Was any neutral shipping safe in WW2?

silverharp

I'm thinking mainly in terms of the Southern Atlantic say Brazil and Portugal who would have been trading with each other. Were there ever any agreements in place with the Germans to allow safe passage of ships between 2 neutral countires?
if not was it ever discussed given that as nutty as the nazis were they must have had to pay attention to not irritating neutal countries for no reason.

marcsignal

Interesting subject silverharp.

Some mention of it in the case of Sweden here

When Germany invaded Denmark and Norway in April 1940, coupled with a German blockade of the North Sea, every single shipment had to be negotiated with both British and German authorities, which drastically reduced the volume of trade.

And of Ireland here

Vizeadmiral Karl Dönitz issued a standing order to U-boats on 4 September 1940, which defined belligerent, neutral and friendly powers. Neutral included "Ireland in particular".

The order concluded: "Ireland forbids the navigation of her territorial waters by warships under threat of internment. That prohibition is to be strictly observed out of consideration for the proper preservation of her neutrality. Signed, Dönitz".

However those orders did not always protect Irish ships. Wolf Jeschonnek, commander of U-607 was mildly reprimanded "An understandable mistake by an eager captain" for sinking the Irish Oak. When U-46 sank the Luimneach on the Lisbon run, her commander recorded in his war diary "flying a British or Irish flag".

A supplement to Dönitz's order found after U-260 was scuttled off Cork read: "for political reasons, Irish ships and also at times Irish convoys are not to be attacked within the blockade zone if they are seen to be such. However, there is no special obligation to determine neutrality in the blockade zone."

tac foley

Especially those ships belonging to Brazil, Argentina and Chile, in view of the many nazis who bolted there to avoid the gallows.

tac

Jawgap

Brazil was part of the Allied war effort from about 1943 onwards so they may not qualify as entirely neutral.

they also had a division sized expeditionary force with an air component in the Med.

I don't think any shipping was entirely safe given the problem with ship recognition and the indiscriminate nature of mines- it might be true to say that in certain regions there was less of a chance of being attacked in comparison to other areas - the south Atlantic would have been one of the safer areas.

Capt'n Midnight

There was a part of Das Boat where they saw an ocean liner with lights on.

Hard call really - go it alone lights blazing standing out like a sore thumb and hope the subs recognise you or go in a convoy where there is some hope of rescue if the worst happens.


Not just WWII shipping either
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_Air_Flight_655

The aircraft, an Airbus A300B2-203 operated by Iran Air, was flying from Bandar Abbas, Iran to Dubai, United Arab Emirates. While flying in Iranian airspace over Iran's territorial waters in the Persian Gulf on its usual flight path, it was destroyed by the United States Navy guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes (CG-49). All 290 onboard including 66 children and 16 crew perished. The incident is ranked ninth among the deadliest disasters in aviation history

Tony EH

Actually the Germans preferred neutral countries to remain neutral. They had enough on the hands dealing with the nations they were fighting.

In answer to the question, yes, neutral ships were allowed safe passage, if they were clearly lit up and were flying proper colours.

For instance the Irish Mercantile Marine had numerous vessels painted entirely in green white and orange, so that they were clearly identifiable.

In the early part of the war, U Boats were able to board and investigate vessels and then send them on their way. But the Q Ship problem put paid to that. Q Ships were armed vessels disguised as merchants and would fire on a surfacing U Boat. Obviously, U Boat captains weren't going to risk the loss of their boat, so surfacing and investigation of non-flagged ships, or even flagged neutral vessels was curtailed.

Neutral vessels were supposed to be lit up at night and clearly flagged during the day, otherwise they were subject to attack. However, identification remained a serious problem for U Boat commanders, as many vessels just didn't follow the guidelines.

