Mind or Matter?

roosh

This is a question about the nature of reality i.e. the state of things as they actually exist, and the validity of a materialist paradigm. This isn't a new idea, in fact, it could probably be classified as philosophy 101.


I find I learn a lot from discussion on here, and elsewhere, primarily because I am presented with different perspectives and my opinions are challenged; but equally because I am introduced to sources of information I wouldn't have come across previously; so this discussion [if it materialises] is as much about that as it is anything else. Still, like any discussion, it is probably necessary to have some starting position from which to proceed.


The proposition
That we* experience a physical world is not in question; it is pretty self-evident. I think it is also prudent to say that the scientific method is probably our best means of making models and predictions about the physical world.

I think it is also fair to say that the scientific method doesn't necessarily cast aspersions on the nature of reality; it deals with the physical world, without any assumption about whether or not the nature of reality is physical.


Science
Without making any assumptions about the nature of reality, if we simply follow the scientific method we deduce that the processes of the brain (physical matter) are what gives rise to our mental experiences.

We also deduce that what we experience as the physical world around us, including our own bodies, is a mental projection of sensory stimuli.

Side by side, these are two, seemingly, contradictory statements:

• matter gives rise to mind i.e. the mind is what the brain does

• the mind gives rise to matter i.e. matter (as we perceive it) is a mental projection of sensory stimuli

Materialism
A materialist paradigm assumes that the nature of reality is physical and that matter gives rise to mind; however, from the above it would appear that such a position is self-refuting.

That matter gives rise to mind, appears to be circular, in that the conclusion has to be assumed.


Another perspective?
Is there another way of looking at the evidence below, which isn't self-refuting and doesn't require us to assume our conclusion?

• matter gives rise to mind

• matter (as we perceive it) is a mental projection i.e. the mind gives rise to matter

18AD

Good question; lots to think about.

Does it actually posit that mind creates matter? I think that would be going too far. Certainly mind perceives matter, and experience gives rise to matter in a particular way. The perceptual way. But to say that it creates it is too far. Maybe?

The true materialist would say that there is no mind at all. There is ismply matter, and brains. Mind is just some illusory addition to matter.

-

You could go the phenomenological route and look to experience itself. In which case matter is a formal concept that arises out of a pre-predicative existence. That is, matter as a formal concept doesn't exist in our experience of the world.

The extreme view would be, does anything exist if no one is around to view it? I'm somewhat sympathetic to the negative answer. It also seems to be the ideal point of science, to find the view from nowhere, without subjectivity.

Just some preliminary thoughts.

Joe1919

There is an argument that although it cannot be proven that 'substance' exists, nevertheless, we have no choice (if we want to live) but to interact with the world in some way. i.e. There exists an 'animal faith' or 'animal spirit' that is stronger than reason and is perhaps driven by feeling and intuition. I will give you some quotes.

'I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther. .....Here then I find myself absolutely and necessarily determined to live, and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of life. But notwithstanding that my natural propensity, and the course of my animal spirits and passions reduce me to this indolent belief in the general maxims of the world, I still feel such remains of my former disposition, that I am ready to throw all my books and papers into the fire, and resolve never more to renounce the pleasures of life for the sake of reasoning and philosophy.' (David Hume Treatise...)

'The hungry dog must believe that the bone before him is a substance, not an essence; and when he is snapping at it or gnawing it, that belief rises into conviction, and he would be a very dishonest dog if, at that moment, he denied it. For me, too, while I am alive, it would be dishonest to deny the belief in substance; and not merely dishonest, but foolish: because if I am observant, observation will bring me strong corroborative evidence for that belief.'(Santayana, Scepticism and animal faith)

Husserl states that Realism is the natural attitude to take towards the world. We are 'conscious of a world endless spread out over space. [...] Corporal physical things are simply there for me. ( Ideas Part 2). But we can also see the world from an ideal point of view and bracket out any idea of existence etc. (This was the philosophical view that he took in his later years).

PS Stating that Realism is the 'natual attitude' does not necessarly imply that it is the 'true' or indeed always the most useful, as for example, the case where it is the 'natural attitude' to consider that the sun goes around the stationary earth.

