeing refugees. Also the death toll was phenomonal due to the use of incendiary bombs on that scale, though since the late 1990s this has been revised downwards. There are aerial photos of Dresden after the raids in which for miles there is not a single roof in highly congested areas. Homes were reduced to 4 standing walls & the rest was incinerated.

Manach

In History, German cities have been previously destroyed - eg Madgeburg during the 30 year war. The destruction of Dresden no doubt had underlying political considerations - showing the Soviets that the Western Allies were fully engaged in the war. I've looked through the wiki entry on US WWII executions (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capital_punishment_by_the_United_States_military) and nothing is mentioned in regard the deliberate killing of enemy civilians, thus was no legal remedy for the actions/atrocity at Dresden.

TheUsual

Morlar wrote: »

Just because 'there was a war on' doesn't mean that 'during war there are no atrocities' which appears to be the logic you are employing. Dresden had no military infrastructure and was known to contain very large numbers of fleeing refugees. Also the death toll was phenomonal due to the use of incendiary bombs on that scale, though since the late 1990s this has been revised downwards.

That's exactly why 66 years later we are still talking about it and there is an active debate.
For me there is no question that Hilter bombed civilians in England and Wales with little warning and no real accuracy - it was because he was an evil b-stard with no morals.
However the allies were supposed to be the white knights standing up to this evil fascist in Europe and should have been above the exact same techniques that Hilter used.

Unfortunately, the winners write the history books in War and the truth is not what they want future generations to think about, only the glory.

indioblack

Overall the bombing of German cities is morally dubious - unless you accept that it was the way the war had progressed.
It was not as simple as saying that the Americans bombed specific targets - check out the proportion of incendiaries against explosive bombs used by the Americans.
The second wave over Dresden was American.
The first casualty returns from the Dresden police give 18,000 dead - obviously it would grow in number - Hamburg in 1943 saw an estimated 40,000 dead from one raid.
The policy of Britain's Air Ministry, Bomber Command, and Harris was designed to end the war and save Allied lives - it failed.
The Allies had to invade and 50% of Bomber Command's aircrew were killed.
But I would be careful about condeming the aerial bombardment of Germany today.

Manic Moran

Dresden had no military infrastructure

Lehman manufactured artillery, they were based in Dresden. Zeiss manufactured weapons optics. There was also a reasonable rail network there.

NTM

Tony EH

The factory complexes and marshaling yards were on the outskirts of the city as far as I know. There was absolutely NO military imperative to destroy the whole city centre.

Had the RAF intended, they COULD have performed a limited tactical strike in daylight (or even night) on the actual paltry military targets that Dresden possessed. Instead they simply chose to employ the usual Bomber Command "tactic" of destroying the whole city and population therein and hope that something of miltary value was hit on the off chance.

There was no effort made on behalf of Bomber Command to actually target the so-called military targets. At least the 8th tried to hit the marshaling yards the next day.

In fact, the majority of Dresden's "military complexes" were to the North of the city and they weren't even targeted. They still exist today and are used by the Bundeswehr. Also, there were important bridges across the Elbe, that were left competely untouched.

At the end of the day, the attacks were absolutely improportionate to the military gains that were on offer.

On the attack, Alexander McKee says it best: "The standard whitewash gambit, both British and American, is to mention that Dresden contained targets X, Y and Z, and to let the innocent reader assume that these targets were attacked, whereas in fact the bombing plan totally omitted them and thus, except for one or two mere accidents, they escaped"

Elmer Blooker

At least the 8th tried to hit the marshaling yards the next day.

[/QUOTE]The idea of "precision" bombing had been abandoned earlier in the war. It proved impossible to hit targets accurately. In fact on February 14 1945 US bombers actually bombed Prague (50 miles away) by mistake. The Danube in Prague was thought to be the Elbe which flows through Dresden!

Manic Moran

Tony EH wrote: »

The factory complexes and marshaling yards were on the outskirts of the city as far as I know. There was absolutely NO military imperative to destroy the whole city centre.

