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Questions about induction and God
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14-04-2012 12:05pm#1These questions are for anyone who thinks that a belief in the existence of God is irrational, stupid or can't be reconciled with science.
Firstly, do you think there is a conclusive answer to the problem of induction? If so, what do you think it is?
Secondly, if you do think there is a real problem with induction, what makes believing in God different from believing in induction? What separates belief in induction, from belief in counter-induction, or from belief in a slightly modified version of induction, where, for example, induction holds whenever it isn't in contradiction with Christian theology?
I'm not claiming that this is in any way an argument for the existence of God, and I'm not trying to catch anyone out. I've just been curious about these questions for a while, and since I didn't study philosophy, I don't really know where to look for their answers.Tagged:0
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It's quite simple really. What reason does anyone give as to why we should assume a deity exists in the first place? Usually this reason is full of waffle, keruffle and relies heavily on appeals of ignorance to subjective notions such as complexity. It doesn't matter how logical your argument is if this initial assumption is utter tripe, which in my view, it pretty much always is. God may exist, but to assume so because, well, because, is just silly.0
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I'm not quite sure what you mean here. Induction, so far as I understand it, applies to domains like maths and logic and not to the physical world which is mapped to maths only by convention. That's assuming you're not applying the term "induction" to "solve" irresolvable conjectures/assumptions like the universality of physical law.
I have no idea at all how you're applying either of those two meaning of "induction" to resolve the existence or non-existence of one or more deity figures.
Perhaps you could clarify?0 -
It's quite simple really. What reason does anyone give as to why we should assume a deity exists in the first place? Usually this reason is full of waffle, keruffle and relies heavily on appeals of ignorance to subjective notions such as complexity. It doesn't matter how logical your argument is if this initial assumption is utter tripe, which in my view, it pretty much always is. God may exist, but to assume so because, well, because, is just silly.
I accept that this isn't an argument for the existence of God, nor is it an argument for the assumption of the existence of God. My question (and point) was that since there doesn't seem to be any argument for the validity of induction (certainly this is the case if you don't believe that the problem of induction has been well solved), what makes an unfounded belief in God different from an unfounded belief in induction?0 -
It's quite simple really. What reason does anyone give as to why we should assume a deity exists in the first place? Usually this reason is full of waffle, keruffle and relies heavily on appeals of ignorance to subjective notions such as complexity. It doesn't matter how logical your argument is if this initial assumption is utter tripe, which in my view, it pretty much always is. God may exist, but to assume so because, well, because, is just silly.
How many humans have ever lived , 90 - 100 billion? Lets be very conservative here and say 30 billion of them have created a very strong belief in some element of "something more than what they see in front of them". Some people have even had "God" experiences. Throughout different cultures, throughout the millenia, humans have channeled this through their own religion/ceremonys/sacred areas/ interpretations. Some of the greatest scientists in the world were deep in faith.
Now, yes, most of that is as a result of being told it by someone else, and the beleif engrained in their brain from a young age.
But Im of the view, while people shouldnt assume God exists, it would be just as foolish, ignorant and unscientific to assume that 30 billion peoples behaviours is based on nothing more than ignorance and stupidity. And thats why the question should be addressed.
I dont believe in God, but I really really dont beleive in assuming that people who have had experiences are just "wrong". Agnostic really0 -
You mean vampires are real???0
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I'm not quite sure what you mean here. Induction, so far as I understand it, applies to domains like maths and logic and not to the physical world which is mapped to maths only by convention. That's assuming you're not applying the term "induction" to "solve" irresolvable conjectures/assumptions like the universality of physical law.
I have no idea at all how you're applying either of those two meaning of "induction" to resolve the existence or non-existence of one or more deity figures.
Perhaps you could clarify?
Sorry, I probably should have been clearer, but I thought if I made my first post too long, people mightn't bother reading/replying to it!
My question is related to the problem of induction from philosophy: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_induction
Inductive reasoning is the approach used to draw conclusions about general principles from limited observations. For example, because the sun has risen every day so far, we expect it to rise tomorrow. Does this clarify what I mean?0 -
whats your view jjn?0
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Yes, that's broadly what I meant above by the "universality of physical law" - does the physics we observe now apply in all places and all times? Without observing all places and times, this conjecture is undecidable, but it's a conjecture which is assumed true and referred to (inaccurately, in my view) as "induction".Inductive reasoning is the approach used to draw conclusions about general principles from limited observations. For example, because the sun has risen every day so far, we expect it to rise tomorrow. Does this clarify what I mean?
