Absolute motion

Masteroid

triocha wrote: »

Everything can be said to be the centre of the universe where ever it/who is at that point.
That point can be and most often is (in my experience anyways, the universe revolves around me and I am the most important thing to my existance so I consider myself as the universe experiencing itself).
Absolute Motion is a mind illusion. It is not a real thing.

Newtonian gravity was an illusion that Einstein opened our eyes to. Something that was measurable was not a real thing.

Absolute motion may be the only real thing.

Morbert

Masteroid wrote: »

I was trying to visualise a model of the universe where the end-point is indistiinguishable from the start-point and it seems sensible to say that anything that exists at the scale of a fully expanded dead universe should have a counterpart at the scale of creation.

As an aside: The premise behind Roger Penrose's new cosmological postulate is that the only difference between the beginning and end of the universe is a conformal rescaling.

roosh

Morbert wrote: »

That has nothing to do with what I said.

It has to do with the point you had been trying to make:

Morbert wrote: »

I could not understand how you would see a contradiction between relative motion and worldlines in spacetime. I believe the following is the core reason.

You are conflating the worldline of an object with the object itself. You are not your past self, nor are you your future self. Instead, you, your past self, your future self, all of your history, constitutes your worldline. The worldline itself does not do the self-identifying. Instead, the perception of yourself is an event in the worldline, all connected by an intrinsic metric.

Morbert wrote: »

It is a not a non sequitur. It instead challenges the assertion you made:"The 4D spacetime interpretation implies that all events in our history are simultaneously preceived"

If your assertion does not hold, then there is no problem between the observation of relative motion, and the existence of worldlines. It really is that simple.

We have, hopefully, cleared up the miscommunication with regard to the simultaneity of perception of historically sequential events; the confusion arising from my use of the term "simultaneous". What was meant was that, while you are experiencing your present self, your past self is experiencing himself; as opposed to your present self experiencing the thoughts of your past self. While, in most contexts, the use of the term simultaneous would suffice here, in this given context it appears to have caused some confusion.

So, the attributed assertion that all events are perceived simultaneously [by the same self] is erroneous - although I must bear the responsibility - as no such assertion was made. However, if such an assertion had been made, even if it didn't hold, it would still not resolve the issue; because the fact that our present selves do not perceive the thoughts of our past selves does not lead to the conclusion that we observe relative motion. Therein lies the non-sequitir.


We don't necessarily need to pursue this, however, as it should hopefully be clear that the attributed assertion was attributed erroneously.

Morbert wrote: »

I said relative motion is a spatio-temporal characteristic of worldlines. That the worldlines themselves exist atemporally is unimportant, as it does not raise any contradictions.

Indeed, you have said this; you have said it numerous times; each time saying it a little differently.

Morbert wrote: »

In special relativity, the observation of relative motion is the difference in time between two events in a world line over the difference in space, as defined by the coordinate labels used (hence "relative" motion).

But the point remains; what we observe as relative motion is independent of any, and all, co-ordinate reference frames; it isn't a numerical value; it isn't the difference between two values over the difference in two other values; it is independent of all numerical values.

Such numerical values and descriptions are a secondary quality; something which don't exist a priori in nature, but something we apply to nature.


It is this primary aspect of relative motion which, it is maintained, is excluded from the model of Minkowski spacetime. You have proffered an explanation below, which is based on the idea of self-perception as an event in a worldline or worldtube. We can examine this idea to see does it reconcile our observations of the natural world with the model of Minkowski spacetime.

Morbert wrote: »

You now seem to simply be arguing that worldlines are not in motion relative to one another. Nobody has ever been arguing this. Instead, it is the case that the relation between points on the worldline of an object, and points on the worldline of an observer, are what we call relative motion.

That worldlines, or worldtubes, are not in motion relative to each other simply means that relative motion cannot exist in an objective or absolute manner. This is not something which you seem to dispute, indeed, saying that relative motion is illusory. One of the consequences of such a position being that planets and other inanimate objects don't move relative to each other; their relative motion is solely based on human perception. This would seem to fall somewhat into the category of idealism; which was not something I had associated with Einsteinian relativity.

The question which remains is with regard to our observation of relative motion; given that we observe relative motion, and Minkowski spacetime necessitates that relative motion be the result of conscious (shall we say) perception we must determine if what we observe is possible under Minkowski spacetime; without the advent of ad hoc, or exotic assumptions.

This we can explore further.

Morbert wrote: »

But that's the point I'm making. Relative motion is not inherent motion.

To take your above example: Slice up the lines into a series of moments. In each moment, there are two dots, which are the locations at which the moments intersect the lines. Under a presentist interpretation, we say the two dots are what are real, and not the lines. The distance between the two dots is changing, and we construct a parameter called time to describe this change.

A relativist says: I observe the distance between the two dots to be x, under my coordinate system. Under the coordinate system of my past self, the two dots are a distance y apart. There is a quantity (x-y)/dt that I will call relative motion.

This again seeks to reduce relative motion to a numerical value; what we observe when we see relative motion is not a numerical value, or mathematical co-ordinates.

If we take our common everyday observation of relative motion, we can see how Minkowski spacetime excludes that and, instead, necessitates that we (or our "present selves") should observe only a single unchanging moment, where everything is frozen in space.


Thought experiment
If we take a more concrete example; that of a car moving relative to you and I. Let's say it is driving along a road in front of us; we're at rest relative to each other and side by side. We can put down markers on the road as well for the sake of explanation. Let's say there is a boulder marked "1" to our left as we look at the road; a distance away to our right is a boulder marked "3", and in the middle of the two boulders is a boulder marked "2". The car starts it's journey in front of boulder #1 and drives along the road and passes the other boulders.

Ever changing present moment
What we would experience, or at least, what we would seem to experience, is the observations made by our "present self", of the car driving past all three boulders; that is, we would experience the events of the car passing all three boulders in the present, as our "present self"; as dynamically changing present moment. This possibility is excluded from Minkowski spacetime.

Self and Events
In Minkowksi spacetime, each event corresponds to a "present self" and there is no transition from one event to the next; so our "present self" should only ever experience a single event. This in turn means that the identification of ourselves as our "present self" can only ever correspond to one event; and without transition to the next moment, or event, our "present self" should observe that single event frozen in space.

For the sake of clarification, let's say that I say to you, as the car is parked in front of boulder #1, "we should not observe the car passing boulder #2 or #3, as that is the purview of our 'future self'"*. We would both agree that my "present self" said it, while your "present self" heard it and both our "present selves" observe the car parked in front of boulder #1. Without a transition to the next moment, we should observe that event as frozen and unchanging.

Even making such a statement would correspond to a number of events, as would the mathematical formula you mention above, but for the sake of explanation we can take it to be a single event.

"Present self"
Now, the obvious point that can be raised here is that our "present self" does only ever experience a single event, and that the "present self" corresponding to the event at boulder #2 is the "future self" of the self that experienced the event at boulder #1, with a similar extension to the "present self" at boulder [event] #3.

The issue that has to be addressed, however, is how each present self doesn't simply observe a a static, unchanging event, as they should if events are static and unchanging in a world tube; how does the experience of a dynamical present moment, and with it our observation of relative motion, arise from events which are static and unchanging along a world tube?

Aging process
For greater clarity, we could limit our thinking to just one individual and perhaps the most basic of all empirical observations, the aging process. If we imagine the world tube of that person extended through spacetime; again, without any transition from moment to moment. It might be confusing to talk about years and months, but hopefully we can use those terms without too much need to justify them.

We can take two ages at opposite ends of the spectrum; where the individual is 2yrs old and where they are 80yrs old; these birthdays can be two separate events. Now, without a transition from the "age 2 event" to the "age 80 event" (and all those inbetween) the individual should only ever experience themselves as being one age; that is, they should only ever experience one event. They should not experience, or observe themselves growing older.


Formation of the universe
The big bang is attributed as being the primeval event in the universe, where all matter was in an infinitely (is that correct) dense cloud, but then exploded and the universe started expanding, and matter as we oberve it came to form.

Now, if Minkowksi spacetime is to be accepted, an explanation is required for how the current state of the universe came to exist simultaneously with the big bang; and this is in the Einsteinian sense of the term "similtaneous". That is, if past, present and future co-exist, the formation of the current state of the universe had to happen at the same time as the big bang; unless we take the "growing block" theory, is it?

