School patronage

Peregrinus

recedite wrote: »

In some previous cases involving clerical abuse, the RCC denied that there was an employer/employee relationship between individual priests and the church. So they can't have it both ways. Whether or not their view is legally correct, it could easily be written into legislation that a religious organisation does not discriminate when it selects candidates for ordination based on their gender or personal "ethos".

Well, it could easily be written in, but legislation purporting to tell churches and similar bodies who to ordain to ministry would certainly be struck down by the Supreme Court as being in violation of Article 44.2.1 of the Constitution (“Freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion”) and Article 44.2.5 (”Every religious denomination shall have the right to manage its own affairs”). And even if, by distributing enough cash-stuffed brown envelopes you managed to surmount that hurdle, the ECHR would be bound to spot the incompatibility of the law with Article 9 of the Convention.

recedite wrote: »

However being realistic, this is a Labour party guy, working apparently off his own bat, to try to make some difference. After he finishes his proposals they will be voted on in the Dail or Seanad, at which time they will also need Fine Gael support to succeed.
He is a former teacher, so he must have some insight into this. In general he seems a competent guy, so I'm hopeful he will come up with something worthwhile.

No, he’s not doing this off his own bat. He’s Minister of State at the Department of Justice and Equality, which is the Department which administers the Employment Equality Act. This will not be a private member’s bill; it will be a government bill, and barring a startling change in policy it will pass. But that also means that there will be a consultation process with affected parties beforehand, so the churches (as well as the teacher’s unions) will get to have their say before the draft bill is finalised.

recedite

Peregrinus wrote: »

..the ECHR would be bound to spot the incompatibility of the law with Article 9 of the Convention.

I think you may have misread my post. I said "does not discriminate". An exception to equality legislation is justifiable for the hiring of actual clerics, that is, if they are to be considered "employees" which in itself is not clear.
But in order to cover any possible legal objection from church authorities, seeking to undermine the proposed legislation, this one exception would have to be specified.

Peregrinus

My apologies; I did misread you.

I think, though, you'd have difficulty in confining the exception to cases where a religion "ordains" someone. Not all religions have a concept of "ordination"; Islam doesn't for instance, and I think there's a number of Christian denominations that would be uncomfortable with the term.

The other problem is why confine this to "ordained" ministers or their analogues in other religious traditions? If a church is appointing someone to a role which involves both teaching and modelling the ethical standards of the religion, then trying to legislate that they cannot take account of obviously relevant criteria, like what the candidates believe and how they live, is I think problematic, both constitutionally and under the Convention.

Having said that, the state could certainly do a lot more to protect teachers than in fact it does. It's just a question of drawing a line that protects the widest class of church employees/appointees, but will still pass constitutional muster. Tricky, but it shouldn't be impossible. But my guess is that the state will err on the side of caution here. The last thing they want is to pass a law that is acceptable to the unions, that is then struck down by the Supreme Court on constitutional grounds. They would immediately be faced with demands for a referendum to amend Article 44, and they'd rather have red hot pokers driven through their eyeballs.

recedite

Peregrinus wrote: »

The other problem is why confine this to "ordained" ministers or their analogues in other religious traditions? If a church is appointing someone to a role which involves both teaching and modelling the ethical standards of the religion, then trying to legislate that they cannot take account of obviously relevant criteria, like what the candidates believe and how they live, is I think problematic, both constitutionally and under the Convention.

Essentially that's what we have now. So either we want to change and move forward or we don't. I don't envisage any constitutional or human rights problem with moving forward; the opposite in fact. Article 44 says;

Freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion are, subject to public order and morality, guaranteed to every citizen

So in the case of an employee, they should be free to follow their own conscience, and not be forced to live according to their employer's morality.

When I loosely said "ordained" I meant anybody who is joining an organisation purely as a religious vocation. So you are right, that is not really the right word. Anyway I mean to include nuns and Islamic clerics etc so long as their "job" is simply to pray and to promote their religion.
I do not mean to include a cleric or a nun who is teaching any subject other than "religious instruction", or a nun working in the health service. Because then they are considered to be employees as well as nuns, and would be subject to the equality legislation in their capacity as employees.
Nobody would be interfering with their ability to practice their religion.
The state interference would only be concerned with the hiring and firing of staff where the job was not solely "the practicing of a religion"

Peregrinus

recedite wrote: »

When I loosely said "ordained" I meant anybody who is joining an organisation purely as a religious vocation. So you are right, that is not really the right word. Anyway I mean to include nuns and Islamic clerics etc so long as their "job" is simply to pray and to promote their religion.

The main job of an imam is in fact to teach. Same goes for a rabbi - in fact, the word "rabbi" means "teacher".