But what does that have to do with deciding whether it's more or less likely that one more particular deities exist, or whether it's reasonable to "believe in" it or them?
I see no immediate connection.0 -
Yes, that's broadly what I meant above by the "universality of physical law" - does the physics we observe now apply in all places and all times? Without observing all places and times, this conjecture is undecidable, but it's a conjecture which is assumed true and referred to (inaccurately, in my view) as "induction".
But what does that have to do with deciding whether it's more or less likely that one more particular deities exist, or whether it's reasonable to "believe in" it or them?
I see no immediate connection.
There isn't an immediate connection to the question of whether it's reasonable to believe in God. The question is, if there is no justification for the validity of induction, why is belief in induction reasonable? What makes belief in induction superior to belief in counter induction (which would lead us to conclude that because the sun has risen every day so far, we expect that it will not rise tomorrow), or belief in a modified principle of induction, which holds in all cases where it doesn't contradict Christianity.
Note that I'm not claiming that counter induction or the above "modified" induction have any justification, but asking what should make us choose induction over those two (or any other) principles.0 -
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How many humans have ever lived , 90 - 100 billion? Lets be very conservative here and say 30 billion of them have created a very strong belief in some element of "something more than what they see in front of them". Some people have even had "God" experiences. Throughout different cultures, throughout the millenia, humans have channeled this through their own religion/ceremonys/sacred areas/ interpretations. Some of the greatest scientists in the world were deep in faith.
Now, yes, most of that is as a result of being told it by someone else, and the beleif engrained in their brain from a young age.
But Im of the view, while people shouldnt assume God exists, it would be just as foolish, ignorant and unscientific to assume that 30 billion peoples behaviours is based on nothing more than ignorance and stupidity. And thats why the question should be addressed.
I dont believe in God, but I really really dont beleive in assuming that people who have had experiences are just "wrong". Agnostic really
People have supernatural beliefs. The predominant idea that spread was that of a God. Probably because any other competing ideas were likely wiped out by violence and the like. You like to think that 30 billion people couldn't be wrong. All you have to do is look at human history, at yourself and others today. Some of the greatest scientists in the world. We're wrong more often than we are right. It's unscientific to assume anything other than humans are wrong. And yes I am saying that humans as whole, myself included, are woefully ignorant. I for one choose to embrace that fact.
Also if the vast majority of those 30 billion had developed a meme* whereby they would all commit mass suicide via jumping off cliffs every fifty years would you still suggest that because of the long history of culture and tradition of cliff jumping that these people can't possibly be ignorant? If such logic isn't flawed here, please explain why it can't be applied to your own reasoning.
*For want of a better term.0 -
Sorry, I probably should have been clearer, but I thought if I made my first post too long, people mightn't bother reading/replying to it!
My question is related to the problem of induction from philosophy: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_induction
Inductive reasoning is the approach used to draw conclusions about general principles from limited observations. For example, because the sun has risen every day so far, we expect it to rise tomorrow. Does this clarify what I mean?
Ahh I get your question now.
Personally this is just an interesting philosophical problem. I'm fully aware that one day the universe I might know might be totally different to the universe I currently reside. Personally I love this explanation.:)Douglas Adams wrote:There is a theory which states that if ever anyone discovers exactly what the Universe is for and why it is here, it will instantly disappear and be replaced by something even more bizarre and inexplicable.
There is another theory which states that this has already happened.
Although it is far from a convincing argument. I think, we choose induction over say counter induction because, apart from being biologically predisposed to such thinking, induction leads us to pragmatic results. Now, some would argue that that pragmatism is enough to justify induction. I personally don't think pragmatism should be used to justify or reject any philosophy or theory.0 -
Ahh I get your question now.
Personally this is just an interesting philosophical problem. I'm fully aware that one day the universe I might know might be totally different to the universe I currently reside. Personally I love this explanation.:)
Apart from being an interesting philosophical problem, I think it's important from the point of view of religious discussions. There are many people who believe that you can't really be a good scientist if you're religious, or that belief in God is downright irrational and stupid. This argument doesn't do anything to justify the belief in God, but I think it does show that those anti theist arguments are at least partly wrong.Although it is far from a convincing argument. I think, we choose induction over say counter induction because, apart from being biologically predisposed to such thinking, induction leads us to pragmatic results. Now, some would argue that that pragmatism is enough to justify induction. I personally don't think pragmatism should be used to justify or reject any philosophy or theory.
