Where is the RDF going to end up?

Alkers

Well our unit has its own room in the armoury in which its weapons are housed. The number of rifles kept there has always been the same and is less than the number of people in the unit (on the books or actually parading). They only see an armourer when we go to the range and there is always only one amourer there regardless of the number of details we have firing on the day. So, for my unit at least, I don't see how having a few people allowed to stay on the books costs any more than striking them off if they miss a certain no. of parade nights.
Also, a lot of people end up going away /can't parade because of work and then parade again at a later date, picking up where they left off. If they were taken off the books they'd have to go through the whole joining process again.

c-90

thats shocking that only 2000 of the rdf qualify for grat. if the rdfs budget was concentrated on that 2000 alone then maybe they would serve a purpose. what are the effective numbers of the pdf? how many are eligible to go over seas and how many are just waiting til the contract is up. maybe the pdf should set the standard before expecting the rdf to live up to it.

concussion

c-90 wrote: »

thats shocking that only 2000 of the rdf qualify for grat. if the rdfs budget was concentrated on that 2000 alone then maybe they would serve a purpose. what are the effective numbers of the pdf? how many are eligible to go over seas and how many are just waiting til the contract is up. maybe the pdf should set the standard before expecting the rdf to live up to it.

Sounds like a good question for the minister, can't find any figures on kildarestreet.com. PDF strength as of 30/11/10 was 9,502 while the Army was 7,704. 10% of Army strength is the limit for overseas deployment. I wouldn't label pre-94 contract holders as non-effective however, and especially not when in comparision to RDF, effective or non-effective.

Poccington

c-90 wrote: »

thats shocking that only 2000 of the rdf qualify for grat. if the rdfs budget was concentrated on that 2000 alone then maybe they would serve a purpose. what are the effective numbers of the pdf? how many are eligible to go over seas and how many are just waiting til the contract is up. maybe the pdf should set the standard before expecting the rdf to live up to it.

The PDF as a whole has already set a standard.

The RDF as a whole, has failed to live it up to it. I don't remember the PDF ever being in a position where less than one third of it's establishment is effective or in the case you raise, unable to go Overseas.

It's either going to have to go through yet another re-org or knocked on the head because at the moment, it's just not working.

concussion

Also, lets not forget that to be 'effective', or more accurately, avoid being classed as 'non-effective', you must only attend two training nights a month, fire your Steyr and attend one weeks camp. It says nothing about your skills other than you can safely handle a rifle, in the opinion of the testing officer.

OS119

concussion wrote: »

Also, lets not forget that to be 'effective', or more accurately, avoid being classed as 'non-effective', you must only attend two training nights a month, fire your Steyr and attend one weeks camp. It says nothing about your skills other than you can safely handle a rifle, in the opinion of the testing officer.

frigtening really.

does anyone know what, in the 'grand design', the PDF/RDF/DoD think the readiness/effectiveness of the RDF should be?

most military units have a 'readiness stance' - an idea of how long it should take the unit to be able to conduct operations - and depending on the units role, whether it has recently come back from operations, how under-strength it is etc.., that figure changes from immediate to 'pick-a-number'.

i was just wondering if there actually is a plan - however burried in dust it may be - for either the RDF as a whole, or specific units, to be mobilised for the operations set out in the brigade structure?

concussion

I have absolutely no idea, but then again I don't see anyting more sensitive than Restricted :P

OS119

concussion wrote: »

I have absolutely no idea, but then again I don't see anyting more sensitive than Restricted :P

you must have some idea though - you can gauge it on what standard those considered by the CoC to be 'trained soldiers' within the unit are at, attitudes of the Officers and NCO's etc...

concussion

OK, in that sense I do have quite an understanding of the AR's capabilities. Publically, it would appear that eligibility for gratuity would be about the only KPI we can work with, and it's essentially useless as I mentioned above. KPI's for, say, a % of a sub-units trained men and NCO's to be proficient at x,y and z may exist, but I've never seen them.