With a Christian background, we tend to think ministry =/= priesthood (i.e. leading worship, offering sacrifice). That's not generally true, though. It's not even generally true within Christianity.

recedite wrote: »

I do not mean to include a cleric or a nun who is teaching any subject other than "religious instruction", or a nun working in the health service. Because then they are considered to be employees as well as nuns, and would be subject to the equality legislation in their capacity as employees.
Nobody would be interfering with their ability to practice their religion.
The state interference would only be concerned with the hiring and firing of staff where the job was not solely "the practicing of a religion"

See, the thing is, if a religion has an ethical dimension - i.e. it has implications for how you live - then everything you do is "practising your religion", including the conduct of all your relationships, including your employment relationships. And pretty well all the religious traditions we meet in Ireland do have an ethical dimension. A Catholic school doesn't aim to be a school that teaches about Catholicism for 40 minutes 4 days a week; it aims to be a school which creates an intentional Catholic community in which every aspect of school life is informed by the values of the gospel. All of the teachers are equally involved in this project. There's clearly a tension between the right of the individual teacher to live and act in accordance with his or her own religious or conscientious convictions, and the right of those who manage the school to practice their religion by attempting to build and lead a community of people committed to living and acting in accordance with the gospel.

I'm not saying that individual teachers already have all the rights in this regard that they are ever going to; far from it. But I am saying that an approach to reconciling this tension which assumes that the role of religion in a school is confined to what happens in the religious instruction class is an unsound approach. It artificially and arbitrarily confines the kinds of practice of religion that are protected, and there is nothing in the cases, either in the Irish courts or in the European courts, to suggest that such an approach will stand up to scrutiny.

recedite

Peregrinus wrote: »

There's clearly a tension between the right of the individual teacher to live and act in accordance with his or her own religious or conscientious convictions, and the right of those who manage the school to practice their religion by attempting to build and lead a community of people committed to living and acting in accordance with the gospel.

I don't see that as practicing a religion, I see it as spreading a religion.
Clearly spreading the religion is a big part of the job specification for most clergy, but that is something they do in addition to practicing their religion.
That is also a human right, but it comes under "freedom of speech". The right to practice your religion is a different human right.

The teachers have their own right to follow their own conscience.

Other people also have rights, such as the right not to be hassled by preaching/proselytizing. In this context I refer you to the "teach don't preach" aspect of the Toledo guiding principles which IMO should apply to all state funded schools.
In the case of a private denominational school where people have freely chosen that ethos, they can of course agree to be preached at; that is also their right.

There is nothing to stop people attempting to form their own little private community with its own religious rules, so long as they comply fully with state/civil laws.
Similarly a white supremacist group could attempt to set up their own community, but as soon as they tried to stop a black person from moving into the area, or prevented a black person from gaining employment in the area, they would fall foul of civil law.

Basically you are entitled to believe whatever you want, but you are not entitled to impose those beliefs on others.

Even if all the exemptions to equality legislation for religious schools are removed, it will still be difficult for an openly LGBT teacher to get employment at such a school. The proposed legislation will do more to protect those who are already employed, but are forced stay in the closet or to keep a low profile.
A homophobic employer can't be forced to employ a gay person any more than a racist one can be forced to employ a black person. But what the law can do is to force the homophobe or racist into the closet, instead of the other way round. Then the bigot would have to make up some other excuse for not employing the person.
But at least then the law is attempting to apply justice uniformly, as opposed to granting an "exemption" from justice to certain employers.

The other ridiculous aspect to all this is that the State is really the employer in a state funded denominational school. The Patron is more like manager.

Peregrinus

recedite wrote: »

I don't see that as practicing a religion, I see it as spreading a religion.

First of all, there’s a false dichotomy there. Why can’t spreading a religion be practising a religion? Indeed, in the case of missionary religions - of which Christianity is the most notable example - isn’t spreading the religion almost by definition an aspect of practising it?

But, secondly, I doubt that you will find many who agree with you that simply by practising their religion collectively rather than individually people have crossed a line into “spreading their religion”.

recedite wrote: »

Clearly spreading the religion is a big part of the job specification for most clergy, but that is something they do in addition to practicing their religion.

Wrong on two counts, for the reason already stated. In a missionary religion, spreading the religion is something all followers are involved with, not just professional clerics. And it most emphatically is not something done “in addition to” practising the religion.

recedite wrote: »

That is also a human right, but it comes under "freedom of speech". The right to practice your religion is a different human right.

Why does it have to be one or the other? Why can’t a particular activity be protected under more than one heading?

recedite wrote: »

The teachers have their own right to follow their own conscience.

Of course. What we have here is a tension between competing rights, in a context where we recognise the validity of both the rights asserted, and we need to work out some kind of compromise of that tension.

recedite wrote: »

Other people also have rights, such as the right not to be hassled by preaching/proselytizing. In this context I refer you to the "teach don't preach" aspect of the Toledo guiding principles which IMO should apply to all state funded schools.
In the case of a private denominational school where people have freely chosen that ethos, they can of course agree to be preached at; that is also their right.