This is precisely the reason I brought up counter induction, a pragmatic justification of counter induction is just as successful. Up until now, counter induction has been a terrible mode of reasoning, therefore by the logic of counter induction, the next time we use counter induction, it should be correct. The same holds true for that modified form of induction I mentioned, it is indistinguishable from normal induction, except in the cases where we assume it to be correct.0 -
This is precisely the reason I brought up counter induction, a pragmatic justification of counter induction is just as successful. Up until now, counter induction has been a terrible mode of reasoning, therefore by the logic of counter induction, the next time we use counter induction, it should be correct. The same holds true for that modified form of induction I mentioned, it is indistinguishable from normal induction, except in the cases where we assume it to be correct.
The reason we choose induction over counter-induction or alternative forms of induction essentially boils down to the fact that we value the utility of information over it's accuracy. All we can assume about reality outside our own minds is that it exists and it's consistent. We don't necessarily see things as they really are, but model them in a way that's useful to us (this applies to individual human minds as well as scientific theories).
So the value of induction isn't that it gives us truth, but that it gives us usable information.
I know this doesn't answer the problem of induction (which may well be unsolvable), but I'm just trying to explain why the use of inductive reasoning to glean pseudo-knowledge isn't a completely arbitrary choice.0 -
Daftendirekt wrote: »The reason we choose induction over counter-induction or alternative forms of induction essentially boils down to the fact that we value the utility of information over it's accuracy. All we can assume about reality outside our own minds is that it exists and it's consistent. We don't necessarily see things as they really are, but model them in a way that's useful to us (this applies to individual human minds as well as scientific theories).
So the value of induction isn't that it gives us truth, but that it gives us usable information.
I know this doesn't answer the problem of induction (which may well be unsolvable), but I'm just trying to explain why the use of inductive reasoning to glean pseudo-knowledge isn't a completely arbitrary choice.
I agree that it isn't arbitrary (if it was, we really might expect to encounter people who live their (very brief) lives according to the principle of counterinduction), but as you say yourself, it doesn't actually solve the problem of induction. More importantly, there's hardly a difference in the value of information given by induction, or a form of induction modified to preserve certain predefined beliefs?0 -
The underlying philosophical problem, if you want to describe it as a problem, arises earlier than induction. It arises once ‘you’ assume that anything exists independently of ‘your’ ‘thoughts’, and that what seems to be reality is not an illusion.
Once ‘you’ make that assumption, induction becomes a reasonable method of devising a model of reality that allows 'you' to function sanely based on that assumption.
Using this model of reality, ideas about gods are different to ideas about induction, both because ideas about gods are not required to explain anything, and also because they often contradict the outcomes of applying reason to the apparent evidence of our senses.0 -
It's not really a problem because all we know (ie. in the scientific sense) is conditional.These questions are for anyone who thinks that a belief in the existence of God is irrational, stupid or can't be reconciled with science.
Firstly, do you think there is a conclusive answer to the problem of induction? If so, what do you think it is?
Secondly, if you do think there is a real problem with induction, what makes believing in God different from believing in induction? What separates belief in induction, from belief in counter-induction, or from belief in a slightly modified version of induction, where, for example, induction holds whenever it isn't in contradiction with Christian theology?
I'm not claiming that this is in any way an argument for the existence of God, and I'm not trying to catch anyone out. I've just been curious about these questions for a while, and since I didn't study philosophy, I don't really know where to look for their answers.
In the example they give in the wiki we could "know" that all swans are white, but a black swan might mess that all up.
In science we would say that "all swans so far observed are white" and should a black one show up, then the original statement is corrected to match the observation.
Furthermore, in science we could offer evidence and reasons why we might believe "all swans are white". Such as understanding and explaining how swan plumage gains it's colour or identify the genetics that cause whiteness in swans. Then using these ideas, our confidence in the statement may become stronger or weaker. For instance we could find that swans are genetically incapable of producing black colouring for their feathers and therefore there is a low chance of a swan ever being black.
Similarly because we understand how and why the Earth spins to a high degree of accuracy we know that there is a low chance of it suddenly stopping for no reason (or that the sun wouldn't raise the next morning.)
