What would it take to make you believe in a supernatural entity?

Zombrex

Peregrinus wrote: »

I disagree. If Icke suggests that the Anunnaki are, in reality, alien space lizards from Draco, then he is suggesting that they are a natural phenomenon, just one hitherto not properly observed or understood by us. We - or, rather, the Babylonians - identified them as “gods” because we couldn’t understand or explain them. But our inability to do this reflects on us, not on them. His propositions can - at least in principal - be tested; we can go to Draco and see if we find the lizards there. Or we can observe the Satanic rituals. Or we can look for DNA/genetic evidence to confirm or refute the “mating with fallen angels” theory.

The proposition “God is the fundamental ground for all existence” is of an entirely different order. It looks to me a lot more like a philosophical proposition than anything which could be bracketed as part of the natural sciences. But that doesn’t mean it isn’t true; it just means that the techniques of natural science are not going to be much help in evaluating it. No amount of trips to Draco or DNA tests or others test of the kind are going to be any help to us, not because we lack the ability or understanding to conduct the appropriate tests but because there are no such tests. This shows that the proposition is, indeed, a proposition of a radically different kind from the proposition that George Bush is a lizard.

Does it though?

You are correct when you say that the techniques of natural science are not going to help us. But that doesn't mean the question is fundamentally different. It means the answer is unknowable, which is still an answer based on modern evaluation.

Just because a methodology does not produce a definitive answer that doesn't mean the question requires a different methodology. Some things are just unanswerable, that is not a reflection on the methodology but a reflection on the limits of what can be answered.

It is a natural human instinct to find this unsatisfactory, and to unfortunately turn to other flawed methodologies that do give an answer albet a pointless irrelevant on (eg religion).

But one of the most fundamental advances in human civilisation over the last few hundred years is gradual comfort with the idea that things are unknown until we actually know them, and to relish that rather than fight against it with quick answers. An answer is not necessarily better than no answer at all particularly if the answer is unsupportable. Early human history was defined by a race to explain everything in some manner no matter what the explanation actually was. The accuracy of the answer mattered far less than simply having an answer. Why thunder? Thor throwing his hammer. Why do we die? God's punishment for Eden.

Ironically religious people think our ignorance is increasing from earlier times because back then people simply pretended they had an explanation for pretty much everything, where as now humans are much clearer on what we do know and don't know and that of course will naturally involve a large category of "We don't know". Some still find this deeply unsatisfactory and turn to other systems of thought that provide answers, but they care far less for the accuracy of these answers.

Peregrinus

Pwpane wrote: »

I'm not a trained philosopher . . .

Neither am I!

Pwpane wrote: »

1. You postulate that God exists and he is the ground for the existence for all things, thus the existence of all things is evidence of his existence. Not logical.

I don’t see why it’s not logical.

If there is a basis for things to exist, what consequence would we expect to flow from that? We would expect things to exist. We observe that things do exist, so our observations are consistent with what we would expect if our premise were true. All perfectly logical. If nothing existed then there would be no evidence that our premise was or might be true.

Of course, we wouldn’t be around to formulate the premise in the first place, or to observe that nothing existed, but let that pass. The point is we can conceive of an alternative state of affairs in which nothing ever exists - there is simply nothingness - and the god-hypothesis is an explanation of why this state of affairs, rather than that state of affairs, prevails. There’s nothing illogical about that.

I would be overreaching myself if I claimed that, because things exist, therefore the fundamental ground for existence, viz. God, must also exist. That would be illogical, since I haven’t excluded the possibility that there could be different explanations for the phenomenon of existence. But I’m not claiming that.

Pwpane wrote: »

2. If the only evidence we can have cannot prove that God exists, why do you believe in God?

[It's quite obvious that you do, and firmly. Rather than going down the road of 'let's discuss this beautifully and elegantly, enjoying the journey as we go', I'd really be interested to know why you personally believe in a God whose existence you say you can't prove?]

A very good question, but is it not the very question that Michael Nugent says in post #84 that we need to park? And in post #85 I agree that we should park it, at least for the time being.

I also say, admittedly, that I think we will have to come back to it, but I don’t want to come back to it just yet - and certainly not in the form of why I believe what I believe. If we go down that road we rapidly get into string-of-subjective-personal-testimonies country, and those discussions tend to spiral into irrelevance fairly quickly. Plus, in so far as I can articulate my reasons for belief I freely admit that they are highly subjective, and not something I would put forward in the expectation that they would influence anyone else.

When we do come on to this question, I think it would be more productive to discuss not why Peregrinus believes what he believes, but why people believe what they believe - i.e. the various tools that people employ to evaluate beliefs and to accept, reject or simply ignore them.

Peregrinus

Mark Hamill wrote: »

What we have here is something that isn't even a philosophical statement, as you could replace "god" in your postulation, assume it true and it would always fit:
Propostion: "Mark Hamill created the universe"
If it where true, you would expect the existence of a universe.

Yes, you could replace the term “god”, but that doesn’t mean it’s not a philosophical statement. Philosophical statements don’t have to be about “god”.

For what it’s worth, I think “Mark Hamill created the universe” is a philosophical proposition. Not, I grant you, one put forward very seriously, and not one we need entertain for very long. We can refute it easily by pointing to (a) evidence that some things existed before Mark Hamill did, and (b) evidence that - no offence - Mark Hamill’s capacities are limited.

Still, an examination of the proposition is useful. Since we can refute the Mark Hamill proposition quite easily, and we cannot refute the god proposition with the same arguments, we learn something; the “god” we are postulating, whatever it is, is something profoundly different from Mark Hamill.

Mark Hamill wrote: »

Oh look, the universe exists, therefore I created the universe.

No, I’ve already said, more than once, that I’m not making that argument. The existence of things is consistent with the premise I offered, not a proof of it. My point here is not the truth of my proposition, but the limitations of the techniques of natural science in evaluating my proposition.

Mark Hamill wrote: »

Except that’s not the proposition being made if sommeone reject your proposition. Even if you ignore the fact that your proposition is so illogical as to be completely moot (a perfect reason in of itself to reject it), by being untestable the possibility of it being true is completely unmeasurable. With absolutely no possible way to tell if its true or not, it is a useless truth to hold to. And it is useless, as nothing can ever be reliably attributed to it, no reliable predictions can be made and nothing can be gained from it.

All we have established is that my proposition cannot be adequate tested by the techniques of natural science. If you want to assert that propositions which cannot be adequately tested by the techniques of natural science are useless, go ahead and assert that. I would just point out, though, that if you do assert that, then you will be asserting a proposition which cannot be adequately tested by the techniques of natural science.

I think the most you can say, with integrity and coherence, is that propositions which cannot be adequately tested by natural science are useless to you, or don’t interest you, or something equally subjective and personal. That’s fine, but obviously it’s a position which will appeal only to you, and to people who already agree with you.

Mark Hamill wrote: »

There is a universe-sized gap between an ethical question with no definite answer (because they are subject to variables), and a question which can never be answered at all. We can have a measure, of sorts, of how right an ethical answer is, there is no way at all to measure you proposition.

That’s an interesting point. What’s the measure of how right an ethical answer is?

Peregrinus

Zombrex wrote: »

Does it though?

You are correct when you say that the techniques of natural science are not going to help us. But that doesn't mean the question is fundamentally different.

I think it does. There’s a class of questions for which the techniques of natural science are particularly well adapted to producing answers which are (a) clear and (b) highly reliable. We call them scientific propositions and they relate to material reality.

But there’s another class of questions, the subject matter of which is not confined to material reality and which cannot be usefully answered employing the techniques of natural science.

And this is not just relevant to questions of religion and ethics and similar fields; I’ve already pointed to Euclidean geometry as a field in which we employ non-scientific techniques to answer questions. But I could just as easily have mentioned literary criticism, or aesthetics, or a host of other fields of enquiry that are deeply enriching and important to humanity.

It seems to me that the distinction between the questions we consider in these fields, on the one hand, and scientific propositions on the other, is pretty fundamental. But I don’t see any point in arguing about terminology. The difference is real, and it’s material to this discussion. Is that not fundamental enough?

Zombrex wrote: »

It means the answer is unknowable, which is still an answer based on modern evaluation.

No, it doesn’t necessarily mean that. I’ve already pointed to Euclidean geometry as a field in which answers are knowable, through techniques which are not the techniques of natural science.

Zombrex wrote: »

Just because a methodology does not produce a definitive answer that doesn't mean the question requires a different methodology. Some things are just unanswerable, that is not a reflection on the methodology but a reflection on the limits of what can be answered.

I grant that. But two points:

First, as just shown, just because a question can’t be answered through the techniques of natural science doesn’t mean that there are no other techniques which can help. There may be no other techniques which will be even as enlightening as the techniques of natural science, but I think if the question is one which interests us we are at least going to look around for other techniques which will help us approach the question.

Secondly, if there are no techniques which cast any light on the question, how do we respond to that? Natural science tends to ignore the question as being of no interest and occasionally - as we see in this thread - you will get people arguing that indeed it can be of no interest. But that’s just not true; ethical questions cannot be answered by the techniques of natural science, but since ethical questions concern themselves with how and whether we act, and since we cannot live without making decisions about how and whether to act, these questions interest us profoundly. It’s just not a scientific interest.

Zombrex wrote: »

It is a natural human instinct to find this unsatisfactory, and to unfortunately turn to other flawed methodologies that do give an answer albet a pointless irrelevant on (eg religion).

Are you assuming that all question-answering methodologies other than the scientific method are flawed? Because, if you are, it’ll be obvious by now that I don’t agree. And you have made no argument in support of the position (if it is your position).

But you do raise an interesting point; there may be some questions which we have great difficulty answering, and for which we can find no particularly helpful methodology. How do we react?

You suggest that “it’s a natural human instinct to find this unsatisfactory”, and that we take recourse in credulity, believing a methodology to be helpful because we wish it to be so. But I suggest that that’s a particularly modern attitude, emerging from the Enlightenment and the belief in the value of human enquiry and the scientific method, and a passionate desire to answer all questions, and therefore a passionate desire that all questions should be answerable. In fact, religious fundamentalism (“the bible gives clear and simple and authoritative answers to all questions?”) and the phenomenon I have just identified (“if it can’t be answered scientifically it’s not worth our time or attention!”) may both be rather bad-tempered refusals to accept the reality and relevance of unanswerable questions. It seems to me that classical philosophy and, yes, the religious tradition offer rather more in the way of resources for living with mystery, contemplating mystery, engaging with mystery, without denying mysteriousness. And they were doing so long before the modern era; The Cloud of Unknowing is neither a modern work, nor an irreligious one.