As for Brazil, as has already been pointed out, she wasn't a neutral, so was subject to attack. In the early years, the Uboatewaffe went through great pains not to attack the vessels of neutral countries, especially in certain grid sections like DB, DC, DM, DN, DO, EB, EC and EF, from Florida down to the top of South America. South Atlantic runs through the "E" and "D" grids had to be carefully observed and if there was doubt left alone. In fact there weren't many voyages there, until 1942, when American joined the war and even then, great care had to be taken. Further into 42, however, the U Boats were given greater freedom.

Over in the East Atlantic, Neutrals like Spain had agreements that their vessels would hug the coastlines and avoid the grids where convoys and enemy traffic were mostly steered. For instance, shipping from Alexandria or Gibraltar to Liverpool were directed further out to sea before turning to complete the northern run of their voyage, passing the Azores.

In any case, most neutral countries avoided the main battle areas in the North Atlantic, which were covered by the "A", "B" and "C" sections, with particular care taken in the Western Approaches.

One final point, while there was danger to Atlantic traffic throughout the war and it was trumpeted with great volume, the vast majority sailed completely unharmed. Even 99% of all shipping to and from Britain reached its destination.

Capt'n Midnight

Tony EH wrote: »

One final point, while there was danger to Atlantic traffic throughout the war and it was trumpeted with great volume, the vast majority sailed completely unharmed. Even 99% of all shipping to and from Britain reached its destination.

99% sounds good but 5 return trips and you are down to 90% because it's 1% every trip.

Tony EH

99% of shipping throughout the entire war.

Capt'n Midnight

That 99% figure sounds too high


Japan lost a huge percentage of shipping during the war.

Book - one day in a very long war

At the end of December 1941 the Japanese merchant marine comprised 5.5 million tons of shipping. By the end of 1942 the initial decline had been reversed and the tonnage had crept up to 5.6 million. Throughout 1943, however, this accelerated ship-building was still not enough to offset losses and the total tonnage on 31st December was only 5.1 million, During 1944 the race was well and truly lost and the combination of ever more powerful American attacks and dwindling Japanese imports reduced the fleet at the end of September to only 2.6 million tons. In the month of October the fleet was reduced a further 13 per cent , to less than 2.3 million tons.

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/history/pac-campaign.html

"Bauxite imports fell off 88% just between the summer and fall of 1944. In 1945, pig iron imports plunged 89%, pulp 90%, raw cotton and wool 91%, fats and oils 92%, iron ore 95%, soda and cement 96%, lumber 98%, fodder 99%, and not one ounce of sugar or raw rubber reached Japan."

Tony EH

Japan never instituted a convoy system properly. Most of her merchant shipping sailed alone, or in very small groups.

Clay Blair who wrote what I believe to be the definitive volumes on the U Boat campaign says that it's over 99% in fact and that only about 10% of convoys were attacked.

I have to admit, I found the stats and figures quite a surprise myself, but the simple fact is that more than the lions share of traffic always got through.

Capt'n Midnight

Tony EH wrote: »

Japan never instituted a convoy system properly. Most of her merchant shipping sailed alone, or in very small groups.

Clay Blair who wrote what I believe to be the definitive volumes on the U Boat campaign says that it's over 99% in fact and that only about 10% of convoys were attacked.

I have to admit, I found the stats and figures quite a surprise myself, but the simple fact is that more than the lions share of traffic always got through.

Still reads to me as 1% per convoy
only 10% of convoys attacked sounds right
no convoy with a blimp escort lost a ship