18AD

The natural attitude of naive realism is also that by which we assume objects exist in their own right. So the scientist is usually considered to be a naive realist as he uses all his instruments to make measurements of objects (that presumably exist).

roosh

18AD wrote: »

Good question; lots to think about.

Does it actually posit that mind creates matter? I think that would be going too far. Certainly mind perceives matter, and experience gives rise to matter in a particular way. The perceptual way. But to say that it creates it is too far. Maybe?

The true materialist would say that there is no mind at all. There is ismply matter, and brains. Mind is just some illusory addition to matter.

-

You could go the phenomenological route and look to experience itself. In which case matter is a formal concept that arises out of a pre-predicative existence. That is, matter as a formal concept doesn't exist in our experience of the world.

The extreme view would be, does anything exist if no one is around to view it? I'm somewhat sympathetic to the negative answer. It also seems to be the ideal point of science, to find the view from nowhere, without subjectivity.

Just some preliminary thoughts.

You might be right, it might perhaps be a little too far.

I think what can be said though, is that all matter, or at least our perception of it [which is all we know about matter] is a projection. That is, if there is a world "out there" then what we experience of it is a projection. But if we say that matter gives rise to the experience of what we label "mind" i.e. the projection of matter, we get caught in somewhat of a loop:

Matter causes the projection of matter, but the matter that causes that projection is just a projection, caused by that matter, which is just a projection, caused by that matter, which is just a projection and so on ad infinitum.

To get out of that loop you could assume that matter causes the projection, but I think that is to assume your conclusion. Alternatively, if mind does exist, and mind causes matter or rather, matter is just a perception of the mind, then there is no recurring loop. That matter appears to give rise to the projection of matter would be just that, an appearance.


I would be somewhat sympathetic to the extreme view you outline above, with some qualification though. I would say that there necessarily is existence, but that if no one was around to perceive it, then the world as we perceive it would not materialise as it does.


With regard to the ideal point of science, I have on occasion wondered, if matter is created by mind, then are we simply exploring our own mental perception of the world? Would the collapse of the quantum wave function simply refer to our sensory perception (as we perceive it); in the way that light entering our retina is in the form of a wave and it then collapses to give our perception of the world - that I think might be a step too far.

roosh

Joe1919 wrote: »

There is an argument that although it cannot be proven that 'substance' exists, nevertheless, we have no choice (if we want to live) but to interact with the world in some way. i.e. There exists an 'animal faith' or 'animal spirit' that is stronger than reason and is perhaps driven by feeling and intuition. I will give you some quotes.

'I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther. .....Here then I find myself absolutely and necessarily determined to live, and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of life. But notwithstanding that my natural propensity, and the course of my animal spirits and passions reduce me to this indolent belief in the general maxims of the world, I still feel such remains of my former disposition, that I am ready to throw all my books and papers into the fire, and resolve never more to renounce the pleasures of life for the sake of reasoning and philosophy.' (David Hume Treatise...)

'The hungry dog must believe that the bone before him is a substance, not an essence; and when he is snapping at it or gnawing it, that belief rises into conviction, and he would be a very dishonest dog if, at that moment, he denied it. For me, too, while I am alive, it would be dishonest to deny the belief in substance; and not merely dishonest, but foolish: because if I am observant, observation will bring me strong corroborative evidence for that belief.'(Santayana, Scepticism and animal faith)

Husserl states that Realism is the natural attitude to take towards the world. We are 'conscious of a world endless spread out over space. [...] Corporal physical things are simply there for me. ( Ideas Part 2). But we can also see the world from an ideal point of view and bracket out any idea of existence etc. (This was the philosophical view that he took in his later years).

PS Stating that Realism is the 'natual attitude' does not necessarly imply that it is the 'true' or indeed always the most useful, as for example, the case where it is the 'natural attitude' to consider that the sun goes around the stationary earth.

I don't think we need to deny the existence of the material world, that we experience it is beyond question; the nature of its existence is open for question, however. That the physical world is a projection, often labeled "mind", is something which follows from a materialistic perspective - assuming science as the method of investigation.

IIRC, Idealism doesn't reject the existence of the [experience of a] physical world as a necessity; it just follows that the physical world is a mental projection (assuming the existence of mind - not necessarily "the mind").

