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Questions about induction and God
Comments
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But it isn't even a case of justifying whether or not the sun will rise tomorrow because there's no evidence to the contrary. There is evidence to support the claim that it will rise. By the laws of nature which we currently know of, even if we disregard the fact that the sun rises every morning, there is still evidence that it will rise tomorrow. Not only that, but the sun is always "risen/active" for about half the planet at any given time, so it isn't even a case of "Will the sun rise tomorrow?", it's "Is the sun still there?"
All our laws of nature and science are obtained through inductive reasoning. If you therefore take away inductive reasoning, there is zero evidence for the sun rising tomorrow. You are right of course, that we are only using shorthand when talking about the sun rising.Fine, lets say justification of induction is circular. So what?
Your point (correct me if I'm wrong) is that because we assume induction to be correct, but we are using induction to form that belief, that we have some type of faith with regards to induction, and this is somehow comparable to people who believe in God and their faith.
Degree matters, as does the definition of the word "faith". Trusting evidence based science (based on induction or not) is not the same as taking something as true despite there being no sufficient evidence for it.
An inductive justification of induction is no justification at all, this is the primary problem.
I don't fully understand how you've summed up my point, but that might be because I've been unclear. Inductive reasoning is at the heart of the way we live our lives, and is essential to any knowledge we have about the world, in particular all scientific knowledge. Evidence based science has no justification, and no evidence, if you take away the inductive principles underlying it. You are confusing the issue by talking about science, because you have to justify induction, before you can even begin to justify science.
Since we can't justify induction, we are taking it on faith. There isn't any evidence for it, let alone sufficient evidence. I then gave a slightly modified principle of induction, whereby certain specific beliefs (for example Christan beliefs) are included alongside a general principle of induction, and said that we have no reason to choose normal induction over this modified induction.0 -
Since we can't justify induction, we are taking it on faith. There isn't any evidence for it, let alone sufficient evidence. I then gave a slightly modified principle of induction, whereby certain specific beliefs (for example Christan beliefs) are included alongside a general principle of induction, and said that we have no reason to choose normal induction over this modified induction.
But we do, because again, degree matters.
Take speeding for example. Speeding is illegal. If you go 81km/h in an 80km/h zone, you are speeding. If you go 120km/h in an 80km/h zone, you are speeding. One is worse than the other.
We do have reason to choose normal induction over modified induction. You say that once you take the inductive reasoning behind it out, it has no justification. But the same can be said for anything. If you take the Bible out of Catholicism, there's no evidence for it. You're arguing about the methodology of determining results, rather than the results. We use induction to show that the sun will rise tomorrow, and we use induction as proof that induction works. And yet, for every day this has been done so far, the sun has risen.
Your argument is a philosophical one, and is correct, but it doesn't mean that the claims that the sun will rise tomorrow are any less valid. There is a reason to choose normal induction over modified induction.... It works. Yes, I'm using induction as justification for using induction to prove induction.... But there is more of a justification for doing that than there is for modified induction.
Degree matters.0 -
All our laws of nature and science are obtained through inductive reasoning. If you therefore take away inductive reasoning, there is zero evidence for the sun rising tomorrow. You are right of course, that we are only using shorthand when talking about the sun rising.
As they say on those financial adds, past performance is no guarantee of future performance:D
I think you're making a kind of non point to be honest. Science may well be based on induction, but as for it being a problem? I just don't see it. Science doesn't really claim to be truth, just a best known version of the "rules" of reality- always open to change in the face of evidence.
The sun has risen every day since men were around to notice it, yes there may be no "proof" that it will rise tomorrow, but that is hardly the same thing as saying there is no real reason to believe it will. I can predict it will rise tomorrow and be as close to certain as it's possible to be that it will - insofar as i can't be "certain" that it even exists. I can only really be certain that i exist, in some form or other (i think, therefore i am) - everything else is just probabilities and perceptions. But all probabilities are not created equal, the existance of a deity seems less likely to me than the existance of the sun, induction or not. I can see a "reason" to believe in the sun, on all to rare occasions i can even feel that reason on my face as i stroll about. Not so much of that with the deity.0 -
But we do, because again, degree matters.
Take speeding for example. Speeding is illegal. If you go 81km/h in an 80km/h zone, you are speeding. If you go 120km/h in an 80km/h zone, you are speeding. One is worse than the other.
We do have reason to choose normal induction over modified induction. You say that once you take the inductive reasoning behind it out, it has no justification. But the same can be said for anything. If you take the Bible out of Catholicism, there's no evidence for it. You're arguing about the methodology of determining results, rather than the results. We use induction to show that the sun will rise tomorrow, and we use induction as proof that induction works. And yet, for every day this has been done so far, the sun has risen.
Your argument is a philosophical one, and is correct, but it doesn't mean that the claims that the sun will rise tomorrow are any less valid. There is a reason to choose normal induction over modified induction.... It works. Yes, I'm using induction as justification for using induction to prove induction.... But there is more of a justification for doing that than there is for modified induction.
Degree matters.
