Alan Shatter Minister of Defence : Irish WW2 Neutrality 'Morally Bankrupt'

Bannasidhe

Other - please explain

Jawgap wrote: »

In Sweden's case I'd don't have the economic data, but given their supply of raw materials, especially iron ore, I'd say yes. They also allowed trans-shipping of German materiel and personnel. But they were in something of a similar, even worse, strategic position to us with regards to Germany.

Switzerland, and their role in the distribution of seized / stolen assets, is a whole new discussion thread - if we see our war time posture in the same class as the Swiss then there was definite moral bankruptcy - unless you fully agree with the principle of money being absolutely morally neutral.

And the bulk of Ireland's export trade was agricultural produce to GB in return for coal, petroleum and other products we could not produce ourselves.

The Irish Mercantile Marine during World War II continued essential overseas trade during the conflict, a period referred to as The Long Watch by Irish mariners.

Irish merchant shipping saw to it that vital imports continued to arrive and exports, mainly food supplies to Great Britain, were delivered. Irish ships sailed unarmed and usually alone, identifying themselves as neutrals with bright lights and by painting the Irish tricolour and EIRE in large letters on their sides and decks. Nonetheless twenty percent of seamen serving in Irish ships perished, victims of a war not their own: attacked by both sides, though predominately by the Axis powers. Often, Allied convoys could not stop to pick up survivors, while Irish ships always answered SOS signals and stopped to rescue survivors, irrespective of which side they belonged to. Irish ships rescued 534 seamen.
At the outbreak of World War II, known as "The Emergency", Ireland declared neutrality and became isolated as never before. Shipping had been neglected since the Irish War of Independence. Foreign ships, on which Ireland's trade had hitherto depended, were less available; Neutral American ships would not enter the "war zone". In his Saint Patrick's Day address in 1940, Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Éamon de Valera lamented:
"No country had ever been more effectively blockaded because of the activities of belligerents and our lack of ships..."

Ireland was a net food exporter. The excess was shipped to Britain. The Irish Mercantile Marine ensured that Irish agricultural, and other, exports reached Britain, and that British coal arrived in Ireland. Some foods such as wheat, citric fruits and tea were imported. Ireland depended on, mainly, British tankers for petroleum. Initially Irish ships sailed in British convoys. In the light of experience they choose to sail alone, relying on their neutral markings. German respect for that neutrality varied from friendly to tragic.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irish_Mercantile_Marine_during_World_War_II

My question is, if you believe Ireland profiteered by increasing price of foodstuffs exported to GB do you believe that the price of vital imports were kept at pre-war prices? Or was there an element of profiteering there too?

Could the argument not be made that in order for Ireland to be able to afford fuel - not least to power the merchant navy - and as fuel was a vital commodity and therefore both rationed and expensive that Ireland had no choice but to increase the costs of it exports just to be able to afford to physically continue to export them?

There is some interesting stuff here Censorship in Ireland, 1939-1945: neutrality, politics, and society By Donal Ó Drisceoil (http://books.google.ie/books?id=mAR0GI5ggf8C&pg=PA105&lpg=PA105&dq=irish+exports+1939-1945&source=bl&ots=OpW_6My7Sp&sig=NNXZ_quKJkjp0iTPGA3KWy6gNlo&hl=en&sa=X&ei=vYUqT6eFIZCFhQe36sjrCg&sqi=2&ved=0CEIQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=irish%20exports%201939-1945&f=false) on the economic squeeze in the form of 'silent sanctions' put on Ireland by GB from 1941 onwards, in particular in relation to the import of coal.

Britain needed Irish food - but was willing to starve Ireland of power supplies. I think in the face of such tactics it would be more then reasonable for Ireland to charge top price for food stuffs - after all, it was the result of British Imperial policy that Ireland had little else to offer but agricultural products. Did they now expect to get those products at pre-war prices while at the same time restricting our fuel supplies?

Jawgap

Were things costly wholly because of the war situation or because of the tariff legacy from the Economic War?

On the coal front, the lack of it, more than anything else according to Cormac Ó Gráda in UCD, caused a lot of hardship. However, it seems there were two sides to this.

Ireland tried to use it's buying power as a consumer of coal to strong arm the British suppliers, not realising that at the outset of the war the one thing colliery owners would not be short of was customers - we kind of shot ourselves in the foot with that one because by the time the Irish representatives realised that they didn't have the power they thought they had, the colliery owners had committed their supplies elsewhere.

Further, there was also a belief that we could use turf to make up any shortfall and that we didn't really need as much coal as we thought we did. It was reckoned we could cut eight million tons of turf to make good the shortfall in British coal supplies.