18AD

roosh wrote: »

You might be right, it might perhaps be a little too far.

I think what can be said though, is that all matter, or at least our perception of it [which is all we know about matter] is a projection. That is, if there is a world "out there" then what we experience of it is a projection. But if we say that matter gives rise to the experience of what we label "mind" i.e. the projection of matter, we get caught in somewhat of a loop:

Matter causes the projection of matter, but the matter that causes that projection is just a projection, caused by that matter, which is just a projection, caused by that matter, which is just a projection and so on ad infinitum.

To get out of that loop you could assume that matter causes the projection, but I think that is to assume your conclusion. Alternatively, if mind does exist, and mind causes matter or rather, matter is just a perception of the mind, then there is no recurring loop. That matter appears to give rise to the projection of matter would be just that, an appearance.

Are you assuming that the projection of the mind can give no direct knowledge of the external world? What is known in the mind is only about the mind? So you can only know about your projections. Because without that assumption you can certainly posit that there is matter without entering a loop.

Also, if you are making the previous assumption your notion of cause and effect is equally assuming its conclusion because cause and effect is an idea about how the world works. Unless you're willing to say that mental projections are inherently self-causing.

At least I think so at first glance.

I would be somewhat sympathetic to the extreme view you outline above, with some qualification though. I would say that there necessarily is existence, but that if no one was around to perceive it, then the world as we perceive it would not materialise as it does.

This is a very interesting position. Merleau-Ponty takes the line that everyone actually inhabits a different world based on their ability to interact with it. So a rock face actually appears differently to a rock climber and to an average Joe.

In the same manner, the world of a bird is different to the world of a human. For a bird, trees actually present themselves as "livable" and "home" etc... Whereas to us they actually appear as "greenery" or as "climbable".

To that extent, the one tree is simply an intersubjective pre-conscious agreement.

With regard to the ideal point of science, I have on occasion wondered, if matter is created by mind, then are we simply exploring our own mental perception of the world? Would the collapse of the quantum wave function simply refer to our sensory perception (as we perceive it); in the way that light entering our retina is in the form of a wave and it then collapses to give our perception of the world - that I think might be a step too far.

This I find equally as problematic as hard materialism. It's just the flip side to "everything is matter" and I think brings with it similar problems.

However, it is interesting to note that our understanding of the world around us is tied in directly with our self-understanding. You could take the route that all understanding is self-understanding. The purpose of understanding anything can never be meaningful if it is the removed objective view.

roosh

18AD wrote: »

Are you assuming that the projection of the mind can give no direct knowledge of the external world? What is known in the mind is only about the mind? So you can only know about your projections. Because without that assumption you can certainly posit that there is matter without entering a loop.

I didn't intend to, but there may be a nested assumption there I'm not aware of.

I would say though, that it is trying to follow on from a strict materialist position where mind is deemed not to exist.

Being made aware of the possibility though I would say that there isn't an assumption either way; there isn't an assumption that the projection is a direct representation of an external world (if one exists) and there isn't an assumption that it isn't. Relying on either assumption would, I think, be assuming the conclusion.

I think, although I might be wrong, without assuming one way or the other, the loop arises.

18AD wrote: »

Also, if you are making the previous assumption your notion of cause and effect is equally assuming its conclusion because cause and effect is an idea about how the world works. Unless you're willing to say that mental projections are inherently self-causing.

At least I think so at first glance.

I haven't really followed the consequences of this to their logical conclusion, and this is very much an exploratory discussion, but I would say firstly that the initial assumption isn't being made.

However, with regard to cause and effect, their distinction as being separate is, I would say, is an erroneous belief, because cause and effect cannot be separated. I'm not even sure if that is a valid response to your point - I'm kind of hoping that your response will paint the next dot of where to go with the discussion (assuming there is even one to be had).

18AD wrote: »

This is a very interesting position. Merleau-Ponty takes the line that everyone actually inhabits a different world based on their ability to interact with it. So a rock face actually appears differently to a rock climber and to an average Joe.

In the same manner, the world of a bird is different to the world of a human. For a bird, trees actually present themselves as "livable" and "home" etc... Whereas to us they actually appear as "greenery" or as "climbable".