Morbert

roosh: You are still letting implicit assumptions slip into your reasoning. Specifically you are taking liberties with the definition of "self".

roosh wrote: »

Thought experiment
If we take a more concrete example; that of a car moving relative to you and I. Let's say it is driving along a road in front of us; we're at rest relative to each other and side by side. We can put down markers on the road as well for the sake of explanation. Let's say there is a boulder marked "1" to our left as we look at the road; a distance away to our right is a boulder marked "3", and in the middle of the two boulders is a boulder marked "2". The car starts it's journey in front of boulder #1 and drives along the road and passes the other boulders.

Ever changing present moment
What we would experience, or at least, what we would seem to experience, is the observations made by our "present self", of the car driving past all three boulders; that is, we would experience the events of the car passing all three boulders in the present, as our "present self"; as dynamically changing present moment. This possibility is excluded from Minkowski spacetime.

Self and Events
In Minkowksi spacetime, each event corresponds to a "present self" and there is no transition from one event to the next; so our "present self" should only ever experience a single event. This in turn means that the identification of ourselves as our "present self" can only ever correspond to one event; and without transition to the next moment, or event, our "present self" should observe that single event frozen in space.

For the sake of clarification, let's say that I say to you, as the car is parked in front of boulder #1, "we should not observe the car passing boulder #2 or #3, as that is the purview of our 'future self'"*. We would both agree that my "present self" said it, while your "present self" heard it and both our "present selves" observe the car parked in front of boulder #1. Without a transition to the next moment, we should observe that event as frozen and unchanging.

Even making such a statement would correspond to a number of events, as would the mathematical formula you mention above, but for the sake of explanation we can take it to be a single event.

"Present self"
Now, the obvious point that can be raised here is that our "present self" does only ever experience a single event, and that the "present self" corresponding to the event at boulder #2 is the "future self" of the self that experienced the event at boulder #1, with a similar extension to the "present self" at boulder [event] #3.

The issue that has to be addressed, however, is how each present self doesn't simply observe a a static, unchanging event, as they should if events are static and unchanging in a world tube; how does the experience of a dynamical present moment, and with it our observation of relative motion, arise from events which are static and unchanging along a world tube?

Yes, our present self does not, in any way, observe the cars passing all three boulders. Instead, we have three relevant events: The car at boulder 1, the car at boulder 2, and the car at boulder 3, and points along the worldline of the observer that intersect the lightcones of these events. What produces the impression of the an observer being the same person as his past is the structure of memory. The observation of the car at boulder 3 is made in the context of knowledge of the previous locations of the car, and they are all interpreted under a single narrative by the brain. We generate a picture, based on observations of static moments threaded by a temporal coordinate, of the car moving.

Aging process
For greater clarity, we could limit our thinking to just one individual and perhaps the most basic of all empirical observations, the aging process. If we imagine the world tube of that person extended through spacetime; again, without any transition from moment to moment. It might be confusing to talk about years and months, but hopefully we can use those terms without too much need to justify them.

We can take two ages at opposite ends of the spectrum; where the individual is 2yrs old and where they are 80yrs old; these birthdays can be two separate events. Now, without a transition from the "age 2 event" to the "age 80 event" (and all those inbetween) the individual should only ever experience themselves as being one age; that is, they should only ever experience one event. They should not experience, or observe themselves growing older.

And they don't. The person at age 2 observes themselves at age 2, and the person at age 80 observes themselves at age 80. The person at age 80, however, also has memories of the person at age 2,3,4 etcetera. These memories are understood in the context of a narrative of "getting older".

Formation of the universe
The big bang is attributed as being the primeval event in the universe, where all matter was in an infinitely (is that correct) dense cloud, but then exploded and the universe started expanding, and matter as we oberve it came to form.

Now, if Minkowksi spacetime is to be accepted, an explanation is required for how the current state of the universe came to exist simultaneously with the big bang; and this is in the Einsteinian sense of the term "similtaneous". That is, if past, present and future co-exist, the formation of the current state of the universe had to happen at the same time as the big bang; unless we take the "growing block" theory, is it?

Minkowski space is insufficient in describing the big bang. You instead use a manifold which exhibits a Minkowski structure at the local level. But anyway: A simplified model of a spacetime with a big bang would be one that resembles a bowl. All timelike worldlines at the beginning of the universe (i.e. at the bottom of the bowl) occupy the same point in space.

roosh

Morbert wrote: »

roosh: You are still letting implicit assumptions slip into your reasoning. Specifically you are taking liberties with the definition of "self".

Stating that liberties are being taken with the definition of "self" is not being specific; there is a need to be explicit in what those liberties are, so that we can see if the assertion is correct, that implicit assumptions are being made.

For example, it appears as though some process of moment to moment, or event to event, transition has to, implicity, be assumed, in order to reconcile our real life observations with Minkowski spacetime and the idea of static, unchanging worldtubes.

Morbert wrote: »

Yes, our present self does not, in any way, observe the cars passing all three boulders. Instead, we have three relevant events: The car at boulder 1, the car at boulder 2, and the car at boulder 3, and points along the worldline of the observer that intersect the lightcones of these events. What produces the impression of the an observer being the same person as his past is the structure of memory. The observation of the car at boulder 3 is made in the context of knowledge of the previous locations of the car, and they are all interpreted under a single narrative by the brain. We generate a picture, based on observations of static moments threaded by a temporal coordinate, of the car moving.

Temporal threading
Firstly, "static moments threaded by a temporal coordinate"??

Secondly, how does this "threading of a temporal co-ordinate" cause us to see static moments as moving?

It seems as though what we have here is an ever more nebulous way to describe how events exist within the structure of spacetime, without an actual explanation of how this static structure can give rise to the observation of relative motion and change. In this case, instead of describing objects as events in the spacetime structure, they are described as moments threaded with a temporal co-ordinate. This is no different to saying that events exist as worldlines, or tubes, in spacetime and have temporal co-ordinates. It doesn't offer any explanation as to how it gives rise to our observation of relative motion.


the boulders
It seems that relative motion is neatly being accounted for by jumping to the end point of the process and saying that we observe the relative motion because we remember the past locations of the car. This is a neat trick, but it is limited because our observation of relative motion and change isn't simply confined to single examples, as it should be in Minkowski spacetime; our observation of relative motion wouldn't simply end with the car frozen in front of boulder #3, as it should under Minkowski spacetime.

A further problem is that the other events, leading up to the final event, are ignored. It also seems as though liberties are being taken with regard to the duration of memories and events.

boulder #1
Observing the car parked at boulder #1, you and I should not observe anything further than that. We should observe the car eternally parked in front of boulder #1; or at least, for the duration of the existence of spacetime.

Without there being some transition to the next observation, or moment, then this is all we should ever observe. That isn't the case though; that doesn't correspond to what we observe in the real life.

The liberty being taken with the definition of the "self" is assuming that we can jump to our "self" at a later time and thereby explain our observation of relative motion. We first need to account for how we get from the self that observes the car parked at boulder #1 to the later self; without such an explanation, then we should forever observe the car at boulder #1.

Boulder #3
Even if we allow the idea that we are at boulder #3, and allow that the duration of our memory results in our observation of relative motion - as opposed to the duration being so short that what we would actually observe, is a miniscule amount of motion - our observation of the universe should finish there. That is all we should ever observe; we should observe nothing past the car at boulder #3. We should also only observe relative motion of the car as permitted by the duration of, not necessarily a memory, but of the single firing of a neuron, or neurons. That means that we should only ever observe a miniscule amount of relative motion. Again, however, this does not correspond to our observations in real life.


Present selves
The obfuscation arises by saying that a single present self doesn't observe all of these, that each different present self observes something different, and has memories which account for the observation of relative motion.

The issue, however, is that, in effect, we are only a single one of those present selves; that is, our physical manifestation is just one of those present selves. So, as a sinlge events ourselves, our observation of relative motion should be limited to single events coupled with the duration of the single firing of a limited number of neurons. This could only account for the observation of very little relative motion, at the very most.

Morbert wrote: »

And they don't. The person at age 2 observes themselves at age 2, and the person at age 80 observes themselves at age 80. The person at age 80, however, also has memories of the person at age 2,3,4 etcetera. These memories are understood in the context of a narrative of "getting older".

Current self
We can think about it in the context of the "current self". If we take a moment and identify it as our current self, then we should experience nothing of the universe after that moment; because that event is frozen in spacetime and there is no moment to moment transition.

We should only ever experience a single memory, if that, of a very limited duration, because those events are frozen in spacetime. We shouldn't experience memories and thoughts continually arising and falling away, as we do.

Unfortunately the idea of a current, or present self, in the context of Minkowski spacetime, allows liberties to be taken too easily. It's more of a linguistic trick than anything really. This is because the physical act of identifying our current self, in an ever changing present moment, doesn't correspond to Minkowski spacetime. In real life, as soon as you designate a moment as your "current self", that moment is no longer current; it becomes a past memory.