Degrees matter, but there is no difference in this case. Firstly, there is a pragmatic argument for counter induction, secondly, the exact same pragmatic argument used to justify induction (it works) applies to a modified inductive assumption with the modification that the universe will be destroyed in 2050 (it works, at least so far).
You claim that there is more of a justification for induction than some form of modified induction, what is this justification that applies only to induction?0 -
sbsquarepants wrote: »As they say on those financial adds, past performance is no guarabtee of future performance:D
I think you're making a kind of non point to be honest. Science may well be based on induction, but as for it being a problem? I just don't see it. Science doesn't really claim to be truth, just a best known version of the "rules" of reality- always open to change in the face of evidence.
The sun has risen every day since men were around to notice it, yes there may be no "proof" that it will rise tomorrow, but that is hardly the same thing as saying there is no real reason to believe it will. I can predict it will rise tomorrow and be as close to certain as it's possible to be that it will - insofar as i can't be "certain" that it even exists. I can only really be certain that i exist, in some form or other (i think, therefore i am) - everything else is just probabilities and perceptions. But all probabilities are not created equal, the existance of a deity seems less likely to me than the existance of the sun, induction or not. I can see a "reason" to believe in the sun, on all to rare occasions i can even feel that reason on my face as i stroll about. Not so much of that with the deity.
I tried to fit that in to one of my posts, but couldn't make it seem natural:D. I won't waste your time by just repeating my arguments, but if you read the link I provided, the problem of induction isn't that we can't be certain about our inductive reasoning, but that we have no reason whatsoever to trust in it.0 -
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Degrees matter, but there is no difference in this case. Firstly, there is a pragmatic argument for counter induction, secondly, the exact same pragmatic argument used to justify induction (it works) applies to a modified inductive assumption with the modification that the universe will be destroyed in 2050 (it works, at least so far).
You claim that there is more of a justification for induction than some form of modified induction, what is this justification that applies only to induction?
Past history, logic, evidence... Yes, we use induction to make these things evidence, but at least there is something there to do this with rather than a claim that the universe will be destroyed in 2050.
Your claim that the world will end in 2050 is not based on past history, is not logical (unless you can somehow see into the future), and has no evidence behind it.
Again, your argument is a philosophical one, in how we decide what to believe, rather than what is actually the truth. But the difference between people using circular reasoning with regards induction and science, and a person's belief in a god or gods, is the fact that we can determine to the best of our abilities whether the science is the truth or not. We can experiment, we can actually try to figure out what is the truth, to the furthest extent that we possibly can. But with religion, it already claims to be the truth and that no experimentation is necessary.
We're only human, and yes, we use science to prove science. We use induction to justify induction. But at least that is aiming towards something.0 -
I tried to fit that in to one of my posts, but couldn't make it seem natural:D. I won't waste your time by just repeating my arguments, but if you read the link I provided, the problem of induction isn't that we can't be certain about our inductive reasoning, but that we have no reason whatsoever to trust in it.
But that's just not true.
The reason we have to trust in it is that it has worked so far. We are pattern spotting, habbit forming creatures, we try something new if it doesn't work we keep trying till we find something that does, then we tend to stick with that and it becomes natural to us. We are predisposed to seeking out and recognising patterns. Induction has worked well for us so far - surely that's reason enough to trust it now?0 -
I tried to fit that in to one of my posts, but couldn't make it seem natural:D. I won't waste your time by just repeating my arguments, but if you read the link I provided, the problem of induction isn't that we can't be certain about our inductive reasoning, but that we have no reason whatsoever to trust in it.
If we have no reason to trust inductive reasoning, then you would have to take that into account in EVERY decision you make during the course of life, scientific or not, and you would have to account for every possible outcome.
Example: I'm about to eat my Cornflakes. Up until now, my Cornflakes haven't poisoned me and there have been an infinitesimal amount of people have been poisoned by them. But if I have no reason to trust my inductive reasoning, then my Cornflakes could very well poison me and I don't have breakfast.
Imagine having to apply that kind of skewed reasoning to every decision of the day. Whether you realize it or not, you apply inductive reasoning unconsciously to every situation you deal with.0 -
Past history, logic, evidence... Yes, we use induction to make these things evidence, but at least there is something there to do this with rather than a claim that the universe will be destroyed in 2050.
Your claim that the world will end in 2050 is not based on past history, is not logical (unless you can somehow see into the future), and has no evidence behind it.
Again, your argument is a philosophical one, in how we decide what to believe, rather than what is actually the truth. But the difference between people using circular reasoning with regards induction and science, and a person's belief in a god or gods, is the fact that we can determine to the best of our abilities whether the science is the truth or not. We can experiment, we can actually try to figure out what is the truth, to the furthest extent that we possibly can. But with religion, it already claims to be the truth and that no experimentation is necessary.
We're only human, and yes, we use science to prove science. We use induction to justify induction. But at least that is aiming towards something.
You say there's evidence, but you haven't provided any. A circular justification of induction is as useful as a circular justification for the existence of God. Since the value of experimentation and science comes from our assumption of inductive validity, it can't help us in trying to understand if our inductive assumption is actually any good. You have presented evidence for induction, but it has all been circular, I have presented no evidence for the universe ending in 2050, so we are in the same boat.sbsquarepants wrote: »But that's just not true.