As long as we’re addressing this in terms of human rights, I think the state-funded versus not state-funded dichotomy is a red herring. If it’s a breach of my human rights to be, e.g., fired because I’m pregnant outside of marriage, then I really don’t see that it ceases to be so if my employer is not state-funded. Are publicly-funded employees “more human” than privately-funded employees, such that they have a greater array of rights enjoying a higher degree of protection? And, remember, what we’re talking about here is an amendment to the employment equality legislation, which in all other respects applies to public-sector and private-sector employers alike. So I’d be very wary of a solution here which distinguishes between state-funded and privately-funded institutions, and only protects the rights of teachers in state-funded schools. I think you give away some of your strongest arguments if you concede that that might be acceptable.

recedite wrote: »

There is nothing to stop people attempting to form their own little private community with its own religious rules, so long as they comply fully with state/civil laws.
Similarly a white supremacist group could attempt to set up their own community, but as soon as they tried to stop a black person from moving into the area, or prevented a black person from gaining employment in the area, they would fall foul of civil law.

Sure, but the analogy isn’t exact. A religious school isn’t saying that a person who is, e.g., openly living in a civil union with a same-sex partner shouldn’t move into the neighbourhood, or take employment in the neighbourhood; they’re saying that such a person can’t join the school community as a teacher.

recedite wrote: »

Basically you are entitled to believe whatever you want, but you are not entitled to impose those beliefs on others.

But isn’t demanding that somebody admit you into their community, when you do not accept the beliefs and practices which the community aims to embody, and in fact adhere to and practice antithetical beliefs and practices “imposing their beliefs on others”?

recedite wrote: »

Even if all the exemptions to equality legislation for religious schools are removed, it will still be difficult for an openly LGBT teacher to get employment at such a school. The proposed legislation will do more to protect those who are already employed, but are forced stay in the closet or to keep a low profile.
A homophobic employer can't be forced to employ a gay person any more than a racist one can be forced to employ a black person. But what the law can do is to force the homophobe or racist into the closet, instead of the other way round. Then the bigot would have to make up some other excuse for not employing the person.

I agree. And, in fact, this is a general weakness with employment discrimination legislation. The proportion of successful discrimination cases which are taken in relation to hiring decisions is extremely small; in the context of a competition to fill a position, it is usually easy to “disguise” a selection made on some protected ground as a selection made on some entirely proper ground, such as greater experience, better qualifications or a more convincing performance at interview. Employment discrimination legislation is much more effective at protecting people who are in employment than it is in protecting people who are seeking employment; I think that’s just the nature of the beast. To eliminate discrimination in hiring practices you can’t rely on rules and enforcement; you really need to change attitudes. (And I think anti-discrimination may have an indirect effect there.)

recedite wrote: »

The other ridiculous aspect to all this is that the State is really the employer in a state funded denominational school. The Patron is more like manager.

Well, possibly. But, as I say, I think that’s a bit of a red herring in a rights-based discourse.

recedite

Peregrinus wrote: »

First of all, there’s a false dichotomy there. Why can’t spreading a religion be practising a religion? Indeed, in the case of missionary religions - of which Christianity is the most notable example - isn’t spreading the religion almost by definition an aspect of practising it?

Spreading the religion is something that affects other people, and those other people have the right to be left alone, if they choose.
So it could very well be that "to practice the religion" involves knocking on other peoples doors every day to proselytize at them, or maybe slaughtering a sheep in the bathtub every Friday night. But these aspects of the religion can be illegal because they affect other people or break other laws, whereas quietly practicing your religion without bothering anyone else is never illegal. That aspect is always protected by the law.

Peregrinus wrote: »

As long as we’re addressing this in terms of human rights, I think the state-funded versus not state-funded dichotomy is a red herring. If it’s a breach of my human rights to be, e.g., fired because I’m pregnant outside of marriage, then I really don’t see that it ceases to be so if my employer is not state-funded. Are publicly-funded employees “more human” than privately-funded employees, such that they have a greater array of rights enjoying a higher degree of protection?

.. A religious school isn’t saying that a person who is, e.g., openly living in a civil union with a same-sex partner shouldn’t move into the neighbourhood, or take employment in the neighbourhood; they’re saying that such a person can’t join the school community as a teacher.

The State, and any publicly funded body, has a higher bar to achieve than a private club in terms of equality.
For example, the owner/boss of a private company can hire his/her son or daughter in preference to an equally qualified stranger. The boss of a department in a public body cannot.

Your own argument is that an openly gay teacher can't force a private club or community with its own ethos to employ them. This argument is based on "freedom of association" as a human right.
While there is some merit in this argument, it ceases to apply once the institution is "open to the public" generally. If the institution is open to the public and also publicly funded, the very highest level of equality must apply.

Peregrinus

recedite wrote: »

Spreading the religion is something that affects other people, and those other people have the right to be left alone, if they choose.
So it could very well be that "to practice the religion" involves knocking on other peoples doors every day to proselytize at them, or maybe slaughtering a sheep in the bathtub every Friday night. But these aspects of the religion can be illegal because they affect other people or break other laws, whereas quietly practicing your religion without bothering anyone else is never illegal. That aspect is always protected by the law.