To that extent, the one tree is simply an intersubjective pre-conscious agreement.

I would be inclined to go a bit further and say that without anyone to perceive it, there is no rockface, at least, as we, or even the rock climber perceives it. It might be a bit like trying to imagine what an uncollapsed quantum wave looks like.

18AD wrote: »

This I find equally as problematic as hard materialism. It's just the flip side to "everything is matter" and I think brings with it similar problems.

Would the law of the excluded middle apply, in that it is either correct or it isn't; just as is the case for strict materialism - I'm not sure if they are the diametric opposites of one another, are they? If they were would it lead to the conclusion that either one or the other is true? They're probably not though, bcos they rely on concepts which can be interpreted differently.

18AD wrote: »

However, it is interesting to note that our understanding of the world around us is tied in directly with our self-understanding. You could take the route that all understanding is self-understanding. The purpose of understanding anything can never be meaningful if it is the removed objective view.

That sounds interesting.

The definition of objective, more accurately, subjective could be contentious though, in the sense of who or what is the subject who experiences; and does what we think the subject is, actually exist?

18AD

Just some other thoughts on this.

Does the idea of a projection not require that you have something onto which you need to project? Does it not also need a projector? Are they themselves included in the projection or are they beyond it? You don't have to say that what is beyond is matter or mind or anything, but merely that there is something more.

Just to return to the phenomenological point of view briefly. Its starting point is that you simply need to look at how things appear. Husserl thought you could just look at the appearances without assuming that they are projections or matter or any other assumption. You could just describe how they appear.

roosh wrote: »

I didn't intend to, but there may be a nested assumption there I'm not aware of.

I would say though, that it is trying to follow on from a strict materialist position where mind is deemed not to exist.

Being made aware of the possibility though I would say that there isn't an assumption either way; there isn't an assumption that the projection is a direct representation of an external world (if one exists) and there isn't an assumption that it isn't. Relying on either assumption would, I think, be assuming the conclusion.

I may not have been clear on this. But can the projection give any knowledge about what is beyond it? You don't have to assume the projection is representative of external world or not, you can come to know it through examining the projection.

However, with regard to cause and effect, their distinction as being separate is, I would say, is an erroneous belief, because cause and effect cannot be separated. I'm not even sure if that is a valid response to your point - I'm kind of hoping that your response will paint the next dot of where to go with the discussion (assuming there is even one to be had).

I was pointing more towards your saying that matter causes the projection. Not only is the matter an assumption, but also that it causes. If matter is an assumption, so is everything you thinkn it does.

I guess you could just transfer cause and effect to mental projections.

I would be inclined to go a bit further and say that without anyone to perceive it, there is no rockface, at least, as we, or even the rock climber perceives it. It might be a bit like trying to imagine what an uncollapsed quantum wave looks like.

That is exactly the conclusion that is drawn. I find it quite compelling.
This also means that there is no meaningful way to talk about an objective rockface. That sort of objectivity traditionally being the aim of science.

Would the law of the excluded middle apply, in that it is either correct or it isn't; just as is the case for strict materialism - I'm not sure if they are the diametric opposites of one another, are they? If they were would it lead to the conclusion that either one or the other is true? They're probably not though, bcos they rely on concepts which can be interpreted differently.

I don't think the two positions are opposites. They simply seem to be two polar universalised accounts of the universe. If it's not all just matter, then maybe it's all just mind. Of course each has it's own distinct problems.

The definition of objective, more accurately, subjective could be contentious though, in the sense of who or what is the subject who experiences; and does what we think the subject is, actually exist?

What I meant by objective here is the traditional view of "being without subject." The subjective is seen as flawed and the objective accurate. But the objective is impossible. As I mentioned earlier, it is also undesirable, as it's meaningless.

As to whether the subject exists, I would certainly consider first-person subjective experience to be the minimum of what a subject might be.

AmeliaO

I've just done an essay on Physicalism and Consciousness - and I was discussing the problems of the thought experiments of Mary's Room and the idea of Philosophical Zombies and whether they're successful in discrediting the physicalist accounts of consciousness, and sadly, as someone who would have been a great believer in Physicalism, the thought- experiments actually do crush the two above theories.