With regard to training, I was delighted to see some documents recently that show that someone, somewhere, is trying to effect change.

davetherave

That was me who posted the stat's about the members of reserve who got the grat.

Broken down by subunit.
http://debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/2009/12/17/00217.asp

Reservists paid Gratuity by Unit

Location And Description	Number
2 E BDE RDF — HQ	22
62 RES INF BN — BN HQ	2
62 RES INF BN — HQ COY	12
62 RES INF BN — A COY	14
62 RES INF BN — B COY	13
62 RES INF BN — C COY	15
62 RES INF BN — D COY	30
62 RES INF BN — SP COY	24
65 RES INF BN — BN HQ	1
65 RES INF BN — HQ COY	40
65 RES INF BN — A COY	41
65 RES INF BN — B COY	22
65 RES INF BN — C COY	24
65 RES INF BN — SP COY	44
67 RES INF BN — BN HQ	1
67 RES INF BN — HQ COY	19
67 RES INF BN — A COY	31
67 RES INF BN — B COY	27
67 RES INF BN — SP COY	28
62 RES FAR — REGT HQ	4
62 RES FAR — HQ BTY	35
62 RES FAR — NO 1 GUN BTY MC KEE	18
62 RES FAR — NO 2 GUN BTY CURRAGH	19
62 RES FAR — NO 3 GUN BTY CURRAGH	28
62 RES CAV SQN — SQN HQ	32
62 RES FD ENGR COY — COY HQ	21
62 RES FD CIS COY — COY HQ	21
62 RES FD MP COY — COY HQ	34
62 RES LSB — BN HQ	4
62 RES LSB — TPT COY	40
62 RES LSB — MED COY	18
DEFENCE FORCES TRAINING AUTHORITY (DFTA)	23
1 AD REGT — 2 AD BTY	19
1 S BDE RDF — HQ	7
32 RES INF BN — BN HQ	9
32 RES INF BN — HQ COY	31
32 RES INF BN — A COY	21
32 RES INF BN — B COY	21
32 RES INF BN — C COY	32
32 RES INF BN — D COY	32
32 RES INF BN — SP COY	32
33 RES INF BN — BN HQ	1
33 RES INF BN — HQ COY	51
33 RES INF BN — A COY	23
33 RES INF BN — B COY	16
33 RES INF BN — C COY	32
33 RES INF BN — SP COY	26
34 RES INF BN — BN HQ	12
34 RES INF BN — HQ COY	53
34 RES INF BN — A COY	36
34 RES INF BN — B COY	48
34 RES INF BN — SP COY	19
31 RES FAR — HQ BTY	24
31 RES FAR — NO 2 GUN BTY THURLES	27
31 RES FAR — NO 3 GUN BTY NENAGH	30
31 RES FAR — NO I GUN BTY CORK	31
31 RES CAV SQN — SQN HQ	45
31 RES FD ENGR COY — COY HQ	26
31 RES FD CIS COY — COY HQ	11
31 RES FD MP COY — COY HQ	39
31 RES LSB — BN HQ	1
31 RES LSB — TPT COY	36
31 RES LSB — MED COY	47
33 RES INF BN — D COY	16
34 RES INF BN — C COY	35
1 AD REGT — 3 AD BTY	36
1 AD REGT — 4 AD BTY	36
4 W BDE RDF — HQ	11
51 RES INF BN — BN HQ	2
51 RES INF BN — HQ COY	8
51 RES INF BN — A COY	20
51 RES INF BN — B COY	34
51 RES INF BN — C COY	37
51 RES INF BN — D COY	53
51 RES INF BN — SP COY	11
56 RES INF BN — BN HQ	16
56 RES INF BN — HQ COY	26
56 RES INF BN — A COY	14
56 RES INF BN — B COY	25
56 RES INF BN — C COY	15
56 RES INF BN — SP COY	19
58 RES INF BN — BN HQ	3
58 RES INF BN — HQ COY	11
58 RES INF BN — A COY	34
58 RES INF BN — B COY	22
58 RES INF BN — SP COY	33
54 RES FAR — REGT HQ	4
54 RES FAR — HQ BTY	31
54 RES FAR — NO 1 GUN BTY GORT	19
54 RES FAR — NO 2 GUN BTY TUAM	18
54 RES FAR — NO 3 GUN BTY MULLINGAR	44
54 RES CAV SQN — SQN HQ	23
54 RES FD ENGR COY — COY HQ	15
54 RES FD CIS COY — COY HQ	31
54 RES FD MP COY — COY HQ	32
54 RES LSB — TPT COY	25
54 RES LSB — MED COY	15
58 RES INF BN — C COY	21
58 RES INF BN — D COY	21
DUBLIN UNIT NAVAL SERVICE RESERVE	26
WATERFORD UNIT NAVAL SERVICE RESERVE	27
CORK UNIT NAVAL SERVICE RESERVE	11
LIMERICK UNIT NAVAL SERVICE RESERVE	22
Total	2,447