The reason we have to trust in it is that it has worked so far. We are pattern spotting, habbit forming creatures, we try something new if it doesn't work we keep trying till we find something that does, then we tend to stick with that and it becomes natural to us. We are predisposed to seeking out and recognising patterns. Induction has worked well for us so far - surely that's reason enough to trust it now?
The fact that it is in our nature (a claim which relies on inductive reasoning, but I don't actually disagree with it), is no more relevant than the fact that some people believe we are predisposed to believing in the supernatural, when it comes to actually justifying those beliefs. The fact that induction has worked well for us so far, is only relevant under the assumption of induction, and is therefore an example of circular reasoning.0 -
If we have no reason to trust inductive reasoning, then you would have to take that into account in EVERY decision you make during the course of life, scientific or not, and you would have to account for every possible outcome.
Example: I'm about to eat my Cornflakes. Up until now, my Cornflakes haven't poisoned me and there have been an infinitesimal amount of people have been poisoned by them. But if I have no reason to trust my inductive reasoning, then my Cornflakes could very well poison me and I don't have breakfast.
Imagine having to apply that kind of skewed reasoning to every decision of the day. Whether you realize it or not, you apply inductive reasoning unconsciously to every situation you deal with.
I am not denying the validity of inductive reasoning or science (I think they are both valid, and extremely important), my claim is that our choosing to trust in induction is effectively a matter of faith, in the same way as choosing to believe in God is a matter of faith.0 -
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I tried to fit that in to one of my posts, but couldn't make it seem natural:D. I won't waste your time by just repeating my arguments, but if you read the link I provided, the problem of induction isn't that we can't be certain about our inductive reasoning, but that we have no reason whatsoever to trust in it.
Very few things can be verified to be objectively true. It is more common to define an axiom/position of faith/assumption as a starting point, then we can argue about how reasonable that assumption is. For example how do we prove that we are not a brain in a vat? We can't, but we tend to live our lives based on the assumption that we are not.
Instead of arguing about if the principle of induction can be objectively proven since it probably can't. Lets look at your last statement, "...but that we have no reason whatsoever to trust in it.". Given the assumption that a model with predictive power is better than one without predictive power then inductive reasoning gives us a good reason to trust it.
You could argue that this assumption is unreasonable, but it is still one that you live your life by.
BTW have you seen this video? I think you might find it interesting.
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But again, the assumption we make that induction work in the future is conditional.I have read what you've written, but you are misunderstanding the problem of induction. This isn't just my reading of the problem of induction, the most basic conclusion of the problem of induction is that what you have said in the above is wrong. The problem isn't that we can't conclusively prove that induction works, the problem is that there isn't a shred of non-circular justification for it. What you are doing above is using induction to justify induction.
What you are doing is the following: Induction has worked well in the past (science, predictions, verification etc.), so it's a fair assumption that it will also do so in the future. But this idea that it's a fair assumption that it will continue to work well is an application of inductive reasoning. Therefore your argument is circular, and provides no justification of induction.
Just to do a very quick summary, Hume's argument was something like this. To justify the use of induction, we need to show that nature is uniform in some sense. This uniformity of nature is a matter of fact about the universe, which is not necessarily true, and can't therefore be justified deductively, so we must have to justify it inductively, but this is circular.
If you are interested, the below link has a quick discussion of the problem of induction, along with an explanation of why some of the commonly used arguments are wrong. The only argument that I know of which is generally considered to be somewhat valid is the pragmatic justification at the end.
http://ls.poly.edu/~jbain/philsci/philscilectures/08.Induction.pdf
One of the problems with the pragmatic justification is that it's pragmatic, so while it may motivate our use of induction, it can't actually justify its success. My point at the end of all of this is that the pragmatic justification can't differentiate in any way between an assumption of induction, and an assumption of induction with some exceptions. What would usually be used to get rid of those exceptions is Occam's razor, but the usefulness of Occam's razor is a consequence of our inductive reasoning, and therefore can't be used to differentiate betwen the two.
We make this assumption because induction has worked so far, which you've agreed is true, there's no reason to think that it will randomly change and there is no better way of discovering stuff about the universe.
However, the assumption that God exists is not based on anything that is verifiable or is distinguishable from delusion.
We are able to make testable predictions about stuff, which is due to the fact that induction works.
Any assumptions or claims about God are not able to translate to any testable predictions or anything verifiable.
The "problem" you have with induction is really just a non-issue that arises from the language we use rather than the actual logic.0 -
The fact that it is in our nature (a claim which relies on inductive reasoning, but I don't actually disagree with it), is no more relevant than the fact that some people believe we are predisposed to believing in the supernatural, when it comes to actually justifying those beliefs. The fact that induction has worked well for us so far, is only relevant under the assumption of induction, and is therefore an example of circular reasoning.