Turf production increased but not to anywhere near the levels required. Plus turf is not a viable substitute for coal - kilo for kilo it puts out less heat and in Ireland it was remotely located from where it was needed with insufficient infra-structure to allow it to be transported in the quantities needed.

Maybe the Brits did strangle us on coal and they may have tightened the noose, but we tied the rope and put it around our neck:)

Bannasidhe

Other - please explain

Jawgap wrote: »

Were things costly wholly because of the war situation or because of the tariff legacy from the Economic War?

On the coal front, the lack of it, more than anything else according to Cormac Ó Gráda in UCD, caused a lot of hardship. However, it seems there were two sides to this.

Ireland tried to use it's buying power as a consumer of coal to strong arm the British suppliers, not realising that at the outset of the war the one thing colliery owners would not be short of was customers - we kind of shot ourselves in the foot with that one because by the time the Irish representatives realised that they didn't have the power they thought they had, the colliery owners had committed their supplies elsewhere.

Further, there was also a belief that we could use turf to make up any shortfall and that we didn't really need as much coal as we thought we did. It was reckoned we could cut eight million tons of turf to make good the shortfall in British coal supplies.

Turf production increased but not to anywhere near the levels required. Plus turf is not a viable substitute for coal - kilo for kilo it puts out less heat and in Ireland it was remotely located from where it was needed with insufficient infra-structure to allow it to be transported in the quantities needed.

Maybe the Brits did strangle us on coal and they may have tightened the noose, but we tied the rope and put it around our neck:)

It's not an either/or situation.
Ireland had little industry - and a lot of what it had remained part of the UK due to partition.
In terms of exports it was therefore utterly reliant on agricultural products - this as a direct result of British policy. This trade had been severely hit by the Great Depression.
The Economic War was the result of Ireland's refusal to continue to pay Land Annuities to the UK (We won't get into a discussion here of the issue of the Irish State repaying loans made by the British government to enable Irish people to buy back lands which had been 'acquired' by British conquest in the first place ) and instead divert those monies towards infrastructure via Local Authorities. The impact of the 'war' on Irish exports cannot be underestimated.

Given that Ireland was independent then it would be natural for the Irish government to attempt to negotiate the best possible deal when it came to the cost of vital imports - that is not using a 'strong arm' - that is a tactical position adopted in the best interest of the country. The fact that the government miscalculated is neither here nor there...the British also 'miscalculated' when they agreed to give back the Treaty Ports in 1938 .

My point is that Ireland was under severe economic pressure. It came into existence with poor infrastructure, severe poverty, high unemployment, little or no welfare support and a stupid agreement to pay 'back' a punitive amount of money.

the land purchase annuities amounted to over £3m per annum, a substantial figure (given that the total revenue intake in the early 1930s was approximately £25m). The average burden of the annuities on the individual farmer was not huge—about 10% of net income—but it was a fixed amount, so the burden increased in difficult times.

http://www.historyireland.com/volumes/?id=115131
The Great Depression impacted greatly on the export trade plus the income of Farmers - but the percentage amount of income - at a time of plummeting incomes -these farmers had to pay towards the Land Annuities did not change - a double whammy in effect.
The Irish government took steps to relieve this pressure by 'burning the bondholders' (:p) and diverting that money to provide an infrastructure and increase employment. For this they were punished when the British government imposed tariffs on Irish imports to recoup the money - Ireland responded by imposing similar tariffs on imports from GB.
The matter was settled in 1938 when Ireland agreed to pay £10 m - or 40 years payments upfront - the British agreed to 'return' the ports.

So having just paid £10 million to the UK, money it desperately needed to recoup, Ireland found itself again in a position where fuel supplies were restricted as it was vital to the UK's war effort and exportation of agricultural products became not only expensive - but physically dangerous.

I think that to claim Ireland was 'profiteering' if it increased the price of its exports or that we put the noose around our own necks' is a bit disingenuous in the circumstances TBH -the noose was placed around our necks many years before and when we tried to cut it, it was tightened.

MODS - I apologise for participating in dragging this thread off topic. And for the record re: Shatter's remarks - bang out of order IMHO. :mad:

Fratton Fred

Morlar wrote: »

That link doesn't seem to work ? Even correcting the typo doesn't seem to resolve it for me.

Try it now.

Morlar

Other - please explain

Fratton Fred wrote: »

Try it now.

I don't want to derail the thread but to me that reads like a puff-piece of fan writing. So much so that it might even warrant it's own thread just to take it to pieces bit by bit. One absent reference would be Churchills firshand involvement in the start of the Irish Civil War.