18AD

AmeliaO wrote: »

I've just done an essay on Physicalism and Consciousness - and I was discussing the problems of the thought experiments of Mary's Room and the idea of Philosophical Zombies and whether they're successful in discrediting the physicalist accounts of consciousness, and sadly, as someone who would have been a great believer in Physicalism, the thought- experiments actually do crush the two above theories.

If you don't mind, how do they succeed in refuting physicalism?

Is Mary's Room the colour scientist example?

take everything

Hi lads
Not sure how relevant this is to the mind/matter thing, but emergence might be of interest.
It's something that intrigued me the last time i read about it.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergentism
Although, that does say that it's compatible with physicalism so not sure if it's completely relevant to this debate.

MisterEpicurus

To suggest a difference between mind and matter, you'd have to show that one is NOT linked to the other directly. Why's that? Because if mind was independent of matter then out material brains would have no say in such situations.

However, given that our brains are always completely linked with a 'mind' process, then it rules out any suggestion that our minds are somehow special or independent of matter.

If I damage Broca's Area of the brain, I lose my language capabilities.

If I damage my frontal lobe and cerebellum, I damage my motor coordination skills.

You can see a direct link between what we think and hence our mind and how the physical process originates.

In every situation, the cause of the action of the mind is linked to a cognitive neural process. If mind was non-material, then why would it be influenced by the total physical nature of the brain, which it is.

Thus, our perceived sense of 'mind' or any linked process is really a function of the organization of matter and nothing else. Unless one can prove that this link can be broken at any stage, then we really shouldn't believe anything to the contrary.

Priori

roosh wrote: »

The proposition
That we* experience a physical world is not in question; it is pretty self-evident.

I would adjust this slightly to say that what we experience is a world, not necessarily a physical world. This gives to much initial leeway to physicalism, assuming the aim is to remain neutral (at the premise stage at least) between mind and matter.

roosh wrote: »

Science
Without making any assumptions about the nature of reality, if we simply follow the scientific method we deduce that the processes of the brain (physical matter) are what gives rise to our mental experiences.

I would say that if we follow the scientific method we merely observe that mental states are correlated with brain states. That the former arises from the latter commits too soon to a kind of emergence, in my opinion.

roosh wrote:

We also deduce that what we experience as the physical world around us, including our own bodies, is a mental projection of sensory stimuli.

I would say mental representation, not mental projection.

roosh wrote:

Side by side, these are two, seemingly, contradictory statements:

• matter gives rise to mind i.e. the mind is what the brain does

• the mind gives rise to matter i.e. matter (as we perceive it) is a mental projection of sensory stimuli

You might have ended up with:

• Mental states/experiential events thus far studied by science have been accompanied by processes in the brain.
• These experiential events seem to be interpretations/representations of sensory stimuli.

Note these conclusions are not contradictory, and they also do not commit to the ultimate nature of reality - whether it be physical/mental/something else entirely.

The first conclusion does not claim that there are no experiential events/mental states without brain activity. In other words, it does not claim that to have experience at all, a conscious being/thing (or simply, a "consciousness") must have a brain as we understand it.

The second conclusion only indicates that reality as perceived may not be in fact what it appears to be. But neither does it claim that reality is not what it appears to be. It could well be (or could well be a part of it).

Personally, I incline towards a neutral monistic viewpoint, with matter and mind as we understand them being 'aspects' of something more fundamental.

Priori

MisterEpicurus wrote:

To suggest a difference between mind and matter, you'd have to show that one is NOT linked to the other directly.

Directly linkage doesn't imply identity. You have to assume the difference yourself before any idea of linking the two concepts becomes intelligible.

A response might be: but that's it, they're just different concepts, two different ways of describing the same reality.

Reductive materialists like Churchland might default to something like this, failing to acknowledge that their response doesn't deal with the fact that the concepts have entirely different content - they do not describe the same content at all.

MisterEpicurus wrote:

if mind was independent of matter then out material brains would have no say in such situations

This doesn't logically follow. If A is independent of B, it doesn't necessarily mean that B cannot have any impact on A.

To take a facetious example, you can be independent of your parents, but they might still have a big "say" in things...