I disagree. Spotting a pattern and making a prediction of future events based on that pattern is not circular reasoning. It doesn't really matter what caused the original prediction to be made, the pattern is either there or it isn't. Early in human history people spotted the predictability of the seasons, their reasons for why they occured were largely off the wall - but the pattern itself held true. Spring follows winter follows autumn follows summer whether virgins are thrown into volcanoes or not:D
Why it happens has been refined over the years, that it happens stays fixed. To say we have no reason to expect it to keep happening this way is plainly untrue. The reason is history and experience, we've all experienced the sequence. We have records of it being like this for centuries, millenia even. It "could" all change tomorrow but odds are it wont.
Climate change eh - great example to pick!!:D0 -
Very few things can be verified to be objectively true. It is more common to define an axiom/position of faith/assumption as a starting point, then we can argue about how reasonable that assumption is. For example how do we prove that we are not a brain in a vat? We can't, but we tend to live our lives based on the assumption that we are not.
Instead of arguing about if the principle of induction can be objectively proven since it probably can't. Lets look at your last statement, "...but that we have no reason whatsoever to trust in it.". Given the assumption that a model with predictive power is better than one without predictive power then inductive reasoning gives us a good reason to trust it.
You could argue that this assumption is unreasonable, but it is still one that you live your life by.
I will watch the video later today. I have two problems with what you have said. Firstly, how do we assess how reasonable our axioms are? If we for example are considering different axioms of mathematics, it might be that we choose to use the axioms of hyperbolic geometry, when dealing with problems for which these axioms seem empirically reasonable. In the case of our assumption that we should use inductive reasoning, any way we might choose to verify the soundness of our choice quickly falls into the problem of being circular, because really, without inductive reasoning, we know basically nothing about the universe.
Secondly, regarding the criterion of predictive power. We should first note that prior to actually assuming inductive reasoning to be valid, we don't have reason to believe in any predictive power of induction. More importantly, any form inductive reasoning, modified to allow unpredictable exceptional events (miracles, for example) is indistinguishable from normal inductive reasoning in terms of predictive power. This is actually the discussion I was hoping to have, because my thinking is that whereas we would normally use Occam's razor, or some principle of parsimony, to choose induction over a modified form of induction, those principles have no value prior to our assumption of induction, and therefore don't differentiate between normal induction and a modified form of induction.But again, the assumption we make that induction work in the future is conditional.
We make this assumption because induction has worked so far, which you've agreed is true, there's not reason to think that it will randomly change for no reason and there is no better way of discovering stuff about the universe.
However, the assumption that God exists is not based on anything that is verifiable or is distinguishable from delusion.
We are able to make testable predictions about stuff, which is due to the fact that induction works.
Any assumptions or claims about God are not able to translate to any testable predictions or anything verifiable.
The "problem" you have with induction is really just a non-issue that arises from the language we use rather than the actual logic.
This isn't my "problem" of induction, while I would be interested in hearing if anyone believes that the problem of induction has been solved, I really do think that it's a matter of basic philosophical knowledge that there is a problem, and that the naive solution to the problem, that it's worked so far, is entirely circular and valueless.sbsquarepants wrote: »I disagree. Spotting a pattern and making a prediction of future events based on that pattern is not circular reasoning. It doesn't really matter what caused the original prediction to be made, the pattern is either there or it isn't. Early in human history people spotted the predictability of the seasons, their reasons for why they occured were largely off the wall - but the pattern itself held true. Spring follows winter follows autumn follows summer whether virgins are thrown into volcanoes or not
Why it happens has been refined over the years, that it happens stays fixed. To say we have no reason to expect it to keep happening this way is plainly untrue. The reason is history and experience, we've all experienced the sequence. We have records of it being like this for centuries, millenia even. It "could" all change tomorrow but odds are it wont.
Climate change eh - great example to pick!!
There's no circular reasoning involved in saying that there is a pattern, you can also make a prediction, and you're safe, but the (implied) claim that this prediction is likely to come true is going to be based on the fact that past predictions based on past identified patterns have come true. But the only way that past performance is relevant to the future, is under an assumption of uniformity of nature or inductive validity.0 -
This isn't my "problem" of induction, while I would be interested in hearing if anyone believes that the problem of induction has been solved, I really do think that it's a matter of basic philosophical knowledge that there is a problem, and that the naive solution to the problem, that it's worked so far, is entirely circular and valueless.
1. It's not actually a problem, either practically or philosophically. Assuming that it works is justified in that is has worked and it is working. Assuming that it will work in the future is conditional (and falsifiable). It is only a problem if you assert as 100% fact that it always work, which we are not doing.
2. Assumption that it works is different from the assumption that God exists or similar is because it allows us to make predictions and has made several successful predictions. A belief in god has never and can never produce successful testable predictions. Further faith in God is not conditional, it will not and does not change in the face of facts (or lack of facts).
Therefore the assumption that induction works is not taken on faith and is not comparable to the assumption that God exists.0 -
Secondly, regarding the criterion of predictive power. We should first note that prior to actually assuming inductive reasoning to be valid, we don't have reason to believe in any predictive power of induction. More importantly, any form inductive reasoning, modified to allow unpredictable exceptional events (miracles, for example) is indistinguishable from normal inductive reasoning in terms of predictive power. This is actually the discussion I was hoping to have, because my thinking is that whereas we would normally use Occam's razor, or some principle of parsimony, to choose induction over a modified form of induction, those principles have no value prior to our assumption of induction, and therefore don't differentiate between normal induction and a modified form of induction.