You’re offering a very watered-down version of freedom of religion there, recedite; you can practice your religion quietly without bothering anybody. Would you accept that version of freedom of speech? No, didn’t think so. Neither would I.

You’re absolutely right that freedom of religion (or any other fundamental freedom) can be in tension with somebody else’s rights and freedoms, and when that happens we have to develop some basis for negotiating the tension in some way. But you’re suggesting that freedom of religion has to give way to someone else’s “right to be left along”. I don’t really think that will stand up; the right to be left alone doesn’t feature in many of the classic statements of human rights.

And, even if we did accept that rather subordinate position for freedom of religion vis-a-vis other rights and freedoms, I don’t think it would get you where you want to be on this issue. If I form a community which is open only to, say, straight people and you happen to be gay and are not eligible for membership, you can’t object to this on the grounds that it infringes your right to be left alone. I haven’t approached you at all. You won’t be affected by my exclusionary rule unless you choose to apply for membership, but you are under no obligation to apply. Similarly, nobody is required to apply for employment in a religious institution, and it’s hard to see how the restrictive employment practices of such institutions infringe anybody’s right to be let alone.

recedite wrote: »

The State, and any publicly funded body, has a higher bar to achieve than a private club in terms of equality.
For example, the owner/boss of a private company can hire his/her son or daughter in preference to an equally qualified stranger. The boss of a department in a public body cannot.

Your own argument is that an openly gay teacher can't force a private club or community with its own ethos to employ them. This argument is based on "freedom of association" as a human right.

While there is some merit in this argument, it ceases to apply once the institution is "open to the public" generally. If the institution is open to the public and also publicly funded, the very highest level of equality must apply.

Is the logic of your argument that if a private employer wishes to discriminate on the grounds of gender, disability, national origin, age, etc that’s OK, because he’s not publicly-funded and shouldn’t be held to the higher standards of equality appropriate to publicly-funded institutions? Is there a reason for treating religion differently from other grounds of discrimination?

(I should say that it’s not my argument that a private institution should be free to refuse to employ gay people. I very much want to make the opposite argument. It’s just that I’m looking for a coherent and defensible basis for doing so.)

recedite

Peregrinus wrote: »

Is the logic of your argument that if a private employer wishes to discriminate on the grounds of gender, disability, national origin, age, etc that’s OK, because he’s not publicly-funded and shouldn’t be held to the higher standards of equality appropriate to publicly-funded institutions?

No, because the most private employers are covered by the Equal Status Act which prohibits discrimination on nine specific grounds (mostly to do with race, religion,and sexuality/marital status and disability) Religious ethos schools are exempt, which seems to be the aspect of the legislation that is up for change.
Beyond these nine specified grounds, a private employer might use "positive discrimination" on other grounds when hiring, such as familial relationship to the boss, or being in the same sports club, which would not be acceptable when hiring for a public sector job.

Peregrinus wrote: »

If I form a community which is open only to, say, straight people and you happen to be gay and are not eligible for membership, you can’t object to this on the grounds that it infringes your right to be left alone. I haven’t approached you at all. You won’t be affected by my exclusionary rule unless you choose to apply for membership, but you are under no obligation to apply. Similarly, nobody is required to apply for employment in a religious institution, and it’s hard to see how the restrictive employment practices of such institutions infringe anybody’s right to be let alone.

That is the argument put forward by religious schools alright, which has allowed them to gain the exemption to equality legislation in the past.
But.... the Equal Status Acts apply to employers providing goods and services (including education) to the public. There are different rules for "private clubs" such that they are allowed to restrict membership to their own group. The scam that the religious communities have been perpetrating involves the mixing and matching of these two different scenarios, at will.
For example, you could start a private club for straight white men; no gays or blacks allowed. But the club can't sell any goods and services. All it can offer is the chance to sit around and "associate" with like minded people. So it could not be a guesthouse, a gym, a school, or even a golf club. Having said that, Malahide Golf Club successfully excluded females as full members on the basis that it was a private club for "male golfers" but IMO that was a wrong decision, and it was opposed by equality officers. The service they sell is golf; its not just a place where male golfers go to "fraternise".

Similarly, an order of monks could live according to their own ethos. They could discriminate while recruiting new members ("religious training" is a specified exemption) However, if they started brewing and selling beer, then they would become subject to equality legislation, because then they would be selling a product to the general public.
But unlike the straight white mens club, the monks could actually open a school with full discriminatory policies, because a religious community can (currently) avail of a special exemption from equality rules when operating a school. And what's more, any teachers employed at the school would be on the state payroll while operating under this discriminatory regime. That is the problem with the current laws.

Personally I think if religious communities are going to be granted an exemption to equality legislation for the provision of a service to the public, it should be for managing breweries instead of schools.
Lets get them doing something useful

Peregrinus

Well, you raise an interesting point there, because of course there are monastic communities which sell goods and services of one kind or another to the public - plenty of them. And nobody suggests (or, I think, would suggest) that because of this they are bound to admit people of a different sex, or a different religion, as members of the community.