And eventually the chances of something odd happening diminishes the more the thing is understood till an occurrence is so unlikely that it is practical to assume that it won't happen.
The Earth could very much suddenly stop spinning over night, but there's no reason to
think it would and all the evidence points to the fact it won't, so you may as well assume that you'll have to get up for work in the morning.
As for separating Christian Induction, that's quite easy. Christianity's supernatural claims (and most other supernatural claims) are unverifiable. It would be more akin to saying all swans turning black when no one is looking than making any inductive conclusion.0 -
Thanks for the answers!Michael Nugent wrote: »The underlying philosophical problem, if you want to describe it as a problem, arises earlier than induction. It arises once ‘you’ assume that anything exists independently of ‘your’ ‘thoughts’, and that what seems to be reality is not an illusion.
Once ‘you’ make that assumption, induction becomes a reasonable method of devising a model of reality that allows 'you' to function sanely based on that assumption.
Using this model of reality, ideas about gods are different to ideas about induction, both because ideas about gods are not required to explain anything, and also because they often contradict the outcomes of applying reason to the apparent evidence of our senses.
I don't want to describe it as a problem, just about every philosopher who's thought about it has described it as a problem! I'm sorry if I'm missing something, but I don't really see how this is anything other than a pragmatic justification of induction. It even seems to be fairly flawed pragmatic argument, since there are many other modes of reasoning that would at the very least also allow us to function somewhat sanely.
Assuming that by saying that the notion of God doesn't explain anything, you are basically using Occam's razor, this also seems flawed. Occam's razor has no inherent value independent of our inductive reasoning. It is an important principle, but I think it would basically be circular reasoning to use it to justify our choice of induction.It's not really a problem because all we know (ie. in the scientific sense) is conditional.
In the example they give in the wiki we could "know" that all swans are white, but a black swan might mess that all up.
In science we would say that "all swans so far observed are white" and should a black one show up, then the original statement is corrected to match the observation.
Furthermore, in science we could offer evidence and reasons why we might believe "all swans are white". Such as understanding and explaining how swan plumage gains it's colour or identify the genetics that cause whiteness in swans. Then using these ideas, our confidence in the statement may become stronger or weaker. For instance we could find that swans are genetically incapable of producing black colouring for their feathers and therefore there is a low chance of a swan ever being black.
Similarly because we understand how and why the Earth spins to a high degree of accuracy we know that there is a low chance of it suddenly stopping for no reason (or that the sun wouldn't raise the next morning.)
And eventually the chances of something odd happening diminishes the more the thing is understood till an occurrence is so unlikely that it is practical to assume that it won't happen.
The Earth could very much suddenly stop spinning over night, but there's no reason to
think it would and all the evidence points to the fact it won't, so you may as well assume that you'll have to get up for work in the morning.
As for separating Christian Induction, that's quite easy. Christianity's supernatural claims (and most other supernatural claims) are unverifiable. It would be more akin to saying all swans turning black when no one is looking than making any inductive conclusion.
I agree that the problem of induction isn't a practical problem, but the fact that in practice we ignore the problem by paying lip service to it, doesn't actually mean it isn't a problem! I may be misunderstanding you when you talk about probabilities, are you just trying to explain to me how science works, or are you claiming that the probability of induction being true is affected by the past successes of induction? If it's the latter, then I think it's circular reasoning, since past successes are only relevant to future successes under the assumption of induction.
It's alright to treat induction as a type of axiom underlying science, but if this is all we're doing, we have to acknowledge that there are other axioms which are no less (or more) valid, in the same way as hyperbolic and elliptic geometry are valid forms of geometry.
Your criterion of verifiability doesn't seem to be a solution, since induction, as a principle, is no more testable than the claim that turn black when they aren't observed. Indeed, if we consider the following two cases
1) Induction
2) Induction, except the universe will cease to exist in 2050.
They are, until the year 2050, identical in what they say about the universe. If we are to choose right now, which to believe in, they have so far made identical predictions and they have the same amount of justification (none). The only obvious reason to choose 1 over 2 is that 1 is simpler than 2, but it is only induction which has taught us that simple explanations are more likely to be true than complicated ad-hoc ones, so it would be circular reasoning to choose 1 over 2 for this reason. Importantly, we have no way of assigning relative probabilities to the two events, without first assuming one of the two inductive models.0 -
I must disagree on this point. For generations the population of the civilised world believed that disease was caused by 'miasma'; i.e. bad smells. We now know that disease is caused by microorganisms; therefore large numbers of people can be, and have been, wrong based on nothing more than ignorance.