Zombrex wrote: »

But one of the most fundamental advances in human civilisation over the last few hundred years is gradual comfort with the idea that things are unknown until we actually know them, and to relish that rather than fight against it with quick answers. An answer is not necessarily better than no answer at all particularly if the answer is unsupportable. Early human history was defined by a race to explain everything in some manner no matter what the explanation actually was. The accuracy of the answer mattered far less than simply having an answer. Why thunder? Thor throwing his hammer. Why do we die? God's punishment for Eden.

Ironically religious people think our ignorance is increasing from earlier times because back then people simply pretended they had an explanation for pretty much everything, where as now humans are much clearer on what we do know and don't know and that of course will naturally involve a large category of "We don't know". Some still find this deeply unsatisfactory and turn to other systems of thought that provide answers, but they care far less for the accuracy of these answers.

I realize I’m saying almost the reverse of what you’re saying. I think of the demand for answerabilty and the assumption that all questions must be answerable as a distinctively modern phenomenon; you see it as something ancient which the modern world enables us to get past.

I think we can agree to differ on the question of timing. What I hope we might be able to agree on is that a believer can find resources to support him either in hiding from the problem of unknowable things, or in confronting and examining it. And the same is true of an unbeliever.

Panrich

Some interesting arguments on both sides here and it is unusual to feel that someone is trying to engage positively on the atheism thread without retreating to the bible or other religious text at the first opportunity.

Peregrinus wrote: »

Yes, you could replace the term “god”, but that doesn’t mean it’s not a philosophical statement. Philosophical statements don’t have to be about “god”.

For what it’s worth, I think “Mark Hamill created the universe” is a philosophical proposition. Not, I grant you, one put forward very seriously, and not one we need entertain for very long. We can refute it easily by pointing to (a) evidence that some things existed before Mark Hamill did, and (b) evidence that - no offence - Mark Hamill’s capacities are limited.

Still, an examination of the proposition is useful. Since we can refute the Mark Hamill proposition quite easily, and we cannot refute the god proposition with the same arguments, we learn something; the “god” we are postulating, whatever it is, is something profoundly different from Mark Hamill.

What if we take two hypothetical people who claim that God created the universe. On the face of things they are in agreement but if we scratch the surface of their claims it becomes apparent that Person A believes that God was 1M tall, blue and no longer interferes in his creation. Person B on the other hand believes that God is human-like and oversees his creation with great interest. What are we to make of each claim? By your proposition, they must merit the same weight as they both pass the Mark Hamill test. We are then ultimately left with a potential infinite number of Gods and this is not a satisfactory outcome. On what basis do you seperate the wheat from the chaff?

Mark Hamill

Peregrinus wrote: »

Yes, you could replace the term “god”, but that doesn’t mean it’s not a philosophical statement. Philosophical statements don’t have to be about “god”.

I never said they did.

Peregrinus wrote: »

For what it’s worth, I think “Mark Hamill created the universe” is a philosophical proposition. Not, I grant you, one put forward very seriously, and not one we need entertain for very long. We can refute it easily by pointing to (a) evidence that some things existed before Mark Hamill did, and (b) evidence that - no offence - Mark Hamill’s capacities are limited.

Still, an examination of the proposition is useful. Since we can refute the Mark Hamill proposition quite easily, and we cannot refute the god proposition with the same arguments, we learn something; the “god” we are postulating, whatever it is, is something profoundly different from Mark Hamill.

If you make the statement "Mark Hamill created the universe" and assume it true, then look for evidence, then you will find it as supported as your own proposition that god created the universe. Pointing out that things existed before me is irrelevant, as time started when the universe started, so all I need do is leave the universe, create it and pop back in at the time I was born. Pointing out that your understanding of my abilities is limited does not actually make them so.
You should also notice that this "god" you speak of, simply only exists in your definition of it i.e. all we have to go on, in terms of its abilities and its extra-universal omni-existence is your assertion of such. If we must accept your assertions in terms of god, then philosophically speaking we must accept my assertions in terms of me, as they are both equally logically supported (well, mine is more supported, as I physically exist ). And all we would be left is a "philosophical" discussion based on people making entirely baseless assertions.

Peregrinus wrote: »

No, I’ve already said, more than once, that I’m not making that argument. The existence of things is consistent with the premise I offered, not a proof of it. My point here is not the truth of my proposition, but the limitations of the techniques of natural science in evaluating my proposition.

Except that its not natural science that is limited, its your proposition. Your proposition is unfalsifiable, that makes it impossible to determine whether or not its true. That doesn't mean it cant be wrong or that it is above the manner of thinking and testing we use for everything else in existence, it means it is an invalid inane statement which holds no value.

Peregrinus wrote: »

All we have established is that my proposition cannot be adequate tested by the techniques of natural science. If you want to assert that propositions which cannot be adequately tested by the techniques of natural science are useless, go ahead and assert that. I would just point out, though, that if you do assert that, then you will be asserting a proposition which cannot be adequately tested by the techniques of natural science.

Your proposition cannot be tested at all. Full stop. No science, be it formal, social or natural can be used to test it, because its unfalsifiable. And unfalsifiable assertions are useless, because they cant be tested at all. How do you test an untestable assertion? In what way is it useful?

Peregrinus wrote: »

That’s an interesting point. What’s the measure of how right an ethical answer is?

How much it aligns with you and your societies values and morals.

ronan45

What sort of "god" or "higher power" would be bothered to create some ape like creatures and watch them over thousands of years? Like Im sure if i was a god i would think of much more fun things to do for entertainment or experimental purposes!

If there is one there why does he not pop down & spice things up every thousand years or so.
Send us some alien friends to visit and sit back and watch the hilarity ensue.

I dont really think were part of a greater plan to be honest, just a somewhat evolved life form that got lucky to a greater extent than others!

frozenfrozen

Amtmann wrote: »

As per the thread title, what would it take to make you believe in, or acknowledge, the existence of - for want of a better term - a god, demon, or supernatural intelligence?

Proof

/thread

Peregrinus

Panrich wrote: »

What if we take two hypothetical people who claim that God created the universe. On the face of things they are in agreement but if we scratch the surface of their claims it becomes apparent that Person A believes that God was 1M tall, blue and no longer interferes in his creation. Person B on the other hand believes that God is human-like and oversees his creation with great interest. What are we to make of each claim? By your proposition, they must merit the same weight as they both pass the Mark Hamill test. We are then ultimately left with a potential infinite number of Gods and this is not a satisfactory outcome. On what basis do you seperate the wheat from the chaff?

OK, couple of preliminary points:

The fact that both of these propositions pass the “Mark Hamill test” (sorry, Mark, but it looks as though this may be how your name will go down in history:-)) doesn’t mean that they “merit the same weight”. As I see it, passing the MH test simply involves the purely negative conclusion that we cannot answer the questions using the scientific method. But we can’t decide how much weight to attach to the questions unless we evaluate them positively in some way.

(I also note in passing that the claims made about God no. 1 - that he is 1m tall and coloured blue - are material claims which in principle could be tested by the scientific method. And, actually, if we clarify the claim that God n. 2 is “human-like”, that too might turn out to be a material claim. (Does human-like mean human-shaped?) So in one way these are perhaps not the best examples of the class of claim we are considering. But in another way, they may be good examples of a class of claim which, in principle, could be scientifically investigated but in practical reality we are unable as yet to mount the necessary investigations - we’d have to locate the postulated Gods before we could measure their height, shape or colour. So, in addition to asking ourselves how we evaluate claims that cannot be scientifically evaluated, we could also ask ourselves how we evaluate claims that could be scientifically evaluated when we are unable to make the scientific evaluation. But perhaps that’s an issue that we can leave for the honours students.)

OK, having mentioned those points and put them aside, I come to the nub of your post:

Panrich wrote: »

On what basis do you seperate the wheat from the chaff?

Or, in other words, granted that there is a class of questions which the scientific method is not helpful in answering, how do we go about answering those questions? That’s exactly what interests me. I don’t know the answer, but in this discussion I hope to feel my way towards it.

I suggest that, as a matter of reality, we do go about answering such questions, all the time. It is impossible to live without facing and at least attempting to answer such questions.

I also suggest that we have a variety of alternative techniques that we employ, and different techniques may be suited to different questions. For example, the (non-scientific) techniques that we employ to resolve questions - usually satisfactorily - in Euclidean geometry are not of much use in, say, lit. crit.

And I suggest - rather tentatively - that the particular set of techniques that we employ to answer a question doesn’t, in practice, just depend on the exact nature of the question. It also depends on subjective factors - our tastes and preferences and the degree of confidence that we repose in this method over that method, and also on whether the question interests us and on how badly we need an answer. And, possibly, on whether we are predisposed to expect or favour a particular answer.

This cuts both ways. On the one hand, you can have a highly religious person who - on a religious or philosophical question - wants and hopes for the theistic answer, and who will favour techniques of investigation and evaluation which support it, or at least accommodate it. On the other hand, you can have an irreligious person who wants and expects the non-theistic answer and whose attitude to techniques of investigation will be similarly coloured by that desire.

Before we rush to denounce this theory, reflect on the fact that the advertising industry makes millions out of assuming that our beliefs are heavily influenced by our desires. The fact that they are so successful suggests strongly that this foundational assumption contains a large measure of truth. So it seems to me quite reasonable to suggest that, to a significant extent, we believe what we want to believe, and our methods and techniques of investigating and evaluating beliefs are tailored accordingly. That raises the question, why do we want to believe what we want to believe? And I suspect that exploring that question takes you into human psychology.

We’ve a natural instinct to think that, well, all that may be true of your beliefs, but mine are formed fearlessly, objectively, dispassionately and from the evidence. But, unless we are singularly lacking in basic social awareness, we refrain from expressing that thought, out of a recognition that it would expose us to - entirely justified - derision.