However, in Minkowski spacetime, that designation is supposed to be frozen in spacetime and so should endure for the duration of the existence of spacetime; that is, the event of the identification of your current self should be the only event you ever experience.


Simple experiment
Sit still for a moment and pay attention to the mental process that occur. If you experience more than a single thought arising and falling away, if you experience more than a single memory, of longer than a split second duration, then the argument being proffered above, in defense of Minkowski spacetime, is invalidated; because more than one thought and more than one split second memory implies a transition from moment to moment.

Morbert wrote: »

Minkowski space is insufficient in describing the big bang. You instead use a manifold which exhibits a Minkowski structure at the local level. But anyway: A simplified model of a spacetime with a big bang would be one that resembles a bowl. All timelike worldlines at the beginning of the universe (i.e. at the bottom of the bowl) occupy the same point in space.

Regardless of the shape, or anything else, it is sufficient to reason that, unless the universe, or Minkowski spacetime, is eternal, then the current state of the universe had to have come into existence simultaneously - in the Einsteinian sense of the word - with the big bang; otherwise there would have been a point at which they didn't co-exist.

This presumably has implications for the idea of cause and effect. A growing block theory could rescue it perhaps, becaues it wouldn't necessitate the simultaneous occurrence of the big bang and the current state of the universe.


EDIT:
Another example that contradicts Minkowski spacetime; if we take our typing responses to each other on here. Each post represents a number of separate events, all of which correspond to a different "present self". At every moment of us typing our replies, we should not experience a later event; my typing the preceding word "event", for example, should have been the only event that I experienced, but here I am experiencing a number of later events in this post.

Now, we can conveniently say that that event is just a memory of this "present self", but the same issue arises again; my typing the words "present self" (allowing for that as a single event) should be the only thing I experience and I shouldn't experience any later events; but here I am again, experiencing a later event. Again, we can say that the previous event is just a memory of this "present self" and this continues on ad infinitum.

We clearly experience an ever changing present moment, be that through a flow, or transition, from one moment or event to the next, or whatever the dynamic is; bcos if we didn't, then all that would ever be experienced by anyone, is a single, incredibly short moment, the duration of which would correspond to a single memory (if that) and an incredibly short observation. That is what is necessitated by Minkowski spacetime, but clearly our experience is contrary to that.

roosh

I was just thinking about this a bit more and have been trying to think of the best way to "close the loophole" that allows for clinging to the above defense of Minkowski spacetime. I think part of the issue lies in the use of a somewhat ambiguous term "present self". In order to discuss it, we should perhaps be a bit more specific and refer to each "self" with their relevant time co-ordinates. It might also be helpful to use the idea of our "future self" when discussing this, because I think there is less of a psychological attachment to the idea of our "future self".


Unfortunately, the dynamic of typing replies on here is such that there is a delay between when we write our posts and when the other reads them; this facilitates a certain amount of ambiguity. I will, however, try to bear this in mind as I write this.

Timestamp
As I write this, it is Friday the 5th of October at 16:12 (GMT+8); that is the time stamp of my present self. Now, unfortunately, due to the nature of "time", that time stamp is already out of date and corresponds to my "past self", such that that self and time stamp are just memories. This makes it somewhat difficult to say that I shouldn't experience anything beyond that time, because I already am.

However, we can take a time in the "future". It's now 16:15, so lets talk about the time 16:20 (GMT+8) on Friday the 5th of October - just to give me time to type. Now, that time stamp doesn't correspond to my "present self", it will correspond to my "future self", however; but, I should not experience that "self"; the time is now 16:17 and that should be all that I experience of this universe. I should not observe the clock turn to 16:19 because of the nature of my existence in spacetime. But there it goes, the clock just turned 16:19. And now it's just turned 16:20, the timestamp of my "future self". Yes, it is now my "present self", but the question is, how did I get from experiencing the 16:15 timestamp to the 16:20 timestamp? My experience of the universe should have been limited to the 16:15 timestamp.

Try it
Now, as mentioned, the dynamics of an online discussion and the time delay factor serve to obfuscate the issue somewhat; if we were standing side by side in real time, it would be harder to dismiss the obvious transition; but we can try and see if it is possible.

When you read this, notice the time on your computer, watch, or any time telling device. Say to yourself that you should not witness the time on the clock change, because you exist as a single event in spacetime, along with the hands on the clock (or numbers if it's digital). There is no moment to moment transition, so you should only experience a moment of extremely limited duration - beyond the scope of human perception perhaps.

Now look at the clock again, but don't be too concerned if it has changed since the original timestamp; but do think of what time it will be in 5 or 7 minutes time. Now, being a single, static event in a worldtube, without any moment to moment transition, tell yourself that you should not experience the clock changing one minute, not to mention 5 minutes time.

Then sit patiently and observe the clock. You will find that you do witness the clock changing every second and every minute, until the time stamp of your "present self" is 5 minutes from the the time you noted. The question that has to be answered is, without any moment to moment transition, how were you able to witness the time on the clock change numerous times?




Just to try and pre-empt the reply, if you say that each "present self" experienced something different, you must remember that you can only experience one of those present selves, and so should only experience one single event frozen in spacetime, such is the supposed nature of your existence in spacetime.



The time now is 16:30.

Morbert

roosh wrote: »

I was just thinking about this a bit more and have been trying to think of the best way to "close the loophole" that allows for clinging to the above defense of Minkowski spacetime. I think part of the issue lies in the use of a somewhat ambiguous term "present self". In order to discuss it, we should perhaps be a bit more specific and refer to each "self" with their relevant time co-ordinates. It might also be helpful to use the idea of our "future self" when discussing this, because I think there is less of a psychological attachment to the idea of our "future self".


Unfortunately, the dynamic of typing replies on here is such that there is a delay between when we write our posts and when the other reads them; this facilitates a certain amount of ambiguity. I will, however, try to bear this in mind as I write this.

Timestamp
As I write this, it is Friday the 5th of October at 16:12 (GMT+8); that is the time stamp of my present self. Now, unfortunately, due to the nature of "time", that time stamp is already out of date and corresponds to my "past self", such that that self and time stamp are just memories. This makes it somewhat difficult to say that I shouldn't experience anything beyond that time, because I already am.

However, we can take a time in the "future". It's now 16:15, so lets talk about the time 16:20 (GMT+8) on Friday the 5th of October - just to give me time to type. Now, that time stamp doesn't correspond to my "present self", it will correspond to my "future self", however; but, I should not experience that "self"; the time is now 16:17 and that should be all that I experience of this universe. I should not observe the clock turn to 16:19 because of the nature of my existence in spacetime. But there it goes, the clock just turned 16:19. And now it's just turned 16:20, the timestamp of my "future self". Yes, it is now my "present self", but the question is, how did I get from experiencing the 16:15 timestamp to the 16:20 timestamp? My experience of the universe should have been limited to the 16:15 timestamp.

Try it
Now, as mentioned, the dynamics of an online discussion and the time delay factor serve to obfuscate the issue somewhat; if we were standing side by side in real time, it would be harder to dismiss the obvious transition; but we can try and see if it is possible.

When you read this, notice the time on your computer, watch, or any time telling device. Say to yourself that you should not witness the time on the clock change, because you exist as a single event in spacetime, along with the hands on the clock (or numbers if it's digital). There is no moment to moment transition, so you should only experience a moment of extremely limited duration - beyond the scope of human perception perhaps.

Now look at the clock again, but don't be too concerned if it has changed since the original timestamp; but do think of what time it will be in 5 or 7 minutes time. Now, being a single, static event in a worldtube, without any moment to moment transition, tell yourself that you should not experience the clock changing one minute, not to mention 5 minutes time.

Then sit patiently and observe the clock. You will find that you do witness the clock changing every second and every minute, until the time stamp of your "present self" is 5 minutes from the the time you noted. The question that has to be answered is, without any moment to moment transition, how were you able to witness the time on the clock change numerous times?


Just to try and pre-empt the reply, if you say that each "present self" experienced something different, you must remember that you can only experience one of those present selves, and so should only experience one single event frozen in spacetime, such is the supposed nature of your existence in spacetime.

The time now is 16:30.