But Im of the view, while people shouldnt assume God exists, it would be just as foolish, ignorant and unscientific to assume that 30 billion peoples behaviours is based on nothing more than ignorance and stupidity. And thats why the question should be addressed.
This is also an example of the failure of inductive reasoning, if I understand the concept correctly (it's the first time I've heard of it by that name). The reasoning was: where there is disease there is a bad smell. Therefore disease must be caused by bad smells.0 -
But what makes it a problem if there's no practical issue?I agree that the problem of induction isn't a practical problem, but the fact that in practice we ignore the problem by paying lip service to it, doesn't actually mean it isn't a problem! I may be misunderstanding you when you talk about probabilities, are you just trying to explain to me how science works, or are you claiming that the probability of induction being true is affected by the past successes of induction? If it's the latter, then I think it's circular reasoning, since past successes are only relevant to future successes under the assumption of induction.
The universe has been consistent to certain laws for as long as we've been observing it. When we found new stuff we've found that it too has also followed laws.
So barring any new evidence, it's a as safe an assumption as it is to assume we are not brains in jars.
Well the various forms of geometry are internally consistent and independently verifiable and also have practical uses in making observable predictions about the universe.It's alright to treat induction as a type of axiom underlying science, but if this is all we're doing, we have to acknowledge that there are other axioms which are no less (or more) valid, in the same way as hyperbolic and elliptic geometry are valid forms of geometry.
Theology, or anything likewise based on claims we can never verify cannot do any of this stuff and are therefore indistinguishable form complete nonsense.
But that's the thing, it's a Freudian admission that induction has worked so far. If it did not, there would have been no way to make any scientific advances or even testable predictions.Your criterion of verifiability doesn't seem to be a solution, since induction, as a principle, is no more testable than the claim that turn black when they aren't observed. Indeed, if we consider the following two cases
1) Induction
2) Induction, except the universe will cease to exist in 2050.
They are, until the year 2050, identical in what they say about the universe. If we are to choose right now, which to believe in, they have so far made identical predictions and they have the same amount of justification (none). The only obvious reason to choose 1 over 2 is that 1 is simpler than 2, but it is only induction which has taught us that simple explanations are more likely to be true than complicated ad-hoc ones, so it would be circular reasoning to choose 1 over 2 for this reason. Importantly, we have no way of assigning relative probabilities to the two events, without first assuming one of the two inductive models.
But we can't exclude your second possibility either, just as we can't exclude the possibility that everything would suddenly turn to custard. We just believe that these things have a low probability of happening.
And even if induction was somehow magically turned on it's head for no reason, it's not exactly a problem as we have only really ever held that it is true conditionally based on past observations.0 -
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But what makes it a problem if there's no practical issue?
The universe has been consistent to certain laws for as long as we've been observing it. When we found new stuff we've found that it too has also followed laws.
So barring any new evidence, it's a as safe an assumption as it is to assume we are not brains in jars.
You are correct, it is as safe an assumption as just about anything else, but the problem is that it isn't a safe assumption. We effectively take it on faith. The fact that we are psychologically comfortable doing this makes the problem of induction practically irrelevant in our day to day lives, but taking something on faith should at the very least be a problem to anyone who criticizes Christians for basing their beliefs on faith.Well the various forms of geometry are internally consistent and independently verifiable and also have practical uses in making observable predictions about the universe.
Theology, or anything likewise based on claims we can never verify cannot do any of this stuff and are therefore indistinguishable form complete nonsense.
Mathematics isn't really verifiable, it consists (if you're a formalist) simply of collections of statements which are true based on different axiomatic systems. The fact that mathematics has verifiable applications is great for making mathematics useful, but there are probably very few if any mathematicians who would think that the truth of mathematics is in any way dependent on empirical observations.
Similarly, the principle of induction isn't independently verifiable. Without first assuming that inductive reasoning is sound, how would you propose to verify it?But that's the thing, it's a Freudian admission that induction has worked so far. If it did not, there would have been no way to make any scientific advances or even testable predictions.
But we can't exclude your second possibility either, just as we can't exclude the possibility that everything would suddenly turn to custard. We just believe that these things have a low probability of happening.
And even if induction was somehow magically turned on it's head for no reason, it's not exactly a problem as we have only really ever held that it is true conditionally based on past observations.