Peregrinus

Mark Hamill wrote: »

If you make the statement "Mark Hamill created the universe" and assume it true, then look for evidence, then you will find it as supported as your own proposition that god created the universe.

“Assuming the truth” of a proposition is a necessary step in the scientific method, Mark. It’s a thought experiment; you assume that the proposition to be tested in true in order to examine what consequences would flow from its truth. Then you test for the consequences. If your tests show that the consequences are not present, then the proposition being tested must be false. (But the converse is not necessarily true.)

Mark Hamill wrote: »

Pointing out that things existed before me is irrelevant, as time started when the universe started, so all I need do is leave the universe, create it and pop back in at the time I was born. Pointing out that your understanding of my abilities is limited does not actually make them so.

“Mark Hamill” is a material entity. Statements about material entities are, in principle, capable of being investigated through the scientific method, which proceeds from observations of material entities. If you want to argue that there is a class of statement about material entities which are not susceptible of investigation through the scientific method, go right ahead and be my guest. All you would be doing, though, is arguing that the scientific method has limited utility, even in relation to the investigation of the material universe, and I would be surprised to learn that that was your position.

Mark Hamill wrote: »

Except that its not natural science that is limited, its your proposition. Your proposition is unfalsifiable, that makes it impossible to determine whether or not its true. That doesn't mean it cant be wrong or that it is above the manner of thinking and testing we use for everything else in existence, it means it is an invalid inane statement which holds no value.

If a proposition could, in principle, be true, but the scientific method is unable to evaluate its truth, that seems fairly clearly to me to be a limitation of the scientific method, rather than a limitation of the proposition.

Your claim that the scientific method represents “the manner of thinking and testing we use for everything else in existence” I find hard to understand. What does the word “else” mean in this sentence? It seems to me that what you are asserting here is that the scientific method is what we use to investigate everything, other than the things that we don’t investigate with the scientific method. If so, the claim is trite (except that it invites the observation that the class of things that we don’t investigate with the scientific method is very, very large).

Mark Hamill wrote: »

Your proposition cannot be tested at all. Full stop. No science, be it formal, social or natural can be used to test it, because its unfalsifiable. And unfalsifiable assertions are useless, because they cant be tested at all. How do you test an untestable assertion? In what way is it useful?

No. All we have established so far is that the claim cannot be tested by the scientific method. If you want to assert that claims which cannot be tested by the scientific method cannot be tested at all, you’ll need to set out your reason for thinking so.

And it seems to me that you’ll have a problem. The claim “that which cannot be tested by the scientific method cannot be tested at all” is itself a claim which cannot be tested by the scientific method. So how are you going to validate your claim? Isn’t your position on this somewhat self-refuting?

It seems to me that you’re assuming a primacy for science and the scientific method which is simply not proven, or justified, and that any attempt to prove or justify it must be self-refuting.

I’m open to being persuaded otherwise, but you’re going to have to walk me through the proof.

Mark Hamill wrote: »

[The measure of how right an ethical answer is] How much it aligns with you and your societies values and morals.

All you are saying here is that the measure of how right an ethical position is is how well it aligns with another ethical position, which in turn is justified by how well it aligns with yet another ethical position . . . and so on. Either we proceed in an endless circle of ethical positions affirming one another, or we come back to one or more axiomatic ethical positions which are assumed to be true without being proven.

This begins to look a bit like Euclidean geometry, except that, in ethics, the fundamental axioms are usually statements about reality - e.g. about human nature or human growth, or life - whereas in Euclidean geometry the fundamental axioms are about ideal, imaginary things - e.g. parallel lines, right angles.

It also begins to look like the scientific method, which also proceeds from a small number of fundamental but unproven axioms about a particular kind of reality.

Thus far, I’m not seeing any basis for claiming a privileged position for the scientific method, or the knowledge it produces. It is singularly well-adapted to producing clear and reliable answers to questions about mass-energy in all its forms. But to move from there to an assertion that questions which can’t be answered through the application of the scientific method are inherently unfalsifiable, inane and completely useless involves a giant logical gap which, so far, I see you making no attempt to fill.

Mark Hamill

Peregrinus wrote: »

“Assuming the truth” of a proposition is a necessary step in the scientific method, Mark. It’s a thought experiment; you assume that the proposition to be tested in true in order to examine what consequences would flow from its truth. Then you test for the consequences. If your tests show that the consequences are not present, then the proposition being tested must be false. (But the converse is not necessarily true.)

However before that step, the scientific method also requires that the proposition be falsifiable. Your statement fails in that regard, hence you can put anything in place of "god" and it would still be true. This makes it useless.

Peregrinus wrote: »

“Mark Hamill” is a material entity. Statements about material entities are, in principle, capable of being investigated through the scientific method, which proceeds from observations of material entities. If you want to argue that there is a class of statement about material entities which are not susceptible of investigation through the scientific method, go right ahead and be my guest. All you would be doing, though, is arguing that the scientific method has limited utility, even in relation to the investigation of the material universe, and I would be surprised to learn that that was your position.

"Mark Hamill", as you understand the entity, is material, but your understanding is not absolute, so there is no reason to assume that there is no non-material aspect of "Mark Hamill" that exists. Of course, there is also no reason to assume that a material entity couldn't create the universe, should that material entity somehow leave the constraints of the space-time universe.

Peregrinus wrote: »

If a proposition could, in principle, be true, but the scientific method is unable to evaluate its truth, that seems fairly clearly to me to be a limitation of the scientific method, rather than a limitation of the proposition.

And if said statement is completely untestable, then how likely it is to be true is completely unmeasurable and therefore its useless. You cannot say that the scientific method is limited in this case (as you cannot even determine if there is something in existence that it is limited in relation to), the statement is limited in its testability, predictability (ie what you can predict from it) and therefore usefulness.

Peregrinus wrote: »

Your claim that the scientific method represents “the manner of thinking and testing we use for everything else in existence” I find hard to understand. What does the word “else” mean in this sentence? It seems to me that what you are asserting here is that the scientific method is what we use to investigate everything, other than the things that we don’t investigate with the scientific method. If so, the claim is trite (except that it invites the observation that the class of things that we don’t investigate with the scientific method is very, very large).

Your right, "else" should not have been used, as it implies that your statement describes something that is in existence. Your statement describes nothing that can in any way be uniquely inferred to exist. Science does not entertain untestable propositions, not as some philosophical distancing from religion, but as a simple logical extension of the fact that science is a method for testing. How do we test an untestable proposition? We cant. What can we say or do about untestable propositions? Nothing, because they are untestable. This is not a limiting of science, we dont say that mathematics is "limited" because you cant add a blrgh and vlrg, when no definition of blrgh and vlrg is possible.

Peregrinus wrote: »

No. All we have established so far is that the claim cannot be tested by the scientific method. If you want to assert that claims which cannot be tested by the scientific method cannot be tested at all, you’ll need to set out your reason for thinking so.

I already explained why. Something is untestable by the scientific method if it is unfalsifiable.

Peregrinus wrote: »

And it seems to me that you’ll have a problem. The claim “that which cannot be tested by the scientific method cannot be tested at all” is itself a claim which cannot be tested by the scientific method. So how are you going to validate your claim? Isn’t your position on this somewhat self-refuting?

I assume that you know that it is one of the fundamental assumptions of science, that everything in the universe is measurable? Its an assumption we have to make in order to test things, make predictions and attain knowledge. Every test we do tests this assumption, but while we can never truly fully test it (although every test we do confirms it), without it, we would have no way to test anything, as we would never be able to eliminate some unmeasurable cause for anything we were testing.

Peregrinus wrote: »

It seems to me that you’re assuming a primacy for science and the scientific method which is simply not proven, or justified, and that any attempt to prove or justify it must be self-refuting.

Then what is your alternative? How do you test and untestable proposition?

Peregrinus wrote: »

I’m open to being persuaded otherwise, but you’re going to have to walk me through the proof.

Considering you keep talking about science and the scientific method as if it is some alien idea, separate from logic and reason, I'm not sure you are open to it. Science is not some arbitrary field of thought, its the current level of the logical evolution of trying to determine the objective truth of any statement. Trying to find out if something is true, in the most objective and logical way possible, will inevitably lead you to ask "if only this was true, what sort of predictions could I make" and then test that proposition. That's all science is. Its just logic in the real world. Those that see to think it doesn't apply to whatever they are talking about are, in reality, saying that logic doesn't apply to what they are talking about.
Now science may not be where this evolution of logic and reason with a desire to find truth ends, but I can't think of a better way, can you offer an alternative?

Peregrinus wrote: »

All you are saying here is that the measure of how right an ethical position is is how well it aligns with another ethical position, which in turn is justified by how well it aligns with yet another ethical position . . . and so on.

Yes, because ethics is subjective. I thought that was obvious. Ethics is the question of what we should do that would best satisfy our rules for harmonious cohabitation. Instinctually, we know that killing is bad, but ethically it can be justified - self defence, euthanasia etc. We decide what is important, why it is important and then what justification we might have for acting contrary.

Peregrinus wrote: »

Thus far, I’m not seeing any basis for claiming a privileged position for the scientific method, or the knowledge it produces. It is singularly well-adapted to producing clear and reliable answers to questions about mass-energy in all its forms. But to move from there to an assertion that questions which can’t be answered through the application of the scientific method are inherently unfalsifiable, inane and completely useless involves a giant logical gap which, so far, I see you making no attempt to fill.

Well, by definition the scientific method, can only not answer a question if its unfalsifiable, so there is no logical gap there. Questions that are unfalsifiable are inane and useless as they don't offer predictions or tell us confirmable truths. We cant test untestable, so what use are they?

Pwpane

Peregrinus:

If there is a basis for things to exist, what consequence would we expect to flow from that? We would expect things to exist. We observe that things do exist, so our observations are consistent with what we would expect if our premise were true. All perfectly logical. If nothing existed then there would be no evidence that our premise was or might be true.

This is a circular argument and definitely not logical:
1. 'Look at everything that exists - I think there must be a basis for things to exist.'
2. 'Let's call the basis for things to exist God'
3. 'So, if God exists then other things should exist, right?'
4. 'Yes, and look around you - other things do exist.'
5. 'You're right. This is evidence that God exists.'