Plus, I think there’s a distinction between providing education to the public (which all schools, including private schools, do) and being state-funded. If your test for applying full employment equality obligations is “provides services to the public”, then I think you’d be applying it to all schools, not just state-funded schools.

Possibly the way to square this particular circle is to stop thinking of this in terms of the employment equality legislation, and to think of it in terms of educational funding. Let it continue to be perfectly lawful for a religious institution to continue to employ religious and/or lifestyle tests in its employment decisions in order to maintain its ethos, but make it a condition for all schools wishing to receive public funding that they should not discriminate on the grounds of marital status, sexual orientation, etc, (or that they should only be allowed to do so for certain posts, e.g. teacher of religion, principal, provision of pastoral care - you could argue about exactly how far this residual exemption could go).

The great bulk of schools, I think, would have little option but to sign up; they simply wouldn’t be viable without public funding.

It wouldn’t be an ideal solution, because it would leave a small minority of unfunded schools where teachers still enjoyed no protection, and employees of other religious institutions, not schools, would be unprotected. Plus, the gay/unmarried/whatever teacher would still be at some disadvantage; there would be certain posts to which he or she could not aspire, which limits career options. Still, it would be better than the current position.

recedite

Peregrinus wrote: »

..employees of other religious institutions, not schools, would be unprotected.

Under the current system, they have more protection. The schools are the only institutions offering a service to the public that have the exemption to equality legislation.

Also bear in mind that an exemption applies for the selection of individuals being recruited for any religious training. This is unconnected with the schools exemption. So taking the example of a monastic community, they could refuse to admit a gay candidate to their monastic community. But if they headed up a large brewery staffed by workers who were trained not as monks, but as technicians etc. then equality legislation would apply to those "lay" workers. I don't see a problem with this set up.

Now, transferring the same logic to the teaching profession, is there any reason that lay teachers should not receive the protection of equality legislation, other than to protect the bigoted stance of their employer?
(their so-called employer, given that they are actually on the state payroll)

On the (separate) question of public funding, no institution that operates a policy of religious discrimination should receive public funding, regardless of whether it is a school or a private club. That should go without saying, but unfortunately that is not the situation at present.

Peregrinus

recedite wrote: »

Under the current system, they have more protection. The schools are the only institutions offering a service to the public that have the exemption to equality legislation.

No, they're not. The exemption we're talking about here is found in Employment Equality Act 1998 s. 37; it applies to any "religious, educational or medical institution which is under the direction or control of a body established for religious purposes or whose objectives include the provision of services in an environment which promotes certain religious values".

recedite wrote: »

Also bear in mind that an exemption applies for the selection of individuals being recruited for any religious training. This is unconnected with the schools exemption. So taking the example of a monastic community, they could refuse to admit a gay candidate to their monastic community. . . .

Actually, that would be a different exemption. Members and potential members of religious communities are not "employees", and the Employment Equality Act doesn't apply at all, so they wouldn't need an exemption from it.

recedite wrote: »

. . . .But if they headed up a large brewery staffed by workers who were trained not as monks, but as technicians etc. then equality legislation would apply to those "lay" workers. I don't see a problem with this set up.

Now, transferring the same logic to the teaching profession, is there any reason that lay teachers should not receive the protection of equality legislation, other than to protect the bigoted stance of their employer?

The s. 37 allows the religions, educational and medical institutions that it applies to do two things:

1. Give more favourable treatment on the religion ground to one employee (or candidate) over another. So a Catholic school can prefer, e.g. the Catholic candidate for the principal's position over the non-Catholic candidate. But this only authorises discrimination on the religion ground, not discrimination based on gender, sexual orientation, marital status or any other protected ground.

2. "Take action which is reasonably necessary to prevent an employee or a prospective employee from undermining the religious ethos of the institution". This is wider, and it's the one they have to rely on if they want to, e.g., dismiss a teacher who has become pregant outside of marriage, or who enters a same-sex civil union. What they need to argue is that whatever they are doing is "reasonably necessary" to maintaing the religious ethos of the institution. You can see how the teachers have a role in maintaining the ethos of a school which is greater than the role the fork-lift operators, say, have in maintaining the ethos of a monastic brewery. So, no, the cases are not on all fours as far as the legislation goes.

recedite

The exemptions I was referring to were for the Equal Status Acts 2000-2008 which were introduced to take account of aspects of EU human rights law and EU directives that may not have been covered by earlier legislation. So I would imagine that those 1998 laws are trumped by these newer laws. Not being a lawyer, I can't say definitively though. More info on law at www.equality.ie Anyway I prefer to talk about what the legal situation should be.

Take the gay forklift driver. If he is swanning around the brewery wearing only a pair of leather shorts, and flying a rainbow flag from his forklift, the monks might say he is impacting on the ethos of their enterpise.

A teacher is no different really. Your argument seems to be that a teacher is different in that they are in a position to directly spread the religion by indoctrinating kids. My response to that is they should not receive public funding if that is their intention.