The most basic point of the problem of induction, acknowledged by Hume, Popper and every other philosopher who's considered it, is that the claim that induction has worked so far is totally useless, when it comes to justifying induction.
You are welcome to accept induction as an article of faith, but if you do, you probably shouldn't feel too superior to people who accept other things on faith!0 -
You need to read what I wrote again. I said that it is internally consistent, which is true. And that mathematical facts can be verified independently. And I said that these things can be used to make verifiable, testable predictions about the observable universe.Mathematics isn't really verifiable, it consists (if you're a formalist) simply of collections of statements which are true based on different axiomatic systems. The fact that mathematics has verifiable applications is great for making mathematics useful, but there are probably very few if any mathematicians who would think that the truth of mathematics is in any way dependent on empirical observations.Similarly, the principle of induction isn't independently verifiable. Without first assuming that inductive reasoning is sound, how would you propose to verify it?You are correct, it is as safe an assumption as just about anything else, but the problem is that it isn't a safe assumption. We effectively take it on faith. The fact that we are psychologically comfortable doing this makes the problem of induction practically irrelevant in our day to day lives, but taking something on faith should at the very least be a problem to anyone who criticizes Christians for basing their beliefs on faith.
But it isn't assumed on faith, it's assumed because it has worked and produced tangible results that we can use to make verifiable predictions.The most basic point of the problem of induction, acknowledged by Hume, Popper and every other philosopher who's considered it, is that the claim that induction has worked so far is totally useless, when it comes to justifying induction.
You are welcome to accept induction as an article of faith, but if you do, you probably shouldn't feel too superior to people who accept other things on faith!
If induction doesn't work how is this possible?
If you are claiming that induction my someday stop working, then I've already covered this in that our assumption of induction is conditional and subject to change as the facts do.
People who claim a belief in God or many other supernatural things do assume it on faith because they do not have anything else at all to back up base their assumption on. And the odd time they make testable claims, they are always falsified.0 -
You need to read what I wrote again. I said that it is internally consistent, which is true. And that mathematical facts can be verified independently. And I said that these things can be used to make verifiable, testable predictions about the observable universe.
The truth of mathematics is totally independent of any empirical validation.But it isn't assumed on faith, it's assumed because it has worked and produced tangible results that we can use to make verifiable predictions.
If induction doesn't work how is this possible?
If you are claiming that induction my someday stop working, then I've already covered this in that our assumption of induction is conditional and subject to change as the facts do.
People who claim a belief in God or many other supernatural things do assume it on faith because they do not have anything else at all to back up base their assumption on. And the odd time they make testable claims, they are always falsified.
You can claim that induction has worked well in the past (it has), you can make predictions using science, and you can test them, and the predictions can be verified, but none of this adds a shred of evidence to the claim that induction is justified. This is the central point of the problem of induction. If you think you have evidence for the reliability of induction, you should publish it, you would be famous! Unfortunately, the claim that induction is reliable, because of how well it has worked in the past, or that it becomes more likely to be true, because we can use it to make predictions which turn out to be accurate, is an example of circular reasoning.0 -
I didn't say the truth of mathematics could be empirically verified. I said that some things in maths could be independently verified, such as certain proofs etc, and that some maths can be used to accuratly predict things we can observe, such as using maths to describe and predict the orbits of planets.The truth of mathematics is totally independent of any empirical validation.
But again, you haven't read what I have written. I said it was a justified assumption not a verified fact.You can claim that induction has worked well in the past (it has), you can make predictions using science, and you can test them, and the predictions can be verified, but none of this adds a shred of evidence to the claim that induction is justified. This is the central point of the problem of induction. If you think you have evidence for the reliability of induction, you should publish it, you would be famous! Unfortunately, the claim that induction is reliable, because of how well it has worked in the past, or that it becomes more likely to be true, because we can use it to make predictions which turn out to be accurate, is an example of circular reasoning.
It is justified in that it works. If it does not work, then you must explain how we are able to many testable observations and predictions.
However if or when it is found to not work, then there would be no confidence in it as he assumption is made on the condition that it can be shown to work.
This is separate from the assumption made by faith as there is nothing to justify that assumption.0 -
But again, you haven't read what I have written. I said it was a justified assumption not a verified fact.
It is justified in that it works. If it does not work, then you must explain how we are able to many testable observations and predictions.
