Questions about induction and God

Penn

jjn2 wrote: »

We are also disagreeing on a fairly fundamental point. You claim that the rationality behind each claim can be determined via scientific skepticism and common sense. If these are based on inductive reasoning, and inductive reasoning has no rational justification, how can they be used to evaluate the rationality of any claim?

Because they are measuring two different claims by the same standards. If inductive reasoning is taken as a given in both cases, then scientific skepticism and common sense (which are based on inductive reasoning) can be used in both cases. Again, it's like the speeding analogy, 1km/h over the speed limit and 60km/h over the speed limit are both speeding. But it is the difference between the speeds which makes one speed more morally unacceptable than the other.

If you measure two pieces of timber by using a 1m length of rope, then you discover that the rope isn't exactly 1m, you can still tell which is the longest piece of timber by using the rope, because you are measuring them by the same limits.

If we accept that inductive reasoning is a given, we can measure each claim by the same limits, so one can be more rational than the other.

jjn2

Penn wrote: »

Because they are measuring two different claims by the same standards. If inductive reasoning is taken as a given in both cases, then scientific skepticism and common sense (which are based on inductive reasoning) can be used in both cases. Again, it's like the speeding analogy, 1km/h over the speed limit and 60km/h over the speed limit are both speeding. But it is the difference between the speeds which makes one speed more morally unacceptable than the other.

If you measure two pieces of timber by using a 1m length of rope, then you discover that the rope isn't exactly 1m, you can still tell which is the longest piece of timber by using the rope, because you are measuring them by the same limits.

If we accept that inductive reasoning is a given, we can measure each claim by the same limits, so one can be more rational than the other.

Then we agree, my questions have been about why we should assume that inductive reasoning is valid, as opposed to making other assumptions.

Penn

jjn2 wrote: »

Then we agree, my questions have been about why we should assume that inductive reasoning is valid, as opposed to making other assumptions.

And this is comparable to a belief in God... how?

Turtwig

Penn wrote: »

Because they are measuring two different claims by the same standards. If inductive reasoning is taken as a given in both cases, then scientific skepticism and common sense (which are based on inductive reasoning) can be used in both cases. Again, it's like the speeding analogy, 1km/h over the speed limit and 60km/h over the speed limit are both speeding. But it is the difference between the speeds which makes one speed more morally unacceptable than the other.

Totally off topic and totally pedantic but it may be useful to motorists here. Your speedometer has an allowed tolerance of (10% of your speed) + 4km/hr. So if your speedometer reads 100 km/hr you could in actual fact be travelling anywhere between 114 and 86 km/hr. So depending on the context an actual speed measured of 1km/hr above the limit might not even be considered speeding.

jjn2

Penn wrote: »

And this is comparable to a belief in God... how?

I don't think it's unreasonable to expect you to read what I've already written if you want to know why I think the two might be comparable. In short, what makes the choice of one unjustified and unvindicated belief (inductive reasoning works), superior to the choice of another unjustified and unvindicated belief (belief in God).

Penn

jjn2 wrote: »

I don't think it's unreasonable to expect you to read what I've already written if you want to know why I think the two might be comparable. In short, what makes the choice of one unjustified and unvindicated belief (inductive reasoning works), superior to the choice of another unjustified and unvindicated belief (belief in God).

Well I don't think it's unreasonable to expect you to read what I've already written when I've asked you twice already to come up with an alternative. Something by which we don't have to base things on an unjustified or unvindicated belief.

And if you have no better suggestion, then we must measure one unjustified and unvindicated belief (inductive reasoning) with another unjustified and unvindicated belief (belief in God) by the same measuring stick (scientific skepticism and common sense (which are themselves based in inductive reasoning, however, in the absence of any alternative method, is the only thing we have by which we can measure these things by)), which does make the choice between these beliefs unequal.

jjn2

Penn wrote: »

Well I don't think it's unreasonable to expect you to read what I've already written when I've asked you twice already to come up with an alternative. Something by which we don't have to base things on an unjustified or unvindicated belief.

And if you have no better suggestion, then we must measure oneunjustified and unvindicated belief (inductive reasoning) with another unjustified and unvindicated belief (belief in God) by the same measuring stick (scientific skepticism and common sense (which are themselves based in inductive reasoning, however, in the absence of any alternative method, is the only thing we have by which we can measure these things by)), which does make the choice between these beliefs unequal.

It should be clear that I don't believe there is an alternative which is justified or vindicated. The bolded bit is just your unfounded assertion. The fact that something is our only method isn't in itself a recommendation of that method. In any event, we could also read tea leaves to make our choice.

Turtwig

jjn2 wrote: »

It should be clear that I don't believe there is an alternative which is justified or vindicated. The bolded bit is just your unfounded assertion. The fact that something is our only method isn't in itself a recommendation of that method. In any event, we could also read tea leaves to make our choice.

Surely you realise then that the only option would be to preserve judgement entirely on whether God exists or not until induction is resolved. Therefore being an atheist would be the de facto option.

Penn

jjn2 wrote: »

It should be clear that I don't believe there is an alternative which is justified or vindicated. The bolded bit is just your unfounded assertion. The fact that something is our only method isn't in itself a recommendation of that method. In any event, we could also read tea leaves to make our choice.

But then every claim made by anyone ever is equally valid. That in itself is a dangerous assumption. Fair enough, lets say belief in inductive reasoning and belief in God are equally valid. We, as a species, have chosen inductive reasoning as our primary belief. Even those who believe in God believe in inductive reasoning. They believe in God, yet still use medicines created through inductive reasoning. They believe in God, yet still stop their car at a stop sign because their inductive reasoning tells them they are not safe, whereas pure believe in God without inductive reasoning would tell them they'll be fine no matter what. When we talk about 'instincts', they are based on inductive reasoning.

jjn2

Jernal wrote: »

Surely you realise then that the only option would be to preserve judgement entirely on whether God exists or not until induction is resolved. Therefore being an atheist would be the de facto option.