If we are define "active" people as those who got their grat, then it is shocking that there are some battalions that can't raise a company strength.

What I would do is, just using the 65th as an example because that's what I know, take everybody from McKee, Swords, Kells and Navan and make one full strength company based in McKee. That company would be the reserve company for the 5th battalion.

Or if that is too drastic then implement annual fitness test to weed out the unsuitable. If they fail, give them four weeks to prepare and retest.

OK, in that sense I do have quite an understanding of the AR's capabilities. Publically, it would appear that eligibility for gratuity would be about the only KPI we can work with, and it's essentially useless as I mentioned above. KPI's for, say, a % of a sub-units trained men and NCO's to be proficient at x,y and z may exist, but I've never seen them.

I would say how self-sufficient a subunit is could be a somewhat good measure of "effectiveness" or "capability".

Do we have enough people with 154's in transits or nissans or trucks to move ourselves without LSB or PDF help? If we do, good. If not, then why not and who is putting their name down for the next course.

If they are a support company, are they able to field a .5 crew or an 81 crew. And how many? Can they run a support weapons course on their own with qualified NCO's as instructors or do they need their parent unit to provide instructors.

concussion

davetherave wrote: »

I would say how self-sufficient a subunit is could be a somewhat good measure of "effectiveness" or "capability".

Do we have enough people with 154's in transits or nissans or trucks to move ourselves without LSB or PDF help? If we do, good. If not, then why not and who is putting their name down for the next course.

If they are a support company, are they able to field a .5 crew or an 81 crew. And how many? Can they run a support weapons course on their own with qualified NCO's as instructors or do they need their parent unit to provide instructors.

Good points, and one paper it would give a pretty good indication of where improvements need to be made. However it would be difficult to quantify in reality due to the endemic lack of commitment which results in ~20% of establishment actually turning up for anything. Added to this is the variation in instruction and testing - those who turn up may have completed a relevant course but may not actually be able to implement their skills efficiently.

Cryos

concussion wrote: »

Good points, and one paper it would give a pretty good indication of where improvements need to be made. However it would be difficult to quantify in reality due to the endemic lack of commitment which results in ~20% of establishment actually turning up for anything. Added to this is the variation in instruction and testing - those who turn up may have completed a relevant course but may not actually be able to implement their skills efficiently.

I think lack of commitment is probably more prominent through the front line companies, for my own unit there is two people who currently do not show up with solid reasons for the last month maybe. We only have around 28 including the CO's and face a problem now because of the embargo that theres more sgts than cpls and recruits put together.

It would be most interesting to see what the current numbers are rather than trying to look at 2008 and 2009 data for active numbers vs persons eligible for gratuity.

But like above if a quota or a minimum attendance was enforced you would have a far more lean and professional reserve army.

xflyer

Really I think the real issue is where the PDF is going to end up. That will decide the fate of the RDF. The new government will be gloves off with the public service and anything not performing will be cut or axed. If the choice is to cut the PDF or the RDF, it's easy to see where the axe will fall.