Had the RAF intended, they COULD have performed a limited tactical strike in daylight (or even night) on the actual paltry military targets that Dresden possessed. Instead they simply chose to employ the usual Bomber Command "tactic" of destroying the whole city and population therein and hope that something of miltary value was hit on the off chance.

There was no effort made on behalf of Bomber Command to actually target the so-called military targets. At least the 8th tried to hit the marshaling yards the next day.

In fact, the majority of Dresden's "military complexes" were to the North of the city and they weren't even targeted. They still exist today and are used by the Bundeswehr. Also, there were important bridges across the Elbe, that were left competely untouched.

At the end of the day, the attacks were absolutely improportionate to the military gains that were on offer.

On the attack, Alexander McKee says it best: "The standard whitewash gambit, both British and American, is to mention that Dresden contained targets X, Y and Z, and to let the innocent reader assume that these targets were attacked, whereas in fact the bombing plan totally omitted them and thus, except for one or two mere accidents, they escaped"

Don't forget that the rules of war at the time allowed the targetting of the civilian workforce, not just the factories themselves. Most of the rail workers didn't live in the marshalling yards, much as most of the factory workers didn't live in the factory. Hitting the city was a good way of getting at the workers.

NTM

marcsignal

Just coming in on the tail end of this, because, tbh, i'm undecided about what stance to take on the matter. While it may be debatable whether the bombing of Dresden was a war crime or not, I certainly believe, at that late stage in the war, it was unnecessary. Germany had only weeks left, and I doubt that not bombing Dresden would have prolonged the war.

As Morlar pointed out, the city was chock full of refugees, not Military personnel.

On the other hand, I'd put money on it, that had Hitler the air power during the London Blitz, he would have flattened London, and the other cities he bombed without a second thought, until the British capitulated.

As for the deliberate targeting of civilians, let's not forget that in 1943 the Germans deliberately targeted Grimsby and Cleethorpes in England with Butterfly Bombs, a weapon designed to cause death to anyone interfering with them as they lay unexploded on the ground after the raid.

There was a thread about the weapon Here a good while back.

If I'm honest, I'd also have to speculate, that had the Germans the capability to do so with the V weapons, they'd have flattened London and other cities in Britain also.

Consequently, I can't really say with any firm conviction, where I stand on this.

hinault

Elmer Blooker wrote: »

Why was it an atrocity? There was a war on.
A quote from Antony Beevor's "Berlin, The Downfall" (p 83)

"The fact that there were 180 V-Bomb attacks on England that week, the highest number so far, did little to soften the planners' hearts"

Anyway there was a much bigger air raid on Berlin on Feb 3 1945, 10 days earlier.

Dresden, even in the immediate aftermath of the bombing of that city, became a very controversial mission in terms of the explanation given by the British for the bombing of Dresden.

British High Command quickly realised that the bombing of Dresden had no basis in military strategic sense.
Even Churchill realised, by March 1945, that the bombing of Dresden was counterproductive in terms of propoganda.

Berlin represented a more important military target than Dresden.

BostonB

In hindsight area bombing doesn't work. But thats in Hindsight.
They couldn't do precision bombing in WWII consistently without heavy losses.
Some of hardest fought air and land battles of the war in Europe were in 1945.
Dresden was bombed because they could. In Hindsight it was a mistake.

BostonB

marcsignal wrote: »

J....I certainly believe, at that late stage in the war, it was unnecessary. Germany had only weeks left, and I doubt that not bombing Dresden would have prolonged the war. ...

War ended end of April. They bombed Dresden mid Feb. Thats 2 and a half months. Not weeks.

Morlar

BostonB wrote: »

In hindsight area bombing doesn't work. But thats in Hindsight.
They couldn't do precision bombing in WWII consistently without heavy losses.
Some of hardest fought air and land battles of the war in Europe were in 1945.
Dresden was bombed because they could. In Hindsight it was a mistake.

I agree it was incorrect to do it - but I am just not so sure it was an honest mistake on the part of bomber command, churchill and harris.

Morlar

BostonB wrote: »

War ended end of April. They bombed Dresden mid Feb. Thats 2 and a half months. Not weeks.