Agreed, but my point was that we can and do hold beliefs even though they are unjustified.

Penn wrote: »

But then every claim made by anyone ever is equally valid. That in itself is a dangerous assumption. Fair enough, lets say belief in inductive reasoning and belief in God are equally valid. We, as a species, have chosen inductive reasoning as our primary belief. Even those who believe in God believe in inductive reasoning. They believe in God, yet still use medicines created through inductive reasoning. They believe in God, yet still stop their car at a stop sign because their inductive reasoning tells them they are not safe, whereas pure believe in God without inductive reasoning would tell them they'll be fine no matter what. When we talk about 'instincts', they are based on inductive reasoning.

It is clear that we all use inductive reasoning, but what I was hoping to show was that, somebody who makes the assumption induction + moderate Christian beliefs, will for all intents and purposes (since moderate Christian beliefs at least, don't contradict any scientific predictions, and only disagree with atheism about historical fact, and the unverifiable question of what happens after we die) understand the world in the exact same way as somebody who simply makes the assumption of inductive validity. Furthermore, the two sets of assumptions are in the same position, in terms of justification/vindication (both unjustified/unvindicated)

Therefore, there shouldn't be any difference between for example a moderate Christian who becomes a scientist, and an atheist who becomes a scientist. On the other hand, no scientist, whether religious or not, can find common ground with somebody who believes in astrology/homeopathy, since these directly contradict science.

This is really targeted at the likes of Dawkins, who imply that there is something problematic with the idea of a scientist holding religious beliefs. I disagree with this, whereas I agree with the idea that there is something problematic with homeopaths and astrologists.

Knasher

jjn2 wrote: »

I have claimed all along that the pragmatic vindication of induction is unsatisfactory, since we can reformulate it as a pragmatic vindication of induction with additional assumptions. My subsequent claim was that Occam's razor can't differentiate between the two cases, since Occam's razor either has to be understood to not apply to the assumptions we used prior to obtaining Occam's razor, or it would get rid of all our assumptions, instead of just the additional ones.

If you had two identical cars being evaluated under some safety standards, the only difference between the two being that one contains one of those buddy christ bobblehead dolls and the other doesn't. What you are saying is equivalent to saying that because both cars will achieve an equal score, then all the safety precautions in the first car, including the bobblehead, are as necessary as the safety precautions in the second car. However this is clearly untrue as a pragmatic evaluation of each precaution, when evaluated against the other precautions, would clearly indicate that a subset of precautions that achieve the same result are preferable to the larger set and that the bobblehead was unnecessary.

You are trying to avoid this type of evaluation of your set of assumptions by explicitly excluding the evaluation of each assumption when separated from the rest. Without the inductive assumption, science and the evaluation of evidence can no longer proceed, whereas the removal of the christ assumption has no negative results on science. Therefore we can easily conclude that the christ assumption is superfluous whereas induction isn't, when applied to the field of science. Now this obviously isn't a proof of the induction assumption, it just means that the induction assumption is a necessary step for science. The only reason to exclude pragmatic considerations from the evaluation of Occam's razor on your set of assumptions is to explicitly avoid having the assumptions that won't pass muster being discarded. Any set of assumptions you care to bring could pass through the exact same loophole you are trying to force for your religious ones, irregardless of how preposterous they are.

While I see your point that both science and faith are based on assumptions and that the ones that science are based on cannot be proven by science without forming a circular argument. It would be disingenuous to claim that therefore all assumptions are on equal footing. The assumptions of science are vindicated, but not proven, by the fact that they are consistent with all observations we have made of the universe and reliably allow us to make further predictions. The assumptions of religion explicitly run counter to the observations we make of the universe, hence they must be labeled miraculous, and any predictions made from religion are either in accordance with science (even a stopped clock is right twice a day), impossible to evaluate, or observably false (in which case they are assumed to be metaphorical), and they are therefore extremely suspect while not being explicitly dis-proven. The disparity between the two is so great that you are trying to shoehorn the assumptions of religion into the assumptions of science in order to vindicate them by borrowing the vindication of science instead of letting them stand and be evaluated on their own, there is no logical interdependence between the two and hence no reason to evaluate them as one beyond trying to hid the assumptions of religion from scrutiny.

sbsquarepants

jjn2 wrote: »

Agreed, but my point was that we can and do hold beliefs even though they are unjustified.
.

Do you not accept that although originaly an idea or theory may be induced, it can then be verified independently. The original urge to perform x test may have been based on induction or faith or a hunch or on anything whatsoever, but the actual science and reasoning behind it constitute proof.
If for example newton had been at the mushrooms and a nice lady dragon in a pink tutu spoke to him about some mysterious force pulling objects towards the ground, that would be clearly bullshít. But if he then followed up and done his experiments, gravity becomes no less real. It's no longer then just the demented ramblings of a ballerina dragon, that's just where the journey to understand it began. Same with inducing anything - originally it may be faith as you call it, but only originally. If the original faith is not matched by evidence it should be, and in scienctific circles is, quickly abandoned.
Religious faith, is faith in the abscence of evidence, it's blind faith and is to my mind quite foolish. Belief or faith in a recurring pattern is not in any way the same thing as belief in an idea or a supreme being. You're using the word faith in a very black and white way and in so doing denying yourself millions of shades of grey.
Induction is not a problem, it's just pedantics.

jjn2

Knasher wrote: »

If you had two identical cars being evaluated under some safety standards, the only difference between the two being that one contains one of those buddy christ bobblehead dolls and the other doesn't. What you are saying is equivalent to saying that because both cars will achieve an equal score, then all the safety precautions in the first car, including the bobblehead, are as necessary as the safety precautions in the second car. However this is clearly untrue as a pragmatic evaluation of each precaution, when evaluated against the other precautions, would clearly indicate that a subset of precautions that achieve the same result are preferable to the larger set and that the bobblehead was unnecessary.