Jawgap

Without dragging this into the Economic War, on the fiscal side, Ireland did relatively well. They raised the money to pay off the British through a bond issue and because the markets reckoned we were solvent we didn't have to pay more than the going rate for the money.

Even with that bond being issued the country's balance sheet was still in good health and even factoring in the payments we were still a creditor nation.

As Lemass said at the time, "The economic war is over. It is, I suggest, complete waste of time to discuss now who began it. The important fact is that we won it."

If we were trading at a disadvantage our balance of payments situation would not have improved in the way it did.

We should also get our heads around the idea that the Nazi administration did not see us as a separate country in anything more than name only - as far they were concerned we were.......

"a British dependency, with autonomy but no real independence either political or spiritual. Hitler in his latest Reichstag speech expressly refers to England's treatment of Ireland as a domestic matter....."*

The risk to our territorial integrity might have been remote, but the risk to our economic and political independence, and our social structures was real - that we did nothing substantial to help protect those interests, relying on others, was morally wrong, a fact compounded the way in which we traded with the UK.

*Confidential report from Charles Bewley [Envoy to Berlin] to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) with covering letter to Eamon de Valera

EDIT:- Bewley's quote above is from his valedictory when he was dismissed - it raises one interesting point, if Germany was not a threat to Ireland why did we withdraw our legation?

Morlar

Other - please explain

Jawgap wrote: »

We should also get our heads around the idea that the Nazi administration did not see us as a separate country in anything more than name only - as far they were concerned we were.......

"a British dependency, with autonomy but no real independence either political or spiritual. Hitler in his latest Reichstag speech expressly refers to England's treatment of Ireland as a domestic matter....."*

The risk to our territorial integrity might have been remote, but the risk to our economic and political independence, and our social structures was real - that we did nothing substantial to help protect those interests, relying on others, was morally wrong, a fact compounded the way in which we traded with the UK.

*Confidential report from Charles Bewley [Envoy to Berlin] to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) with covering letter to Eamon de Valera

You are referring to a single private letter from one individual, written about the content of an unknown speech, and then using that 2nd hand snapshot to try to encompass the totality of one nations views on another nation throughout the entirety of the War.

Bannasidhe

Other - please explain

Jawgap wrote: »

relying on others, was morally wrong

What choices did we have?
Enter the war? To enter on the side of the Allies would have necessitated the return of British troops as our own armed forces were in no position to defend us (not least due to the desertions).
Politically the return of British troops would have been suicide.
Should we have joined the Axis - the enemy of our enemy and all that? In 1939 that may have appeared an attractive proposition.

Economically, how would we pay for armaments? How would we pay to rebuild after the inevitable bombing raids? Nobody knew in 1939 that the Marshall Plan would be coming down the line.
How would the IRA - who were already in contact with Germany have reacted? Civil war would have been a distinct possibility as Germany would not have neglected the opportunity to spread dissent.

Ireland was slowly, against the odds, building a functioning independent State - would its continued security now be wagered on an alliance with the very global power who had caused our problems in the first place?

The role of the Irish government was to protect Irish interests - I firmly believe they did that - and I am no fan of Dev (quite the opposite in fact), but in this instance I think his stance was correct. He stood up to Churchill's bulling and bluster, aided the Allies when and as he could, ensured Ireland was not subjected to invasion or carpet bombing by either side and created a sense of national unity among a people for whom the scars of the Civil War were hardly scabbed over.

There is nothing morally bankrupt in that -it is the duty of government to protect the people. Dev did his duty.
I would suggest that for those who were 'defending' democracy against totalitarianism to even contemplate the invasion of neutral countries was morally bankrupt.

Fratton Fred

Morlar wrote: »

I don't want to derail the thread but to me that reads like a puff-piece of fan writing. So much so that it might even warrant it's own thread just to take it to pieces bit by bit. One absent reference would be Churchills firshand involvement in the start of the Irish Civil War.

I look forward to it.

Bannasidhe

Other - please explain

Fratton Fred wrote: »

I look forward to it.

Me Too - can we talk about Winnie's Daddy - Randy Churchill - too?

Dotsie~tmp

I disagree with Alan Shatter - No it was not Morally Bankrupt

Our continued hypocritical stance under the unbrella or NATO protection is pathetic too.

Morlar

Other - please explain

Dotsie~tmp wrote: »

Our continued hypocritical stance under the unbrella or NATO protection is pathetic too.

Sure aren't we just a terrible people altogether.