A modified form of induction that allows unpredictable exceptional events would mean that no conclusions could be drawn from any experiment or observation because it would be impossible to distinguish between a "miracle" event and a natural occurrence. The only reason we have for making the assumption that we live in an universe where inductive reasoning is valid, is because between counter-induction (which does provide predictions but the predictions prove counter-induction is invalid) and non-induction, the only one which provides useful data is induction. Of course that also means that we can never actually prove induction, because any proof would indeed be circular (although we could disprove induction by contradiction), it is the only form that provides usable data, so for that reason alone it is the only valid choice.0 -
1. It's not actually a problem, either practically or philosophically. Assuming that it works is justified in that is has worked and it is working. Assuming that it will work in the future is conditional (and falsifiable). It is only a problem if you assert as 100% fact that it always work, which we are not doing.
2. Assumption that it works is different from the assumption that God exists or similar is because it allows us to make predictions and has made several successful predictions. A belief in god has never and can never produce successful testable predictions. Further faith in God is not conditional, it will not and does not change in the face of facts (or lack of facts).
Therefore the assumption that induction works is not taken on faith and is not comparable to the assumption that God exists.
Do you realize that you're contradicting every philosopher who's ever written about the problem of induction? As soon as you say anything about the probability of your predictions coming true, you run into difficulties. The standard understanding of the problem of induction, as discussed in this thread, and on the link in my reply to you on page 2, is that we can't just not know for certain that our predictions are good, but that we have no way at all of assessing their probability of being correct.A modified form of induction that allows unpredictable exceptional events would mean that no conclusions could be drawn from any experiment or observation because it would be impossible to distinguish between a "miracle" event and a natural occurrence. The only reason we have for making the assumption that we live in an universe where inductive reasoning in valid, is because between counter-induction (which does provide predictions but the predictions prove counter-induction is invalid) and non-induction, the only one which provides useful data is induction. Of course that also means that we can never actually prove induction, because any proof would indeed be circular (although we could disprove induction by contradiction), it is the only form that provides usable data, so for that reason alone it is the only valid choice.
It wouldn't be impossible to distinguish between a miracle event and a natural occurence. Most Christians who are also scientists will do their work happily without expecting or considering that a miracle will occur, even though they might believe that these are technically possible. When you see that inductive reasoning is the only form of reasoning which provides useful data, you are not justifying induction, you are vindicating it. This would really be sufficient, but I don't see how this vindication doesn't apply equally well to an assumption of induction holding, except on the few occasions where miracles might occur.0 -
No you've misunderstood me again.Do you realize that you're contradicting every philosopher who's ever written about the problem of induction? As soon as you say anything about the probability of your predictions coming true, you run into difficulties. The standard understanding of the problem of induction, as discussed in this thread, and on the link in my reply to you on page 2, is that we can't just not know for certain that our predictions are good, but that we have no way at all of assessing their probability of being correct.
You've already agreed that induction has worked in the past, because it has been used to make successful testable predictions.
We can test induction in the present by making a testable prediction.
The problem only exists if it is asserted as absolute fact that this will be always the case for the future based on that previous information.
However we do not do this, instead we just make a conditional assumption. And we find out if induction continues to work as we continue to make testable predictions.
No miracles or any supernatural events have ever once been shown to occur either via prediction or after the fact.It wouldn't be impossible to distinguish between a miracle event and a natural occurence. Most Christians who are also scientists will do their work happily without expecting or considering that a miracle will occur, even though they might believe that these are technically possible. When you see that inductive reasoning is the only form of reasoning which provides useful data, you are not justifying induction, you are vindicating it. This would really be sufficient, but I don't see how this vindication doesn't apply equally well to an assumption of induction holding, except on the few occasions where miracles might occur.0 -
You say there's evidence, but you haven't provided any. A circular justification of induction is as useful as a circular justification for the existence of God. Since the value of experimentation and science comes from our assumption of inductive validity, it can't help us in trying to understand if our inductive assumption is actually any good. You have presented evidence for induction, but it has all been circular, I have presented no evidence for the universe ending in 2050, so we are in the same boat.
It's not the same boat though. Again, degree matters. There are 8billion people on this planet. There are 500billion people on this planet. Both those statements are wrong, but one is more wrong than the other.
A circular justification of induction is not the same as a circular justification for the existence of God because of scientific skepticism and common sense, which is all we can possibly have. There is no way around the circular justification of induction for science, because it is as far as we can possibly go. But it does not make science and religion equal.
What would you suggest otherwise? How could we determine facts? Should we all begin to prepare in case the sun doesn't rise tomorrow?
We are not all-knowing. We are not omnipotent. We can only do the best with what we currently have. But I'm sorry, whether or not using circular reasoning of induction or circular reasoning for religion both use circular reasoning, one is still more wrong than the other.0 -
No you've misunderstood me again.
You've already agreed that induction has worked in the past, because it has been used to make successful testable predictions.