I would be overreaching myself if I claimed that, because things exist, therefore the fundamental ground for existence, viz. God, must also exist. That would be illogical, since I haven’t excluded the possibility that there could be different explanations for the phenomenon of existence. But I’m not claiming that.

So - you're saying that there might be a God, but there might not be a God either. Not useful!

Plus, in so far as I can articulate my reasons for belief I freely admit that they are highly subjective, and not something I would put forward in the expectation that they would influence anyone else.....When we do come on to this question, I think it would be more productive to discuss not why Peregrinus believes what he believes, but why people believe what they believe - i.e. the various tools that people employ to evaluate beliefs and to accept, reject or simply ignore them.

I'm disappointed that you don't wish to share your reasons for believing in God. You see, I've come to the opinion that belief is entirely subjective; that there is no evidence for the existence of God, only the weight of tradition; and that a person believes in God because of some personal experience that affects them at an emotional level. I'm interested in the reasons why intelligent people do believe - because at the moment I can't fathom why.

Peregrinus

Pwpane wrote: »

Peregrinus:
This is a circular argument and definitely not logical:
1. 'Look at everything that exists - I think there must be a basis for things to exist.'
2. 'Let's call the basis for things to exist God'
3. 'So, if God exists then other things should exist, right?'
4. 'Yes, and look around you - other things do exist.'
5. 'You're right. This is evidence that God exists.'

That’s not my argument, though. What I’m arguing for here is not the truth of the claim that “God is the fundamental ground for the existence of all things that exist”. I’m arguing for the comparative uselessness of natural science and the scientific method in casting light on this claim, one way or the other.

Yes, in so far as we would expect observable consequences to flow from the truth of this claim, we do in fact observe those consequences. One possible refutation of the claim has been disposed of. But that certainly does not amount to a proof of the claim; it merely shows that, if we want to test this claim beyond this fairly trivial point, we’re going to have to look beyond the bounds of natural science for techniques to do so.

Pwpane wrote: »

So - you're saying that there might be a God, but there might not be a God either. Not useful!

Ah, but what is it, exactly, that is “not useful” here?

I suggest we can consider two possibilities.

First, the scientific method is not useful here. I think this is pretty indisputable, really. The scientific method can cast very little light on the claim being examined, which is all we want it to do. It’s very useful in other contexts; in this context, not so much.

Secondly, the claim “God is the fundamental ground for the existence of all things that exist” is not useful, because it can’t be tested.

The unstated but essential premise of this position is that, if a claim cannot be tested by the scientific method, then it can’t be tested at all.

And that’s a premise I dispute. In the first place, I don’t see anyone making a coherent argument as to why this must be so. In the second place, it defies common sense and common experience. As already pointed out, there’s a huge range of claims that can’t be tested by the scientific method that we evaluate and make use of every day, in fields as diverse as pure mathematics, Euclidean geometry, ethics, aesthetics, criticism and many more.

If we can’t test a claim through the scientific method, it may be that it’s not a useful claim, but that hasn’t been demonstrated. It may also be that we cannot test it at all, but that hasn’t been demonstrated either. The proposition that unscientific claims are inherently untestable and useless is refuted by pointing to the counterexample of, e.g., Pythagoras’ theorem, which is tested rigorously (albeit not scientifically) and is certainly useful.

Pwpane wrote: »

I'm disappointed that you don't wish to share your reasons for believing in God. You see, I've come to the opinion that belief is entirely subjective; that there is no evidence for the existence of God, only the weight of tradition; and that a person believes in God because of some personal experience that affects them at an emotional level. I'm interested in the reasons why intelligent people do believe - because at the moment I can't fathom why.

Well, I’ll say this; if I did share my reasons for my belief, they would do nothing to change your mind. They are pretty subjective.

Instead, I’m going to suggest a different thought; the reasons for unbelief are equally subjective, and a person may just as readily reject a belief in God because of some personal experience that affects them at an emotional level as accept it.

Pwpane

Peregrinus wrote: »

What I’m arguing for here is not the truth of the claim that “God is the fundamental ground for the existence of all things that exist”. I’m arguing for the comparative uselessness of natural science and the scientific method in casting light on this claim, one way or the other........ As already pointed out, there’s a huge range of claims that can’t be tested by the scientific method that we evaluate and make use of every day, in fields as diverse as pure mathematics, Euclidean geometry, ethics, aesthetics, criticism and many more.

I understand that that is your premise. But I haven't heard your alternative method yet in order to judge it. So far, you seem to use non sequiturs to promote the inability of science to take part in the discussion. Let's put that on hold, and show us the alternative so we can understand what you are proposing.

Instead, I’m going to suggest a different thought; the reasons for unbelief are equally subjective, and a person may just as readily reject a belief in God because of some personal experience that affects them at an emotional level as accept it.

I don't think that's a different thought. If there is no evidence, it follows. It comes back to what I was taught as a child about faith - you either have it or you don't, and it's a gift from God.

But that's more circularity. It makes belief into a feeling.

As far as I can make out, people want that feeling to give them a sense of purpose in their difficult lives.

But as an idea, it just doesn't make sense to me.

Even you imply that your own reasons are personal and wouldn't make sense to me either, insofar as they wouldn't be reasonable enough to give a justification for belief.

That's really what I'm interested in - what justifiable reasons do people have for belief? Given my background and the people I live among, I would like to understand.

Mark Hamill

Peregrinus wrote: »

That’s not my argument, though. What I’m arguing for here is not the truth of the claim that “God is the fundamental ground for the existence of all things that exist”. I’m arguing for the comparative uselessness of natural science and the scientific method in casting light on this claim, one way or the other.

But you are presenting that as if its somehow a weakness of science that it can't examine circular logic. Which is ridiculous.

Peregrinus

Mark Hamill wrote: »

But you are presenting that as if its somehow a weakness of science that it can't examine circular logic. Which is ridiculous.

There is nothing circular about the proposition that "God is the fundamental ground for the existence of all things that exist". It's a simple statement and, while arguments can be circular, statements can't.

Others are constructing arguments which start from that statement and try to reason through to the conclusion that "therefore God exists", and then pointing out (correctly) that those arguments are circular. But I am explicitly not putting forward those arguments. And, if I were, we wouldn't need the scientific method to critique those arguments; they are sufficiently critiqued by pointing out that they are circular. Circular reasoning is fallacious.

No, my point has nothing to do with those arguments. My point is that science cannot usefully examine this statement.

That's a characteristic of science, but not necessarily a “weakness”, unless you take the view that science should be able to do things that it doesn’t claim to do.

The claim that “God is the fundamental ground for the existence of all things that exist" is by no means unusual in not being susceptible of scientific examination. I’ve already pointed out - and nobody has disputed - that “the square of the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides” is not susceptible of scientific examination, and that there are wide fields of enquiry and interests in which it is generally or often true that relevant or interesting claims are not susceptible of scientific investigation.

In post #102 you suggest that “one of the fundamental assumptions of science [is that] everything in the universe is measurable”. This raises the fairly fundamental question of what we mean by “everything in the universe”. I'll happily agree that all forms of mass-energy that exist are “in the universe”; anything that we can, or could in principle, touch, feel, see, hear, smell. But what about a Euclidean right-angled triangle? What about a point in a plane? What about prime numbers? What about truth? What about falsifiabilty? What about logic? These are entirely conceptual; they do not and cannot exist as any manifestation of mass-energy. Are they “in the universe”?

If the answer is “no”, then you can stand over your claim that science is apt for investigating everything in the universe, but I think you must abandon your claim that what cannot be scientifically investigated is useless, inane, a nullity, unable to be tested in any meaningful way, etc.

On the other hand, if the answer is “yes” then you must abandon your claim that science is apt for investigating everything in the universe. (And I think you also must concede that what you describe as “one of the fundamental assumptions of science” is false.)

Look carefully at the claim that "God is the fundamental ground for the existence of all things that exist". It makes no explicit claim that God “exists”. The only implicit claim is that God “exists” in the sense that a “ground” - i.e. a reason, a basis, a justification, an explanation, a fundamental principle - can be said to “exist”. Science proceeds by observing and measuring the observable and measurable; hence the need for the fundamental assumption that you identify. But reasons and basis and justifications and grounds and similar concepts are not observable or measurable in the way that atoms and galaxies and rocks and chickens and electromagnetic radiation can be observed or measured. For that reason they are not susceptible of scientific observation or verification; we examine them employing the techniques of philosophy, not science.

To say that science is not apt for investigating claims about these things is not to point to a “weakness” in science; just to a characteristic of science which defines its role and utility.

Peregrinus

Pwpane wrote: »

I understand that that is your premise. But I haven't heard your alternative method yet in order to judge it. So far, you seem to use non sequiturs to promote the inability of science to take part in the discussion. Let's put that on hold, and show us the alternative so we can understand what you are proposing.

Well, I can’t let the non sequitur allegation go by unchallenged. The “inability of science to take part in the discussion” is in fact common ground between myself and Mark Hamill (and, so far as I know, everyone else) so I don’t need to “promote” it. Where we differ is on whether this means that the statement under examination is useless, irrelevant, meaningless, inane, incapable of any meaningful consideration or scrutiny, etc. I maintain that it doesn’t mean this, and I don’t think I have employed any non sequiturs in support of that position.

But let that be; I've registered my protest. The question you raise is an interesting one. If the application of the techniques of science isn’t particularly enlightening here, what is?

I don’t see that it’s particularly for me to offer an alternative method. I have no special authority here. You yourself have to deal with non-scientific statements all the time, and form views about them. What techniques do you employ to do so? Are any of those techniques likely to be helpful here? Should you not be asking yourself those questions before asking others to tell you how to make such judgments? You already know how to make them as well as anyone else does.

But, as I said before, let’s not personalize this; let’s talk in general terms. One of the fundamental assumptions of science is that things exist (i.e. the universe is real, not illusory). That’s an axiom; science does not look behind it. If you ask why things exist - not how things came into existence, or how they came into their current state of existence, but why things exist at all, as opposed to nothing existing; if you ask, in short, why existence exists - the orthodox scientific answer is something like “the question is meaningless” or “the question can’t be answered” or “the phenomenon of existence is a given” or “science does not deal in reasons why”.