The sad thing about the RDF and it's predecessor the FCA was that it was never really used for anything, the occasional guard duty aside. In the new economic reality anything that doesn't have a purpose will be cut.

concussion

There is a quota, in a roundabout way. If you don't meet the minimum requirements for grat you are posted on the non-effective list. Once there you are either discharged or have to apply to be removed and posted as effective. This decision is made by the Bde. Commander.

I agree, I would like to see current numbers but those currently available will only reflect the strength of the Reserve, most of whom don't show up for regular training. Gratuity numbers at least shows how many fulfilled their minimum trainining requirement. (With the exception of recruits, as they do not receive a gratuity until they have completed a certain time in service, 12 months possibly)

Cryos

Time to get working on that FOI request!

davetherave

Once the Dail is back a written question to whoever the new minister is, via your local TD, should be able to find it out the number of reservists who qualified for grat in 2010.

Edit: Would a freedom of information cover it???

Cryos

davetherave wrote: »

Once the Dail is back a written question to whoever the new minister is, via your local TD, should be able to find it out the number of reservists who qualified for grat in 2010.

Edit: Would a freedom of information cover it???

It would, its not going into detail about particular people just an overall number on the force and those that received gratuity, the last FOI requests i did with the DF went through without a problem.

OS119

not sure if an FOI request would do it, but a question from a TD should - to ask the minister what the framework and timescale for mobilising the RDF for territorial defence is and what force he expects the RDF to generate...?

one is tempted to think that however much personal satisfaction individual members get from training, if the DoD/PDF don't even have a fag-packet plan for using the RDF then the whole thing ought to be scapped without delay.

SamuelFox

Interesting thread. To be honest, whoever said that “things that don’t do anything will be cut” got it right. Even if you buy into the idea that Ireland needs a military (which I do) and that the current system supplies that (which I don’t) the RDF doesn’t provide much of an asset. If a situation ever arises where Ireland needs to raise a reserve force then it would take a matter of months – the skill level in the RDF is unfortunately so low that very basic training of civvies (which is pretty much the RDF anyway) would result in a better quality force.

Discussions of the RDF need to be separated from the very understandable loyalty that a lot of people have towards it. Those of us that served know that it contains a number of very high quality people, and for a lot of us the FCA/RDF sated an appetite for further military service – some into frontline militaries and more into the Irish services. However, militaries rely so heavily on leadership that regardless of the quality of the troops, if the leadership isn’t equally good the unit will not develop. Unit and sub-unit leadership in the RDF is a serious issue, but the bigger issue is the PDF. Unlike front line armies, the PDF have not utilised the RDF at all. I suspect the reason is an understandable professional insecurity on the part of the PDF. However, regardless of the reason the RDF have not been utilised except as a training aid to the PDF and generally only at a Pte and JNCO level. The extent that other militaries use their reserves shows how wasteful this policy is. Unless a meaningful role is found for the RDF within the existing structure the whole thing is a waste of time.

Tubsandtiles

SamuelFox wrote: »

Interesting thread. To be honest, whoever said that “things that don’t do anything will be cut” got it right. Even if you buy into the idea that Ireland needs a military (which I do) and that the current system supplies that (which I don’t) the RDF doesn’t provide much of an asset. If a situation ever arises where Ireland needs to raise a reserve force then it would take a matter of months – the skill level in the RDF is unfortunately so low that very basic training of civvies (which is pretty much the RDF anyway) would result in a better quality force.

Discussions of the RDF need to be separated from the very understandable loyalty that a lot of people have towards it. Those of us that served know that it contains a number of very high quality people, and for a lot of us the FCA/RDF sated an appetite for further military service – some into frontline militaries and more into the Irish services. However, militaries rely so heavily on leadership that regardless of the quality of the troops, if the leadership isn’t equally good the unit will not develop. Unit and sub-unit leadership in the RDF is a serious issue, but the bigger issue is the PDF. Unlike front line armies, the PDF have not utilised the RDF at all. I suspect the reason is an understandable professional insecurity on the part of the PDF. However, regardless of the reason the RDF have not been utilised except as a training aid to the PDF and generally only at a Pte and JNCO level. The extent that other militaries use their reserves shows how wasteful this policy is. Unless a meaningful role is found for the RDF within the existing structure the whole thing is a waste of time.