Bannasidhe

Other - please explain

Dotsie~tmp wrote: »

Our continued hypocritical stance under the unbrella or NATO protection is pathetic too.

The unbrella? I assume that is a reference to the U.N. - given Ireland's active participation in UN forces I don't think we can be accused to giving nothing back.

NATO originally was part of a Cold War alliance against the Soviet Bloc - exactly how was Ireland ever threatened by the Soviets that would have warranted us joining NATO?

What threat do we now face from so-called Muslim extremists now? Very little - why? Because we don't threaten Muslim countries. Plus, any slim threat which does exist would be the result of our government allowing the use of Irish airspace and Shannon for illegal rendition flights and as stop-over points for US troops.

BlaasForRafa

Jawgap wrote: »

In Sweden's case I'd don't have the economic data, but given their supply of raw materials, especially iron ore, I'd say yes. They also allowed trans-shipping of German materiel and personnel. But they were in something of a similar, even worse, strategic position to us with regards to Germany.

Switzerland, and their role in the distribution of seized / stolen assets, is a whole new discussion thread - if we see our war time posture in the same class as the Swiss then there was definite moral bankruptcy - unless you fully agree with the principle of money being absolutely morally neutral.

Swedish company Bofors licenced weapons designs to both sides. Also Swiss companies like Oerlikon and Solothurn sold and licenced weapons designs to the Germans.

Morlar

Other - please explain

BlaasForRafa wrote: »

Swedish company Bofors licenced weapons designs to both sides. Also Swiss companies like Oerlikon and Solothurn sold and licenced weapons designs to the Germans.

Bofors also made 2 of the 3 (or so) AA guns 'protecting' Dublin throughout the war.

Bannasidhe

Other - please explain

Morlar wrote: »

Bofors also made 2 of the 3 (or so) AA guns 'protecting' Dublin throughout the war.

Nonsense - I have it on good authority that my mate Mick C's Dad protected Dublin all on his own with an Enfield rifle - no bullets, just the rifle. He also got shocking whiplash from swinging his head constantly as he wasn't sure which direction - or by whom - the invasion would come...

Jawgap

Morlar wrote: »

You are referring to a single private letter from one individual, written about the content of an unknown speech, and then using that 2nd hand snapshot to try to encompass the totality of one nations views on another nation throughout the entirety of the War.

It wasn't a private letter - it was a valedictory - these are summations prepared by departing ambassadors - a despatch from the frontline, if you like

The text of Bewley's valedictory can be found here:-

Documents on Foreign Irish Policy

Hitler's speech is referenced in another of Ambassador Bewley's Reports - it looks the one he gave to answer Roosevelt's diplomatic efforts.

It's reproduced in the German "Whitebook" "100 Documents on the Origin of the War (as published by the the German Foreign Office) so while it might be unknown in certain circles, that does not make it unimportant.

Morlar

Other - please explain

Jawgap wrote: »

It wasn't a private letter -

In that case let's quote them in full context :

http://www.difp.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=2458

Confidential report from Charles Bewley to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin)1
(43/33) (Copy)

Berlin, 29 April 1939

The German Chancellor's speech of 28th April has no doubt been fully reproduced in the Dublin press, and it would be unnecessary to give any analysis of its contents. The general opinion here (not only in German circles but among the neutral members of the Diplomatic Corps) is that the Chancellor has been very successful in exposing the amateurishness of President Roosevelt's diplomatic offensive. His reference to Ireland and Palestine in particular were received with considerable amusement.

The general effect of the speech seems to be on the whole regarded as conciliatory. The denunciation of the Naval Agreement with England and the German-Polish Pact had been regarded as highly probable, if not inevitable: the fact that in each case the Chancellor has declared himself ready to enter into new negotiations prevents such a step from being regarded as purely aggressive, while putting the onus of continued friendly relations on the other party. It is in my opinion evidence of the desire not to embitter the international situation that no reference was made to the introduction of compulsory service in England, and that in particular there was no allusion to the entirely inadequate nature of the measure or the obvious reluctance of the population of England to submit itself to military training.

The references in the speech to Ireland have no doubt been reproduced in the Irish newspapers. I think it however well to give the translations.

In speaking of the German solution of the Czechoslovak problem, the Führer goes on to say:

'No more than English measures, let us say in Ireland, whether they are good or bad, are subject to German control or criticism, is this the case with these old German principalities.'