However if or when it is found to not work, then there would be no confidence in it as he assumption is made on the condition that it can be shown to work.
This is separate from the assumption made by faith as there is nothing to justify that assumption.
I have read what you've written, but you are misunderstanding the problem of induction. This isn't just my reading of the problem of induction, the most basic conclusion of the problem of induction is that what you have said in the above is wrong. The problem isn't that we can't conclusively prove that induction works, the problem is that there isn't a shred of non-circular justification for it. What you are doing above is using induction to justify induction.
What you are doing is the following: Induction has worked well in the past (science, predictions, verification etc.), so it's a fair assumption that it will also do so in the future. But this idea that it's a fair assumption that it will continue to work well is an application of inductive reasoning. Therefore your argument is circular, and provides no justification of induction.
Just to do a very quick summary, Hume's argument was something like this. To justify the use of induction, we need to show that nature is uniform in some sense. This uniformity of nature is a matter of fact about the universe, which is not necessarily true, and can't therefore be justified deductively, so we must have to justify it inductively, but this is circular.
If you are interested, the below link has a quick discussion of the problem of induction, along with an explanation of why some of the commonly used arguments are wrong. The only argument that I know of which is generally considered to be somewhat valid is the pragmatic justification at the end.
http://ls.poly.edu/~jbain/philsci/philscilectures/08.Induction.pdf
One of the problems with the pragmatic justification is that it's pragmatic, so while it may motivate our use of induction, it can't actually justify its success. My point at the end of all of this is that the pragmatic justification can't differentiate in any way between an assumption of induction, and an assumption of induction with some exceptions. What would usually be used to get rid of those exceptions is Occam's razor, but the usefulness of Occam's razor is a consequence of our inductive reasoning, and therefore can't be used to differentiate betwen the two.0 -
God doesn't exist in the same way that the sun will rise tomorrow.
Until it's proven that God exists, he doesn't (because there is not enough evidence to support that he does). Until it's proven that the sun won't rise tomorrow, it will (because we have more than enough evidence to support that it will).0 -
God doesn't exist in the same way that the sun will rise tomorrow.
Until it's proven that God exists, he doesn't (because there is not enough evidence to support that he does). Until it's proven that the sun won't rise tomorrow, it will (because we have more than enough evidence to support that it will).
This is simply wrong, what you believe to be evidence is actually circular. If you read the rest of this thread, or the link in my last post, you will see why.0 -
This is simply wrong, what you believe to be evidence is actually circular. If you read the rest of this thread, or the link in my last post, you will see why.
Firstly, just because someone disagrees with you, don't assume they didn't read the thread or links. I know what your position is, I just disagree with it.
Secondly, it's not "what I believe to be evidence". Is induction circular? Yes. However, because we cannot see into the future, we cannot account for things that we do not know about. We can only use a) evidence from what has happened in the past and b) predictions about what will happen in the future (based on past and present conditions).
In both cases of God not being real and the sun rising tomorrow, it's the most logical explanation given the information we have. Does that mean that it's 100% right? No. Something we don't know about travelling at 100,000,000 light years per second could smash into the Sun and kill us all. But there is nothing to suggest that it will or that something like that exists, so we cannot assume that it is a factor in whether or not the sun will rise tomorrow. We can only work off the information we have. Are all swans white? Yes, because all swans noted have always been white. If a black swan came, then are all swans white? No, they are usually white, but there are some black ones.
People 600 years ago thought the sun revolved around the earth. Were they right? At the time, yes, because they were working off the information they had. That the sun came from the east, rose up into the sky, and set to the west. But were they actually right? No, because we now know that that is not the case.
It's not about what we perceive to be right or perceive to be valid evidence. It's about using all the information we currently have to make a judgement. Will the sun rise tomorrow? Based on the evidence we have, there is absolutely no reason to suppose that it won't. If it didn't rise tomorrow, then we would have new evidence to show that it doesn't always rise.
Same with God. There is no scientific evidence to support the idea that God exists. Does he exist? Probably not. In 600 years, will science have improved to the level that we would be able to prove God existed? Who knows. If it did though, and we were able to prove God existed, then obviously there would be scientific evidence to support the idea that God exists. But until that happens, there's no reason to suggest that he does.
Is using induction circular? Yes. But it is also the most valid way of determining facts. No one can say anything with 100% certainty (unless it's 99.9999...% and they're rounding up). We can only ever work with the information we have.