MisterEpicurus

Priori wrote: »

Directly linkage doesn't imply identity. You have to assume the difference yourself before any idea of linking the two concepts becomes intelligible.

A response might be: but that's it, they're just different concepts, two different ways of describing the same reality.

Reductive materialists like Churchland might default to something like this, failing to acknowledge that their response doesn't deal with the fact that the concepts have entirely different content - they do not describe the same content at all.



This doesn't logically follow. If A is independent of B, it doesn't necessarily mean that B cannot have any impact on A.

To take a facetious example, you can be independent of your parents, but they might still have a big "say" in things...

But I'm not 'assuming' a difference.

The mind is dependent on the neural functioning of the brain. This can be tested. Hence, losing neural functioning has a direct effect on the mind. This difference doesn't need to be assumed, just ask any person involved with brain injury and they'll inform you what they were able to do and what limitations they suffer from now.

The mind is a perceptive manifestation of the electrochemical neural connections of the brain. To be more specific, the concept of 'Memory' has a distinct location in our brain, notably the Hippocampus for the formation of long-term memory. Memory is part of what we describe as 'mind'. This faculty is lost when the Hippocampus becomes damaged and the patient can recognize this as well. This can apply for any organized system in the brain.

And this isn't 'two different ways of describing the same reality', because they're not 'different'...matter constructs the minds processing, when this matter is destroyed, then the end product of that part of the mind is also destroyed. Indeed, the process may return after some surgical techniques.

It's true that I clumsily phrased the sentence;
"if mind was independent of matter then out material brains would have no say in such situations"
Based on what I've written above, I think it's safe to assume that any independence our minds are capable of are wholly related to the mechanical 'matter' processes. But this supposed 'independence' is merely a play on words. It would be analogous to a computer where programming can almost give the computer a 'mind' of its own, even a virus. When part of the computer is damaged it will go out of its way to fix it through the programming language and it may permanently break. But we would never ascribe the word 'mind' to a computer and I'm suggesting the same about our brains. It simply confuses what could be a perfectly rational conversation.

Priori

MisterEpicurus wrote:

To be more specific, the concept of 'Memory' has a distinct location in our brain

I don't deny that human conscious experience supervenes upon neural activity. A great deal is determined by the brain. There is, however, some elbow room, which makes possible the fact that the mind can, in turn, influence the brain. Researchers are appreciating more and more the plasticity of the brain, which poses a serious challenge to the older paradigm which pairs abilities/functions rigidly with neural location.

MisterEpicurus wrote:

they're not 'different'...matter constructs the minds processing

For something to construct something else, they must be distinct to begin with. Otherwise there can be no talk of constructing. There is the constructer, and the constructed. In this sense you assume the difference.

MisterEpicurus wrote:

we would never ascribe the word 'mind' to a computer and I'm suggesting the same about our brains. It simply confuses what could be a perfectly rational conversation.

I am trying to be clear with the concepts I'm using, which I think is conducive to a rational conversation. Stating that we must jettison the idea that our brains have minds before we can make this conversation rational, which is essentially what you're saying, already alienates anyone who doesn't share your specific mind/brain identity theory. I do hope you can have a rational conversation with somebody who doesn't agree with you. Otherwise what use is rationality?

MisterEpicurus

Priori wrote: »

I don't deny that human conscious experience supervenes upon neural activity. A great deal is determined by the brain. There is, however, some elbow room, which makes possible the fact that the mind can, in turn, influence the brain. Researchers are appreciating more and more the plasticity of the brain, which poses a serious challenge to the older paradigm which pairs abilities/functions rigidly with neural location.

Out of curiosity, could you point me to some evidence (journals etc) which suggest that the mind could be independent of the brain.

For something to construct something else, they must be distinct to begin with. Otherwise there can be no talk of constructing. There is the constructer, and the constructed. In this sense you assume the difference.

Well, yes, there is a distinction. The 'constructer' is our bodies and the 'constructed' is the mind. Through evolution we have developed the capacity to reflect. This happened very slowly through genetic alterations...at least that's what's accepted I believe. It's like the body; it's not have 'I have a body', it's more a case that 'I am a body'. I think the sum total of neural processes reflects what we call a mind and because I have the capacity to reflect, I would say I am a mind.

