'Soviet Offensive Plans Controversy'

Morlar

I have been reading a couple of authors recently who go out of their way to rubbish the so called 'Soviet Offensive plans Theory', namely David M Glantz and Lukacs. I am not decided on this issue, however it is an interesting theory. Any thoughts/opinions on this one ?

Here is the wikipedia version of it :

Soviet offensive plans controversy
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Joseph Stalin

The Soviet offensive plans controversy refers to the debate among historians on the question of whether Joseph Stalin was planning to invade Germany prior to Operation Barbarossa.


Background

Immediately after the German invasion of the USSR during World War Two, Adolf Hitler put forward a thesis that the Red Army made extensive preparations for an offensive war in Europe, thus justifying the German invasion as a pre-emptive strike.[1] After war this view was brought forward by some Wehrmacht leaders, like Wilhelm Keitel.[2]

Suvorov, "Icebreaker", and the 1980s
Viktor Suvorov

In the 1980s, this thesis was reiterated by Victor Suvorov, a former officer of the Soviet military intelligence in his book "Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War"[3] and several subsequent books. He argued that Soviet ground forces were extremely well organized, and were mobilizing en masse all along the German-Soviet border for a Soviet invasion of Europe slated for Sunday July 6, 1941, but they were totally unprepared for defensive operations on their own territory.

One of Suvorov's pieces of evidence favoring the theory of an impending Soviet attack was his claim regarding the maps and phrasebooks issued to Soviet troops. Military topographic maps, unlike other military supplies, are strictly local and cannot be used elsewhere than in the intended operational area. Suvorov claims Soviet units were issued with maps of Germany and German-occupied territory, and phrasebooks including questions about SA offices — SA offices were found only in German territory proper. In contrast, maps of Soviet territory were scarce. Notably, after the German attack, the officer responsible for maps, Lieutenant General M.K. Kudryavtsev was not punished by Stalin, who was known for extreme punishments after failures to obey his orders. According to Suvorov, this demonstrates that General Kudryavtsev was obeying the orders of Stalin, who simply did not expect a German attack.[4]

Another piece of evidence, according to Suvorov, was the extensive effort Stalin took to conceal general mobilization by manipulation with the laws setting the conscription age. That allowed Stalin to provide the explosive build up of the Red Army. Since there was no universal military draft in the Soviet Union until 1939, by enacting the universal military draft on 1 September 1939, and by changing the minimum age for joining the Red Army from 21 to 18, Stalin triggered a mechanism of explosive increase of the military strength of the Red Army.

This specific law on mobilization allowed the Red Army to increase its army of 1.871.600 million men in 1939 to 5.081.000 million men in the spring of 1941 under secrecy to avoid alarming the rest of the world.[5] 18 million reservists were also drafted.[citation needed] The duration of service was 2 years. Thus, according to supporters of the Soviet Union Offensive Plans Theory, the Red Army had to enter a war by 1 September 1941 or the drafted soldiers would have to be released from service.

Reactions and critiques

In some countries, particularly in Russia, Germany and Israel Suvorov's thesis has jumped the bounds of academic discourse and captured the imagination of the public.[1] However, the most widely read and specialized studies of the Soviet history lend no support to Suvorov's ideas[6] Among the noted critics of Suvorov's work are Israeli historian Gabriel Gorodetsky, American military historian David Glantz,[7] Russian military historians Makhmut Gareev and Lev Bezymensky, and perhaps his most vehement Russian opponent Alexei Isayev,[8] the author of Anti-Suvorov. Many other western scholars, such as Teddy J. Uldricks,[1] Derek Watson,[9] Hugh Ragsdale,[10] Roger Reese,[11] Stephen Blank,[12] Robin Edmonds,[13] agree that the major Suvorov's writings rest circumstantial evidences,[14] or even on "virtually no evidentiary base"[1] [15] According to Jonathan Haslam, Suvorov's claim that "Germany frustrated Stalin's war"[16] "would be comical were it not taken so seriously".[17] Late Soviet emigre historian Alexandr Nekrich (extremely critical of Stalin in other contexts) also rejected major Suvorov ideas as unsubstantiated and contrary to the broader Stalin's policy.[18]

Nevertheless, studies of some historians, e.g. Russian military historian Mikhail Meltyukhov (“Stalin's Missed Chance”) gave partial support to the claim that Soviet forces were concentrating in order to attack Germany. Other historians who support this thesis are Vladimir Nevezhin, Boris Sokolov, Valeri Danilov, Joachim Hoffmann[19] and Mark Solonin.[20] Offensive interpretation of Stalin's prewar planning is also supported by Sovietologist Robert C. Tucker and Pavel Bobylev.[21] Moreover, it is argued by Hoffmann that the actual Soviet troop concentrations were near the border, just like fuel depots and airfields. All of this is claimed to be unsuitable for defensive operations.[22]