That answer may satisfy you, or it may not. Whether it does or not is entirely subjective. (That’s the nature of satisfaction, really.) There may be reasons why it satisfies your or doesn’t satisfy you; exploring those is really the realm of psychology. For the time being, all I’m asking you to accept that a person might or might not be satisfied with an answer like that, that either position can be reasonable (i.e. not irrational) and that science cannot prove or refute either position (since science, obviously, cannot be used to investigate or prove its own axioms).

Right. You can see, I hope, that someone who doesn’t find that answer satisfactory would be willing - should, logically, be willing - to entertain other, necessarily non-scientific, answers, such as the one offered by the “god is the fundamental ground . . .” proposition, and that entertaining them is not irrational.

“Entertain”, of course, doesn’t mean “uncritically accept”. So how, exactly, will they “entertain” this particular proposition? First, most obviously, they will ask themselves whether they find it any more satisfactory than the best that science can do. Secondly, they might explore what it means. (Is it saying anything more than “we choose to label the fundamental ground for existence ‘God’”?) Thirdly, they might consider its implications. Fourthly, they might examine it for coherence with other beliefs that they hold. Fifthly, they might consider whether it helps to answer any other questions that interest them. Sixthly, they might measure it against their gut instinct. Seventhly . . . well, you can add to this list yourself.

This is all highly subjective, of course, but, then, much of philosophy is. In particular, matters of belief necessarily are - including the choice not to believe a particular proposition. After all, the person who was satisfied with the scientific answer (or, rather, refusal to answer) a few paragraphs back has reasons - necessarily, subjective reasons - for accepting the belief that, if there isn’t a scientific answer, there isn’t an answer.

Pwpane

Peregrinus:

There is nothing circular about the proposition that "God is the fundamental ground for the existence of all things that exist". It's a simple statement and, while arguments can be circular, statements can't.

Others are constructing arguments which start from that statement and try to reason through to the conclusion that "therefore God exists", and then pointing out (correctly) that those arguments are circular. But I am explicitly not putting forward those arguments. And, if I were, we wouldn't need the scientific method to critique those arguments; they are sufficiently critiqued by pointing out that they are circular. Circular reasoning is fallacious.

The problem really was with your use of the word 'evidence'.

The question you raise is an interesting one. If the application of the techniques of science isn’t particularly enlightening here, what is?

I don’t see that it’s particularly for me to offer an alternative method.....Should you not be asking yourself those questions before asking others to tell you how to make such judgments?

You're walking a line between leading an argument along chosen lines and being patronising - careful, or you'll lose your audience!

You posit the question 'why do things exist?' and say that it is reasonable to try to answer this question using whatever means are suitable: not scientific as concepts are not material - if I understand you correctly. My problem with this is not your method of enquiry, but your starting point. I don't say that the question 'why?' is meaningless, but wonder why you think there should be a 'why?' in the first place. The question 'why?' seems to me to pre-suppose a sentient reason or purpose i.e. God. This again is circular. Why do people seem to need a reason why they are here, why do they need to feel their lives have a purpose? If you argue that God is the most reasonable answer to why things exist, maybe you are right but I would need to get past your starting point first. Why is the 'how' not sufficient reason for you for the existence of things?

Careful deductive reasoning has been used to rationalise all sorts of dubious conclusions. To my mind, it has been the starting premise of these arguments that was the problem.

Look carefully at the claim that "God is the fundamental ground for the existence of all things that exist". It makes no explicit claim that God “exists”. The only implicit claim is that God “exists” in the sense that a “ground” - i.e. a reason, a basis, a justification, an explanation, a fundamental principle - can be said to “exist”.

I have to register a protest here! The claim that 'God is the reason we exist' is of course a claim that God exists. Otherwise the statement is a nonsense. If it was phrased: 'Could God be the reason we exist?' it would be different.

Mark Hamill

Peregrinus wrote: »

No, my point has nothing to do with those arguments.

Yet you were the first one who made those arguments, in post 85.

Peregrinus wrote: »

My point is that science cannot usefully examine this statement.

Statements aren't examined by science, they are hypothesised during the scientific process and the reasoning behind them, and the predictions derived from them, are examined. You make observations, hypothesise and test, the whole process is science. Your statement can only be examined in conjunction with the reasoning that created it and its predictions (post 85), however the reasoning is circular, so it is a fallacious statement. You need to offer useful reasoning before science can examine anything.

Peregrinus wrote: »

The claim that “God is the fundamental ground for the existence of all things that exist" is by no means unusual in not being susceptible of scientific examination. I’ve already pointed out - and nobody has disputed - that “the square of the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides” is not susceptible of scientific examination, and that there are wide fields of enquiry and interests in which it is generally or often true that relevant or interesting claims are not susceptible of scientific investigation.

Mathematical proofs are a part of scientific examination. You seem to be trying trying to separate different fields of science for no discernible (logical) reason.

Peregrinus wrote: »

If the answer is “no”, then you can stand over your claim that science is apt for investigating everything in the universe, but I think you must abandon your claim that what cannot be scientifically investigated is useless, inane, a nullity, unable to be tested in any meaningful way, etc.

There are examples of these in the universe, the study is done in the abstract to keep it straightforward, but we could use natural examples of right angled triangles or two dimensional space as a plane. Truth is a measure of how much a concept aligns with reality, logic is a way to determine that truth.

Peregrinus wrote: »

Look carefully at the claim that "God is the fundamental ground for the existence of all things that exist". It makes no explicit claim that God “exists”. The only implicit claim is that God “exists” in the sense that a “ground”

How is saying that "A" is the grounds for "B" existing, not an implicit claim that "A" exists?

Peregrinus wrote: »

But reasons and basis and justifications and grounds and similar concepts are not observable or measurable in the way that atoms and galaxies and rocks and chickens and electromagnetic radiation can be observed or measured. For that reason they are not susceptible of scientific observation or verification; we examine them employing the techniques of philosophy, not science.

Of course these are examinable by science. Reasons and basis etc are supposed to represent something that exists, so we can see how close they actually match with what exists by scientifically measuring what exists.

Peregrinus

Pwpane wrote: »

The problem really was with your use of the word 'evidence'.

I’m sorry if I misled you there, but I’d defend the use of the word. The scientific method proceeds by examining evidence. The only evidence pertinent to the God-claim is things other than God do exist, which is what you would expect if the claim was true. But my point has always been that that’s not enough evidence for a useful evaluation of the claim.

Pwpane wrote: »

You're walking a line between leading an argument along chosen lines and being patronising - careful, or you'll lose your audience!

I certainly don’t want to be patronizing and, if that’s how it comes across, I apologise. My point is simply that the question you’re asking me here is a question that you have almost certainly already asked and answered for yourself. Ordinary human life requires us to evaluate claims that are not susceptible of scientific testing all the time.

Pwpane wrote: »

You posit the question 'why do things exist?' and say that it is reasonable to try to answer this question using whatever means are suitable: not scientific as concepts are not material - if I understand you correctly. My problem with this is not your method of enquiry, but your starting point. I don't say that the question 'why?' is meaningless, but wonder why you think there should be a 'why?' in the first place. The question 'why?' seems to me to pre-suppose a sentient reason or purpose i.e. God. This again is circular. Why do people seem to need a reason why they are here, why do they need to feel their lives have a purpose?

Right, that’s a very good point.

When you say that the “question 'why?' seems to me to pre-suppose a sentient reason or purpose i.e. God”, my immediate answer is that no, it doesn’t. Where is the presupposition of sentience? Does the question not admit of an answer referring to a non-sentient reason? It seems to me that it does.

But drop the word “sentient” and I think you challenge gives me a little bit more difficulty. If I ask “why?” (or “what is the reason?”) does the question not presuppose that there must be some reason, and that our only task is to discern what it is?

I’d say the question does not presuppose that, because the answer “there is no reason” is a possible and meaningful answer to the question. In doing that, of course, I must concede that “there is no reason” may be a satisfactory answer. But I’ve already conceded that.

Pwpane wrote: »

If you argue that God is the most reasonable answer to why things exist, maybe you are right but I would need to get past your starting point first. Why is the 'how' not sufficient reason for you for the existence of things?

Well, “how” is not a sufficient reason because “how” is not a reason at all. Someone who accepts the “how” answer as complete is not saying that he knows the reason why things exist. He is saying that he accepts that there is no reason, or that he accepts that he does not know whether there is a reason, or he that he is not interested in whether there is a reason, or something of that kind.

It seems to me that it comes down to this; the question “why do things exist?” is one which may not interest some people. And, if they’re not interested, they’re not interested; fair enough. I am not arguing that they should be interested. But, equally, I can see no argument why someone else should not be interested. The fact that a question is difficult, or arguably impossible, to answer is not a reason for not being interested in it.

As for moving on from there to argue that “God” is the most reasonable answer to the question of why things exist, I’m not even going to attempt that!

Pwpane wrote: »

Careful deductive reasoning has been used to rationalise all sorts of dubious conclusions. To my mind, it has been the starting premise of these arguments that was the problem.

What do you identify as “the starting premise of these arguments”? And why is it a problematic premise?

Pwpane wrote: »

I have to register a protest here! The claim that 'God is the reason we exist' is of course a claim that God exists. Otherwise the statement is a nonsense. If it was phrased: 'Could God be the reason we exist?' it would be different.

It’s a most a claim that God exists only in the sense that a reason - something purely conceptual or imaginary - exists, and not in the sense that, e.g., a rock exists. I think we need to distinguish between these senses in this conversation because when, e.g. Mark Hamill says that “everything which exists is measurable”, he’s plainly using “exist” in a sense which does not include purely conceptual existence.

Peregrinus

Mark Hamill wrote: »

Yet you were the first one who made those arguments, in post 85.

Yes, but I made them in order to demonstrate that they are inadequate, and I said so in post 85.

Mark Hamill wrote: »

Mathematical proofs are a part of scientific examination. You seem to be trying trying to separate different fields of science for no discernible (logical) reason.

The scientific method may employ mathematics, of course, and logic (and indeed language). But it doesn’t follow that all mathematical demonstrations or calculations, all logical arguments, all linguistic statements, are examples of the scientific method.