You are right Dresden was a Valentines day special. I am pretty sure the writing was on the wall in any event.

BostonB

Morlar wrote: »

You are right Dresden was a Valentines day special. I am pretty sure the writing was on the wall in any event.

I'm sure all everyone killed and fighting in those months wouldn't agree.

Germany produced 8,000 aircraft in the 4 months of 1945. In 1944 the year with the highest production, 4 months produced 13,000. So its a bit much to just write off 1945 as non event. There was a lot of major fighting. Most people don't realize that.

Morlar wrote: »

I agree it was incorrect to do it - but I am just not so sure it was an honest mistake on the part of bomber command, churchill and harris.

I said it was a mistake in hindsight. Not that it wasn't deliberate act. But it has to be taken in context of the raids before it, and the events known, or believed at that time. Its only long after the war that it became know that area bombing had poor results.

Was it wrong. Yes. Did they know it didn't work. No. They thought the end justified the means. The question really is was it justified, if you thought it worked as means of shortening the war.

BostonB

AFAIK the Firestorm raids in Japan killed more then the atomic bomb raids.

Tony EH

BostonB wrote: »

Germany produced 8,000 aircraft in the 4 months of 1945.

The total aircraft production output for 1945 was 7,052 aircraft of all types, including 1630 FW190's, 2798 BF109's and 730 ME262's. The main fighter aircraft of the Jagdwaffe. However, you could build a million aircraft but without any pilots they ain't going to go anywhere and due to many other reasons, most of those fighters never got off the ground.

Also, in about the last year of the war there were numerous Allied pilots who never saw a single German aircraft. Some crew went their entire tour not seeing any Luftwaffe planes in the sky. By the last months of '44, flak had become the biggest single threat to Allied aircrew.

The Germans used to have a joke that went something like "If they're silver, they're American planes. If they're green, they're British and if they're invisible, they're ours."

BostonB wrote: »

I said it was a mistake in hindsight.

There was no "mistake" involved in the Allied boming of Dresden or any other German village, town or city. They knew exactly what they were doing and they knew the exact effects their bombing was having on the ground.

The bombing of Dresden was simply the extention of ongoing Allied policy of wiping out German urban areas.

I personally believe that Dresden was hit so hard, because the Western Allies wanted to send a clear message to Soviets on just how immense Allied destruction had become. They knew that levelling Dresden wouldn't shorten the war by one single second, so ulterior motives probably lay behind the decision to utterly destroy the city, while leaving the military targets completely untouched.

I have been searching for some time now for a Soviet reaction to seeing Dresden when they moved into the city in 45. But, in vain. There's not a lot on it. I did have a conversation, years ago, with a gent whose father was in Bomber Command, he wasn't on the Dresden raid though. He said that when the Russians saw what was left of the city after the raid they were shocked. Considering that the city had escaped the war, but for an Allied raid, the level of Destruction they witnessed had a real effect on them.

I have nothing to corroborate that annecdote, of course, but it remains interesting to me all these years.

marcsignal

BostonB wrote: »

War ended end of April. They bombed Dresden mid Feb. Thats 2 and a half months. Not weeks.

Well, you could say 10 weeks then, but any attempt at tactical deployment of remaining German military units (many of which consisted of old men with low morale, and children) was continuously hampered by Allied air superiority. With the rail network destroyed, and many of the bridges gone, the army was as good as neutered, tactically.

Aircraft were still being produced, yes, but not in large factories as before, but rather in a scattered way, in small workshops dotted throughout Germany, hidden in forests, in places like Mühldorf in Bavaria. There were then logistical problems getting these aircraft to where they were needed, most arriving to units in small numbers at a time, making their impact in the skies virtually ineffectual.

I'd also agree with Tony EH about the issue of pilots, or lack of them, not to mention severe fuel shortages, which had as good as grounded the Luftwaffe after the Ardennes offensive.

BostonB

Tony EH wrote: »

There was no "mistake" involved in the Allied boming of Dresden or any other German village, town or city. They knew exactly what they were doing and they knew the exact effects their bombing was having on the ground. ...