We can test induction in the present by making a testable prediction.
The problem only exists if it is asserted as absolute fact that this will be always the case for the future based on that previous information.
However we do not do this, instead we just make a conditional assumption. And we find out if induction continues to work as we continue to make testable predictions.
No miracles or any supernatural events have ever once been shown to occur either via prediction or after the fact.
The claim that inductive reasoning is absolutely reliable is trivially false, but the problem I'm talking about isn't that we can't be absolutely certain of it. The problem is that there is absolutely justification at all for why you should have even the slightest bit of faith in your predictions.It's not the same boat though. Again, degree matters. There are 8billion people on this planet. There are 500billion people on this planet. Both those statements are wrong, but one is more wrong than the other.
A circular justification of induction is not the same as a circular justification for the existence of God because of scientific skepticism and common sense, which is all we can possibly have. There is no way around the circular justification of induction for science, because it is as far as we can possibly go. But it does not make science and religion equal.
What would you suggest otherwise? How could we determine facts? Should we all begin to prepare in case the sun doesn't rise tomorrow?
We are not all-knowing. We are not omnipotent. We can only do the best with what we currently have. But I'm sorry, whether or not using circular reasoning of induction or circular reasoning for religion both use circular reasoning, one is still more wrong than the other.
You are entitled to your opinion, but if you can't justify it, that's all it is. Scientific skepticism and common sense depend on inductive reasoning, and therefore don't help your case.0 -
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It wouldn't be impossible to distinguish between a miracle event and a natural occurence. Most Christians who are also scientists will do their work happily without expecting or considering that a miracle will occur, even though they might believe that these are technically possible. When you see that inductive reasoning is the only form of reasoning which provides useful data, you are not justifying induction, you are vindicating it. This would really be sufficient, but I don't see how this vindication doesn't apply equally well to an assumption of induction holding, except on the few occasions where miracles might occur.
Exactly what test could you run to distinguish between a miracle event and a natural occurrence? Any corroborating evidence could just as easily be another miracle or any contradicting evidence could be the miracle instead of the original miracle, or perhaps both are miraculous. Or neither, perhaps there is simply an error in your methodology or data collection, how do you tell the difference between a very rare error and a miracle. Any further questions or serious problems with your hypothesis could easily be dismissed by miraculous events. Every single conclusion you draw would be subject to the exact same bit of unanswerable and pointless questioning.
Scientists of faith, in order to be taken seriously by the scientific community, have a responsibility to separate their personal religious beliefs from their scientific work. Anyone who cannot do this simply cannot be a scientist. That isn't to say that the work of any scientist who hasn't properly separated their work from their faith, is completely without merit, simply that when they start allowing miracles to explain events, they are no longer doing science. The very best example of this is Issac Newton, when he published Principia Mathematica he was unable to explain how the whole system stayed in balance and he used god performing miracles and to explain away this problem, if he hadn't allowed himself the option of miraculous explanations then who knows how much more he may have contributed to science to resolve this problem.0 -
You are entitled to your opinion, but if you can't justify it, that's all it is. Scientific skepticism and common sense depend on inductive reasoning, and therefore don't help your case.
Yes, but scientific skepticism and common sense are all we have to differentiate between two things with circular reasoning behind them. It is as far as we can possibly go, so it is all we have. Is it circular? Yes. Can it be applied to everything? Yes. Do I talk in questions? Yes. But whether or not it's inductive reasoning, scientific skepticism and common sense are all we really have. And both scientific skepticism and common sense judge God's existence to be less likely than what science has told us.0 -
But we don't have faith in the predictions. They are either verified or not. Until that time they aren't accepted as true.The claim that inductive reasoning is absolutely reliable is trivially false, but the problem I'm talking about isn't that we can't be absolutely certain of it. The problem is that there is absolutely justification at all for why you should have even the slightest bit of faith in your predictions.
You might have strong reasons for making that prediction, but it would not be held as accurate or true until it can be verified to a high degree of certainty.
And this is the difference between rational thought and supernatural thought. A belief in God requires faith and is held as true without and in spite of reasons to indicate it might be true or verification that it is true.0 -
Exactly what test could you run to distinguish between a miracle event and a natural occurrence? Any corroborating evidence could just as easily be another miracle or any contradicting evidence could be the miracle instead of the original miracle, or perhaps both are miraculous. Any further questions or serious problems with your hypothesis could easily be dismissed by miraculous events. Every single conclusion you draw would be subject to the exact same bit of unanswerable questioning.