The scientific method proceeds by making empirical and measurable observations of that which is empirically observable, and examining the results for consistency with a hypothesis. If they are inconsistent with the hypothesis, the hypothesis is shown to be false.

Mathematical and logical arguments which do not rely on observed empirical data - and there are many of these - are therefore not applications of the scientific method

Mark Hamill wrote: »

There are examples of these in the universe, the study is done in the abstract to keep it straightforward, but we could use natural examples of right angled triangles or two dimensional space as a plane.

There are no natural examples of the Euclidean and Platonic ideals; that’s why they are “ideals”. Even if there were, the standard proof for, e.g., Pythagoras’ theorem does not refer to them, and in particular does not employ empirical measurable observations of them. It is therefore not an application of the scientific method. Yet nobody doubts its probative value.

Mark Hamill wrote: »

Truth is a measure of how much a concept aligns with reality . . .

That raises the question of what “reality” is, no? You pointed out earlier that a foundational axiom of the scientific method is that “everything in the universe is measurable”, and I pointed out that this is true only for certain values of “everything in the universe”. If there are entities which cannot be empirically observed - like “concepts” - then the scientific method cannot be an exhaustive method of “measuring” how much they align with “reality”.

Mark Hamill wrote: »

. . . logic is a way to determine that truth.

Not essentially, no. It’s perfectly possible for an argument to be completely logical, yet to rest on untrue premises, e.g.:

1. All swans are green.
2. Mark Hamill is a swan.
3. Therefore Mark Hamill is green.

No logical flaws there, but obviously the conclusion is false. It’s false because the premises are false, but we don’t employ logic to show that; we just make empirical observations of Mark Hamilll or of a swan.

Mark Hamill wrote: »

How is saying that "A" is the grounds for "B" existing, not an implicit claim that "A" exists?

You’ve cut off my sentence when quoting it, Mark. What I said was the claim that God is a ground implies that God must exist in the sense that a ground exists - i.e. in the sense that a concept exists, which involves an existence which is not necessarily empirically observable, and therefore not necessarily susceptible of examination through the scientific method.

Mark Hamill wrote: »

Of course these are examinable by science. Reasons and basis etc are supposed to represent something that exists, so we can see how close they actually match with what exists by scientifically measuring what exists.

If you can’t make empirical observations of a Euclidean right-angled triangle, or of a prime number, what makes you think you can necessarily make empirical observations of a “reason”?

Zombrex

Peregrinus wrote: »

I think it does. There’s a class of questions for which the techniques of natural science are particularly well adapted to producing answers which are (a) clear and (b) highly reliable. We call them scientific propositions and they relate to material reality.

But there’s another class of questions, the subject matter of which is not confined to material reality and which cannot be usefully answered employing the techniques of natural science.

It is arguable though that these questions therefore cannot be usefully answered. Switching to another methodology, such as theology, doesn't solve this problem.

Peregrinus wrote: »

And this is not just relevant to questions of religion and ethics and similar fields; I’ve already pointed to Euclidean geometry as a field in which we employ non-scientific techniques to answer questions. But I could just as easily have mentioned literary criticism, or aesthetics, or a host of other fields of enquiry that are deeply enriching and important to humanity.

But there is no objectively right answer in literary criticism or aesthetics. These are formed as part of opinion.

Whether God exists or not is not a matter of opinion. There is a right answer, and there is a wrong answer. It is also not a question contained in the axioms of a human defined system. We don't decide if God exists or not.

If you accept both of those things then it pushes the question of God right back into the realm of the natural sciences.

Peregrinus wrote: »

First, as just shown, just because a question can’t be answered through the techniques of natural science doesn’t mean that there are no other techniques which can help. There may be no other techniques which will be even as enlightening as the techniques of natural science, but I think if the question is one which interests us we are at least going to look around for other techniques which will help us approach the question.

It depends on the question. Again the existence of God is not a subjective assessment, nor it is a conclusion of a human defined construct.

Peregrinus wrote: »

Secondly, if there are no techniques which cast any light on the question, how do we respond to that? Natural science tends to ignore the question as being of no interest and occasionally - as we see in this thread - you will get people arguing that indeed it can be of no interest. But that’s just not true; ethical questions cannot be answered by the techniques of natural science, but since ethical questions concern themselves with how and whether we act, and since we cannot live without making decisions about how and whether to act, these questions interest us profoundly. It’s just not a scientific interest.

Ethical questions are not statements about the nature of the reality.

You are committing a category error.

Peregrinus wrote: »

Are you assuming that all question-answering methodologies other than the scientific method are flawed?

Flawed at determining which statements about the nature of reality are accurate, yes. Though I wouldn't call that an assumption.

Peregrinus wrote: »

Because, if you are, it’ll be obvious by now that I don’t agree. And you have made no argument in support of the position (if it is your position).

I'm not sure if you do agree or not. You say that there are other methods to answer these questions, but then bring in questions that are irrelevant to the areas of discussion.

I think if you thought about it you would agree that no other methodology is helpful in determining the accuracy of claims about nature. And "God exists" is a claim about nature.

Peregrinus wrote: »

You suggest that “it’s a natural human instinct to find this unsatisfactory”, and that we take recourse in credulity, believing a methodology to be helpful because we wish it to be so. But I suggest that that’s a particularly modern attitude, emerging from the Enlightenment and the belief in the value of human enquiry and the scientific method, and a passionate desire to answer all questions, and therefore a passionate desire that all questions should be answerable.

I would strongly disagree. If you look at what religions attempted to explain, basically everything from the formation of the universe to human behavior and contrast that with what the early scientists happily admitted they didn't know at the beginning of the Enlightenment you will see a stark contrast.

Or to put it another way, pre-Enlightenment everything was understood, from the formation of the universe to the reason humans act as they do, to the nature of the elements, to the shape of the Earth. It just so happened that all of these explanations were wrong. It took the Enlightenment to realize that in fact very little was genuinely understood.

Mark Hamill

Peregrinus wrote: »

Yes, but I made them in order to demonstrate that they are inadequate, and I said so in post 85.

You made them in order to imply that the scientific method was inadequate to examine the proposition, when in reality they show why the proposition is inadequately worded to be properly examined.

Peregrinus wrote: »

The scientific method may employ mathematics, of course, and logic (and indeed language). But it doesn’t follow that all mathematical demonstrations or calculations, all logical arguments, all linguistic statements, are examples of the scientific method.

I said they are all part of the method, not examples of it.

Peregrinus wrote: »

The scientific method proceeds by making empirical and measurable observations of that which is empirically observable, and examining the results for consistency with a hypothesis. If they are inconsistent with the hypothesis, the hypothesis is shown to be false.

Mathematical and logical arguments which do not rely on observed empirical data - and there are many of these - are therefore not applications of the scientific method

And if they cant be represented empirically, what importance are they? If a mathematical or logical argument cannot in any way represent anything at all in the empirical world, then what is their use?

Peregrinus wrote: »

There are no natural examples of the Euclidean and Platonic ideals; that’s why they are “ideals”. Even if there were, the standard proof for, e.g., Pythagoras’ theorem does not refer to them, and in particular does not employ empirical measurable observations of them. It is therefore not an application of the scientific method. Yet nobody doubts its probative value.

I said already that we don't use natural examples as it would just overcomplicate the study of these. And the reason that nobody doubts the probative value is because of the evidence of them being used in the real world.

Peregrinus wrote: »

That raises the question of what “reality” is, no? You pointed out earlier that a foundational axiom of the scientific method is that “everything in the universe is measurable”, and I pointed out that this is true only for certain values of “everything in the universe”. If there are entities which cannot be empirically observed - like “concepts” - then the scientific method cannot be an exhaustive method of “measuring” how much they align with “reality”.

If these concepts had no empirical basis, then they would be indistinguishable from not existing and so then they wouldn't align with reality anyway.

Peregrinus wrote: »

Not essentially, no. It’s perfectly possible for an argument to be completely logical, yet to rest on untrue premises, e.g.:

1. All swans are green.
2. Mark Hamill is a swan.
3. Therefore Mark Hamill is green.

No logical flaws there, but obviously the conclusion is false. It’s false because the premises are false, but we don’t employ logic to show that; we just make empirical observations of Mark Hamilll or of a swan.

The logical flaw is accepting the premise without a logical reason to do so. We know that the conclusion is false because empirical evidence tells us that is false, which tells us that the premise must be false.

Peregrinus wrote: »

You’ve cut off my sentence when quoting it, Mark. What I said was the claim that God is a ground implies that God must exist in the sense that a ground exists - i.e. in the sense that a concept exists, which involves an existence which is not necessarily empirically observable, and therefore not necessarily susceptible of examination through the scientific method.

Except the universe isn't a concept, it is empirically observable. Therefore your claim is that real, empirically observable things can come from concepts which dont necessarily exist, but that would mean that those concepts are empirically measurable (at least in terms of their effects) which would imply that god, as a concept, empirically measurable which would imply that the scientific method is a valid way to test god. And that would imply that god does empirically exist which would contradict your claim.

Peregrinus wrote: »

If you can’t make empirical observations of a Euclidean right-angled triangle, or of a prime number, what makes you think you can necessarily make empirical observations of a “reason”?

Empirical observations are were you get the hypotheses for these, buts its by testing the predictions of these that you can see if they exist. You notice how right angled triangles in nature all seem to have a certain property in relation to the lengths of their sides, so you hypothesis a formula representing the sides and see if is correct for a range of different sides. Now, in reality, you can all that in abstract with maths, you don't need physical examples and the proofs run better ignoring distractions. Buts that's not to say that you can't use real examples.
When you give the reason for something happening, you are explaining the empirical events that caused it. How exactly is that not scientifically examinable?

Pwpane

Peregrinus wrote: »

I certainly don’t want to be patronizing and, if that’s how it comes across, I apologise. My point is simply that the question you’re asking me here is a question that you have almost certainly already asked and answered for yourself.

Thank you. The fact that I have answered my own questions to myself to the best of my ability is the reason I'm here. As I've said, I don't understand the reasoning religious people use to come to their answers. I live among religious people and I would like to understand. If it changes my own view I have no problem with that. That's why I would like you to explain your own reasoning.