Why would you selectively quote what I said to entirely change the meaning????

I said....

BostonB wrote: »

....I said it was a mistake in hindsight. Not that it wasn't deliberate act....

Tony EH

I'm not "trying to change the meaning". Relax yourself.

"Mistake" is probably the wrong word to use.

BostonB

Tony EH wrote: »

The total aircraft production output for 1945 was 7,052 aircraft of all types, including 1630 FW190's, 2798 BF109's and 730 ME262's. The main fighter aircraft of the Jagdwaffe. However, you could build a million aircraft but without any pilots they ain't going to go anywhere and due to many other reasons, most of those fighters never got off the ground.....

While vastly outnumbered, its wrong to suggest there was no German pilots flying and no air combat. For example. JG7 (ME262) claimed 500 Allied aircraft in the last two months of the war.

BostonB

Tony EH wrote: »

I'm not "trying to change the meaning". Relax yourself.

"Mistake" is probably the wrong word to use.

Gonna be hard to have a discussion if you use the "wrong" words.

Tony EH

Em...I'm suggesting that YOU are using the wrong word, by employing "mistake".

Tony EH

BostonB wrote: »

While vastly outnumbered, its wrong to suggest there was no German pilots flying and no air combat. For example. JG7 (ME262) claimed 500 Allied aircraft in the last two months of the war.

I'm not suggesting anything of the sort. However, the reality is that by mid 1944, the Jagdwaffe had become a shadow of its former self. In fact, they had always faced an uphill struggle. Even in 1943, before the combined bombing offensive got going in earnest, they were completely outnumbered and it was only ever going to get worse. The Allies always had the advantage in a battle of attrition in the West.

BostonB

marcsignal wrote: »

Well, you could say 10 weeks then, but any attempt at tactical deployment of remaining German military units (many of which consisted of old men with low morale, and children) was continuously hampered by Allied air superiority. With the rail network destroyed, and many of the bridges gone, the army was as good as neutered, tactically. ...

In Iwo Jima, the Americans suffered 6,821 deaths out of 26,038 total casualties. D-day 10,000, with 125,847 casualties.

By the end of th Battle of the Bulge at the end of Jan 1945, the Americans had 19,000 killed almost 90,000 casualties.

Neutered?

BostonB

Tony EH wrote: »

I'm not suggesting anything of the sort. However, the reality is that by mid 1944, the Jagdwaffe had become a shadow of its former self. In fact, they had always faced an uphill struggle. Even in 1943, before the combined bombing offensive got going in earnest, they were completely outnumbered and it was only ever going to get worse. The Allies always had the advantage in a battle of attrition in the West.

I can't see how your comments about no pilots suggest anything else tbh.

BostonB

The inference here is that the war was pretty much over before Dresden and the allies could almost just walk into Berlin. I think thats a massive over simplification. There was still a lot of fighting and production in 1945. Thats the point I was addressing

BostonB

jonniebgood1 wrote: »

Was the RAF bombing strategy adopted as WWII progressed justified?

Whilst the American airforce endured huge losses trying to bomb pinpoint targets such as armaments factories, the RAF flew at night and invariable blanket bombed areas rather than specific buildings/ factories. This often led to areas of residential buildings being hit with civilian casuaties.

PS- if this should be in WWII section can it be moved???

This was the original question. It suggests that the USAF where accurate with their daylight raids. They weren't either. They realized this and switched to area bombing also. The RAF just realized it earlier. So theres no logic in singling out the RAF for this.

The idea that a city need to have military targets is also bogus. Theres lots of other reasons to destroy a city. Tony EH that the allies were thinking of a demonstration for Stalin. Theres a suggestions that much of the firebombing, and atomic bombing of Japan was done for the same reasons. The public reason was to prevent a costly land war. Where in reality the US had cut off Japan with its submarines long before most of those raids. They could have simply laid siege.

Things aren't always as simple as they are presented.

marcsignal

BostonB wrote: »

In Iwo Jima, the Americans suffered 6,821 deaths out of 26,038 total casualties. D-day 10,000, with 125,847 casualties.