I am trying to be clear with the concepts I'm using, which I think is conducive to a rational conversation. Stating that we must jettison the idea that our brains have minds before we can make this conversation rational, which is essentially what you're saying, already alienates anyone who doesn't share your specific mind/brain identity theory. I do hope you can have a rational conversation with somebody who doesn't agree with you. Otherwise what use is rationality?

I agree they are conducive to discussion. I would say the brain is a mind and given the brain is part of the body and the fact I have a body, I think it's safe to assume I am a mind. Arguing other ways may detract because of semantics .

Duggys Housemate

Priori wrote: »

Directly linkage doesn't imply identity. You have to assume the difference yourself before any idea of linking the two concepts becomes intelligible.

A response might be: but that's it, they're just different concepts, two different ways of describing the same reality.

Reductive materialists like Churchland might default to something like this, failing to acknowledge that their response doesn't deal with the fact that the concepts have entirely different content - they do not describe the same content at all.



This doesn't logically follow. If A is independent of B, it doesn't necessarily mean that B cannot have any impact on A.

To take a facetious example, you can be independent of your parents, but they might still have a big "say" in things...

This is the problem with philosophy. Its just a lot of verbiage where words can remain undefined. In science two systems are independent of each other, if any only if, there is no causal links between them. Your parent story is therefore false, an adult independent of his parents would not talk to them. if there is any influence at all, there is no full independence.

As for the main question. The world we see is not the quantum world, but neither is it a false representation. In the macro non quantum universe we live in, crashing into a tree would kill us. It is, in fact mostly empty space, but is solid to our senses and selves. So we have evolved to see a tree which is very really there, to feel a tree which is there, and to hear it fall when it very really falls. That these sounds, and images are to do with fluctuations in the electromagnetic fields, and air, does not make them false. The tree is there. Kick it. Refute it thus.

That a "quantum" intelligence might see something else does not make the tree's existence false. It is there, and we evolved to see it.

Priori

Duggys Housemate wrote:

In science two systems are independent of each other, if any only if, there is no causal links between them. Your parent story is therefore false, an adult independent of his parents would not talk to them. if there is any influence at all, there is no full independence.

So you admit that there is exists partial independence, or degrees of independence (otherwise to say "full" independence is adding unnecessary verbiage)?

I agree that, strictly speaking, in the case of an adult/parent, there can be no full independence, perhaps even a priori. Offspring are implicitly dependent on their parents for their very existence.

Duggys Housemate wrote:

Its just a lot of verbiage where words can remain undefined

That's a completely unfair appraisal of an entire subject. The statement with which you begin your argument, i.e. "In science two systems are independent of each other, if any only if, there is no causal links between them" is actually through and through philosophical. Science works with underlying philosophical presuppositions, which science itself often does not question.

Scientific breakthroughs are often made on the back on revising these philosophical presuppositions, thereby effecting things called paradigm shifts.

Duggys Housemate wrote:

As for the main question. The world we see is not the quantum world, but neither is it a false representation. In the macro non quantum universe we live in, crashing into a tree would kill us. It is, in fact mostly empty space, but is solid to our senses and selves. So we have evolved to see a tree which is very really there, to feel a tree which is there, and to hear it fall when it very really falls. That these sounds, and images are to do with fluctuations in the electromagnetic fields, and air, does not make them false. The tree is there. Kick it. Refute it thus.

That a "quantum" intelligence might see something else does not make the tree's existence false. It is there, and we evolved to see it.

Completely agree with you here.

roosh

There isn't need for mind and the brain to be independent is there? The brain (matter) can be dependent on the mind i.e. it can be a mental projection.

MisterEpicurus

MisterEpicurus wrote: »

Out of curiosity, could you point me to some evidence (journals etc) which suggest that the mind could be independent of the brain.

roosh wrote: »

There isn't need for mind and the brain to be independent is there? The brain (matter) can be dependent on the mind i.e. it can be a mental projection.

So Priori, I return to the question I posed above which you evaded. Care to answer?

Priori

MisterEpicurus wrote: »

So Priori, I return to the question I posed above which you evaded. Care to answer?