When you say that the “question 'why?' seems to me to pre-suppose a sentient reason or purpose i.e. God”, my immediate answer is that no, it doesn’t....If I ask “why?” (or “what is the reason?”) does the question not presuppose that there must be some reason, and that our only task is to discern what it is?.....Well, “how” is not a sufficient reason because “how” is not a reason at all......It seems to me that it comes down to this; the question “why do things exist?” is one which may not interest some people.

Apologies for chopping your post, but it seems to me that in here lies our difficulty - the meaning of 'reason', 'why', 'how'. If someone asks me 'why is the onion on the floor?', a sufficient answer for me is that 'it fell off the table'. It makes no sense to me to start the discussion 'ah, but there must be a reason why it's there, so why is it really there?' The first answer is what I mean by 'how', the second by 'why'. If I accept the first as the reason the onion is on the floor this does not mean I am not interested in why it's there. Science is fully interested in why/how things exist.

As for moving on from there to argue that “God” is the most reasonable answer to the question of why things exist, I’m not even going to attempt that!

That's a pity. Still, why do you think that it is reasonable to believe that God does exist? (Stop picking holes in the arguments of others and put forward some of your own!!)

Peregrinus

Zombrex wrote: »

It is arguable though that these questions [which cannot be usefully answered employing the techniques of natural science] therefore cannot be usefully answered. Switching to another methodology, such as theology, doesn't solve this problem.

It’s arguable, yes. But the argument has to be made; it can’t be assumed.

And the argument has to deal with the fact that we face such questions all the time and we do, in fact, attempt to answer them, and that we often do answer them in a way that is practically satisfactory. I suppose that invites a consideration of what we mean by “usefully answered”

Zombrex wrote: »

But there is no objectively right answer in literary criticism or aesthetics. These are formed as part of opinion.

Whether God exists or not is not a matter of opinion. There is a right answer, and there is a wrong answer. It is also not a question contained in the axioms of a human defined system. We don't decide if God exists or not.

If you accept both of those things then it pushes the question of God right back into the realm of the natural sciences.

But lit. crit. and aesthetics are just examples of fields of enquiry in which we employ non-scientific techniques. It is not generally true of all such fields that they are “matters of opinion”. Euclidean geometry, for example, is not. Formal logic is not.

The natural sciences deal with what is empirically observable. A question does not fall within the realm of the natural sciences merely because it has a right or wrong answer, as opposed to being a matter of opinion; it has to be a question relating to what is empirically observable.

Zombrex wrote: »

Ethical questions are not statements about the nature of the reality.

You are committing a category error.

Whether ethical questions are statements about reality is a matter of debate, surely? They’re not statements of empirically observable reality, but to proceed from there to the conclusion that they are not statement of reality at all seems to be assuming the conclusion.

Again, ethics is just an example. Correct me if I misunderstand you, but your position seems to be that no statement which cannot be investigated by the scientific method - i.e. no statement which cannot be empirically investigated - is a statement about reality. Is that your position? And, if so, is it an assumption, or can you demonstrate it to be correct?

Zombrex wrote: »

[In answer to my question, “Are you assuming that all question-answering methodologies other than the scientific method are flawed?”]:

Flawed at determining which statements about the nature of reality are accurate, yes. Though I wouldn't call that an assumption.

Then let’s see your proof!

Zombrex wrote: »

I would strongly disagree. If you look at what religions attempted to explain, basically everything from the formation of the universe to human behavior and contrast that with what the early scientists happily admitted they didn't know at the beginning of the Enlightenment you will see a stark contrast.

Or to put it another way, pre-Enlightenment everything was understood, from the formation of the universe to the reason humans act as they do, to the nature of the elements, to the shape of the Earth. It just so happened that all of these explanations were wrong. It took the Enlightenment to realize that in fact very little was genuinely understood.

I think that’s just flat-out wrong. Pre-modern cultures abound with stories of unvisited places, monsters, myths, lost worlds, other planes of existence, etc. I think you are assuming that, because they had such stories, they must have received them in the way that modern biblical literalists receive the bible. There’s no evidence for this assumption and, given that we are dealing with pre-moderns, it seems a fairly improbable assumption.

Yes, they told stories to fill gaps in their knowledge, in a way that we don’t do, but it doesn’t follow that they necessarily treated the stories as knowledge.

For example, in Ireland we had a story about Hy-Brasil, a land lying to the west of Ireland. The stories are detailed, sufficiently so that when Portuguese navigators called to Ireland in the 15th century to learn what they could, they marked Hy-Brasil on at least some of their charts.

But we have no records that the Irish ever attempted to go there. They went to Scotland. They went to Iceland. They went to Greenland. But they never tried to go to Hy-Brasil. The Vikings, a seafaring bunch who also heard all about Hy-Brasil from the Irish, also never attempted to go there. And when we consider that the Irish also considered that it was only visible for one day every seven years, and that it was the abode of the blessed, we can see that they understood it in a different way from their understanding of Iceland and Greenland, about which their beliefs were boringly pragmatic.

The Portuguese didn’t spot this. Perhaps they didn’t spend long enough in the taverns of Galway to understand, perhaps the locals were simply winding them up, perhaps even the Portuguese had the beginnings of a modern imagination and could only understand stories about Hy-Brasil as referring to an actual island. But the Irish were under no such illusions; they understood that Hy-Brasil was a way of talking about unknown or unattainable places, and a way of talking about the mystery of death.

Peregrinus

Mark Hamill wrote: »

And if they cant be represented empirically, what importance are they? If a mathematical or logical argument cannot in any way represent anything at all in the empirical world, then what is their use?

“Use” is a very subjective term. Of what “use” is it to know that there are an infinite number of pairs of prime numbers of the form n, n+2? Of what use is a proof of Fermat’s theorem? Of what use is platonic metaphysics? Of what use is theorizing about the geometry of a universe with greater than three spatial dimensions?

Indeed, is “use” empirically observable? In asking “what is their use?”, are you asking a question which can be answered through the scientific method? If, as I think, “use” is a subjective concept, are you not using non-scientific reasoning to attack the use of non-scientific reasoning?

Mark Hamill wrote: »

I said already that we don't use natural examples as it would just overcomplicate the study of these.

You did say that, but you were were wrong. The reason we don’t use natural examples of Euclidean forms is because there aren’t any; Euclidean forms are platonic ideals.

Mark Hamill wrote: »

And the reason that nobody doubts the probative value is because of the evidence of them being used in the real world.

That won’t get you a pass in Junior Cert maths, Mark!

You know it’s not true. The whole point of the geometric proof of the theorem is that it doesn’t rely, at all, on any measurements. Our (subjective) confidence in the proof may be magnified by the observation that it accords with empirical observations of things which are more-or-less right-angled triangles, but the theor is true, and the proof valid, withour regard to our confidence in it.

Mark Hamill wrote: »

If these concepts had no empirical basis, then they would be indistinguishable from not existing and so then they wouldn't align with reality anyway.

Mark, you told me back in post #102 that it was “one of the fundamental assumptions of science, that everything in the universe is measurable”. Why is that an assumption? Because it can’t be proven. If it could be proven, it wouldn't have to be assumed.

In the same post you set out reasons for making the assumption, and I have no problem with that. But once we recognize that it’s an assumption, we have to accept the consequences, and one of them is that the scientific method, proceeding on the assumption that everything real is measurable, cannot be use to prove that everything real is measurable.

It seems to me that what you’re doing here is defending your assumption not just as necessary for a coherent system, but as reasonable, even if not proven. Given that we cannot prove that only empirically observable things exist, you suggest, we can say the unobservable either does not exist or might as well not exist; is in a condition indistinguishable from not existing.

But this is circular. Unobservable things are in a condition indistinguishable from not existing only because they only aspects of existence which you will regard are empirically-observable aspects.

Your logical cleft stick is this; if you are going to argue that the non-empirically-observable is useless, unreal, might as well not exist, or whatever, you are going to have to make a non-scientific argument in support of the claim. But if you are to rely on a non-scientific argument, you must abandon your claim that truth can only be arrived at through the scientific method, since otherwise you must reject the validity of your own non-scientific argument. And if you, expressly or implicitly, assert the validity of a non-scientific argument, then it is inconsistent to say that everything unobservable is useless, unreal, etc.

Mark Hamill wrote: »

Except the universe isn't a concept, it is empirically observable. Therefore your claim is that real, empirically observable things can come from concepts which dont necessarily exist, but that would mean that those concepts are empirically measurable (at least in terms of their effects) which would imply that god, as a concept, empirically measurable which would imply that the scientific method is a valid way to test god. And that would imply that god does empirically exist which would contradict your claim.

The god-claim, if true, would have empirically-observable effects; it would have the effect that empirically-observable things exist. And, lo, we empirically observe that they do.

It doesn’t follow from that the cause or reason for their existence, whether we label that “God” or not, must be itself empirically observable.

Mark Hamill wrote: »

Empirical observations are were you get the hypotheses for these, buts its by testing the predictions of these that you can see if they exist. You notice how right angled triangles in nature all seem to have a certain property in relation to the lengths of their sides, so you hypothesis a formula representing the sides and see if is correct for a range of different sides. Now, in reality, you can all that in abstract with maths, you don't need physical examples and the proofs run better ignoring distractions. Buts that's not to say that you can't use real examples.

What you are saying here, Mark, is that our scientific observations of things that are more-or-less right-angled triangles lead us to frame a hypothesis about all right-angled triangles.

But we cannot test that hypothesis through the scientific method. Observation of one triangle may tell us that this triangle conforms to Pythagoras’ theorem, not that all do. The furthest that empirical observation will get us is to a point where we can say “we have yet to find a right-angled triangle which does not conform”.

For a general proof we have to move to a distinctly non-scientific mode of investigation which does not rely on empirical observations at all, to any extent, not one tiny little bit. And that gets us to a level of knowledge and certainty about the general proposition beyond anything which the scientific method can achieve.

In short, what we have here is empirical observations giving rise to a question to which we can only find an answer by resorting to non-scientific and non-empirical methods of investigation.

Mark Hamill wrote: »

When you give the reason for something happening, you are explaining the empirical events that caused it. How exactly is that not scientifically examinable?