Well said, the RDF serves no purpose without a fundamental role in which it has none at the moment and more than likely will not receive in the future. The PDF maintain the roles they have very well.

Cryos

Tubsandtiles wrote: »

Well said, the RDF serves no purpose without a fundamental role in which it has none at the moment and more than likely will not receive in the future. The PDF maintain the roles they have very well.

I think both posts by yourself and SamuelFox hit it on the head, without a proper mission statement or objectives as defined by the parent organisation the RDF will continue to provide little value for the money invested [which of course is far less than the pdf].

Checking Radios or maintaining some equipment for the PDF units provides some value but doest justify the numbers in a wider scope of operations. Unless ireland goes mission crazy in the next while i dont see the RDF being brought in to tackle much apart from the ongoing PA etc activities.

Poccington

Tubsandtiles wrote: »

Well said, the RDF serves no purpose without a fundamental role in which it has none at the moment and more than likely will not receive in the future. The PDF maintain the roles they have very well.

Quite correct.

However, it has also been pointed out that as an organisation, there's also been quite a resistance to change within the RDF. I mean just look at Integration, there was a big, massive chance for the RDF to step up to the plate beside PDF Unit's and what happened? It fell flat on it's face and this time, the fault definitely didn't lie purely at the feet of the PDF.

Less than a third of it's establishment qualifying for grat, when the qualifying criteria requires such little commitment, empire protecting etc.

These are all things that need to be dealt with head on, long before talk of the RDF being given any kind of viable function aside from "We'll call you when everything goes tits up".

Local-womanizer

Is there a minimum number required to be qualified for Grat each year?

What annoys me is that in my unit at least,the majority of people would jump at the chance to partake in integration, and many did the first time around. As a result the effect on the relationship between our unit and the parent PDF unit has been hugely positive.

In our unit too this year,there is a noticeable change in the handling with anything now. There is a real drive to get things organised and completed and so far it has work.

The fitness levels are also on the increase with PT held anytime we are in barracks overnight.

For the organisation to change the system needs too,drastically. Annual PT tests and entry level interviews would go a long way to improving matters. Aim for a slightly higher age of recruit,those in the final years of college perhaps. Would it not be possible to train RDF members to a level were they could handle many domestic issues such as CIT and guard in barracks to free the PDF up for training up for overseas?(when overseas do open up again) Reduce the need for PDF bods in Ireland so more can do overseas missions.

The big thing for me is to cut the numbers,and I mean all those on the inactive list. They take up funds and resources that could be put in to use to those who put in the effort. Restructure the RDF into a more viable effective force,no need for huge numbers for that.

Our unit is making a big effort in the way we do things,with the PT and the running of any training weekends. This I feel is a big step in improving the perception we have of ourselves,if the RDF can't take itself seriously then what hope has it of any of the politicians doing so when it comes to cuts...

SamuelFox

I’d agree to an extent with what Poccington said, but I think the bigger point is that the RDF is a military organisation and everything that happens, or doesn’t happen, is the responsibility of the leadership which is the PDF.

The fundamental point that people need to remember about the RDF is that is a creation of, and a mirror of, the PDF. All the leaders are selected, trained and managed by the PDF.

In terms of integration, the opposition in our unit came from two places, mainly the Cadre staff and the RDF officers. Both of those groups were allowed to slow the process down because of vested interests – the Cadre, because in the long term it would expose their cushy numbers; and the officers because when their troops became part of a PDF unit they would become irrelevant. I remember being pulled aside by my Cadre CQMS and told that I wouldn’t be able to balance work and the RDF, and if I was RTU’d from Integration I would have that mark on my record for the rest of my RDF career. It didn’t bother me and I proceeded with integration, but I’m sure others got the same chat and took the advice.