This is actually irrelevant to the claim that there is no justification for choosing induction over induction + miracles (or the converse), but I'll try to answer anyway. A Christian scientist, operating under the assumption that miracles are possible, would simply try to explain a given event, in the exact same way as an atheistic scientist might. If he can't, he might give up and work something else. He would conclude that either he simply hasn't yet discovered the natural cause of the event, or that it was a miracle. In practice his work would run along identical lines to that of any other scientist. It's not like any Christian scientist (whether he believes in miracles or not, I suspect that most wouldn't), explicitly considers the possibility that his coin tossing experiment is actually being ruined by the Holy Spirit.Scientists of faith, in order to be taken seriously by the scientific community, have a responsibility to separate their personal religious beliefs from their scientific work. Anyone who cannot do this simply cannot be a scientist. That isn't to say that the work of any scientist who hasn't properly separated their work from their faith, is completely without merit, simply that when they start allowing miracles to explain events, they are no longer doing science. The very best example of this is Issac Newton, when he published Principia Mathematica he was unable to explain how the whole system stayed in balance and he used god performing miracles and to explain away this problem, if he hadn't allowed himself the option of miraculous explanations then who knows what he may have contributed to science to resolve this problem.
A Christian doesn't have to be any less scientifically curious than an atheist. If Newton invoked God, it was probably because he didn't know how to proceed, otherwise, he might as well have invoked God on the first page, and not bothered with the rest of his work.0 -
It wouldn't be impossible to distinguish between a miracle event and a natural occurence. Most Christians who are also scientists will do their work happily without expecting or considering that a miracle will occur, even though they might believe that these are technically possible. When you see that inductive reasoning is the only form of reasoning which provides useful data, you are not justifying induction, you are vindicating it. This would really be sufficient, but I don't see how this vindication doesn't apply equally well to an assumption of induction holding, except on the few occasions where miracles might occur.
Do you believe in miracles?
I once saw a man on tv saw a woman in half, while she was in a box. It was truly scary. But all was not lost, he joined the separated boxes again and hey presto, she was whole again. None of her 'bits' fell out. It was a miracle.
I also saw him put a lovely watch in a velvet sack and hit it with a hammer. Don't worry, the watch was fine. Miraculously, it was reassembled in the sack before our very eyes. Praise be.0 -
Yes, but scientific skepticism and common sense are all we have to differentiate between two things with circular reasoning behind them. It is as far as we can possibly go, so it is all we have. Is it circular? Yes. Can it be applied to everything? Yes. Do I talk in questions? Yes. But whether or not it's inductive reasoning, scientific skepticism and common sense are all we really have. And both scientific skepticism and common sense judge God's existence to be less likely than what science has told us.
In the context of doubting inductive reasoning, or considering an alternative to it, there is no value in appealing to some of the consequences of inductive reasoning.But we don't have faith in the predictions. They are either verified or not. Until that time they aren't accepted as true.
You might have strong reasons for making that prediction, but it would not be held as accurate or true until it can be verified to a high degree of certainty.
And this is the difference between rational thought and supernatural thought. A belief in God requires faith and is held as true without and in spite of reasons to indicate it might be true or verification that it is true.
There are two problems with the above, firstly, this isn't actually how science, or any of our thought processes actually work, and secondly, you still have no rational reason to adopt it. Your above model gives no way justified way of choosing a prediction, since we have already established that you have no faith in those predictions. You have simply moved the problem of justifying your predictions back to the problem of choosing your predictions. Why should you for example turn left on the steering wheel in your car instead of right? You choose your predictions using inductive reasoning, despite (according to the problem of induction), not having any reason for choosing those predictions. If on the other hand you say that you abandon inductive reasoning because it's unjustified, you simply have no way of choosing your predictions at all.
What you are proposing corresponds to Popper's deductivism, which doesn't eliminate the problem of induction, but simply moves it back a level.0 -
The justification for induction over any other form is that it is the only one that provides the opportunity to draw useful conclusions from data and actually do science. There, unfortunately, can't be any proof of induction because I accept it would be circular. However as it stands it is the only valid approach for us to take, if another came along then we would use both until one of them is dis-proven by contradiction. Until that happens we have to rely on induction because it is all we have to rely on. No justification is necessary for induction, simply because it is our only choice, just as no justification is necessary for turning left instead of right when a road bends to the left, anything else and we would crash into a ditch. Anything other than induction and, at least at this point in time, science couldn't proceed.This is actually irrelevant to the claim that there is no justification for choosing induction over induction + miracles (or the converse), but I'll try to answer anyway. A Christian scientist, operating under the assumption that miracles are possible, would simply try to explain a given event, in the exact same way as an atheistic scientist might. If he can't, he might give up and work something else. He would conclude that either he simply hasn't yet discovered the natural cause of the event, or that it was a miracle. In practice his work would run along identical lines to that of any other scientist. It's not like any Christian scientist (whether he believes in miracles or not, I suspect that most wouldn't), explicitly considers the possibility that his coin tossing experiment is actually being ruined by the Holy Spirit.
As you say yourself believer scientists (chose this wording to avoid christian scientists, seeing that is taken by a crazy sect of christianity), who may believe that miracles are possible don't invoke induction+miracles, until they have tried everything else they could think of and have given up. To me it seems you are admitting the futility of induction+miracles reasoning but for some reason are still defending it. If induction+miracles was a valid form of reasoning, then why would the scientist give up when he gets to that point, why not do what every other scientist using induction alone does, draw conclusions and come up with further experiments based upon those conclusions to solve the problem without anything more than induction?