What would you suggest to be an alternative? How should we determine if the sun will rise tomorrow? I think the sun will rise tomorrow because I have seen no evidence to say that it won't. But I'm not 100% sure. 99.999999....%, but not 100%.0 -
Firstly, just because someone disagrees with you, don't assume they didn't read the thread or links. I know what your position is, I just disagree with it.
Unfortunately there is no law forbidding you to disagree with me, but if you're going to disagree with the philosophical consensus regarding the problem of induction, you should probably provide some supporting arguments. To be fair, you've done that now.Secondly, it's not "what I believe to be evidence". Is induction circular? Yes. However, because we cannot see into the future, we cannot account for things that we do not know about. We can only use a) evidence from what has happened in the past and b) predictions about what will happen in the future (based on past and present conditions).
In both cases of God not being real and the sun rising tomorrow, it's the most logical explanation given the information we have. Does that mean that it's 100% right? No. Something we don't know about travelling at 100,000,000 light years per second could smash into the Sun and kill us all. But there is nothing to suggest that it will or that something like that exists, so we cannot assume that it is a factor in whether or not the sun will rise tomorrow. We can only work off the information we have. Are all swans white? Yes, because all swans noted have always been white. If a black swan came, then are all swans white? No, they are usually white, but there are some black ones.
People 600 years ago thought the sun revolved around the earth. Were they right? At the time, yes, because they were working off the information they had. That the sun came from the east, rose up into the sky, and set to the west. But were they actually right? No, because we now know that that is not the case.
It's not about what we perceive to be right or perceive to be valid evidence. It's about using all the information we currently have to make a judgement. Will the sun rise tomorrow? Based on the evidence we have, there is absolutely no reason to suppose that it won't. If it didn't rise tomorrow, then we would have new evidence to show that it doesn't always rise.
Same with God. There is no scientific evidence to support the idea that God exists. Does he exist? Probably not. In 600 years, will science have improved to the level that we would be able to prove God existed? Who knows. If it did though, and we were able to prove God existed, then obviously there would be scientific evidence to support the idea that God exists. But until that happens, there's no reason to suggest that he does.
Is using induction circular? Yes. But it is also the most valid way of determining facts. No one can say anything with 100% certainty (unless it's 99.9999...% and they're rounding up). We can only ever work with the information we have.
What would you suggest to be an alternative? How should we determine if the sun will rise tomorrow? I think the sun will rise tomorrow because I have seen no evidence to say that it won't. But I'm not 100% sure. 99.999999....%, but not 100%.
I am not saying that induction is circular (inductive reasoning itself isn't circular), what I am saying is that your justification of induction is circular. You would probably not be impressed if I attempted to prove God's existence using the testimony of the bible either. Everything you have said about the sun and about swans assumes induction. You say we can use (a) and (b), but they give you no information, unless you first assume some principle of induction.
I really don't understand how we can be having a discussion about whether our use of induction is justified, only for you to simply state as fact that induction is the most valid way of determining facts. This is meant to be your conclusion, not your justification.
I have explained some alternatives, if you consider the principle of induction, except for example with the additional assumption that God exists, or that the universe will be destroyed in 2050. There is no reason to choose them over normal induction, but there is also no reason to choose induction over them.
Finally, I am sure you are familiar with the problem of justifying your belief that the sun will rise tomorrow, with the fact that there is no evidence to the contrary.0 -
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Finally, I am sure you are familiar with the problem of justifying your belief that the sun will rise tomorrow, with the fact that there is no evidence to the contrary.
But it isn't even a case of justifying whether or not the sun will rise tomorrow because there's no evidence to the contrary. There is evidence to support the claim that it will rise. By the laws of nature which we currently know of, even if we disregard the fact that the sun rises every morning, there is still evidence that it will rise tomorrow. Not only that, but the sun is always "risen/active" for about half the planet at any given time, so it isn't even a case of "Will the sun rise tomorrow?", it's "Is the sun still there?"
Fine, lets say justification of induction is circular. So what?
Your point (correct me if I'm wrong) is that because we assume induction to be correct, but we are using induction to form that belief, that we have some type of faith with regards to induction, and this is somehow comparable to people who believe in God and their faith.
Degree matters, as does the definition of the word "faith". Trusting evidence based science (based on induction or not) is not the same as taking something as true despite there being no sufficient evidence for it.0
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