You are trying to avoid this type of evaluation of your set of assumptions by explicitly excluding the evaluation of each assumption when separated from the rest. Without the inductive assumption, science and the evaluation of evidence can no longer proceed, whereas the removal of the christ assumption has no negative results on science. Therefore we can easily conclude that the christ assumption is superfluous whereas induction isn't, when applied to the field of science. Now this obviously isn't a proof of the induction assumption, it just means that the induction assumption is a necessary step for science. The only reason to exclude pragmatic considerations from the evaluation of Occam's razor on your set of assumptions is to explicitly avoid having the assumptions that won't pass muster being discarded. Any set of assumptions you care to bring could pass through the exact same loophole you are trying to force for your religious ones, irregardless of how preposterous they are.

While I see your point that both science and faith are based on assumptions and that the ones that science are based on cannot be proven by science without forming a circular argument. It would be disingenuous to claim that therefore all assumptions are on equal footing. The assumptions of science are vindicated, but not proven, by the fact that they are consistent with all observations we have made of the universe and reliably allow us to make further predictions. The assumptions of religion explicitly run counter to the observations we make of the universe, hence they must be labeled miraculous, and any predictions made from religion are either in accordance with science (even a stopped clock is right twice a day), impossible to evaluate, or observably false (in which case they are assumed to be metaphorical), and they are therefore extremely suspect while not being explicitly dis-proven. The disparity between the two is so great that you are trying to shoehorn the assumptions of religion into the assumptions of science in order to vindicate them by borrowing the vindication of science instead of letting them stand and be evaluated on their own, there is no logical interdependence between the two and hence no reason to evaluate them as one beyond trying to hid the assumptions of religion from scrutiny.

As this is a point you absolutely refuse to grasp, and have to resort to redefining words, such as necessary, to avoid, at this point I can't see this thread really going anywhere, so I'll not be wasting any further time on it. Good luck.

While I am very sure about a lot of what I'm saying, I actually made it clear on the first page that I'm not sure about the aspect that we're discussing now. It isn't my refusal to grasp, so much as a possible (assuming I'm wrong) inability to grasp!

I can see that the grouping of assumptions together appears to be nothing more than a trick to avoid scrutiny of some of those assumptions, but what I'm actually saying is slightly different. It boils down to the question of when we should apply Occam's razor (a tool with no inherent worth). If we apply Occam's razor to every assumption we make about the world, they all disappear. If we apply it to our extraneous assumptions and not our inductive assumption, we will be left only with the inductive assumption, but there seems to be no argument for why the inductive assumption should be immune.

Obviously you shouldn't have to waste more of more your time on this discussion than you feel like, but do you disagree with the idea that Occam's razor would lead us to abandon our inductive assumption?

sbsquarepants wrote: »

Induction is not a problem, it's just pedantics.

We may bypass or ignore the problem, but I don't think there are many people who would agree that it actually isn't a problem.

Knasher

jjn2 wrote: »

Do you disagree with the idea that Occam's razor would lead us to abandon our inductive assumption?

Inductive reasoning isn't immune from Occam's razor. However when we evaluate the assumptions of science without inductive reasoning, then we loose the ability to draw conclusions and science cannot proceed. So I absolutely disagree that Occam's razor would lead us to abandon the inductive assumption. Inductive reasoning is a necessary assumption for science and the results that science delivers vindicates its use, but doesn't and cannot prove the assumptions it is based upon.

Do you disagree?

One is still free to abandon science if they wish, either by refusing science wholesale or by refusing the assumptions that underpin it, they just can't abandon the workings of science and still claim to be part of the scientific community (or rather if they do the scientific community won't take them seriously). Equally one is free to enjoy the fruits of science without accepting how they were achieved, but to do so will disbar you from contributing to scientific understanding and is a loss to the science based society as a whole (especially when parents make that decision on behalf of their children).

jjn2 wrote: »

It boils down to the question of when we should apply Occam's razor (a tool with no inherent worth).

One cannot make an estimate on the probability of the assumption of induction being correct without relying on induction itself, so any probability could be biased. So for the sake of argument if we apply an equal 0.5 probability to every assumption, irregardless of how plausible they are, it's pretty self evident to say that the more assumptions you make, the greater chance at least one of the is wrong and thereby calling all conclusions based upon those assumptions into question. The fewer assumptions the better so removing superfluous assumptions is clearly advantageous. And the christ assumption is very clearly superfluous.

jjn2 wrote: »

Obviously you shouldn't have to waste more of more your time on this discussion than you feel like

Sorry about getting a bit annoyed in my last post, I edited out the last line before you commented because I felt it was a childish thing to say, but you had quoted me before the edit.

Zombrex

jjn2 wrote: »

I don't think it's unreasonable to expect you to read what I've already written if you want to know why I think the two might be comparable. In short, what makes the choice of one unjustified and unvindicated belief (inductive reasoning works), superior to the choice of another unjustified and unvindicated belief (belief in God).

I won't lie, I'm at a loss when it comes to all this Hume talk.

I think though that the question was how does this relate specifically to God, as opposed to any thing else? Or even does it?

Could you replace "God" with "invisible pink unicorn" and make the same argument (you cannot justify believe in induction so why criticize people who believe in invisible pink unicorns).

If so it seems to be some what pointless, since the point seems to be the unjustification of induction makes it ok to believe in anything and everything you like. Which clearly isn't the case.

Mark Hamill

I'm at a loss as to how someone using a computer, to talk to people all over the world, can say that inductive reasoning is unjustified.

robindch

Zombrex wrote: »

Could you replace "God" with "invisible pink unicorn" and make the same argument (you cannot justify believe in induction so why criticize people who believe in invisible pink unicorns).

Yes -- I mentioned that point here, but jjn2 didn't reply to that issue.