No self witnesses the clock turn. Instead, a self observes the clock at a position, but also has memories of the clock at previous positions experienced by previous selves. These memories build a narrative of the clock moving. That such a narrative is built from memory is actually why saccadic suppression can mess with our concept of time. Glance at a second hand on your watch and it sometimes seems to "hang" there for a little longer than a second, because your brain retroactively inserts false memories to accommodate the movement of the eye.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chronostasis

roosh

Morbert wrote: »

No self witnesses the clock turn. Instead, a self observes the clock at a position, but also has memories of the clock at previous positions experienced by previous selves. These memories build a narrative of the clock moving. That such a narrative is built from memory is actually why saccadic suppression can mess with our concept of time. Glance at a second hand on your watch and it sometimes seems to "hang" there for a little longer than a second, because your brain retroactively inserts false memories to accommodate the movement of the eye.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chronostasis

It might help if I re-phrase the above point but with explicit reference to memory. It is probably worth stating that the role of memory in our perception of relative motion isn't in question; what is in question is whether it can be used to account for how static and unchanging worldtubes could observe relative motion.


The time now is 16:10 (GMT+8), so my memory should not go beyond 16:10 (GMT+8). I certainly shouldn't have a memory of the clock at 16:11, or 16:12; or again, to give myself time to type, at 16:15.

The observation of the clock hand, or the digital clock in this case, changing from 10 to 11 is not something I should observe; assuming you agree that a clock hand moving from 10mins to 11 mins is an observation that we make in this universe; regardless of the nature of that observation is made; that is, assuming you agree that we do observe relative motion.

The clock is now showing 16:12, meaning that 16:11 is now part of my memory; the question we must ask is, how have I gone from the self that observed 16:10 and had no memory of 16:11, to the self that observes 16:12 and now has a memory of 16:11?

The clock now showing 16:13 means that 16:12 is now in my memory; and there goes 16:14.


Let's push the time back a bit; the clock now shows 16:15. My memories should be limited to times prior to 16:15, and my experience of the universe should stop there, because there is no moment to moment transition. I should not experience anything beyond 16:15 and the time, say 16:17 should certainly not be in my memory.

The clock has now struck 16:16, so my experience has gone beyond 16:15; this seems to suggest some transition from 16:15 to 16:16. And there goes 16:17. So, I shouldn't have experienced anything beyond 16:15, yet here I am looking at the clock showing 16:17; the time we said shouldn't form part of my memory. So let's wait a little.

And there goes 16:18, meaning that 16:17 is now in my memory. How did I get from the time 16:15, not to mind 16:10, to 16:17 without some form of moment to moment transition. Without any moment to moment transition, my perception of the universe should have been frozen at 16:15; the time 16:15 should not have been in my memory. Indeed, the time 16:11 shouldn't have been in my memory, becauase my experience of the universe should have been frozen at 16:10.


Then 16:17 came, a time I mentioned, at 16:15, I shouldn't witness and a time that certainly shouldn't have formed part of my memory - if, indeed, we do exist as static and unchanging worldtubes, with no moment to moment transition. But, 16:17 changed to 16:18 and 16:17 was consigned to memory.

Having typed a bit more, but then deciding to delete it, the time is now 16:27, a time I should not be witnessing given that I should have been frozen at 16:10. 16:27 certainly shouldn't become a memory.

But, there is 16:28 and 16:27 is now just a memory.

Morbert

roosh wrote: »

It might help if I re-phrase the above point but with explicit reference to memory. It is probably worth stating that the role of memory in our perception of relative motion isn't in question; what is in question is whether it can be used to account for how static and unchanging worldtubes could observe relative motion.


The time now is 16:10 (GMT+8), so my memory should not go beyond 16:10 (GMT+8). I certainly shouldn't have a memory of the clock at 16:11, or 16:12; or again, to give myself time to type, at 16:15.

The observation of the clock hand, or the digital clock in this case, changing from 10 to 11 is not something I should observe; assuming you agree that a clock hand moving from 10mins to 11 mins is an observation that we make in this universe; regardless of the nature of that observation is made; that is, assuming you agree that we do observe relative motion.

The clock is now showing 16:12, meaning that 16:11 is now part of my memory; the question we must ask is, how have I gone from the self that observed 16:10 and had no memory of 16:11, to the self that observes 16:12 and now has a memory of 16:11?

The clock now showing 16:13 means that 16:12 is now in my memory; and there goes 16:14.


Let's push the time back a bit; the clock now shows 16:15. My memories should be limited to times prior to 16:15, and my experience of the universe should stop there, because there is no moment to moment transition. I should not experience anything beyond 16:15 and the time, say 16:17 should certainly not be in my memory.

The clock has now struck 16:16, so my experience has gone beyond 16:15; this seems to suggest some transition from 16:15 to 16:16. And there goes 16:17. So, I shouldn't have experienced anything beyond 16:15, yet here I am looking at the clock showing 16:17; the time we said shouldn't form part of my memory. So let's wait a little.

And there goes 16:18, meaning that 16:17 is now in my memory. How did I get from the time 16:15, not to mind 16:10, to 16:17 without some form of moment to moment transition. Without any moment to moment transition, my perception of the universe should have been frozen at 16:15; the time 16:15 should not have been in my memory. Indeed, the time 16:11 shouldn't have been in my memory, becauase my experience of the universe should have been frozen at 16:10.


Then 16:17 came, a time I mentioned, at 16:15, I shouldn't witness and a time that certainly shouldn't have formed part of my memory - if, indeed, we do exist as static and unchanging worldtubes, with no moment to moment transition. But, 16:17 changed to 16:18 and 16:17 was consigned to memory.

Having typed a bit more, but then deciding to delete it, the time is now 16:27, a time I should not be witnessing given that I should have been frozen at 16:10. 16:27 certainly shouldn't become a memory.

But, there is 16:28 and 16:27 is now just a memory.

You haven't gone from one self to the other. You do not change into your future self any more than an identical twin changes into their sibling. Instead, we have a series of selves, each with their current observation, and memories of previous observations, which they interpret as a coherent history. This does not translate into any metaphysical awareness or mechanism that allows you transcendental awareness of any atemporal existence.

roosh

Morbert wrote: »

You haven't gone from one self to the other. You do not change into your future self any more than an identical twin changes into their sibling. Instead, we have a series of selves, each with their current observation, and memories of previous observations, which they interpret as a coherent history. This does not translate into any metaphysical awareness or mechanism that allows you transcendental awareness of any atemporal existence.

As has been pointed out, the identical twin analogy doesn't fit, because our identical twin's memories [of previous observations] doesn't contribute to our interpretation of a "coherent history".

I must admit, it is a valiant attempt to defend the concept, but it is a defense which simply ignores some fundamental facts. The most fundamental is that our experience of the universe should be frozen at a specific time and any observation of relative motion, attributable to brain function, should be so short as to be, I dare say, imperceptible.

The time is not 08:58. My experience of the universe should not go beyond that, if there is no moment to moment transition. 08:58 is simultaneous with my present self; it should not become a memory for me, because that present self is static and unchanging in my worldtube.

But, the clock now shows 09:00; so not only is 08:58 in my memory, so too is 08:59. This should not have happened if my present self is just a part of a static and unchanging worldtube.


Saying that we have a "series of selves, each with their current observation, and memories of previous observations, which they interpret as a coherent history" doesn't address the point. While we might have "a series of selves" we only ever experience one of those selves and have memories of the former selves. Our experience should not go beyond one specific present self and the present self we find ourselves as should never form part of our memory, because we should not experience any subsequent present self.

Yet, here I am looking at 09:05 on the clock; that should be it as far as my experience goes; I should not see 09:06, unless there is some transition from 09:05 to 09:06; 09:05 should not form part of my memory because my present self, which is simultaneous with 09:05 is, supposedly, part of a static and unchanging worldtube.

But the clock has struck 09:06 and 09:05 is now part of my memory.

Morbert

roosh wrote: »

As has been pointed out, the identical twin analogy doesn't fit, because our identical twin's memories [of previous observations] doesn't contribute to our interpretation of a "coherent history".

I must admit, it is a valiant attempt to defend the concept, but it is a defense which simply ignores some fundamental facts. The most fundamental is that our experience of the universe should be frozen at a specific time and any observation of relative motion, attributable to brain function, should be so short as to be, I dare say, imperceptible.

The time is not 08:58. My experience of the universe should not go beyond that, if there is no moment to moment transition. 08:58 is simultaneous with my present self; it should not become a memory for me, because that present self is static and unchanging in my worldtube.

But, the clock now shows 09:00; so not only is 08:58 in my memory, so too is 08:59. This should not have happened if my present self is just a part of a static and unchanging worldtube.


Saying that we have a "series of selves, each with their current observation, and memories of previous observations, which they interpret as a coherent history" doesn't address the point. While we might have "a series of selves" we only ever experience one of those selves and have memories of the former selves. Our experience should not go beyond one specific present self and the present self we find ourselves as should never form part of our memory, because we should not experience any subsequent present self.