Why not start up an order of teaching monks. They could be called "The Christian Brothers". The faithful supporters from among the population could fund them privately, and they could teach whatever they liked (in addition to the basic minimum educational curriculum as required by dept of education). The rest of us would be free to just ignore them.

Peregrinus

Equality legislation in Ireland is set out in two separate acts; the Employment Equality Act, which deals with equality in employment relationships, and the Equal Status Act, which deals with equality in other areas of life.

The reasons for this are partly historical (we had employment equality legislation decades before we had the wider legislation) and partly practical (employment is already a highly regulated environment with procedures for resolving disputes, enforcement mechanisms, etc, and it makes sense that employment equality legislation should dovetail with all this).

An institution like a school is affected by both Acts. When it comes to hiring, promoting or disciplining staff, the Employment Equality Act (and any exemptions contained in it) applies, but in relation to, e.g., setting admission criteria for students, it’s the Equal Status Act (and its exemptions) that applies.

The current proposal by the Government is to amend the Employment Equality Act.

With regard to the gay forklift driver in the leather hot pants and the rainbow flag mesh singlet*, I take your point; he could be affecting the ethos of the institution for which he works, and disciplinary action against him might possibly be something arguably protected by the s. 37 exemption. But, really, for someone like a fork-lift driver, behaviour which is egregious enough to affect the ethos of the employing institution would probably be something that could be disciplined even without relying on s. 37. Most employers would consider that presentation at work something that would justify some intervention, and I think most employment tribunals would agree with them.

Be that as it may, a teacher in a school clearly contributes to the creation and maintenance of the school’s ethos in a much more profound way than a forklift driver in a brewery does. Any argument which proceeds on the basis that the two employees are on all fours as regards their significance to and impact on ethos is going to fail because nobody will take it seriously.

My argument is absolutely not “that a teacher is different in that they are in a position to directly spread the religion by indoctrinating kids”. I haven’t said anything of the kind. I’ve said that the role of a teacher in a religious school involves both teaching and modelling the ethical standards of the religion concerned. If you want to argue that the state should not be involved in funding schools which inculcate ethical standards, go ahead, but appreciate that this will imply that there must be no funding for any school of any description. If, on the other hand, you want to argue that the state should fund the inculcation of ethical standards held on non-religious grounds but not those held on religious grounds, I will be interested and possibly amused to read your argument, and I will be fascinated if you can point to any state anywhere in the world which actually does as you suggest. But, until you make the argument, you can hardly ask me to accept it.

* [I’ve said too much, haven’t I?]

recedite

Peregrinus wrote: »

If, on the other hand, you want to argue that the state should fund the inculcation of ethical standards held on non-religious grounds but not those held on religious grounds, I will be interested and possibly amused to read your argument

I'll opt for a variation of this; The state should fund the inculcation of ethical standards based on lawful grounds, but not those held on solely religious grounds which contradict the law.
By this I mean that homosexuality is no longer illegal, but discrimination on grounds of race, religion, sexuality etc is illegal. Therefore the state should not fund discrimination against people or practices that are otherwise lawful.

The same goes for pregnant and unmarried. The state opposes discrimination on the grounds of marital status, therefore it should not fund that discrimination.

Peregrinus

I have to point out that discrimination on the grounds of age and sex are also generally illegal, but all schools discriminate on the grounds of age and many do on the grounds of sex.

And this points to the essential circularity of the argument. A religious school discriminating on the grounds of age, sex or sexual orientation is not doing anything illegal if there are provisions in the equality legislation allowing them to do that. Which, of course, there are. So you can't say that the state shouldn't fund it because it is unlawful.

And there is a second element of your argument which needs to be unpicked. You say:

"The state should fund the inculcation of ethical standards based on lawful grounds, but not those held on solely religious grounds which contradict the law"

You're focussing here on the grounds on which someone builds their ethical standards. And there are two problems with this. The first is that you pose a distinction between (a) lawful grounds, and (b) religious grounds which contradict the law. But this is a false dichotomy; we can also have religious grounds which do not contradict the law, or grounds which contradict the law but are not religious. I think you need to decide whether the state's attitude should be determined by whether the grounds are lawful or not, or by whether the grounds are religious or not, but I don't see that you can combine both in the way you are trying to.

The second problem, of course, is that different people may hold the same ethical standards for different reasons. In fact this is extremely common. If a particular ethical standard is held on religious grounds by some people, and on non-religious grounds by others - a distaste for murder, say, or opposition to the death penalty - what attitude should the state take?

I suggest that people's grounds for holding to particular ethical standards are not really the issue. Most people's ethical standards rest on a variety of grounds, and they are not always clear themselves about the reasons for particular ethical standards they adopt. And in any event it's not the business of a democratic state to tell people what they should believe or how they should form their consciences. And I don't think a state which professes freedom of religious belief and practice can at the same time say that views informed by religious beliefs are excluded from the public square. So I think we need to find another way to approach this.

recedite

Peregrinus wrote: »

And this points to the essential circularity of the argument. A religious school discriminating on the grounds of age, sex or sexual orientation is not doing anything illegal if there are provisions in the equality legislation allowing them to do that.