Equally, once we got to the PDF Unit we saw a lot of resistance – the only thing that went smoothly was issuing new kit. Everything else was accompanied by some drama. In practice, I think the PDF were insecure about having RDF pers being improved, with the potential to take PDF jobs. People here will scoff at that, buts it quite true – every time a RDF guard is mounted in a PDF barracks it is money out of PDF pockets.

PDF troops saw the bigger picture – that if the TA could serve in Afghan than RDF troops would be more than able for somewhere like Chad or Kosovo. If you can train a Seaman to be a peacekeeper in a few months you can definitely do the same with reservists. Overseas slots are scarce enough without having to compete with the RDF for them. Without question they would also be able for CITs, Portlaoise etc, all the nice allowance earners enjoyed by the PDF.

More than that, some were scared about the potential for a reduction in numbers in the PDF. If the RDF could take some tasks, why not cut the PDF? RDF were doing fine in the Naval Service, they would do even better in the less technical Army.

What if civilian skills could be used, as in front line militaries? Why send as many troops on FAS apprentice courses when we can use qualified RDF tradesmen? Same with training up Officers to do professional roles like lawyers or Engineers – let RDF officers do it at a fraction of the cost, and probably to a far higher level. Things like that make it clear that the RDF, for all its faults was not the only problem with the failure of integration.

One of the fundamental tenets of military leadership is that you can delegate authority but you can’t delegate responsibility. If a decision was taken to proceed with integration then it should have happened. Something was going wrong - the RDF were still doing parade nights and going on camp, so why weren’t they signing up for integration, particularly given the extra money on offer? Questions should have been asked of the PDF leadership at Unit level and pressure put on them to sort it. This wasn’t done, and if the PDF had any interest in integration it would have been.

SamuelFox

LW, I think you are spot on with what needs to be done but unfortunately that’s the easy part – if the will was there the RDF could be transformed into a fantastic asset that would most likely cost a fraction of what it does now.

Morpheus

It already costs f3ck all.

certain senior NCOs and Officers of units quietly instructed innocent 3 stars and corporals NOT to get involved in the integration. this was wrong but it happened.

concussion

Myself and three Gunners went for Integration with our local Bn. - after the orientation day we were told that as we were Artillery we couldn't do an infantry module, much to the disappointment of ourselves and our PDF instructor. Don't know where the decision was made but that's all the chance we got Total shame, they barely had a section of the platoon that they hoped for and it would have given us great skills to bring back to our own unit.

Poccington

Morphéus wrote: »

It already costs f3ck all.

certain senior NCOs and Officers of units quietly instructed innocent 3 stars and corporals NOT to get involved in the integration. this was wrong but it happened.

**** like that needs to stop.

IMO, 1 Coy of a PDF Inf Bn should be RDF. Can't really speak for Arty, CIS etc. cause I wouldn't be too clued up on how they're run.

With the RDF Coy all they would need is a PDF Office Staff run by a Sgt, a PDF CQ and a PDF Coy Commander to deal with the boss upstairs. Every appointment after that should be filled by RDF bodies, trained at the initial stages by the BTC, with modulised YE and Instructor Courses run by the PDF Unit itself, again using both PDF and RDF instructors. The Coy would then throughout the year work towards taking part in the Bn Ex, Brigade Ex and Bn LFTT and assuming the early years are positive, then the issue of Overseas could be tackled. Of course, someone needs to cop on and get the employment protection issue sorted.

As for CIT's and Portlaoise, you're welcome to them. I hate doing either of them and CIT's aren't worth anything allowance wise. :pac:

Cryos

Great to see the thread not go to the usual "Disband those RDF tossers"

Alot of good points that do converge on most issues and do provide educated insight as to where things could go !

Local-womanizer

Cryos wrote: »

Great to see the thread not go to the usual "Disband those RDF tossers"

Alot of good points that do converge on most issues and do provide educated insight as to where things could go !

Now if only does who make the call regarding the DF would actually look at this thread!