Yet, here I am looking at 09:05 on the clock; that should be it as far as my experience goes; I should not see 09:06, unless there is some transition from 09:05 to 09:06; 09:05 should not form part of my memory because my present self, which is simultaneous with 09:05 is, supposedly, part of a static and unchanging worldtube.

But the clock has struck 09:06 and 09:05 is now part of my memory.

You are still assuming the you that witnesses 9:05 is the same person as the you that witnesses 9:06. This is not the case. Instead, we have a "you" witness 9:05, and a "you" witnessing 9:06, and a "you" asking me how can this be? You are still assuming the narrative provided by memories is some metaphysical litmus test. What you call a transition into the future is really a you, at any moment, connecting your past experiences to your present experiences and interpreting it as change.

roosh

Morbert wrote: »

You are still assuming the you that witnesses 9:05 is the same person as the you that witnesses 9:06. This is not the case. Instead, we have a "you" witness 9:05, and a "you" witnessing 9:06, and a "you" asking me how can this be? You are still assuming the narrative provided by memories is some metaphysical litmus test. What you call a transition into the future is really a you, at any moment, connecting your past experiences to your present experiences and interpreting it as change.

I'm not, at all, assuming that; what I'm wondering is, why my experience of the universe isn't frozen at 09:05 as it should be, if that iteration of me is part of a static and unchanging worldtube.; that is, I should still be seeing 09:05 on my clock; the me that sees 09:05 on the clock should be the only me I experience. How can it be that I am not seeing 09:05 on my clock?

You say that they are separate selves, but you are unwittingly taking more than one self when we should only ever experience one self. Above you take 3 separate selves and line them up in order, and say, there you go, that explains it; but you are limited to using one single self, because that is all we experience.

Again, why am I not seeing 09:05 on the clock, when that should be the only experience of the clock I have? If you say that this is a later self, who is connecting past experiences, then you must explain how we got from the 09:05 self to the self that has 09:05 as a memory.


There is also no evidence to suggest that the 09:05 me still exists, and is observing 09:05; something which is necessitated by the position you are presenting.

Morbert

roosh wrote: »

I'm not, at all, assuming that; what I'm wondering is, why my experience of the universe isn't frozen at 09:05 as it should be, if that iteration of me is part of a static and unchanging worldtube.; that is, I should still be seeing 09:05 on my clock; the me that sees 09:05 on the clock should be the only me I experience. How can it be that I am not seeing 09:05 on my clock?

You say that they are separate selves, but you are unwittingly taking more than one self when we should only ever experience one self. Above you take 3 separate selves and line them up in order, and say, there you go, that explains it; but you are limited to using one single self, because that is all we experience.

Again, why am I not seeing 09:05 on the clock, when that should be the only experience of the clock I have? If you say that this is a later self, who is connecting past experiences, then you must explain how we got from the 09:05 self to the self that has 09:05 as a memory.

There is also no evidence to suggest that the 09:05 me still exists, and is observing 09:05; something which is necessitated by the position you are presenting.

The distinction between "frozen" and "atemporal" is an important one. History having an atemporal existence doesn't imply we would be aware of the atemporal existence. You observing 9:05 would have an atemporal existence, just as you observing 9:06 and asking why you're not still seeing 9:05 would have an atemporal existence.

Also, you are beginning to drag up old points again. There is no evidence of a block universe in the same way there is no evidence for a complex set of dynamics needed to explain the universal nature of the speed of light.

roosh

Morbert wrote: »

The distinction between "frozen" and "atemporal" is an important one. History having an atemporal existence doesn't imply we would be aware of the atemporal existence. You observing 9:05 would have an atemporal existence, just as you observing 9:06 and asking why you're not still seeing 9:05 would have an atemporal existence.

It's not quite as important as you would seem to make out; and I'm not even sure how it fits into the argument you have profferred up until this point.

That each point on a worldtube exists "atemporally", or "without time", doesn't seem to have any bearing on how we could observe relative motion in a block universe. Indeed, that points exist atemporally along a worldtube isn't mutually exclusive with the point that there is no moment to moment transition form one point on a worldtube to another; which is all the term "frozen" means in this context. Throwing in the word "atemporal", as though it meaningfully addresses the issue, doesn't change anything.

If I am an event on a worlttube, and there is no moment to moment transition, sucht that I am "frozen" as that point, then I should not experieince anything other than that point and the memories of preceding points; I should only experience the clock at 09:05. That I don't means we can consider the proposed concept refuted.

Morbert wrote: »

Also, you are beginning to drag up old points again. There is no evidence of a block universe in the same way there is no evidence for a complex set of dynamics needed to explain the universal nature of the speed of light.

The age of a point has no bearing on it's relevance.

What we do have is evidence of, however, is that only the present moment exists, because the alternative, as you have presented, is a universe in which no relative motion should occur.

Given that such an explanation is not viable, the alternative explanation for how relative motion can occur is, of course, absolute motion. Which, it should be re-iterated, doesn't mean motion relative to an absolute reference, or rest, frame; as such a definition would be self-contradictory.


Crazy!
The most likely scenario, I would believe, is that every object in the universe is in a state of absolute motion, with nothing at absolute rest; this inevitably leads to relative motion between objects. It might seem like a crazy thought that maybe the earth is actually rotating, maybe it is actually in orbit around the sun, maybe the sun is actually in motion through the galaxy, and maybe when we walk down the street we are actually in motion on the surface of an earth that is, also, actually moving.

Morbert

roosh wrote: »

It's not quite as important as you would seem to make out; and I'm not even sure how it fits into the argument you have profferred up until this point.

That each point on a worldtube exists "atemporally", or "without time", doesn't seem to have any bearing on how we could observe relative motion in a block universe. Indeed, that points exist atemporally along a worldtube isn't mutually exclusive with the point that there is no moment to moment transition form one point on a worldtube to another; which is all the term "frozen" means in this context. Throwing in the word "atemporal", as though it meaningfully addresses the issue, doesn't change anything.

If I am an event on a worlttube, and there is no moment to moment transition, sucht that I am "frozen" as that point, then I should not experieince anything other than that point and the memories of preceding points; I should only experience the clock at 09:05. That I don't means we can consider the proposed concept refuted.

You say it is not important, and then go on to make the exact same mistake you made before. The event of you at 9:05 only experiences the clock at 9:05. The event of you at 9:06 only experiences the clock at 9:06. There is no transition from one to the other. These are atemporal qualities, not eternal "frozen" qualities. If you at 9:05 became aware of being "frozen" at 9:05, then you at 9:05 would not be atemporal.

The age of a point has no bearing on it's relevance.

Then I refer you to my earlier responses to the point.

roosh

Morbert wrote: »

You say it is not important, and then go on to make the exact same mistake you made before. The event of you at 9:05 only experiences the clock at 9:05. The event of you at 9:06 only experiences the clock at 9:06. There is no transition from one to the other. These are atemporal qualities, not eternal "frozen" qualities. If you at 9:05 became aware of being "frozen" at 9:05, then you at 9:05 would not be atemporal.

You're making two unfounded assertions here:
1) that it is an important distinction
2) that I am making a mistake

The simple fact remains, that if we are events on a worldtube and those events don't move along the worldtube, then we are static on the worldtube. If one of those events is me seeing the clock at 09:05 and there is no transition to the next event, then I should only ever experience that event - again, assuming that my present self is an event on a worldtube which doesn't move along the worldtube i.e. is static on the worldtube.


You've started to use the word "atemporal" now, as though it somehow meaningfully addresses the issue; but it doesn't address the issue in the least. In fact, it is almost meaningless in the way you are using it.

You say that, "if you at 9:05 became aware of being "frozen" at 9:05, then you at 9:05 would not be atemporal"; given that I should be "frozen", static, or not moving along the worldtube, and given that there is no transition from one event to the next, this simply represents another contradiction in the concept. It's just further evidence that the concept is incoherent.

Essentially you're saying, the concept says that we are atemporal, so if we were aware of being "frozen" on the worldtube that would mean we weren't atemporal; therefore we can't be aware of being frozen. That's just circular reasoning.

The fact is, if we are events, or points, on a worldtube, which don't move along the worldtube, then we are static on the worldtube, that is, we are frozen on the worldtube. If one of those events is me seeing the clock at 09:05 and there is no transition to the next event, then I should only ever experience 09:05.

Saying that the concept says we are atemporal doesn't address this issue; it simply highlights an inconsistency in the concept.

Morbert wrote: »

Then I refer you to my earlier responses to the point.

Your earlier responses to the point were to use the block universe as the counter argument; here we can see that a block universe is one in which there would be no relative motion.