And later, in answering President Roosevelt's request that Germany should pledge itself not to attack Ireland, he adds:

'I have just read a speech of the Irish Prime Minister De Valera, in which - strange as it may seem - unlike Mr. Roosevelt he does not accuse Germany of oppressing Ireland, but makes the charge against England that Ireland has to suffer under her continuous aggression. However great Roosevelt's comprehension of the needs and difficulties of other states, it must still be assumed that the Irish President knows the dangers which threaten his country better than the President of the American Union.'

It will be seen from these extracts that the German attitude towards Ireland is exactly the same as it was before 1914, - that just as Alsace-Lorraine in 1914 was, and Bohemia in 1939 is no concern of England's, so Germany is not prepared to interest herself practically in Ireland, as being in the English sphere of influence. The efforts of Sir Roger Casement2,Joseph Plunkett3 and others to induce Germany to declare the freedom of Ireland as one of her war aims were not successful, mainly because the German Government feared that the opposing powers would draw an analogy between Ireland and Alsace-Lorraine. The same analogy would now exist, whether it be a correct one or not, between Ireland and Bohemia, and of course no German Government would (except possibly in a war) make a direct claim for the liberty and independence of Ireland.

On the other hand, Ireland is at present the object of great sympathy in Germany, - partly from sentimental reasons, partly as being a useful method of propaganda against England. I have not the slightest doubt that, if Ireland wished to increase its trade with Germany, it could do so very largely, - on even better conditions than the present Agreement. I have also little doubt that the officials in charge of the German press would welcome any assistance given then by the Irish Government in regard to propaganda on the general questions of Ireland's position, including the Partition question. Of course any such campaign would be inaugurated by the Press Department of the Foreign Office and the Ministry for Propaganda, - with which, as you indicate in your minutes of 30th June 1937 (114/13) and 21st March 1938, and telegram of 9th July 1939, it is not desired that I should enter into relations4. If at any time the Minister should wish me to approach the officials in question, I shall of course be delighted to do so.

http://www.difp.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=2480

Confidential report from Charles Bewley to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin) with covering letter to Eamon de Valera1
(Copy)

Berlin, 2 August 1939

Dear Mr. De Valera,
I enclose copy of report on the general situation, which I trust you will do me the honour of reading.

Yours faithfully,
[signed] CHARLES BEWLEY

I think it well to send a report on the present relations of Germany and Ireland at the end of my six years' occupation of the post of Minister in Berlin. While I am aware that reports made by a Minister are never communicated to Ministers accredited in other countries and are frequently not submitted to the Minister for External Affairs, I desire to put on record a short and objective statement of the facts, in order that no suggestion may be made that I myself have any responsibility for the present state of affairs.

It would be wasted time to set out in detail the arguments in favour of particular measures which are contained in very many of my earlier minutes. I therefore propose to give in as concise form as possible the conclusions at which I have arrived.