Personally, I prefer the easter bunny to invisible pink unicorns, mostly coz they bring chocolate and make my kid happy

joseph brand

jjn2 wrote: »

Therefore, there shouldn't be any difference between for example a moderate Christian who becomes a scientist, and an atheist who becomes a scientist. On the other hand, no scientist, whether religious or not, can find common ground with somebody who believes in astrology/homeopathy, since these directly contradict science.

Does religion not contradict science? Resurrection, Transubstantiation, Noah's Ark, Moses (through Jehovah) parting the Red Sea etc etc

jjn2 wrote: »

This is really targeted at the likes of Dawkins, who imply that there is something problematic with the idea of a scientist holding religious beliefs. I disagree with this, whereas I agree with the idea that there is something problematic with homeopaths and astrologists.

Homeopathy, Astrology, Psyschics and Religion all contradict science don't they? There doesn't seem to be as much cost in following science as there is in any of the other 'beliefs' above. Funny that!

Coincidentally, there are many parents forking out between 500 and 900 euros on average for Communions atm. Relatives and family friends will all be out-of-pocket too, as regards monetary gifts. Money money money!

King Mob

jjn2 wrote: »

We disagree fundamentally on how science is carried out. The way I see it though, your view of science is along the line of Popper's deductive model of science, which I believe has been discredited. The following link discusses it

http://ls.poly.edu/~jbain/scitechsoc/lectures/04.Popper.pdf

Then I don't think you understand how science works.

The above link may well be refuting Popper's opinions, but that's a childish strawman of the scientific process.

Standman

In any case, it's always worth remembering that philosophy is more of a tool to train the mind as opposed to a practical way of understanding everyday things. It's an interesting subject no doubt, but it's kind of pointless invoking complex philosophical arguments in an attempt to equate things that are quite obviously not feasibly equatable.

Knasher

jjn2 wrote: »

Therefore, there shouldn't be any difference between for example a moderate Christian who becomes a scientist, and an atheist who becomes a scientist. On the other hand, no scientist, whether religious or not, can find common ground with somebody who believes in astrology/homeopathy, since these directly contradict science.

There is no difference between a christian who becomes a scientist and a atheist who becomes a scientist, provided the religious scientist doesn't bring their religious assumptions with them when preforming science. If they never use them in science, then they are irrelevant to science. The exact same can be said of a homeopath or astrologer, if they never apply their personal supernatural assumptions to science, then they are irrelevant to science. Much like Newtons belief in alchemy and christanity are considered irrelevant to or are discarded from his contributions to science. (Although I'm sure other believers will use their personal beliefs and their position as scientists to validate the beliefs in an argument from authority).

jjn2 wrote: »

This is really targeted at the likes of Dawkins, who imply that there is something problematic with the idea of a scientist holding religious beliefs. I disagree with this, whereas I agree with the idea that there is something problematic with homeopaths and astrologists.

What Dawkins finds problematic is the idea of somebody holding two contradictory beliefs, e.g. miracles vs scientific naturalism, and the risk of one being forced to conform with the other. Considering some of the steps the ID crowd are taking, such as setting up their own peer review journals so they can claim their papers pass peer-review, it isn't a completely unfounded worry.

But let me ask, would you accept scientific arguments being validated on religious grounds? If not then why would it be a good idea to include religious assumptions in the underpinnings of science.

I would also be interested if you could name a single objection to homeopathy (that isn't overly specific) that wouldn't also apply to christianity. Simply asking out of curiosity, because I can't think of a single one that couldn't be generalized to apply to both.

jjn2

I've got a lot to reply to, so here goes

Knasher wrote: »

Inductive reasoning isn't immune from Occam's razor. However when we evaluate the assumptions of science without inductive reasoning, then we loose the ability to draw conclusions and science cannot proceed. So I absolutely disagree that Occam's razor would lead us to abandon the inductive assumption. Inductive reasoning is a necessary assumption for science and the results that science delivers vindicates its use, but doesn't and cannot prove the assumptions it is based upon.

Do you disagree?

Yes I disagree. Occam's razor doesn't have one definition, so it's a bit difficult to say what is actually a reasonable formulation. Ignoring this problem for now, if we consider our assumption about inductive reasoning, it can be understood as the assumption of uniformity of nature. This is an assumption about the actual universe. Occam's razor now suggests we explain our observations with the fewest possible assumptions. If we now consider not making the assumption of uniformity of nature, we can observe the universe, and see that none of our observations are in contradiction with our assumptions (they couldn't be since we've run out of assumptions). These are therefore all vindications of our empty set of assumptions. Occam's razor therefore suggests we choose the set of assumptions with fewer assumptions, causing us to dismiss our assumption of the uniformity of nature.

One is still free to abandon science if they wish, either by refusing science wholesale or by refusing the assumptions that underpin it, they just can't abandon the workings of science and still claim to be part of the scientific community (or rather if they do the scientific community won't take them seriously). Equally one is free to enjoy the fruits of science without accepting how they were achieved, but to do so will disbar you from contributing to scientific understanding and is a loss to the science based society as a whole (especially when parents make that decision on behalf of their children).

There is no difference between a christian who becomes a scientist and a atheist who becomes a scientist, provided the religious scientist doesn't bring their religious assumptions with them when preforming science. If they never use them in science, then they are irrelevant to science. The exact same can be said of a homeopath or astrologer, if they never apply their personal supernatural assumptions to science, then they are irrelevant to science. Much like Newtons belief in alchemy and christanity are considered irrelevant to or are discarded from his contributions to science. (Although I'm sure other believers will use their personal beliefs and their position as scientists to validate the beliefs in an argument from authority).

What Dawkins finds problematic is the idea of somebody holding two contradictory beliefs, e.g. miracles vs scientific naturalism, and the risk of one being forced to conform with the other. Considering some of the steps the ID crowd are taking, such as setting up their own peer review journals so they can claim their papers pass peer-review, it isn't a completely unfounded worry.