It is a circular argument; that's why the law needs to be changed. If the law declares something to be illegal, then any such activity should prima fascie be considered illegal unless there is a compelling reason to make an exception. What compelling reason have religious organisations ever come up with which would justify discrimination? To preserve their ethos? That is the circular argument.

Imagine if the law declared racial discrimination to be illegal, but then racists demanded an exemption for anyone who is a member of a racist organisation, or a racist community. And they got it.

Peregrinus wrote: »

The first is that you pose a distinction between (a) lawful grounds, and (b) religious grounds which contradict the law. But this is a false dichotomy; we can also have religious grounds which do not contradict the law, or grounds which contradict the law but are not religious.

I don't mean to imply a false dichotomy; these are just two examples. But the same general principle can be applied to the two other re-combinations you mention;
(C)Religious grounds which do not contradict the law; for example, suppose two religions clash on the length they wear their hair. The law has no opinion on the matter. Therefore it would be wrong for the state to fund either the short hairs or the long hairs, in their opposing attempts to spread their own particular morality.

(D)Grounds which contradict the law but are not religious; for example a racist group which attacked black people. Naturally the state would not fund this group, it would attempt to arrest them.

Peregrinus wrote: »

The second problem, of course, is that different people may hold the same ethical standards for different reasons. In fact this is extremely common. If a particular ethical standard is held on religious grounds by some people, and on non-religious grounds by others - a distaste for murder, say, or opposition to the death penalty - what attitude should the state take?

Again, not a problem. The state should look to see what is lawful, and ignore everything else. Murder is unlawful.

All this pre-supposes that "the law" is a set of rules agreed by society which does not favour one group or one religion over another. In other words, it is secular. The problem with our existing law is that it contains a few elements and exemptions that were put there at the behest of various religious vested interests. Its a lot better than something like sharia law of course, but its not totally secular.

expectationlost

Department of Education and Skills
School Patronage

All Written Answers on 18 Sep 2014
« Previous answerNext answer »

Photo of Seán KennySeán Kenny (Dublin North East, Labour)
Link to this: Individually | In context
210. To ask the Minister for Education and Skills if she will provide a list of primary schools in Dublin North East constituency which provide non-denominational education for primary school children; and the procedures to allow enrolment at these schools. [34890/14]
Photo of Jan O'SullivanJan O'Sullivan (Limerick City, Labour)
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My Department does not compile statistical data on an electoral or constituency area basis.

For school planning purposes the country is divided into geographic districts known as feeder areas each with several primary schools feeding into a post-primary centre with one or more post-primary schools.

The information requested by the Deputy will, therefore, have to be reconfigured into the format requested. I have arranged for this to be done and it will be forwarded to the Deputy as soon as possible.

With regard to enrolment policy procedures, it is the responsibility of the managerial authorities of all schools to implement an enrolment policy in accordance with the Education Act, 1998. A Board of Management may find it necessary to restrict enrolment to children from a particular area or a particular age group or on the basis of some other criterion. The criteria to be applied by schools in such circumstances are a matter for the schools themselves. This selection process and the enrolment policy on which it is based must be non-discriminatory and must be applied fairly in respect of all applicants. Under section 15(2)(d) of the Education Act 1998, each school is legally obliged to publish its enrolment policy.

https://www.kildarestreet.com/wrans/?id=2014-09-18a.586&s=%22Dublin+North+East%22#g587.q ok so how can we get this info,

expectationlost

Schools opened under patronage divesting process September 2013



School Name Patron Accommodation Accommodation status
*Portabello ERNS Educate Together Former Edmund Rice Schools Trust Building, Basin Lane, Dublin 8 Permanent


*This school opened in temporary accommodation in 2013. It has now moved to its permanent location.

Schools opened under patronage divesting process September 2014

School Name Patron Accommodation Accommodation Status

Malahide/Portmarnock ETNS Educate Together Holywell ETNS Temporary
Tramore ETNS Educate Together Pond Lane, Tramore Temporary
Trim ETNS Educate Together The Glebe, Trim Temporary
Newtownwhite ETNS, Ballina Educate Together Former CoI NS, Newtownwhite Permanent

https://www.kildarestreet.com/wrans/?id=2014-09-17a.3627&s=%22School+Patronage%22

expectationlost

As part of the implementation of these recommendations, surveys of parental preferences in 43 areas were undertaken and sufficient parental demand for a wider choice of school patron emerged in 28 of the areas. The demand demonstrated was for English medium multidenominational education in 27 of these areas, while one area demonstrated demand for an Irish-language national school (35 of the 43 areas surveyed already have a Gaelscoil option available).

https://www.kildarestreet.com/wrans/?id=2014-09-17a.3690&s=%22School+Patronage%22

recedite

Q.To ask the Minister for Education and Skills if she will provide a list of primary schools in Dublin North East constituency which provide non-denominational education for primary school children; and the procedures to allow enrolment at these schools....