By the end of th Battle of the Bulge at the end of Jan 1945, the Americans had 19,000 killed almost 90,000 casualties.

Neutered?

I'm talking about the last 10 weeks, and the period after the Ardennes, after which the Germans had used up their tactical reserves of fuel, armour, and men. Granted the resistance put up by individual German soldiers became more fanatical, as they were fighting on home soil. However most of these soldiers were children. Yes, conditions always favour the defender in cities and towns, but the Army was in no way the tactical war machine of 1942.

It is possible however, I'm forgetting the fact, that the Allies were convinced there would be very strong resistance in the south with the much vaunted 'National Redoubt', and perhaps that was a factor, when it came to deciding to bomb Dresden. But I think anyone could have seen that the game was up by Feb 1945.

BostonB

The last 10 weeks. That would include the battle of Berlin. Which alone was Soviets, 81,116 dead 280,251 wounded/sick. Germans, around 100,000 dead. Soviets lost 2,000 armored vehicles. A neutered army mostly of children? Its not credible tbh. It was one of the bloodiest battles in history, never mind WWII. Curiously enough the allies in the west lost 1000 armoured vehicles over the same period. So its doesn't seem to be have been a walk in the park even after the Ardennes.

The point of this, is that to say it was all over by Feb seems a bit too simplistic.

Tony EH

...and leveling the likes of Dresden or little towns like Swinemunde and other urban areas in the last few weeks of the war would help allviate this how?

Obviously, everyone is aware that the ground fighting would continue to cause military casualties, that is the nature of war. But, incinerating women and children from 4 miles up isn't going to stave off that fact one iota, nor would it shorten the war by a single second and this was known at the time too, hence Churchill's and other bigwigs desire to distance themselves from bonbing "for the sake of terror", once the public had caught wind of what their gallant bomber crews were actually doing.

The miltary casualties on the ground were going to be endured with or without hundreds of thousands of unnecessarily dead civilians.

BostonB

I'm not going to defend area bombing. I've already said that in hindsight it doesn't work. Well most of the time.

You seem fixated on the idea that theres no military objective in bombing civilian targets.

The purpose of the area bombardment of cities was laid out in a British Air Staff paper, dated September 23, 1941:
"The ultimate aim of an attack on a town area is to break the morale of the population which occupies it. To ensure this, we must achieve two things: first, we must make the town physically uninhabitable and, secondly, we must make the people conscious of constant personal danger. The immediate aim, is therefore, twofold, namely, to produce (i) destruction and (ii) fear of death."[3]
...

The primary object of the Combined Bomber Offensive laid down in the Casablanca directive of the 21st January, 1943, was ".... the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.”[5]

Besides which on a purely simplistic level. Having to defend cities against area bombing sucked up massive military resources, that had to weaken the resources available for everything else.

Theres was always been a very powerful lobby for strategic bombing, that dominated over those against it. So when these vast fleets of bombers were built, and found to be inaccurate, even with the Norden bombsight, and vulnerable to heavy losses, this lobby had to find something to use them for, and justify them. In some ways area bombing came out of that. There was great (and powerful/influential) resistance to the idea it didn't work.

In Europe, the Norden likewise demonstrated a poor real-world accuracy...
.. Under perfect conditions only 50 percent of American bombs fell within a quarter of a mile of the target, and American flyers estimated that as many as 90 percent of bombs could miss their targets....

You still see this strong pro heavy bomber element many years later, with the RAF doing the Black Buck raids, on the Falklands, at enormous expense, and then achieving very little for all that effort.

ejmaztec

ejmaztec wrote: »

I think the allies convinced themselves that the Dresden bombing was the right thing to do. Had it not been for the Russians, I don't think that it would have taken place.

There's a lot of information on this site, one small part quoted below.

http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/PopTopics/dresden.htm

Tony EH wrote: »

I personally believe that Dresden was hit so hard, because the Western Allies wanted to send a clear message to Soviets on just how immense Allied destruction had become. They knew that levelling Dresden wouldn't shorten the war by one single second, so ulterior motives probably lay behind the decision to utterly destroy the city, while leaving the military targets completely untouched.