Your question is valid only for value of “reason” which equal “empirical event”. You are assuming that only empirical events can be reasons, and therefore all reasons are scientifically considerable. But all you’re doing here is restating the “fundamental assumption” you have already identified, and you can’t use the fundamental assumption to prove the truth of the fundamental assumption.

Peregrinus

Pwpane wrote: »

Apologies for chopping your post . . .

No worries. It’s a fair chopping, and useful in advancing the discussion.

Pwpane wrote: »

. . . but it seems to me that in here lies our difficulty - the meaning of 'reason', 'why', 'how'. If someone asks me 'why is the onion on the floor?', a sufficient answer for me is that 'it fell off the table'. It makes no sense to me to start the discussion 'ah, but there must be a reason why it's there, so why is it really there?' The first answer is what I mean by 'how', the second by 'why'. If I accept the first as the reason the onion is on the floor this does not mean I am not interested in why it's there. Science is fully interested in why/how things exist.

Two thoughts. First, science isn’t fully interested in why/how things exist. Based on the fundamental assumption mentioned by Mark Hamill in post #102, it’s only interested to the extent that how/why is empirically observable.

Secondly, “how” and “why” may sometimes overlap, but they are nevertheless distinct questions.

Suppose the onion is not on the floor, but on the table. And suppose you ask “why is the onion on the table?”

If I were to answer “because I put it there”, you would probably think I was a bit of a smart-aleck, or was being evasive, or stupid. Because, while it’s a grammatically feasible answer to the question, and it does explain the immediate physical explanation of the onion's presence on the table, in a more substantial sense it doesn’t answer the question.

If I answer “because I’m about to use it in this rather lovely trio de canard aux champignons et tomates confites that I’m making” you’d recognize that as a better answer to your question.

At this point, note, the trio de canard is not empirically observable. On the table, as well as the onion, there are cuts of duck and mushrooms and tomato and garlic and herbs and other stuff, but no trio de canard. That exists only in a conceptual sense, as an unrealized intention. Neither the trio, nor my intention to create it, can be empirically observed. My intention is, nevertheless more truly the reason why the onion is on the table than the empirically observable fact that I placed it there.

(Note: in this illustration, I am not an analogue for God, and my preparation of a trio de canard is not an analogue for the creation of the universe. Objections based on the invalidity of these analogies are therefore misplaced. My point is simply that the question “why?” is not the same as the question “how?”, and that the range of answers to “why?” that can be meaningful and legitimate is not limited to answers which can be empirically investigated, unless we arbitrarily presuppose that it is so limited.)

Pwpane wrote: »

That's a pity. Still, why do you think that it is reasonable to believe that God does exist? (Stop picking holes in the arguments of others and put forward some of your own!!)

I think it’s reasonable to believe that God exists to at least this extent; it’s not unreasonable. i.e. the belief that God exists does not, in itself, defy reason.

That’s a very limited claim, I know. It could well be the case that, further interrogated, the belief might turn out to be unreasonable. E.g., if someone says “I believe that God exists because I prayed to him to pass Junior Cert French, and I did!”, I think you could legitimately criticize the reasoning there as incomplete (to put it mildly), and so the conclusion as not supported by reason. But the simple choice to believe that God exists because his existence provides an account for things which cannot otherwise be adequately accounted for (e.g. the phenomenon of existence) is not so easily shown to be unreasonable.

Mark Hamill

Peregrinus wrote: »

“Use” is a very subjective term. Of what “use” is it to know that there are an infinite number of pairs of prime numbers of the form n, n+2? Of what use is a proof of Fermat’s theorem? Of what use is platonic metaphysics? Of what use is theorizing about the geometry of a universe with greater than three spatial dimensions?

Indeed, is “use” empirically observable? In asking “what is their use?”, are you asking a question which can be answered through the scientific method? If, as I think, “use” is a subjective concept, are you not using non-scientific reasoning to attack the use of non-scientific reasoning?

Really? I've seen some pseudo-philosophising bs from theists to avoid simple questions, but this is ridiculous. When I say "what use is it?" I'm asking what is it for? If something has no use, if it is for "nothing", then while it may be subjectively interesting, it remains objectively pointless.

Peregrinus wrote: »

You did say that, but you were were wrong. The reason we don’t use natural examples of Euclidean forms is because there aren’t any; Euclidean forms are platonic ideals.

Then what are they for? What use are they?

Peregrinus wrote: »

That won’t get you a pass in Junior Cert maths, Mark!

You know it’s not true. The whole point of the geometric proof of the theorem is that it doesn’t rely, at all, on any measurements. Our (subjective) confidence in the proof may be magnified by the observation that it accords with empirical observations of things which are more-or-less right-angled triangles, but the theor is true, and the proof valid, withour regard to our confidence in it.

But the probative value is in how it can be useful for the real world. Its all well and good having some mathematical proof, if it has no real world applications, then it has no probative value.

Peregrinus wrote: »

Your logical cleft stick is this; if you are going to argue that the non-empirically-observable is useless, unreal, might as well not exist, or whatever, you are going to have to make a non-scientific argument in support of the claim. But if you are to rely on a non-scientific argument, you must abandon your claim that truth can only be arrived at through the scientific method, since otherwise you must reject the validity of your own non-scientific argument. And if you, expressly or implicitly, assert the validity of a non-scientific argument, then it is inconsistent to say that everything unobservable is useless, unreal, etc.

Its not an unscientific argument, its just logic. Things that are non empirically observable are, by definition, indistinguishable from not existing. If something cannot, ever, in any way, be measured in terms of any effect on any substance or force it may have, then it has no effect on any substance or force and therefore might as well not exist. And if they have no effect then how do you examine them?

Peregrinus wrote: »

The god-claim, if true, would have empirically-observable effects; it would have the effect that empirically-observable things exist. And, lo, we empirically observe that they do.

It doesn’t follow from that the cause or reason for their existence, whether we label that “God” or not, must be itself empirically observable.

If something causes some empirical effect, then we can observe that thing by that effect, that's how damn near every field of science works, hell its how your eyesight works, all you are seeing is reflected light, at different wavelengths. You dont look through space at objects, you pick up light, reflected off them and you brain interprets the light.

Peregrinus wrote: »

In short, what we have here is empirical observations giving rise to a question to which we can only find an answer by resorting to non-scientific and non-empirical methods of investigation.

I can see you are trying to use empirical science to try and argue that maths isn't empirical, therefore not scientific, therefore science isn't applicable to certain things, therefore god exists. The scientific method needs empirical evidence when testing an empirical environment, but when it is examining a human defined abstract environment, such as maths? Well you still observe, hypothesise and test.

Peregrinus wrote: »

Your question is valid only for value of “reason” which equal “empirical event”. You are assuming that only empirical events can be reasons, and therefore all reasons are scientifically considerable. But all you’re doing here is restating the “fundamental assumption” you have already identified, and you can’t use the fundamental assumption to prove the truth of the fundamental assumption.

I'm not trying to prove the fundamental assumption, I'm using it to prove a specific empirical event as a reason for something else to happen, so why is that an issue? Science never tries to prove the fundamental assumption, as that would require complete omniscience. It just recognises that you must make the assumption in order to construct models about the universe and to be able to determine, with any measure of surety, whether what you claim has caused something, has actually caused something. Is there any alternative method that can offer the same surety without such an assumption?

Pwpane

Peregrinus wrote: »

Two thoughts. First, science isn’t fully interested in why/how things exist. Based on the fundamental assumption mentioned by Mark Hamill in post #102, it’s only interested to the extent that how/why is empirically observable.

Semantics problem again - science is not half hearted about its interest in existence.

Secondly, “how” and “why” may sometimes overlap, but they are nevertheless distinct questions...My intention is, nevertheless more truly the reason why the onion is on the table than the empirically observable fact that I placed it there.

Agreed. This is what I was trying to say. 'Why', as you use it, assumes an intention, a sentient being.

I think it’s reasonable to believe that God exists to at least this extent; it’s not unreasonable. i.e. the belief that God exists does not, in itself, defy reason.....That’s a very limited claim, I know. It could well be the case that, further interrogated, the belief might turn out to be unreasonable.

So why start from the position that God exists? Considering the non-sense that has resulted from deductive reasoning from the assumption that God exists, I think it is safer to work on the 'how'. Safer as in the reliability of the results, and safer as in the well being of humans. Safer, as the only evidence for God seems to be subjective and subjective evidence is highly suspect.

But the simple choice to believe that God exists because his existence provides an account for things which cannot otherwise be adequately accounted for (e.g. the phenomenon of existence) is not so easily shown to be unreasonable.

Yes, I think faith is a choice. It seems to be based on a discomfort in believing in chance, a discomfort in believing that our lives have no purpose. To my mind (and gut feeling), when things are not adequately accounted for it is not reasonable to assume something non - natural is the cause and on that scaffold erect a whole system of thinking and life regulation. To my mind it is more reasonable to say 'the world is a mystery, let's investigate it' than to say 'God is a mystery, we cannot know His purposes, let's worship Him'

Pwpane

To quote Zombrex's post from the Christianity forum:

Anything could exist, anything could be true, particularly if we suppose that this thing can have any property imaginable and exist outside of space time and not conform to any laws of nature.

Supposing that this is or isn't likely is rather irrelevant. The only thing you need to do is demonstrate that the most accurate explanation for why humans believe is that they are really interacting with a deity. Anything else is just philosophical smoke and mirrors.

This makes sense to me. Is there any evidence that people are interacting with God, rather than just their feeling that they are? I know people who believe in God because of His response to prayer, and because of good things that have happened to them. They also say 'I can FEEL Him, I KNOW He's there'. When He doesn't respond to prayer and when bad things happen to them, this is taken as evidence of human inability to understand the mind of God.

I also know someone who believes in certain superstitions (eg Fi 13th) because of the documented evidence that they are correct and because of things that have happened to them. The fact that bad things happen on other dates also makes no impression on their conviction.

Because they are friends, I can't query these beliefs too far without causing offence. It's also like fighting fog.

That's why I appreciate your input Peregrinus, Mark and Zombrex. Many believers can't stand back and observe from the outside, they are too far within it. They also can't take the implication that their struggle is in vain; they sincerely think 'if there is no God, what's it all for?'

I don't think it's a good enough reason to believe in a deity, that I would feel useless and abandoned without one.