Strength of the opposing forces on the Soviet Western border. June 22, 1941

Germany and Allies Soviet Union Ratio
Divisions 166 190 1 : 1.1
Personnel 4,306,800 3,289,851 1.3 : 1
Guns and mortars 42,601 59,787 1 : 1.4
Tanks (incl assault guns) 4,171 15,687 1 : 3.8
Aircraft 4,389[23] 11, 537[24] 1 : 2.6
Source: Mikhail Meltyukhov “Stalin's Missed Chance” table 47,[25]

Supporters of Soviet offensive plans theory also refer to some recently discovered facts, e.g. publication of Zhukov's proposal of May 15, 1941,[26] which called for a Soviet strike against Germany. This document suggested secret mobilization and deploying Red Army troops next to the western border, under the cover of training.[27] However, Robin Edmonds argued that RKKA's planning staff would not have been doing its job well if it had not considered a potential possibility of a pre-emptive strike against Wehrmacht,[13] whereas Teddy J. Uldricks pointed out that there is no documentary evidence that this Zhukov's proposal was accepted by Stalin.[1] Another piece of evidence is a recently discovered Stalin's speech on the 5 May 1941 when he revealed his mind to graduating military cadets.[28] He proclaimed: "A good defense signifies the need to attack. Attack is the best form of defense... We must now conduct a peaceful, defensive policy with attack. Yes, defense with attack. We must now re-teach our army and commanders. Educate them in the spirit of attack".[29] However, according to Michael Jabara Carley, this speech could be equally interpreted as a deliberate attempt to discourage the Germans from launching the war.[30]

Other Russian historians, Iu. Gor'kov, A.S. Orlov, Iu. A. Polyakov, Dmitri Volkogonov analyzed newly available evidence to demonstrate that Soviet forces were certainly not ready for the attack.[1]

According to Meltyukhov, the January 1941 strategic war games on 'Northern' and 'Southern' variants (conducted respectively on January 2–6 and Jan. 8-11 1941, as also depicted in articles by Pavel Bobylev[31]) did indeed assume that the forces of the 'East' (i.e. USSR) at first had to repel an assault by the 'West' (i.e. Germany), no concrete actions on how this could take place were covered. Instead, the war games concentrated on the Soviet 'counterattack'. As the attack of the forces of the 'East' was more successful in the Southern variant, this area was chosen as the main direction of Soviet forces.[32]

BlaasForRafa

I think its unlikely that the Soviets were planning an attack in 1941, I think 1942 would have been much more likely. Right up to the start of Barbarossa Stalin was trying to buy off the germans with shipments of food and other materiel.

Also during 1941 the Soviet army was going through a massive re-armament program. The T-34 and KV-1 tanks were just starting to replace the BT and T-26/28 tanks, the SVT-40 rifle was beginning to replace the venerable Mosin-Nagant and in the air force modern types like the Yak-1, Lagg-3 and Mig-3 were replacing the polikarpov series of fighters. I don't think that the Russians would have attacked until this re-armament was a lot more complete.

I've read one of Glantz's books and found him to be meticulous in his detail and not as pro-Soviet as his detractors would make him out to be.

Morlar

I'd agree with you on Glantz in particular, meticulous to detail and fairly authorative. I think the fact that he specialises in the Soviet perspective could possibly unfairly open him to criticism of a bias. I haven't noticed him to be biased at all. Lukacs is a different kind of author. I didn't mention either author in terms of alleging a bias on their part.

I think it is at least semi-credible theory and one that I would be keen to find out more about before deciding. I always think it is odd the way that the reasons given at the start of a war can fade out of the history books depending on who wins. ie Germany invading Poland 'to protect the ethnic German civilians from atrocities' & transport corridor. The thoughts that the 'fear of a Soviet invasion' may have had an element of truth to it, or at least it seems credible that there may have been a genuine (if varying) German perception that this was somewhere between possible, likely & pending.

TerrorFirmer

It does seem possibly that an offensive could have been planned, but certainly not for 1941, likely more 1943/44 era....in 1941 the SU was in a bit of a mess, particularly in leadership but also partly in equippment, an offensive would probably have collapsed. It makes for interesting reading, though to be fair I've read far more accounts that point out countless factors to prove that it's extremely unlikely than those that argue the potential, but good reading nonetheless.