Ireland, at the end of ten years' separate representation at Berlin, is regarded by the German Government, as by the other Governments where it has representation, as a British dependency, with autonomy but no real independence either political or spiritual. Hitler in his latest Reichstag speech expressly refers to England's treatment of Ireland as a domestic matter in which he would not be entitled to interfere2. President Roosevelt in his open letter to Hitler refers to 'Great Britain and Éire' as one of the countries which should be guaranteed.
The causes of this impression are numerous. In the first place, foreign spectators naturally pay less attention to phrases like 'Commonwealth of Nations' or 'External Association' than to the reality of the situation, i.e. that Ireland, or the 26 counties, remains a member of the British Empire.
This inherent difficulty in the position of Ireland could at least in part be overcome by a manifestation of her will to follow a policy in international affairs independent of English policy. No such policy has been adopted.
Instances in the lack of independence from England in deciding on Irish policy are:
The continuous following in England's steps in the League of Nations, e.g., the introduction of sanctions against Italy, the insistence on 'neutrality' between the Catholic and the Communist forces in Spain, etc., etc. The explanation given in minutes of the Department to the effect that English and Irish policy merely happen to coincide is not likely to carry conviction.
The apparent approbation by the Irish Government of the refusal of the Irish press and in particular of the Government organ to publish any for eign news except that supplied by British propagandist agencies. Phrases such as 'freedom of the press' are not considered a satisfactory explanation.
Acts of submission to the King of England, as for instance the instructions sent to the Irish Chargé d'Affaires in Paris to take part in cere monies held in honour of His Majesty and attended by the members of the British Empire. Full details appeared in the continental, though of course not in the Irish, press.
The complete indifference of the Irish government and officials to the development of trade with countries other than Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
The failure to inform the German Government, or any other Government to which an Irish Minister is accredited, of the attitude of the Irish Government on any question of international politics. The silence on the part of the Irish Government is regarded as a proof that it has no policy except to follow that of the British Government.
The prohibition of the supply of news to, or even of direct communication with, the responsible officials in the German Foreign Office and Propaganda Ministry on the ground that the relations of the German Government and the Catholic Church are strained. The net result of such prohibition is that Ireland loses such publicity against partition, where as the German Government does not even know that it is being punished for its misdeeds by the officials of the Irish Department of External Affairs.
The preference of the Irish Government to be represented by English consular officials, instead of following the example of independent states in appointing its own consuls. I have been furnished by the Department with a long defence of its practices: as however it was concerned exclusively with the alleged state of affairs in the United States of America, I fear that the world in general would experience the same difficulty as myself in seeing its relevance.
As I have pointed out a number of matters obviously requiring reform, I feel that the Minister has a right to ask for my opinion on their cause. I propose accordingly to set out my view with all possible conciseness.
The first and most obvious cause of the failure to adopt an independent policy in foreign affairs is what I can only describe by the colloquial term 'inferiority complex'. So long as British institutions (from the system of government down to details of household management) are regarded as the only possible model for Irish Government Departments, so long will it be impossible to expect an objective or independent view on international affairs. Lest it should be thought that I am exaggerating, I desire to refer to a recent correspondence on the payments to be made to the Legation porter during illness: the solution which appeared natural to the officials of the Irish Department of External Affairs was to inquire as to the practice of the British Embassy.
This instance is of course a trivial one though significant: it could be reinforced by very many others. The effect produced on the outside world was summed up by a foreign diplomat no longer in Ireland in the observation 'Your people from the Minister downwards don't really believe that any other country exists except England.'
The secondary cause of the failure of the Irish Department of External Affairs to function in the manner in which Ministers of Foreign Affairs in other states function is its lack of experience and apparent reluctance or incapacity to learn. In other states one of the first duties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is considered to be the instruction of their Ministers abroad as to the policy of their government, and in particular as to the answers to be given to particular inquiries about that policy. The officials of the Irish Department of External Affairs obviously do not consider such instruction as any part of their duties, and indeed, resent any suggestion that their present practice could be improved in any respect, with the natural result that Irish Ministers abroad are never in a position to explain the attitude of the Irish Government on any subject to the Government to which they are accredited, and that the Government to which they are accredited assumes that the Irish Government has no policy except that of Great Britain. It is not for me to conjecture whether this outward self-satisfaction conceals an inner feeling of inadequacy or not.
If in fact the Irish Government has no such policy, the officials of the Department cannot be blamed for not communicating it. If on the other hand an independent policy exists, it is difficult to see why it should be kept as a secret not only from foreign governments but from the representatives of the Irish Government itself.
It is of course for the Minister for External Affairs to decide whether his Department shall carry out the duties to which I have alluded. I desire however to suggest the possibility that the practice of all other countries during their centuries of independent national life is not less important than the views held by officials, whose experience began in the year 1922 and has since then for practical purposes been confined to Dublin.
I have no doubt that the Minister is already aware of all the facts enumerated by me in this minute. I am confident however that their presentation in tabulated form will be of assistance to him should he in the future contemplate the transformation of the Department into an effectively functioning instrument for the carrying out of a definite policy in international affairs.

Here is Hitlers Reichstag speech of April 28th 1939 :

http://comicism.tripod.com/390428.html

Fratton Fred

Bannasidhe wrote: »

Me Too - can we talk about Winnie's Daddy - Randy Churchill - too?

As long as we can discuss Dev's.

Bannasidhe

Other - please explain

Fratton Fred wrote: »

As long as we can discuss Dev's.

If the Cuban Juan Vivion de Valera aka Juan Vivion de Valeros aka Vivion De Valero had any role in UK or Irish politics - then he is fair game. If his sole contribution was sperm donation in New York, as seems to be the case, we have just discussed his contribution in full.

Randy Churchill, and his "Ulster will fight, and Ulster will be right" on the other hand ...;)

Morlar

Other - please explain

Bannasidhe wrote: »

If the Cuban Juan Vivion de Valera aka Juan Vivion de Valeros aka Vivion De Valero had any role in UK or Irish politics - then he is fair game. If his sole contribution was sperm donation in New York, as seems to be the case, we have just discussed his contribution in full.

Randy Churchill, and his "Ulster will fight, and Ulster will be right" on the other hand ...;)

I think the malignant role of Churchill in Ireland did have an effect on Irish popular opinion of the war at that time.