I have been searching for some time now for a Soviet reaction to seeing Dresden when they moved into the city in 45. But, in vain. There's not a lot on it. I did have a conversation, years ago, with a gent whose father was in Bomber Command, he wasn't on the Dresden raid though. He said that when the Russians saw what was left of the city after the raid they were shocked. Considering that the city had escaped the war, but for an Allied raid, the level of Destruction they witnessed had a real effect on them.

I have nothing to corroborate that annecdote, of course, but it remains interesting to me all these years.

I think the Soviet hierarchy got what they wanted. The soldiers on the ground were probably shocked, but they may not have been made aware that Stalin & Co had applied pressure in getting the job done.

The link in my earlier post, "No 16", gives an official account of the lead-up to the bombing.

BostonB

I think there were many reasons why Dresden was bombed. Including the above.

Manic Moran

BostonB wrote: »

The idea that a city need to have military targets is also bogus

Well, I wouldn't go that far. Although there were no rules specifically governing aerial bombardment, the rules on naval bombardment were generally applied to cover the gap. There had to be some direct military objective or presence. However, the rules were also very generously written so that factories, infrastructure, the people who operated them, or even the fact that there was anti aircraft artillery present was considered sufficient to make it a valid target.

NTM

BostonB

Well that what is says in what I quoted. I didn't read beyond that.

Tony EH

BostonB wrote: »

I'm not going to defend area bombing. I've already said that in hindsight it doesn't work. Well most of the time.

You seem fixated on the idea that theres no military objective in bombing civilian targets.

After 20+years of studying the air war of 1939-45, I am well aware of the RAF's stated aims and limitations.

I am also aware that by Feb 1945, incinerating 4 year old girls and their mothers and leveling medieval towns and cities was going to do absolutely NOTHING to further those nicely worded aims.

This fact was also not lost on the Allies at the time.

As said, had they wished, they COULD have carried out a limited tactical strike on the actual military targets that were available on the outskirts of the city under discussion.

This would certainly have had a much larger effect on the Wehrmacht's already paltry ability to resist and it certainly wasn't beyond Bomber Command's ability. Limited strikes had been carried out successfully in targets in France, for example.

Leveling the centre of a city, frying largely innocent civilians and totally ignoring the military objectives wasn't going to do anything for the war effort of any Allied nation.

As for my "fixation" on there being "no military objective in bombing civilian targets", or civilians...it was known to Bomber Command that the consistent bombing of civilians produced a negative effect and one contrary to the stated aim of "weakening morale". It was clear that German efforts over London hadn't produced a weakening of resistance and, in fact, served to galvanise the population instead. The exact same result occurred in Germany. In other words, it was bull**** and known to be bull**** to the powers concerned.

It's clear that Bomber Command chose to bomb civilians and civilian infrastructure so devastatingly, because it:

a) Would kill Germans, regardless of age, sex, or involvement in the war effort.

b) Destroy Germany and make it extremely difficult for the Country to get back on it's feet after the war was over. In effect, a Morganthau-esque desire to see a weak Germany in the future. However, this proved to be a complete failure.

c) It was the easiest option and the one that required the least effort on the part of Bomber Command. A campaign of obliterating Villages, towns and cities is a far easier task than a limited campaign of trying to bomb worthy military targets. It also gave the government something to tell the people. It looked like they were doing "something".

In the end, Bomber Command's choice of killing civilians ended up doing nothing for the Allied war effort. In fact, it's considered by some to be a waste of British airmen's lives. The target priority was completely wrong and the military gains minimal.

Elmer Blooker

Tony EH wrote: »

......it was known to Bomber Command that the consistent bombing of civilians produced a negative effect and one contrary to the stated aim of "weakening morale". It was clear that German efforts over London hadn't produced a weakening of resistance and, in fact, served to galvanise the population instead. The exact same result occurred in Germany. In other words, it was bull**** and known to be bull**** to the powers concerned.