But let me ask, would you accept scientific arguments being validated on religious grounds? If not then why would it be a good idea to include religious assumptions in the underpinnings of science.

I would also be interested if you could name a single objection to homeopathy (that isn't overly specific) that wouldn't also apply to christianity. Simply asking out of curiosity, because I can't think of a single one that couldn't be generalized to apply to both.

I've combined two of your posts. The beliefs of most moderate Christians in no way contradict scientific facts. We may believe in scientifically unfounded and seemingly unnecessary entities, but we don't believe in things which contradict the established principles of science. A moderate Christian who is a scientist can work in any field of science, and his moderate Christian assumptions, together with his assumption of inductive validity will always lead to the same conclusions as those of a scientist who doesn't hold any of the Christian beliefs. A homeopath believes that water has memory, of some form, and that homeopathic treatments work. Both of these claims are (under the assumption that induction is valid of course) testable, and patently wrong. The same applies for a fundamentalist Christian, who believes that the earth is actually 6000 years old.

To sum up you might uncharitably believe that a moderate Christian is "not even wrong" (because he makes unverifiable claims), but he isn't directly wrong, whereas a homeopath, or fundamentalist is. Dawkins has attempted to paint the conflict between those who believe in the scientific method on one side, and the religious on the other hand. I believe that the conflict is between those people who have beliefs that can be reconciled with science, and those who have beliefs which go against what science would lead us to conclude.

One cannot make an estimate on the probability of the assumption of induction being correct without relying on induction itself, so any probability could be biased. So for the sake of argument if we apply an equal 0.5 probability to every assumption, irregardless of how plausible they are, it's pretty self evident to say that the more assumptions you make, the greater chance at least one of the is wrong and thereby calling all conclusions based upon those assumptions into question. The fewer assumptions the better so removing superfluous assumptions is clearly advantageous. And the christ assumption is very clearly superfluous.
Sorry about getting a bit annoyed in my last post, I edited out the last line before you commented because I felt it was a childish thing to say, but you had quoted me before the edit.

No problem! If the aim is to be correct, the Christ assumption isn't superfluous, he is either the son of God or he isn't. We now have the choice believe he is the son of God, with two possible outcomes, one successful and one unsuccessful, and the choice don't believe he is the son of God, with one successful and one unsuccessful outcome. Like you say, we have no prior estimate of the probability of either of those possibilities, so we can say nothing about which decision is better.

Zombrex wrote: »

Could you replace "God" with "invisible pink unicorn" and make the same argument (you cannot justify believe in induction so why criticize people who believe in invisible pink unicorns).

robindch wrote: »

Yes -- I mentioned that point here, but jjn2 didn't reply to that issue.

Personally, I prefer the easter bunny to invisible pink unicorns, mostly coz they bring chocolate and make my kid happy

I did actually address this point, but in the form of counterinduction being possible, rather than pink unicorns or easter bunnies. I haven't at any point claimed that what I'm saying promotes the belief in God to the same level of justification as science, but rather, that I believe inductive reasoning (and therefore science) is relegated to the level of justification of God, the easter bunny and an invisible pink unicorn.

Mark Hamill wrote: »

I'm at a loss as to how someone using a computer, to talk to people all over the world, can say that inductive reasoning is unjustified.

I have explained why I (and many important philosophers) think inductive reasoning is unjustified. This doesn't in any way mean that I think we should abandon science though! You can either read the link

http://ls.poly.edu/~jbain/philsci/philscilectures/08.Induction.pdf

to see why the success of inductive reasoning isn't a justification for inductive reasoning.

joseph brand wrote: »

Does religion not contradict science? Resurrection, Transubstantiation, Noah's Ark, Moses (through Jehovah) parting the Red Sea etc etc

Actually the belief that something really strange and seemingly unexplainable happened in the past doesn't contradict science. It may be totally unjustified, but it's not in contradiction with science. Similarly, since transubstantiation (according to wikipedia, I'm quite ignorant about theology) holds that in every testable way the wafer remains as before, the claim is unjustified (and indeed unverifiable), but not in contradiction with science.

King Mob wrote: »

Then I don't think you understand how science works.

The above link may well be refuting Popper's opinions, but that's a childish strawman of the scientific process.

And I don't think you understand how science works. Additionally, I think Popper, famous as one of the greatest philosophers of science, although ultimately wrong in this case (in the opinions of other philosophers of science, not just me), is less likely to have made a childish strawman of the scientific process than you are! I would be interested to hear what some of the other people posting on this thread think of your view of science, because I am convinced that you are very much in the minority in believing that inductive reasoning plays such a peripheral role in science.

King Mob

jjn2 wrote: »

And I don't think you understand how science works. Additionally, I think Popper, famous as one of the greatest philosophers of science, although ultimately wrong in this case (in the opinions of other philosophers of science, not just me), is less likely to have made a childish strawman of the scientific process than you are! I would be interested to hear what some of the other people posting on this thread think of your view of science, because I am convinced that you are very much in the minority in believing that inductive reasoning plays such a peripheral role in science.

Peripheral role? Seriously?
Please read my posts again and you will see this in now the case.

I stated clearly that induction is used is forming the falsifiable model. However as I have stated several times and has been repeated, the conclusion is not accepted until it is confirmed by experiment and even then it is always accepted only conditionally until new evidence is found.

I did not say that inductive logic plays a peripheral role, just that science does not actually rely purely on the assumption of it. This is because 1) science does not accept absolutes and 2) the results are confirmed empirically.

The reason why your above link is a strawman is because scientists and science do not actually work in the way it describes, nor is it an accurate representation of what I am outlining.
It might well be refuting Popper's particular arguments, but that's not relevant.

Please read what I actually type.

Knasher

jjn2 wrote: »

We may believe in scientifically unfounded and seemingly unnecessary entities, but we don't believe in things which contradict the established principles of science. A moderate Christian who is a scientist can work in any field of science, and his moderate Christian assumptions, together with his assumption of inductive validity will always lead to the same conclusions as those of a scientist who doesn't hold any of the Christian beliefs.