I didn't evade this at all, I honestly only saw that question this morning when I logged in and read your response properly. My attention must have been diverted to Duggys Housemate's post.

I'm curious to know where exactly I said that the mind was independent of the brain?

In any case, the literature on neuroplasticity is what you should look into if you are interested in knowing why I might think that the mind can, in turn, influence the brain, which was what I said above when I made reference to the fact that "Researchers are appreciating more and more the plasticity of the brain, which poses a serious challenge to the older paradigm which pairs abilities/functions rigidly with neural location." (I never doubted that the brain influences the mind, and was mainly challenging your assertion that there is a definite physical "location" for memory, which is a theory becoming more difficult to hold on to).

For strong empirical support of the fact that the mind is not simply the brain, you might start with a serious look at this collection of articles.

Morbert

Priori wrote: »

In any case, the literature on neuroplasticity is what you should look into if you are interested in knowing why I might think that the mind can, in turn, influence the brain, which was what I said above when I made reference to the fact that "Researchers are appreciating more and more the plasticity of the brain, which poses a serious challenge to the older paradigm which pairs abilities/functions rigidly with neural location." (I never doubted that the brain influences the mind, and was mainly challenging your assertion that there is a definite physical "location" for memory, which is a theory becoming more difficult to hold on to).

Neuroplasticity research has indeed overthrown the old "Neurons that wire together, fire together" principle, though is is not a challenge to any materialistic understanding of the mind. Materialists agree that the "mind" can influence the brain insofar as thought influences neural efficacy.

Priori

Morbert wrote: »

Neuroplasticity... is not a challenge to any materialistic understanding of the mind. Materialists agree that the "mind" can influence the brain insofar as thought influences neural efficacy.

It is a challenge to reductive materialism, or type physicalism, which asserts that the mind is nothing but the brain.

Morbert

Priori wrote: »

It is a challenge to reductive materialism, or type physicalism, which asserts that the mind is nothing but the brain.

You will have to be more explicit, because I see no such challenge. A physicalist would understand the mind influencing the brain as the neural pathways changing, based on recent neural activity.

Priori

Morbert wrote: »

You will have to be more explicit, because I see no such challenge. A physicalist would understand the mind influencing the brain as the neural pathways changing, based on recent neural activity.

I suppose it depends on whether you are committed to the causal closure of the physical world, in which case something non-physical (thought) should not be able to have any effect on something physical (neural activity). In other words, casuation should be upward only (with our world of consciousness and thoughts relegated to mere epiphenomena).

But reductive physicalists will no doubt argue that consciousness and thought are physical.

I have read so many arguments insisting that consciousness is physical and don't find any of them compelling. An explanation like that is completely behaviouristic, i.e. exclusively third-personal. It doesn't at all explain the first-personal, qualitative aspects of conscious experience. It merely equates them with observable neural correlates.

The next step might be to say 'but what sort of explanation would satisfy you?' All I can say is, not one that remains dumb on the question of why there should be any subjective experience at all.

Morbert

Priori wrote: »

I have read so many arguments insisting that consciousness is physical and don't find any of them compelling.

I have not found a compelling argument for consciousness being necessarily physical, but similarly I have not found a compelling argument showing an incompatibility between consciousness and physicalism. I think the issue is mainly a disconnect between the language of neuroscience (synaptic, action potential, neuron, ion flow) with the language of pyschology/psychophysics (experience, feeling, emotion, anger).

Duggys Housemate

I want to solve the OP's apparent issues:

Side by side, these are two, seemingly, contradictory statements:
matter gives rise to mind i.e. the mind is what the brain does
the mind gives rise to matter i.e. matter (as we perceive it) is a mental projection of sensory stimuli

The second statement is a bit of a leap. The mind doesn't "give rise" to matter, it interprets the matter which is already there.

It seems we all went into this without much regard for the absurdities in the original post.

roosh

Duggys Housemate wrote: »

I want to solve the OP's apparent issues:

The second statement is a bit of a leap. The mind doesn't "give rise" to matter, it interprets the matter which is already there.

Does it? This is based on what?

Duggys Housemate

roosh wrote: »

Does it? This is based on what?

science.