This is one factor in the later Churchil DeValera relationship. Somethihng Mr Shatter might want to investigate at some point



(From Tim Pat Coogans Michael Collins)

Fratton Fred

Morlar wrote: »

I think the malignant role of Churchill in Ireland did have an effect on Irish popular opinion of the war at that time.

This is one factor in the later Churchil DeValera relationship. Somethihng Mr Shatter might want to investigate at some point



(From Tim Pat Coogans Michael Collins)

And still 70,000 people decided to go off and fight.

Bannasidhe

Other - please explain

Fratton Fred wrote: »

And still 70,000 people decided to go off and fight.

Despite Churchill not because of...

Morlar

Other - please explain

Fratton Fred wrote: »

And still 70,000 people decided to go off and fight.

How many of those 70k did so despite, and not because , of Churchill do you think?

Morlar

Other - please explain

(snap).

Jawgap

Morlar wrote: »

In that case let's quote them in full context :

Why?

Isn't that just wasting people's time by throwing up excessively long posts?

Why don't you post up the full text of the debate in which contained the Lemass quote........

Morlar

Other - please explain

If you are using the flimsiest of quotes to support a wild theory then context is important.

Jawgap

Morlar wrote: »

Bofors also made 2 of the 3 (or so) AA guns 'protecting' Dublin throughout the war.

Bannasidhe wrote: »

Nonsense - I have it on good authority that my mate Mick C's Dad protected Dublin all on his own with an Enfield rifle - no bullets, just the rifle. He also got shocking whiplash from swinging his head constantly as he wasn't sure which direction - or by whom - the invasion would come...

The AA Component of the Irish Army on the 1st July 1940 was

4 Bofors of the Lt AA Battery
2 3.7" guns
4 3" 30cwt guns (30 cwt refers to the weight of the barrel not the shell!!)

they also had a search light battery of 6 lights.

The British had plans to allocate (to the whole island) a total of 288 heavy AA guns, 318 light AA guns, 312 searchlights and 180 balloons- the main concentrations were planned around the Curragh (84 guns and 144 searchlights) and Belfast (72 guns, 168 searchlights and 40 balloons)

Dublin was to get 28 guns and 40 balloons.

BlaasForRafa

Morlar wrote: »

How many of those 70k did so despite, and not because , of Churchill do you think?

Have you evidence one way or the other?

Morlar

Other - please explain

BlaasForRafa wrote: »

Have you evidence one way or the other?

First of all let's recap - You are asking me to disprove something which has not been established to begin with.

I would point to his abysmal record on Ireland. His personal role in the lead up to the Irish Civil War as referenced above can not be ignored.

In addition to that :

http://www.irishexaminer.com/opinion/columnists/ryle-dwyer/britains-greatest-was-our-worst-enemy-when-the-chips-were-down-134908.html

‘Britain’s Greatest’ was our worst enemy when the chips were down

By Ryle Dwyer

Saturday, October 30, 2010

BBC viewers voted Winston Churchill as ‘Britain’s Greatest’. He is remembered as the man who saved them during the Second World War, but he was undoubtedly one of Ireland’s greatest scourges. As Minister for War in 1920 he was the politician most responsible for the Black and Tans.

He was the one who conceived the idea of forming the notorious Auxiliaries to serve as special police in Ireland during the War of Independence.

They perpetrated the infamous incident at Croke Park – on Bloody Sunday, November 21, 1920 – when they fired indiscriminately into a crowd of spectators at a football match, killing 15 totally innocent people, including one of the footballers on the field.

Churchill was also part of the British team that negotiated the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921. His main contribution was insisting that Britain should retain the right to use any Irish bases it desired in time of war, but those rights were renounced in 1938.

Today, President Mary McAleese is opening a heritage centre on Bere Island. As mentioned elsewhere (page 9), Churchill came up with the harebrained proposal to seize the base at Berehaven in October 1939. Was he really that stupid?

De Valera had already secretly assured the British he would give them all possible aid short of declaring war. Time proved that he delivered on the promise, but Churchill tried to turn the clock back and act as if Ireland were still a British colony.

Anthony Eden – one of Churchill’s strongest backers and the man who ultimately succeeded him as Conservative leader – thought Churchill’s attitude towards Berehaven was "madness." Yet there was method to that madness. Churchill used Ireland to cover up British disasters during the war, such as the sinking of the battleship Royal Oak at anchor in Scapa Flow, with the loss of 833 sailors.

Churchill was the minister in charge of the British navy. When he suggested seizing Berehaven, the cabinet forgot about the Royal Oak disaster. Ireland could have done no more to protect Scapa Flow than it could have to prevent the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour two years later.