A. The information requested by the Deputy will, therefore, have to be reconfigured into the format requested. I have arranged for this to be done and it will be forwarded to the Deputy as soon as possible...

The reconfigured answer will be "None" (if it ever emerges).

Cabaal

http://www.broadsheet.ie/2014/09/22/the-law-of-god-not-the-childs-feelings-is-the-guiding-principle/

From yesterday’s Sunday Times, Justine McCarthy wrote about the Children’s Ombudsman’s report on alleged physical and sexual abuse at a Co. Kilkenny primary school.

In March 2011, the administration office for the [Stay Safe] programme told the ombudsman’s office it had not provided training at the school since 1993.

The school’s child-abuse prevention policy, which was reviewed in March 2002 and applied at the time of the alleged abuse states: “The Stay Safe programme has been approved by the board of management as a teacher’s aid to be used in accordance with the Catholic ethos which demands that the law of God and of the church, and not the child’s feelings, be the guiding principle.”

In 2006, the year the abuse allegations began, a questionnaire was sent to all schools to determine how Stay Safe was being implemented. Had there been any difficulties in implementing it? The school replied “yes”, saying it had “examined it and use only what staff, parents and board deem suitable to [their] ethos”.

There you go now.

worrying stuff, being gay is against their ethos....I guess its ok to bully the hell out of gay kids or kids who have gay parents.

Business as usual then.....shocking that it reads like its 1960's Ireland when its 2006 Ireland,

Also...law of god, they can go **** themselves on that one. There's only one law in this land and its the law in the Irish State, no other made up law goes above it,

recedite

Catholic ethos which demands that the law of God and of the church, and not the child’s feelings, be the guiding principle

Is this the same Canon Law that moved paedophile priests around, while hauling the child victims up before private kangaroo courts, and then swearing the abuse victims to silence?
I hope the school in question is no longer overriding the "stay safe" program provided by Dept. of education.

oceanclub

The Stay Safe programme has been approved by the board of management as a teacher’s aid to be used in accordance with the Catholic ethos which demands that the law of God and of the church, and not the child’s feelings, be the guiding principle.”

I'm assuming this wording was particular to the school and therefore its identify is an open secret?

P

Brian Shanahan

Cabaal wrote: »

http://www.broadsheet.ie/2014/09/22/the-law-of-god-not-the-childs-feelings-is-the-guiding-principle/



worrying stuff, being gay is against their ethos....I guess its ok to bully the hell out of gay kids or kids who have gay parents.

Business as usual then.....shocking that it reads like its 1960's Ireland when its 2006 Ireland,

Also...law of god, they can go **** themselves on that one. There's only one law in this land and its the law in the Irish State, no other made up law goes above it,

Anyone else listening to the Philip Boucher Hayes report on drivetime today? He was detailing some of the allegations listed in the Children's Ombudsman's report.

Apparently one of the teachers has been accused of smacking multiple children with a thorn stick, sometimes on their genitals, and on occasions another teacher or the principal (or both) watched her do it. And according to the report the HSE didn't investigate the allegations, considering them corporal punishment and not abuse.

Sickening is the only word for it.

recedite

Brian Shanahan wrote: »

smacking multiple children with a thorn stick, sometimes on their genitals..

Mortification is a doctrine; according to (one version of) god's law it's good for body and soul.
As Pope John XXIII said,

But the faithful must also be encouraged to do outward acts of penance, both to keep their bodies under the strict control of reason and faith, and to make amends for their own and other people's sins... St. Augustine issued the same insistent warning: "It is not enough for a man to change his ways for the better and to give up the practice of evil, unless by painful penance, sorrowing humility, the sacrifice of a contrite heart and the giving of alms he makes amends to God for all that he has done wrong

And popes are infallible. Sure haven't we all seen the fanatics struggling up Croagh Patrick in their bare and bleeding feet, to save us from our own sins, or something. We should be more thankful :rolleyes:

expectationlost

during their yearly look at money in oireachtas the education committee http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/mediazone/pressreleases/name-24414-en.html

transcript not out yet try the video http://media.heanet.ie/oireachtas/asx.php?Channel=Committee3&Date=20140924&StartTime=04:48:20.000&Duration=01:01:00.000


School patronage reform is leading to religious ‘segregation’, committee told
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/education/school-patronage-reform-is-leading-to-religious-segregation-committee-told-1.1940196

this was averil power who saying divestment was a system of segregation that we didn't have in the past, but we did didn't we just with catholic and protestent

PopePalpatine

I wasn't surprised to see the Ionanists at their weaselly ways in that discussion.

robindch

Brian Shanahan wrote: »

[...] Philip Boucher Hayes report on drivetime today? He was detailing some of the allegations listed in the Children's Ombudsman's report.

He's documented it more fully here:

http://philipboucher-hayes.com/2014/09/24/the-law-of-god-and-the-church-not-a-childs-feelings/

Weird behaviour on the part of the teacher indeed. But far more worrying is the robotic, legalistic, religious response from the school's board of management.