What you are saying is that the redeeming virtue of the extra assumptions of moderate christians is that they lead to no different conclusions. Which to say they are superfluous.

jjn2 wrote: »

A homeopath believes that water has memory, of some form, and that homeopathic treatments work. Both of these claims are (under the assumption that induction is valid of course) testable, and patently wrong. The same applies for a fundamentalist Christian, who believes that the earth is actually 6000 years old.

If the homeopath doesn't use his homeopathic assumptions or a fundamentalist christian doesn't use his religious assumptions when preforming science, then what difference does it make to science. If the validation of the moderate christian scientist is that he doesn't use his religious assumptions in science, then where is the difference?

jjn2 wrote: »

If the aim is to be correct, the Christ assumption isn't superfluous, he is either the son of God or he isn't. We now have the choice believe he is the son of God, with two possible outcomes, one successful and one unsuccessful, and the choice don't believe he is the son of God, with one successful and one unsuccessful outcome. Like you say, we have no prior estimate of the probability of either of those possibilities, so we can say nothing about which decision is better.

So what, the assumption is dichotomous. That establishes nothing else, and certainly doesn't establish its necessity to be included in the underpinning assumptions of science. Hence it remains superfluous.

jjn2 wrote: »

Yes I disagree. Occam's razor doesn't have one definition, so it's a bit difficult to say what is actually a reasonable formulation. Ignoring this problem for now, if we consider our assumption about inductive reasoning, it can be understood as the assumption of uniformity of nature. This is an assumption about the actual universe. Occam's razor now suggests we explain our observations with the fewest possible assumptions. If we now consider not making the assumption of uniformity of nature, we can observe the universe, and see that none of our observations are in contradiction with our assumptions (they couldn't be since we've run out of assumptions). These are therefore all vindications of our empty set of assumptions. Occam's razor therefore suggests we choose the set of assumptions with fewer assumptions, causing us to dismiss our assumption of the uniformity of nature.

You have also lost the ability to make any explanations at all, you aren't picking the simplest explanation in accordance with Occam's razor, you are simply picking no explanation. The simplest explanation requires the assumptions underpinning science in order to be made or evaluated, thereby validating their use.

Knasher wrote: »

But let me ask, would you accept scientific proofs being argued on religious assumptions? If not then why would it be a good idea to include religious assumptions in the underpinnings of science.

I'd still love an answer to this.

jjn2

Knasher wrote: »

What you are saying is that the redeeming virtue of the extra assumptions of moderate christians is that they lead to no different conclusions. Which to say they are superfluous.

So what, the assumption is dichotomous. That establishes nothing else, and certainly doesn't establish its necessity to be included in the underpinning assumptions of science. Hence it remains superfluous.

But let me ask, would you accept scientific proofs being argued on religious assumptions? If not then why would it be a good idea to include religious assumptions in the underpinnings of science.

They are superfluous to science, since they have no scientific content, but they are no more superfluous than the assumptions of science, if you accept that there is no vindication or justification for those (I realize that you believe we are vindicated in those assumptions).

Regarding the last question, my answer is no, but as I've described above, the religious assumptions aren't the underpinnings of science, but the underpinnings of our view of the world. They are superfluous, in the sense that Occam's razor would, if we applied it, suggest we should get rid of them, but below I'll explain how I still think the same is true for inductive reasoning.

If the homeopath doesn't use his homeopathic assumptions or a fundamentalist christian doesn't use his religious assumptions when preforming science, then what difference does it make to science. If the validation of the moderate christian scientist is that he doesn't use his religious assumptions in science, then where is the difference?

Since there are direct contradictions, there would be a cognitive dissonance, not present when a moderate Christian does science. It wouldn't necessarily have any practical implications, so if a fundamentalist does science, temporarily suspending his belief about the age of the universe, he can do useful work. The problem is simply that he probably won't be inclined to do so, since the natural conclusion to fundamentalism is that to some extent, science is an enemy (since there are disagreements). Similarly a homeopath can conceivably be a productive scientist, but there will still be a degree of conflict with medicine.

If none of our beliefs are justified, we aren't saying that some beliefs are irrational and others are rational, but rather, we are making a value judgement that science is valuable, and choosing to reject those assumptions which are in conflict with science.

You have also lost the ability to make any explanations at all, you aren't picking the simplest explanation in accordance with Occam's razor, you are simply picking no explanation. The simplest explanation requires the assumptions underpinning science in order to be made or evaluated, thereby validating their use.

I'd like to reiterate that I'm not at all sure about this, but I disagree. The fact that an explanation would explain a phenomenon is only a reason to accept the explanation if we have a reason to believe that there really is a phenomenon to be explained. Lacking this reason, as I believe we do in the case of the uniformity of nature, Occam's razor would not suggest that we spare the assumption.

If I toss a coin a lot of times, and in a subset of those observations, I get a long alternating sequence of heads and tails, I can either decide that I need an explanation for this phenomenon, or that it is adequately accounted for by my more general understand of coin tossing. Everything is accounted for by no assumptions, so Occam's razor stops after getting rid of inductive reasoning, rather than before.

King Mob wrote: »

Peripheral role? Seriously?
Please read my posts again and you will see this in now the case.

I stated clearly that induction is used is forming the falsifiable model. However as I have stated several times and has been repeated, the conclusion is not accepted until it is confirmed by experiment and even then it is always accepted only conditionally until new evidence is found.

I did not say that inductive logic plays a peripheral role, just that science does not actually rely purely on the assumption of it. This is because 1) science does not accept absolutes and 2) the results are confirmed empirically.

The reason why your above link is a strawman is because scientists and science do not actually work in the way it describes, nor is it an accurate representation of what I am outlining.
It might well be refuting Popper's particular arguments, but that's not relevant.

Please read what I actually type.