Whatever importance Berehaven might have had to the British in 1939, this vanished with the fall of France in June 1940. Thereafter, even if the British had Irish bases, ships approaching Britain via the south of Ireland would have been extremely vulnerable to attacks from German aircraft and submarines based in France. Hence British shipping went around Northern Ireland, where they already had bases.

On November 5, 1940, as the American people were voting in the presidential election, Churchill lashed out publicly against the denial of the Irish bases. "The fact that we cannot use the south and west coasts of Ireland to refuel our flotillas and aircraft, and thus protect the trade by which Ireland as well as Great Britain lives," he said, "is a most heavy and grievous burden and one which should never have been placed on our shoulders, broad though they be."

The remarks came out of the blue. Some feared Churchill believed that once President Franklin D Roosevelt was safely re-elected, Britain could seize Irish bases without having to fear any reaction from the US. But it is more likely Churchill was again diverting attention from another disaster.

Word had just been received from mid-Atlantic that the German battleship Admiral Scheer was attacking a convoy of 39 ships bound for Britain. The British had been unaware there was a battleship loose in the Atlantic, so the Jervis Bay, a lightly armed merchant cruiser, was all that was protecting the convoy.

That night Berlin radio announced the Germans had wiped out the convoy. All further convoys were suspended for what became the longest delay of the war. Most of the ships in the convoy had actually escaped thanks to the delaying tactics of the Jervis Bay, but it was some days before this became apparent.

On Easter Monday, April 15, 1941, Dublin celebrated the 25th anniversary of the Easter Rising. People had reason to be particularly thankful for Irish independence the following night when some 180 German bombers attacked Belfast, killing at least 745 people, compared with the highest estimate of 554 people killed in the infamous bombing of Coventry the previous November.

Belfast should have been one of the easiest places for the British to defend against German attacks on account of its geographic location, but the city was blitzed four times by the German aircraft in the four weeks from April 8 to May 6, 1941. A total of 1,100 people were killed in the raids. About 3,200 houses were destroyed and 56,000 others damaged. Some 220,000 people abandoned the city to live elsewhere, at least temporarily.

In the aftermath of the bombing Churchill backed a plan to introduce conscription in Northern Ireland. Many Protestant unionists were working in defence-related plants and yards, so they would have been exempt. It was expected Catholic nationalists would be most likely to be drafted. This would obviously lead to serious complications, so Churchill was probably using the controversy as another diversionary stunt. President Roosevelt and prime ministers Mackenzie King of Canada and Robert Menzies of Australia all warned Churchill that conscription difficulties in Northern Ireland would cause serious problems for their governments, but Churchill pressed ahead. Virtually all of his cabinet opposed him.

Alexander Cadogan, permanent under secretary at the Foreign Office, noted that Churchill was in the habit of jumping to ill-considered decisions and then arguing that to recede from them would demonstrate weakness. "It shows stupidity to jump to them," Cadogan noted.

THE conscription controversy actually drew attention away from the naval conflict in the Atlantic, in the days surrounding the sinking of The Hood, the pride of the Royal Navy, by the German battleship Bismarck. In the following days the British searched frantically for The Bismarck. On the morning of May 27, Churchill gave full play to his sense of the dramatic as he told parliament that British aircraft had located and damaged the Bismarck, and the Royal Navy was moving in for the kill.

He then announced that the proposed introduction of conscription in Northern Ireland was being dropped because "it would be more trouble that it was worth". By switching from the Bismarck drama to conscription, he "left the House with a sense of coitus interruptus," one member noted. Suddenly an aide conspicuously passed a note for the prime minister.

"I crave your indulgence, Mr Speaker, " Churchill said. "I have just received news that the Bismarck has been sunk."

The chamber erupted into wild cheering and the conscription crisis was forgotten. The focus of the war turned away from Ireland for the remainder of the conflict following the German invasion of Russia a few weeks later.

Churchill was a master propagandist who did more than anyone to distort the true benevolence of Irish neutrality towards the Allies. With his flair for publicity, especially self-publicity, he became the personification of John Bull, with the bulldog spirit, but his distortions in relation to Ireland were pure bull****.

Even before the above points his earlier role as architect of Gallipoli (as first lord of the admiralty) which led to the pointless deaths of at least 4,000 Irishmen would also be a consideration :

http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2010/1115/1224283324914.html

3,411 were from the 10th (Irish) Division, 569 from the Dublin Fusiliers. Others, from the 29th Division, Dublins, Munsters and Inniskillings, and Irishmen serving with the ANZAC forces also died in their hundreds.