Morbert

roosh wrote: »

You're making two unfounded assertions here:
1) that it is an important distinction
2) that I am making a mistake

The simple fact remains, that if we are events on a worldtube and those events don't move along the worldtube, then we are static on the worldtube. If one of those events is me seeing the clock at 09:05 and there is no transition to the next event, then I should only ever experience that event - again, assuming that my present self is an event on a worldtube which doesn't move along the worldtube i.e. is static on the worldtube.


You've started to use the word "atemporal" now, as though it somehow meaningfully addresses the issue; but it doesn't address the issue in the least. In fact, it is almost meaningless in the way you are using it.

You say that, "if you at 9:05 became aware of being "frozen" at 9:05, then you at 9:05 would not be atemporal"; given that I should be "frozen", static, or not moving along the worldtube, and given that there is no transition from one event to the next, this simply represents another contradiction in the concept. It's just further evidence that the concept is incoherent.

Essentially you're saying, the concept says that we are atemporal, so if we were aware of being "frozen" on the worldtube that would mean we weren't atemporal; therefore we can't be aware of being frozen. That's just circular reasoning.

The fact is, if we are events, or points, on a worldtube, which don't move along the worldtube, then we are static on the worldtube, that is, we are frozen on the worldtube. If one of those events is me seeing the clock at 09:05 and there is no transition to the next event, then I should only ever experience 09:05.

Saying that the concept says we are atemporal doesn't address this issue; it simply highlights an inconsistency in the concept.

Again (and again and again), you are positing an issue that doesn't exist because of your misunderstanding of the formalism. The sentence in blue is a non sequitur. What you should be saying is "If one of those events is me seeing the clock at 09:05 and there is no transition to the next event, then that event should only ever be me seeing the clock at 9:05."

roosh

Morbert wrote: »

Again (and again and again), you are positing an issue that doesn't exist because of your misunderstanding of the formalism. The sentence in blue is a non sequitur. What you should be saying is "If one of those events is me seeing the clock at 09:05 and there is no transition to the next event, then that event should only ever be me seeing the clock at 9:05."

But I should only ever experience one present self, because

Morbert wrote: »

the perception of yourself is an event in the worldline

and those events don't move along the worldline; they are fixed, static, frozen, call it what you will; but they don't move along the worldline. There is also no transition from one event to the next, or one moment to the next; so, being only one iteration of self-perception, I should only experience one.

So, that event should only ever be me seeing the clock at 09:05, and that is the only iteration of self-perception I should experience; so I should only ever experience the universe and the clock at 09:05.

Essentially,

Morbert wrote: »

[we] are asking why our experience is [...] sequential

and not just sequential in the sense of a very brief moment, as would be facilitated by a miniscule duration of a memory that would constitute a single event of self-perception in a worldline; but continually sequential from birth to our present age, and presumably to death.

How is it sequential, while also not sequential as would be necessitated if all moments, or iterations of self-perception, equally exist in a worldline; bearing in mind that the identical twin example only explains why we don't experience futre or past thoughts, it doesn't explain the sequence.

Morbert

roosh wrote: »

those events don't move along the worldline; they are fixed, static, frozen, call it what you will; but they don't move along the worldline. There is also no transition from one event to the next, or one moment to the next; so, being only one iteration of self-perception, I should only experience one.

So, that event should only ever be me seeing the clock at 09:05, and that is the only iteration of self-perception I should experience; so I should only ever experience the universe and the clock at 09:05.

Essentially, and not just sequential in the sense of a very brief moment, as would be facilitated by a miniscule duration of a memory that would constitute a single event of self-perception in a worldline; but continually sequential from birth to our present age, and presumably to death.

How is it sequential, while also not sequential as would be necessitated if all moments, or iterations of self-perception, equally exist in a worldline; bearing in mind that the identical twin example only explains why we don't experience futre or past thoughts, it doesn't explain the sequence.

Correct, that event is only ever you seeing the clock at 09:05. However, what you are not considering is all the other events where you see the clock at all other times. The relation between these events, and their causal effects in the brain, are what build the narrative of a "transition".

roosh

Morbert wrote: »

Correct, that event is only ever you seeing the clock at 09:05. However, what you are not considering is all the other events where you see the clock at all other times. The relation between these events, and their causal effects in the brain, are what build the narrative of a "transition".

Correct, that event should only ever be me seeing the clock at 09:05, and that is the only iteration of self-perception I should experience; so I should only ever experience the universe and the clock at 09:05.


Can I take it you agree, so, that all "self-perception events" are frozen on an observers worldline, and that in the 3D world we should only experience one iteration of self-perception.

That your point is, essentially, that it is the collection of "self-perception events" that make up the narrative, which gives the illusion of a transition?

Masteroid

roosh wrote: »

Correct, that event should only ever be me seeing the clock at 09:05, and that is the only iteration of self-perception I should experience; so I should only ever experience the universe and the clock at 09:05.


Can I take it you agree, so, that all "self-perception events" are frozen on an observers worldline, and that in the 3D world we should only experience one iteration of self-perception.

That your point is, essentially, that it is the collection of "self-perception events" that make up the narrative, which gives the illusion of a transition?

I don't think that transition is an illusion.

Perception is a sampling process and an event, any event, is a process of energy exchange.

There are two categories of event, 'pushing events' and 'pulling events'.

Pushing events can be further divided into two categories, 'absorptive events' which cause a system to gain energy and 'emissive events' which cause a system to lose energy. For example, when a photon is absorbed by an electron. the photon exerts a pushing force on that electron whereas when an electron emits a photon, the electron exerts a pushing force on the photon. Or a speaker pushes the air and the air pushes the ear-drum.

Pulling events are characerized by enmeshed fields. Think of electrons and protons in atoms or of the earth orbiting the sun. The exchange of forces in pulling events occurs in 'secret' between the members of those systems.

And both types of event, pushing and pulling, affect a change in motion.

Perception is the process of sampling pushing events that occur in systems governed by pulling events. It is because the electron remains bound to the atom that it emits a photon.

By sampling events over time we can deduce transitions and thusly, detect motion. But we are not perceiving motion, we are perceiving events that take place on a moving object.

In a sense, perception is quantized as it relies on a sample-rate but the motion of that which is in motion is not quantized. A travelling photon does not move from point to point along its path, it travels through all the points along its path.

And it is the same for a planet or a galaxy.

What I can't seem to grasp is how an event that is frozen in time can either emit or absorb a photon. A frozen event would be without any dynamics, it would be unchangable and absolutely immune to entropy. How can entropy reign in a universe that is comprised entirely of frozen and unalterable events?

roosh

roosh wrote: »

Correct, that event should only ever be me seeing the clock at 09:05, and that is the only iteration of self-perception I should experience; so I should only ever experience the universe and the clock at 09:05.


Can I take it you agree, so, that all "self-perception events" are frozen on an observers worldline, and that in the 3D world we should only experience one iteration of self-perception.

That your point is, essentially, that it is the collection of "self-perception events" that make up the narrative, which gives the illusion of a transition?

OK, I'll take it that my summary of your position is accurate.

The issue, as has been stated, is that all "self-perception events" are frozen on an observers worldline, and we only ever have access to one of those "self-perception events", with all previous "SPEs" making up our memories - we don't need to get into the issue of the duration of a memory, or the neurons which correspond to a memory and how they wouldn't be sufficient to explain our observation of relative motion.

So, the SPE of me looking at the clock at 09:05 is frozen on my worldline; there is no transition to the, for the sake of argument, next SPE where the clock reads 09:06, or any subsequent SPEs. This means that my narrative should only have gone as far as 09:05, because I don't have access to the experiences of SPEs which are further along my worldline. But here I am, a couple of weeks later (?) a this stage, and the clock reads 23:31.

roosh

Masteroid wrote: »

I don't think that transition is an illusion.

Perception is a sampling process and an event, any event, is a process of energy exchange.

There are two categories of event, 'pushing events' and 'pulling events'.

Pushing events can be further divided into two categories, 'absorptive events' which cause a system to gain energy and 'emissive events' which cause a system to lose energy. For example, when a photon is absorbed by an electron. the photon exerts a pushing force on that electron whereas when an electron emits a photon, the electron exerts a pushing force on the photon. Or a speaker pushes the air and the air pushes the ear-drum.

Pulling events are characerized by enmeshed fields. Think of electrons and protons in atoms or of the earth orbiting the sun. The exchange of forces in pulling events occurs in 'secret' between the members of those systems.

And both types of event, pushing and pulling, affect a change in motion.

Perception is the process of sampling pushing events that occur in systems governed by pulling events. It is because the electron remains bound to the atom that it emits a photon.