I think you're trying to say that the bombing of German cities didn't break German morale - "galvanise the population!"
I think the German population was "galvanised" by the fact that all opposition to the Nazis was liquidated by beheading and hung from meat hooks.
Towards the end of the war SS thugs were roaming Berlin hanging "deserters" from lamp posts. I dont think the young boys and old men (the Volksturm) had any choice when they were sent the face the Russian T-34s as cannon fodder.
The reality is the bombing ceased when Germany surrendered.

BostonB

It makes no sense and indeed its contradictory to concede that military targets were not the objective of the raid, then point out how they could have better targeted the military targets of and around the city.

They bombed Caan and the area behind the beaches with heavy bombers and achieved very little militarily. In fact they slowed down their own advance, as they blocked/destroyed all the streets and roads.

Regardless of that it still did suck up vast resources.

Luftwaffe Aircraft Used Only Against Allied Bombers
Month Year Percentage
June 1940 0%
June 1941 7%
June 1942 17%
June 1943 21%
June 1944 29%
Jan 1945 50%

• 12,000 heavy bombers were shot down in WWII
• 2/3 of Allied bomber crews were lost for each plane destroyed
• 6 bomber crewmen were killed for each one wounded
• Over 100,000 Allied bomber crewmen were killed over Europe

I would hardly call that nothing.

BostonB

Tony EH wrote: »

...In the end, Bomber Command's choice of killing civilians ended up doing nothing for the Allied war effort. In fact, it's considered by some to be a waste of British airmen's lives. The target priority was completely wrong and the military gains minimal.

I wouldn't say nothing. See above. Even if they picked the right target it wouldn't make much of a difference. Heavy bombers weren't accurate to be useful in most cases and too vulnerable. But they'd built them so they found a use for them. Consider that Russia, Germany, and Japan, fought the same war with almost no heavy bombers.

Tony EH

BostonB wrote: »

It makes no sense and indeed its contradictory to concede that military targets were not the objective of the raid, then point out how they could have better targeted the military targets of and around the city.

It makes perfect sense. The stated objective of BC was to kill civilians and "weaken morale". They persued this even when the option to actually hit military objectives was on offer as in the case of Dresden. Bombing Dresden was a complete waste of time and the other options on offer would have yeilded far superior military gains for the Allies.

BostonB wrote: »

They bombed Caan and the area behind the beaches with heavy bombers and achieved very little militarily. In fact they slowed down their own advance, as they blocked/destroyed all the streets and roads.

Regardless of that it still did suck up vast resources.

Caen is a perfect example of the utter waste of time that I am talking about. Called by Max Hastings as "...one of the most futile air attacks of the war", the bombing of Caen did more to exterminate French civilians, than it did to tie up German forces...which would have been tied up anyway! Antony Beevor called it "...utter disaster", Carlo D'Este said "...not only did it do little to help I Corp, it hindered the Allied push into the city."

Caen is certainly NOT a good example of sterling use of Allied bombing capability (not that I am saying that you say it is). The reason being is that it was still adhering to the idea of area bombing as a means to achieve a military objective...and that idea is flawed. Wiping out a large area and hoping that something of value was hit is not a good use of military machinery.

But...the attacks to the North of the town, on actual Wehrmacht positions WAS very successful. It succeeded in destroying their HQ there and threw the forces based there into absolute chaos.

A good example would be Bomber Command's tactical strike by heavies on the Renault Factory works. This was carried out with a fair amount of precision and the damage sustained was considerable.

BostonB

Tony EH wrote: »

It makes perfect sense. The stated objective of BC was to kill civilians and "weaken morale". They persued this even when the option to actually hit military objectives was on offer as in the case of Dresden. Bombing Dresden was a complete waste of time and the other options on offer would have yeilded far superior military gains for the Allies.

So you hopefully you'll us an example where they actually hit just the military targets with this tactical precision you talk of. Which will demonstrate they don't need to hit civilian targets.