If he didn't invoke god, he may of put time into considering other possibilities and he may have found a way to proceed. Instead he found his conclusion and stuck by it, as soon as he switched from inductive to inductive+miracles, the science and discovery stopped; as it always does. Nowhere am I claiming that christians can't be any less scientifically curious, simply that once they start using anything other than inductive reasoning (or anything based upon it), they are no longer being scientific because, so far, it is the only valid form of reasoning we have. Again you seem to be agreeing that once you start using induction+miracles, you might as well give up, which is the point I was trying to make to begin with. Induction is the only valid form we currently have, once you start using contra-induction, non-induction or induction+miracles, then at least as a scientist, you're finished.A Christian doesn't have to be any less scientifically curious than an atheist. If Newton invoked God, it was probably because he didn't know how to proceed, otherwise, he might as well have invoked God on the first page, and not bothered with the rest of his work.0 -
The justification for induction over any other form is that it is the only one that provides the opportunity to draw useful conclusions from data and actually do science. There, unfortunately, can't be any proof of induction because I accept it would be circular. However as it stands it is the only valid approach for us to take, if another came along then we would use both until one of them is dis-proven by contradiction. Until that happens we have to rely on induction because it is all we have to rely on.
As you say yourself believer scientists (chose this wording to avoid christian scientists, seeing that is taken by a crazy sect of christianity), who may believe that miracles are possible don't invoke induction+miracles, until they have tried everything else they could think of and have given up. To me it seems you are admitting the futility of induction+miracles reasoning but for some reason are still defending it. If induction+miracles was a valid form of reasoning, then why would the scientist give up when he gets to that point, why not do what every other scientist using induction alone does, draw conclusions and come up with further experiments based upon those conclusions?
When I used the shorthand induction + miracles, I didn't mean an approach. It is an assumption about the world, which is that inductive reasoning is generally valid, but that miracles can occur. In the same way, when we talk about induction (without miracles), we simply make the assumption that inductive reasoning is generally valid.
To make it simpler, let's consider the assumption that inductive reasoning is generally valid, with the assumption that inductive reasoning is generally valid, but Christ was resurrected.
As far as I can see, there is nothing to recommend the one assumption about the world over the other. We have no reason to choose either, they both produce the same general predictions about the world, and they disagree only about the question of whether Christ was resurrected. The only difference we have between the two assumptions is that the latter involves two assumptions instead of just one. We might then say that the second assumption is unnecessary, and unnecessary assumptions are undesirable, but this use of Occam's razor seems to me to be a consequence of our selection, and therefore can't be used to help in the selection of assumptions.0 -
There are two problems with the above, firstly, this isn't actually how science, or any of our thought processes actually work, and secondly, you still have no rational reason to adopt it. Your above model gives no way justified way of choosing a prediction, since we have already established that you have no faith in those predictions. You have simply moved the problem of justifying your predictions back to the problem of choosing your predictions. Why should you for example turn left on the steering wheel in your car instead of right? You choose your predictions using inductive reasoning, despite (according to the problem of induction), not having any reason for choosing those predictions. If on the other hand you say that you abandon inductive reasoning because it's unjustified, you simply have no way of choosing your predictions at all.
What you are proposing corresponds to Popper's deductivism, which doesn't eliminate the problem of induction, but simply moves it back a level.
Again you have misread what I wrote.
I stated clearly that:
"You might have strong reasons for making that prediction, but it would not be held as accurate or true until it can be verified to a high degree of certainty."
And yes, forming a predictive model that is testable is the fundamental way that science works.
As for what you use to choose your predictions you do use inductive logic and basing it on other facts that have already been confirmed.
But you don't hold your conclusion to be in any way true until it is confirmed to be.
The inductive logic only gets you to the point of making the model were the problem of induction might be an issue if and only if that's as far as you can go and you believed that the model was 100% true. But since we can make testable predictions and that science never accepts something to be 100% true, it's not a problem.0 -
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Why would the selection of induction+Christ invalidate Occam's Razor? If Occam's Razor is invalidated, then under the induction+Christ system we can also include fairies and wizards and any other supernatural or miraculous explanation we care to postulate ad-inifitum and again we have sacrificed the scientific method because the scientific method simply cannot work in a supernatural universe. If Occam's Razor isn't invalidated, then under either system we are left with the problem of justifying the inclusion of the Christ assumption.When I used the shorthand induction + miracles, I didn't mean an approach. It is an assumption about the world, which is that inductive reasoning is generally valid, but that miracles can occur. In the same way, when we talk about induction (without miracles), we simply make the assumption that inductive reasoning is generally valid.
To make it simpler, let's consider the assumption that inductive reasoning is generally valid, with the assumption that inductive reasoning is generally valid, but Christ was resurrected.
As far as I can see, there is nothing to recommend the one assumption about the world over the other. We have no reason to choose either, they both produce the same general predictions about the world, and they disagree only about the question of whether Christ was resurrected. The only difference we have between the two assumptions is that the latter involves two assumptions instead of just one. We might then say that the second assumption is unnecessary, and unnecessary assumptions are undesirable, but this use of Occam's razor seems to me to be a consequence of our selection, and therefore can't be used to help in the selection of assumptions.0
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g9x_oa--KAc
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