I agree that scientists don't work in the way described in my link, and for the same reason, they don't work in the way you've described. It's very simple, you deny that scientists use inductive inferences to generalize their observations, but the use of statistics in science proves you wrong (note that the inductive inferences made in statistics are examples of inductive reasoning, and not consequences of mathematical induction). We do have degrees of certainty, not just provisional beliefs held with no confidence. A falsificationist model of science can never increase our degree of certainty in any of our theories. Your point sounds more like that of a Christian fundamentalist claiming that the theory of evolution is ”just a theory” than that of a physics and philosophy graduate.

As a side note, I have never claimed, and wouldn't claim, that science relies purely on the assumption of inductive reasoning.

King Mob

jjn2 wrote: »

I agree that scientists don't work in the way described in my link, and for the same reason, they don't work in the way you've described. It's very simple, you deny that scientists use inductive inferences to generalize their observations, but the use of statistics in science proves you wrong (note that the inductive inferences made in statistics are examples of inductive reasoning, and not consequences of mathematical induction).

Again, this is a misunderstanding of what I said. I'm not denying any such thing and am well aware that science does so on the practical level. However you are not arguing about what they do on the practical level and neither was I.

jjn2 wrote: »

We do have degrees of certainty, not just provisional beliefs held with no confidence.

I never said this.

jjn2 wrote: »

A falsificationist model of science can never increase our degree of certainty in any of our theories.

Complete nonsense. And if this was the case, why do scientist bother with experiment? Why did we dig that giant hole in the ground to find a particle that we think is there because of inductive reasoning and mathematics?
Surely if science was just reliant on induction rather than falsification, we'd just have stopped at the hypothesis and left it at that before we spend billions of euros to find the Higgs-Boson.
And yet we build it, cause we don't rely on induction and require falsification and experiment.

jjn2 wrote: »

Your point sounds more like that of a Christian fundamentalist claiming that the theory of evolution is ”just a theory” than that of a physics and philosophy graduate.

Again more nonsense. It's a fundamental and important fact in science that all ideas are subject to change and modification as new evidence, more accurate observation and better theories.
It's kinda another of those really important things that makes science different to religion that you're ignoring.

jjn2 wrote: »

As a side note, I have never claimed, and wouldn't claim, that science relies purely on the assumption of inductive reasoning.

If this is the case, what is it I say that you disagree with?
And then since science does not rely on an assumption of inductive reasoning, what's your point?

jjn2

King Mob wrote: »

Again, this is a misunderstanding of what I said. I'm not denying any such thing and am well aware that science does so on the practical level. However you are not arguing about what they do on the practical level and neither was I.

I wasn't initially talking about science on a practical level, but thought you must be, since in your last post you said "scientists and science do not actually work in the way it describes".

I never said this.

The only thing that can provide any degree of confidence, or allow you to to attempt estimate the probability of a general statement, from a limited set of observations is the use of inductive reasoning. There is no way around this.

Complete nonsense. And if this was the case, why do scientist bother with experiment? Why did we dig that giant hole in the ground to find a particle that we think is there because of inductive reasoning and mathematics?

Experiments are (obviously) a central part of science. The problem is that experiments without inductive reasoning only give us one tiny unusable piece of information, the results of the experiment. If I try to measure the speed of light in a vacuum, and don't afterwards use inductive reasoning, I will have only measured the speed of that light in that vacuum. Such an experiment would provide no verification of the general claim "The speed of light in a vacuum is". If the speed of light was measured to be something unexpectedly different to our prediction, we couldn't conclude that our prediction was falsified, but would have to make the useless conclusion that at least one of our prediction, or at least one of the many assumptions that we made in designing the experiment was wrong. Recall that in the absence of inductive reasoning, experimental verification doesn't actually have any value, so it is an impossible task to ever identify correct assumptions.

Again more nonsense. It's a fundamental and important fact in science that all ideas are subject to change and modification as new evidence, more accurate observation and better theories.
It's kinda another of those really important things that makes science different to religion that you're ignoring.

Science can correct itself, this is evidence that we use inductive reasoning in justifying our scientific theories. If we didn't, a falsification would undermine everything we think we know, rather than just our experimental prediction.

If this is the case, what is it I say that you disagree with?
And then since science does not rely on an assumption of inductive reasoning, what's your point?

In science we use deductive and inductive reasoning, both are necessary and unavoidable parts of science. Inductive reasoning is what makes experiments useful, and if you don't understand this, it is you who doesn't understand science! How can you ignore the central role that statistical inference plays in science? It is unquestionably rooted in inductive reasoning, and it is unquestionably an element of science that we can't throw away, and it is unquestionably unaccounted for by your understanding of science.

Naz_st

I've only skimmed through the thread, so apologies if this has already been said, but isn't this whole line of argument ultimately pointless? I mean, it seems to me to be trying to argue against an axiom.

If you want to think about, or interact with, reality in any meaningful way it requires of you to accept certain axioms (e.g. I'm not a brain in a jar, I'm not in the matrix, etc). None of these axioms can ever be proved (that's the nature of an axiom) so any debates about them are pointless. Induction is simply one of those. You have to work under the assumption that the physical laws of the universe aren't going to randomly change tomorrow, otherwise nothing will ever make sense.

As to what Induction has to do with God, I'm not clear. One is something which has to be taken as an axiom for the universe to make sense, the other isn't (the universe makes sense, more sense really, without the assumption of God's existence).

Knasher

jjn2 wrote: »

They are superfluous to science, since they have no scientific content, but they are no more superfluous than the assumptions of science, if you accept that there is no vindication or justification for those (I realize that you believe we are vindicated in those assumptions).