Tony EH wrote: »

Caen is certainly NOT a good example of sterling use of Allied bombing capability (not that I am saying that you say it is). The reason being is that it was still adhering to the idea of area bombing as a means to achieve a military objective...and that idea is flawed. Wiping out a large area and hoping that something of value was hit is not a good use of military machinery.

But...the attacks to the North of the town, on actual Wehrmacht positions WAS very successful. It succeeded in destroying their HQ there and threw the forces based there into absolute chaos.

Caen was bombed 26 times between D-Day and its liberation on 9 July. The Navy hit it with about 600,000 shells from battleships and cruisers in the month after D-Day.

On the night of 7 July, 467 Lancaster and Halifax heavy bombers of the Royal Air Force—half of Bomber Command's available strength at that time—attacked Caen, dropping over 2,000 tons of bombs on the city.[nb 9] Although intended mainly to facilitate the Anglo-Canadian advance and to prevent German reinforcements from reaching the battle or retreating through Caen,[90][91] a secondary consideration was the suppression of the German defences. In this the bombing largely failed; the main German armour and infantry positions to the north of Caen remained intact.[71] Several tanks were hit and temporarily disabled, but only two Panzer IVs of the 12th SS Panzer Division were destroyed.[91] However, General Miles Dempsey, in command of the British Second Army, was more concerned with the bombing's morale-boosting effect on his troops than any material losses it might inflict on the Germans.[18]
The pathfinders of No. 625 Squadron RAF, tasked with dropping the target markers for the bombers, were instructed not to allow the target zone to "drift back" towards the Allied lines as had been the tendency in earlier missions.[71] Together with the cautious shifting of the target zone during the planning stage, the effect was that in many cases the markers were dropped too far forward, pushing the bombed zone well into Caen itself and further away from the German defences. By 22:00 on 7 July the bombers had departed, leaving 80% of the city's northern sector destroyed.[92] Caen University was particularly hard hit, starting chemical fires that soon spread.[70]
At 22:50, six squadrons of fast Mosquito bombers attacked individual targets,[89] and ten minutes later the 636 guns of the assaulting divisions opened fire, with the battleship Rodney and other ships adding their support.[77] This prolonged bombardment was intensified by the artillery of VIII Corps,[73] which targeted the villages north of Caen in an effort to eliminate German strongpoints before the infantry assault began.[77]

I don't know the details of the HQ, you are talking of. Seems to me they flattened the city and it was pure luck if they hit any of military importance. It certainly doesn't demonstrate a precision strike capability like you are suggesting. They certain didn't avoid the civilians either. So I don't really get this as a good example.

Tony EH wrote: »

A good example would be Bomber Command's tactical strike by heavies on the Renault Factory works. This was carried out with a fair amount of precision and the damage sustained was considerable.

Bombing a factories is not tactical bombing. Its strategic bombing.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tactical_bombing

Tony EH

BostonB wrote: »

So you hopefully you'll us an example where they actually hit just the military targets with this tactical precision you talk of. Which will demonstrate they don't need to hit civilian targets.

If you read the rest of the post before replying to snippets, you'd get some.

BostonB wrote: »

Bombing a factories is not tactical bombing. Its strategic bombing.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tactical_bombing

I know exactly what the differences are. My use of the word "tactic" is to illustrate the move away from the standard "tactic" of levelling a city.

BlaasForRafa

BostonB wrote: »

So you hopefully you'll us an example where they actually hit just the military targets with this tactical precision you talk of. Which will demonstrate they don't need to hit civilian targets.

Fighter production was mentioned earlier in this thread and I recalled seeing this report knocking around. Its details the effect of bombing raids on the various Focke-Wulf plants and the damage done.

http://www.alternatewars.com/WW2/WW2_Documents/USSBS/05_Focke-Wulf/Airframes_Plant_5.htm

If you look through the report, the FW management were of the opinion that the american day-bombing raids were more effective at disturbing production than the british night bombing raids.

The raid on the jig-manufacturing plant is named several times and if it had been raided one more time it would have seriously disrupted production of Germany's most effective piston-engined fighter. Raids at other plants which had no duplicates like the plexiglass canopy plant and the electrode plant were also serious disruptions to production.