By sampling events over time we can deduce transitions and thusly, detect motion. But we are not perceiving motion, we are perceiving events that take place on a moving object.

In a sense, perception is quantized as it relies on a sample-rate but the motion of that which is in motion is not quantized. A travelling photon does not move from point to point along its path, it travels through all the points along its path.

And it is the same for a planet or a galaxy.

What I can't seem to grasp is how an event that is frozen in time can either emit or absorb a photon. A frozen event would be without any dynamics, it would be unchangable and absolutely immune to entropy. How can entropy reign in a universe that is comprised entirely of frozen and unalterable events?

thanks masteroid, I'll have to read it a few times to see if I understand it fully.

Just to check that I've got the gist right, can it, broadly speaking, be taken that your post can be taken as an argument against the block universe?

Masteroid

roosh wrote: »

thanks masteroid, I'll have to read it a few times to see if I understand it fully.

Just to check that I've got the gist right, can it, broadly speaking, be taken that your post can be taken as an argument against the block universe?

Absolutely.

I just don't like all the infinities that the block-universe necessarily implies. Any path of an arbitrarily short length travelled by a photon can be divided into an infinite number of points. Is every point represented by an entire universe? For every photon that existed, that exists and that will exist in the future?

Then there is the process of perception. All perceptions are of past events. This is why I prefer to think of the present as being non-existent and entirely subjective. There are as many 'nows' as there are perceivers of now. So philosophically, you could say that the universe is different for everyone.

The thing is though, we do not perceive the universe, do we, we percieve events that occur as the universe unfolds. We don't perceive motion, we deduce it by comparing memories so we don't actually see the thing that is moving, we see the photons that either bounce of it or that are emitted from it.

In reality then, as well as philosophically, in the same way that two people might think that they are looking at the same rainbow but are actually perceiving different ones, different observers of the universe are perceiving an entirely different set of events.

As I said at the top, perceived events are always in the past and the more distant the observation, the older a percieved event will be. But perception is a two-part process, each perception is akin to an 'entangled' pair of events. In other words, by testing the state of absorbed photons we can say something about the state of the system that emitted them. So perception only occurs when the perceived event emits data that causes another event to occur when it is absorbed.

Now I haven't mentioned the avalanche of responses that are triggered through perception but it can easily be seen how one observed event can cause an infinite number of other events to occur as a result of perception. Think of a photo-multiplier or the plethora of responses that are invoked by observing a lion nearby.

So we have to think about what we mean by 'now'.

I would say that 'Now is the time that perception has an effect'. And, rather usefully to my position, that is all the time, continuously.

And perception needn't be a scanning system either, that would complicate things especially since many people would think that the sensory organ are scanning but they're not. Perception is more like a system of trip-wires and relies on local events causing change. I am defining 'now' as being the point in time when the trip wire can have an effect on the state of the system that utilises that effect.

And I can make it even simpler, now is the only time that the process of change can have an effect. (And I do hope we don't go down the rabbit-hole about how events predicted for the future can effect either the past or present.)

All of which leads us to the universal now. It's no different, the universe can only perceive change as it happens and furthermore, the universe perceives itself as it was and not as it is.

So perception allows us to sample events and make deductions about certain properties of the universe, it allows us to track changes in real time, as they happen. But perception only tracks changes to the perception system itself so because of limitations on speed of information, distance makes perception an inaccurate tool by way of which to manufacture 'now' for any large region of space.

As I said, on this basis, one could say that the process of perception is quantized but the motion of the thing we allocate as perceived is not what is perceived. The thing exists seperately from perception. You and I might observe the same blue car and you are collecting different photons than I am but those photons are bouncing of the same blue paint for both of us.

And I just realised, if both of us stood in front of and were hit by that car, the car would lose twice as much momentum than if it hit just you, it wouldn't be two different cars sharing our combined momentum.

We may well see two different rainbows but there is only one pot of gold.

And speaking of momentum and mass, this is another problem for me in a block-universe. Let's for a moment assume that human brains have evolved a mechanism that causes us to create a personal narrative by experiencing slices of the universe in order of expansion and without this mechanism, the universe is perceived as meaningless chaos.

Why should it be that there is a perfect correlation between the order of expansion and the unerring path of an object moving undisturbed through space to such an extent that we can derive a physics of relative motion?

If all slices of the universe exist at all the points in time and there is no preferred frame of reference, then why should any of physics come about? And how could each point in spacetime, and in each slice, encode things like velocity, direction, mass? How does one point in one slice of spacetime so closely resemble the same point in the previous slice of spacetime, so closely that it looks like the same point simply changing its position?

And we can't invoke momentum to rescue us from this extraordinary state of affairs. The time-frozen slice can't move so how can it transfer energy from one slice to another?

And where is the universe between slices? Stroking Schrodinger's cat, one presumes but doesn't a block-universe rule out uncertainty? If there is randomness that gives rise to the configuration of one slice and the randomness is almost identically organised in every single slice then it's not random, is it? Or uncertain. Randomness would reduce down to the equivalent of the white background that throws the organisation of the text of this post into stark relief. Random would just mean meaningless.

And all of this becomes more problematic if all the slices were created at the big bang, if an infinitely large universe were created at the same time as an infinitely small one then that's just too much for me and I have to draw a line.

Throw in a few more dimensions and it gets worse. How can each point in spacetime contain so much information about its counterpart in another slice?

I don't see why we can't just have three dimensions and thermodynamics, or what there is and its tendency to change. It's easier if things are actually moving, collisions and determinism etching the universe further into the future.

I think that the universe is spinning. That's why galaxies are shaped the way they are, they experienced a kind of coriolis effect early in their formation and that motion has subsequently been passed onto to all systems in creation.

I see the universe as a 'coherer' such as in a laser and that it is currently in the excitation state. At some point, all the stars in all the galaxies will come to a violent end. At that point the universe will be filled with gamma rays. Without going into the issue of black holes, most of the matter in the universe will have been converted into photons.

After another period of forever, 'holes' start to develop in the universe which photons have ceased to pass through. The universe is filled with a network of such holes that just keep expanding over time.

When enough time has passed, these holes overlap and then the universe becomes in a critical state. This 'super-hole' becomes a true void.

At the same time, all the photons, travelling away from this new void, have become so red-shifted that there is almost no difference in any of their wavelengths and they are aranged as a vast cloud forming a shell around the new void, which continues to grow.

This completes the excitation phase.

Now, from the perspective of the photons nearest to the void, the space behind it is colder than the space in front of it. Thermodynamics reigns so the photons start to drift back into the void. The photons that are closest to those drifting photons 'feel' a braking force and they too start to drift back.

A wave develops and almost all the photons begin their journey to the centre of the universe. The photons that are left continue to define the edge of the universe.

Entropy is reset and almost all the energy in the universe is focussed to a point and it is only after yet another period of forever, the energy arrives.

The first photons pass through the central point and impact with photons coming from the other direction. This causes a disturbance in the developing wave and symmetry is broken.

When there is a sufficient amount of energy at the centre of the void, thermodynamics changes its mind again, there is a big bang and entropy begins its countdown again.

And the breaking of symmetry causes the universe to have 'spin'.

Why can't it be as simple as that, the universe is just a vast laser beam that fires off a blast of energy every five forevers or so?

I think we could measure things like this.

Morbert

roosh wrote: »

Correct, that event should only ever be me seeing the clock at 09:05, and that is the only iteration of self-perception I should experience; so I should only ever experience the universe and the clock at 09:05.


Can I take it you agree, so, that all "self-perception events" are frozen on an observers worldline, and that in the 3D world we should only experience one iteration of self-perception.

That your point is, essentially, that it is the collection of "self-perception events" that make up the narrative, which gives the illusion of a transition?

More or less, yes.

roosh

Morbert wrote: »

More or less, yes.

Cool, I posted a reply on that basis; I'll just link to it instead of re-writing it.

Masteroid

Morbert wrote: »

More or less, yes.

And yet it moves.

Masteroid

To try another approach then.

Think of a balloon in the process of being inflated. Imagine that its internal pressure is increasing at a constant rate.

In this situation, the volume of the balloon will always lag the internal pressure. Pressure causes expansion therefore pressure comes before expansion. When the rate of increase of internal pressure goes to zero, the volume of the balloon will continue to increase until equillibrium is acheived.

This 'lag' is the 'aperture' through which change takes place. The difference between the intenal pressure of the balloon and the tension of the skin is converted to motion causing the skin to move away from a central point.

But there is more than one way to inflate a balloon. Instead of increasing the internal pressure, we could decrease the external pressure.