Superfluous to what exactly. I'm happy to accept that the assumptions of science are superfluous to reality, as reality will exist or not exist independent of our understanding of it. If you mean they are superfluous to science, by which we derive an understanding of reality, then you are clearly wrong and I don't see how I can spell that out further. But lets be honest, the assumptions of science are as truisms in every arena beyond science, science is just pedantic enough to spell them out as they really are, unverifiable assumptions. I accept these assumptions, not because I am making a leap of faith that they are true, but simply because science, so far, has been the only reliable way for us to learn anything.

jjn2 wrote: »

Regarding the last question, my answer is no, but as I've described above, the religious assumptions aren't the underpinnings of science, but the underpinnings of our view of the world. They are superfluous, in the sense that Occam's razor would, if we applied it, suggest we should get rid of them, but below I'll explain how I still think the same is true for inductive reasoning.
[I'm assuming this was the relevent paragraph so I moved it up]
If I toss a coin a lot of times, and in a subset of those observations, I get a long alternating sequence of heads and tails, I can either decide that I need an explanation for this phenomenon, or that it is adequately accounted for by my more general understand of coin tossing. Everything is accounted for by no assumptions, so Occam's razor stops after getting rid of inductive reasoning, rather than before.

I'd like to reiterate that I'm not at all sure about this, but I disagree. The fact that an explanation would explain a phenomenon is only a reason to accept the explanation if we have a reason to believe that there really is a phenomenon to be explained. Lacking this reason, as I believe we do in the case of the uniformity of nature, Occam's razor would not suggest that we spare the assumption.

I would be interested to know how you derived your more general understanding of coin tossing (in this example) without relying on science or the assumptions underlying it. I would also like to know how you would differentiate between the necessity for further explanation for the phenomenon and your current understating. In my view you are simply tossing a coin in the air and offering no explanation for anything you are observing, hardly the simplest explanation that Occam's razor endorses.

jjn2 wrote: »

Since there are direct contradictions, there would be a cognitive dissonance, not present when a moderate Christian does science. It wouldn't necessarily have any practical implications, so if a fundamentalist does science, temporarily suspending his belief about the age of the universe, he can do useful work. The problem is simply that he probably won't be inclined to do so, since the natural conclusion to fundamentalism is that to some extent, science is an enemy (since there are disagreements). Similarly a homeopath can conceivably be a productive scientist, but there will still be a degree of conflict with medicine.

If none of our beliefs are justified, we aren't saying that some beliefs are irrational and others are rational, but rather, we are making a value judgement that science is valuable, and choosing to reject those assumptions which are in conflict with science.

I'm not going to expand on this simply because I can't read your mind so I can't say what your definition of a moderate christian is or what beliefs they should hold. For example, the belief that god is omnipotence is a logically impossible position, omniscience is incompatible with free will and omnibenevolence is incompatible with both (at least without misconstruing the meaning of words), all of these are mainstream beliefs, but are internally contradictory, but I obviously can't say if you would accept them as moderate christian beliefs or not. So without knowing what your beliefs exactly are, I really can't say if they are in conflict with science or not.

King Mob

jjn2 wrote: »

I wasn't initially talking about science on a practical level, but thought you must be, since in your last post you said "scientists and science do not actually work in the way it describes".

I also said "nor is it an accurate representation of what I am outlining."
And what I was referring to both how scientists work on the philosophical level as well as the practical level.

jjn2 wrote: »

The only thing that can provide any degree of confidence, or allow you to to attempt estimate the probability of a general statement, from a limited set of observations is the use of inductive reasoning. There is no way around this.

Experiments are (obviously) a central part of science. The problem is that experiments without inductive reasoning only give us one tiny unusable piece of information, the results of the experiment. If I try to measure the speed of light in a vacuum, and don't afterwards use inductive reasoning, I will have only measured the speed of that light in that vacuum. Such an experiment would provide no verification of the general claim "The speed of light in a vacuum is". If the speed of light was measured to be something unexpectedly different to our prediction, we couldn't conclude that our prediction was falsified, but would have to make the useless conclusion that at least one of our prediction, or at least one of the many assumptions that we made in designing the experiment was wrong. Recall that in the absence of inductive reasoning, experimental verification doesn't actually have any value, so it is an impossible task to ever identify correct assumptions.

Lets take the example of the Higgs-boson.
The hypothesis gained from inductive reasoning about the standard model of particle physics is that at certain energy we will observe a particle with certain behaviour.
The experiment produces the conditions needed for that particle to exist.
It is a negative result if, no particle is observed, or a particle with a different behaviour is produced.
It is a positive result if the particle is observed and exhibits the predicted behaviour.

None of that requires statistics or induction, the particle is either observed or it is not.

The reality is of course a little more messy than this but the underlining point is true. The same goes for most other experiments where statistics and inductive reasoning is only ever used for practical convenience and is always conditional.

jjn2 wrote: »

Science can correct itself, this is evidence that we use inductive reasoning in justifying our scientific theories. If we didn't, a falsification would undermine everything we think we know, rather than just our experimental prediction.

No it's not. If we used purely inductive reasoning and assumed it in all cases unconditional, we would never worry about experiment. Then this would make science more like religion and then you'd actually have a point.
But we don't. We require falsification before we accept something.

Again, if this is not the case, why are we wasting billions on the LHC?

If all ideas in science are not subject to revision, why then has Newtonian physics given way to Quantum and Einsteinian physics? Why are people working on theories that modify, correct or overturn even these ideas?

It's because science only assumes induction conditionally.

jjn2 wrote: »

In science we use deductive and inductive reasoning, both are necessary and unavoidable parts of science. Inductive reasoning is what makes experiments useful, and if you don't understand this, it is you who doesn't understand science! How can you ignore the central role that statistical inference plays in science? It is unquestionably rooted in inductive reasoning, and it is unquestionably an element of science that we can't throw away, and it is unquestionably unaccounted for by your understanding of science.

Again, I never ignored statistics, I just stated that it is a practical convenience of science but you are arguing about the philosophical level of science.

Because science uses both deductive and inductive reasoning, the "problem" of induction simply is not a problem.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EYPapE-3FRw