When we do that, we change the dynamics. Now, the internal pressure of the ballon will lag the volume. As the surface of the balloon is 'pulled' away from the centre, the internal pressure decreases and again, when the change in external pressure is zero, the internal pressure will continue to drop until it finds itself in equillibrium.

The universe behaves like the second example. The true void pulls at the surface of the universe and it expands. This causes a thermal gradient at the universe's edge and the internal energy of the universe attempts to remove that gradient. This result in motion of all the internal systems of the universe as the gradient itself becomes transferred to the rest of the universe.

This equalisation process is the cause of change and occurs only now. The external pressure does not fluctuate and, therefore, nor does the gradient.

Furthermore, any point in the universe can consider itself as a universe in itself since all points surrounding it are moving away from it. It moves.

So expansion, an event, is the universal now, the equalisation process, an event, is the perceived now. At any one time there are just two simultaneous events in the universe, the universal now and the perceived now and the second lags the first such as to be slightly out of sync with it. There is 'latency' between input and output

It is from these two events that past, present and future are derived and thusly:


From the point of view of the 'universal now', the 'perceived now' is the past, the 'universal now' is the present and its future is uncertain.

From the point of view of the 'perceived now', the 'universal now' is the future, the 'perceived now' is the present and its past is uncertain.

The two events, between them, encode the past, present and the future.

Two simultaneous events that define the process of change, a change that occurs at the edge of the universe which seems to be everywhere.

Perception is as close to the edge of the universe as we will ever get.

To conclude then, the edge of the universe is in 'absolute motion' and the energy of that motion is imparted to all the systems within the universe during the process of equalisation.

Therefore, everything must move.

roosh

roosh wrote: »

OK, I'll take it that my summary of your position is accurate.

The issue, as has been stated, is that all "self-perception events" are frozen on an observers worldline, and we only ever have access to one of those "self-perception events", with all previous "SPEs" making up our memories - we don't need to get into the issue of the duration of a memory, or the neurons which correspond to a memory and how they wouldn't be sufficient to explain our observation of relative motion.

So, the SPE of me looking at the clock at 09:05 is frozen on my worldline; there is no transition to the, for the sake of argument, next SPE where the clock reads 09:06, or any subsequent SPEs. This means that my narrative should only have gone as far as 09:05, because I don't have access to the experiences of SPEs which are further along my worldline. But here I am, a couple of weeks later (?) a this stage, and the clock reads 23:31.

Just wanted to bump this post, in case it was missed.

Masteroid

roosh wrote: »

Just wanted to bump this post, in case it was missed.

I'm not sure why you're holding on to this.

I don't want to put words in Morbet's mouth here, and I'm sure he'll tell me if he thinks I'm out of line, but I'd like to try and clarify Morbet's position regarding SPE's as I see it in part.

But first I would like to point out that events that are 'modified' as you move along your world-line include yourself as in your consciousness, your perceived self.

Instead of thinking of points along your world-line as 'frozen events', think of each event as being an 'input/output' device. It works like this.

Imagine the series of events as a line going left to right, past to future, and each event as an I/O device with its input to the left and its output to the right.

The data that appears at the 'input' of each device is the configuration of the event 'now', which was determined in the past.

The input is processed through the device where a metric is applied and the new configuration appears at the 'output', the event in a different configuration.

And we perceive each configuration as it is 'appears at the output'.

So, now we can arrange your world-line, left to right, as what you perceive as the sequence of events you experience in your lifetime.

You can think of this line of I/O devices as being perfectly interlocking pieces that have a relationship with each other.

But let's examine this relationship.

If we think of each slice as a computerised process it would go something like:

A reading device at the input records the data generated by another device.

The gathered data is processed through an algorithm and a hard copy of the new dat is generated at the output.'

And let's just say for the sake of argument that perception is the 'error-checking mechanism that compares the input and output to ensure correct 'tracking' and detect errors in the process.

Now we're all set.

The only 'real' data that exists is at the output. The input data is only in hard copy in the previous slice which is, in effect, 'read from'.

Replace the error-checking mechanism with your 'self'.

Now, the only universe that you can perceive is the one that you generate. If you were called as a witness in some sort of cosmic trial, the only 'hard evidence' that you have is the 'hard copy' you generated.

That and the algorithm that resulted in the hard copy.

If we take the hard copy then 'un-apply' the algorithm we can generate the data that appeared at the input.

Now, this wouldn't be quite as good as a hard copy since there is always the possibility of a 'read error' that does not get picked up but it is tantamount to having two sets of data plus the algorithm that determined the output. A kind of compression, if you will.

The thing is, all of these hard copies appear as points along your world-line. They are all that you can perceive as 'real'. The 'outputs'.

But each self can produce a 'memory' of the previous configuration. This is how 'sense' and 'reason' are manufactured.

'You' are the error checking mechanism here. Your world-line is the continuous record of your satisfaction that the past has become the present.

Your consciousness is a series of 'ticks' in the 'Conversion Successful!' column. Your 'self' perceives the 'outcome of change' and not 'the process of change'.

Each 'self' can construct its previous 'self' but that is a deductive process.

Each self does construct its previous self and 'deduces' that he is the same self but different. He then 'deduces' that change must take place between 'then' and 'now' in order for him to be different and he does this because he is unaware that it is 'self' that 'deduced' the difference.

And all 'selfs' do it. Its 'now' that does the changing, not some other process between then and now.

Anyway, we constructed a world-line consisting of points that represent all the events you can experience and then we referred to each point as being one instance of 'self' or, if you like, an 'SPE'.

Each SPE instinctively deduces a direct relationship with a past event, that it itself changed from something that it was into what it is.

But it didn't did it?

The SPE itself compared an input to an output and then constructed a curve that represented 'change' when it should have been plotting points that represented 'difference'.

'You' are an event that is caused by the difference that exists between two states, different 'difference', different 'you'.

'Self' is not placed between two event, 'self' is what emerges from two simtaneous views of 'self', one 'real', one 'deduced'.

Do you see that?

Hopefully it is much easier to see how your world-line constructs its narrative.

Each 'self' contains information about a previous 'self'. And the 'self' before that can construct the previous one, and so on. It's like a map that leads you from one place to the next where there is information about where to go next. No matter where you choose to reference your world-line, it is possible to construct your entire past up to that point.

And that is what 'consciousness', 'self' does. It constructs memories based on the past and makes them manifest systems that exist in 'reality'.

Each 'self' has access to this 'system' and can incorrectly deduce a process of change as opposed to a succession of differences. But we have memories of the past.

If you understand how the FAT 32 file system worked and how it enabled large files to be constructed from different fragments of the disk by recording information about the next entry in the current one?

Although time appears to go backward in this analogy, no matter which part of a fragmented file you start at, you can construct the rest of the file from that point to the end. You can construct the file in a forward direction but you can't do it backwards.

As far as your world-line is concerned, it doesn't make a difference if time goes forward, backward or indeed, whether it exists at all.

Even if time were to go backward, the only way to construct a narrative is by compare 'now' with the true past as determined by the encoded algorithm. Even if life were to start from death, our 'selfs' would simply go through a process of 'forgetting the future' but still being to construct their entire past. A young man wouldn't remember being old but he will be able to recall his schooldays.

Time doesn't come into it. Even if time stopped, you would deduce that you have a past and a future that is uncertain.

The future is uncertain because your 'now self' doesn't have information about the algorithm used by your 'future self'.

We can't 'deduce' the future but by assuming that algorithms make some kind of sense, we can make predictions about what our future selves can experience.

But we don't 'know' until we get there.

So I hope that you can see that there is a way of viewing the universe in terms of 'snapshots' and that world-lines are a collection of points that represent 'different' sets of events rather a set of events that undergo change.

I hope you can see how the narrative is generated by the existence of 'self' and that 'self' is an emergent property of each point on a world-line. That each point represents a unique set of events that give rise to the existence of 'you'. Each set of events produces a different 'you' since it is the difference between events that produces 'you'.

And obviously you can see how motion is the result of a deduction using memory and reason.

We don't perceive motion, we perceive events caused by the thing we deduce to be in motion.

I said more than I intended to here but replacing the 'flow of change' with 'the difference between two sets of events' is no different to replacing 'wave-physics' with 'particle-physics'.

Ultimately they are two different devices that can be used to describe (differently) the same phenomena.

None of this addresses to subject of absolute motion and really your argument with Morbet is a red-herring.

I think you would be better served by trying to pin down what constitutes an 'event' and whether an event can occur in the absence of actual motion rather than try (unsuccessfully) to detract from the scientific validity of Morbet's contributions.

Sorry, I didn't mean to go on.