One note on the Japanese was that waiting for convoys reduced the efficiency of ships (that got through) also towards the end of the war they were only sailing in daylight because of US radar and journey times were doubled

http://www.amazon.com/Hitlers-U-Boat-War-Hunters-1939-1942/dp/0679640320

While U-boats delayed and diminished the arrival of supplies to Europe, 99% of all ships in transatlantic convoys reached their destinations. For Blair, that is a sizable margin of acceptable loss. He even stands foursquare behind Admiral Ernest King's reluctance to organize merchant convoys after Pearl Harbor. German U-boats operating off the Atlantic Coast and in the Caribbean accounted for about a quarter of all tonnage sunk during the war, but even these losses could be replaced. Blair compares by implication German failures in the U-boat war to the U.S. submarine campaign in the Pacific, which succeeded in strangling Japan by mid-1945. But to assert, as he does, that the U-boats never had a chance seems to fly in the face of an overwhelming body of evidence that cannot be dismissed as retrospective mythmaking. Even before the climactic convoy battles of 1943, the Allied navies were morally and materially stretched to near breaking point. Though richly informed and a pleasure to read, this volume ultimately provokes without convincing.

Stovepipe

Well, I guess the merchant mariners must have been imagining things, as any accounts I've read, highlights the terror felt by merchant crews, time and again. The convoys sailed through a narrow band of the North Atlantic and terminated their Easterly journies at the same narrow choke points. They were very much in fear of the Condors and wolf packs and the U-boats held their respect to the very last day of the War.
regards
Stovepipe

Tony EH

Capt'n Midnight wrote: »

http://www.amazon.com/Hitlers-U-Boat-War-Hunters-1939-1942/dp/0679640320

That's just that reviewers opinion. But the cold facts that are presented in Blair's work ARE convincing to anyone reading in an unbiased manner.

The simple case is this. In order for Germany to have achieved her goal of cutting off supplies, she had to sink at very least 300.000 tons a month. In the run up to 1942, that was achieved just 4 times. After 1942, the goal to attain became over 700.000 tons a month, which was managed only once.

It's very clear, therefore, that the U Boat threat has been grossly exaggerated and that Blair's conclusion that the U Boats never came even close to their goal is correct.

Where I would find his conclusions on more uneven ground is when he compares the achievements of the Uboatewaffen with the US Navy. As I don't believe that such comparisons are valid. The Americans never faced the problems or counter-measures that the Germans had to face in the Atlantic.

Tony EH

Stovepipe wrote: »

Well, I guess the merchant mariners must have been imagining things, as any accounts I've read, highlights the terror felt by merchant crews, time and again. The convoys sailed through a narrow band of the North Atlantic and terminated their Easterly journies at the same narrow choke points. They were very much in fear of the Condors and wolf packs and the U-boats held their respect to the very last day of the War.
regards
Stovepipe

Fear of attack, doesn't mean attack.

Of course they were in terror of attack. They were also in terror of the Atlantic itself.

During many months the rate of return do to the nature of the sea and weather was worse than the rate of attack by U Boat.

gbee

Tony EH wrote: »

I have to admit, I found the stats and figures quite a surprise myself, but the simple fact is that more than the lions share of traffic always got through.

That's a surprise to me. They must have been milking the German U-Boat threat and exaggerating losses, but a recent story about Churchill shows a great division over strategy and deployments where the US more or less went their own way to win the war.

Churchill wanted the war to last at least another year. So the German U-Boat was not as successful at popular opinion deemed it to be.

Victor

Capt'n Midnight wrote: »

There was a part of Das Boat where they saw an ocean liner with lights on.

Hard call really - go it alone lights blazing standing out like a sore thumb and hope the subs recognise you or go in a convoy where there is some hope of rescue if the worst happens.

Passenger ships (perhaps 18 knots) were much faster than cargo ships (often 6 knots and operating at the speed of the slowest ship in the convoy) and had much less need to operate in convoy.

gbee

Tony EH wrote: »

After 1942, the goal to attain became over 700.000 tons a month, which was managed only once.

It's very clear, therefore, that the U Boat threat has been grossly exaggerated

But, whilst exaggerated, and whilst they did reach their targets, was it German insufficiency that whose targets were not bet at the required frequency or indeed could have been met at all, leaving aside counter measures that everyone says was ineffective anyway?

Stovepipe

A couple of points: the amount of U-boats actually at sea at any one time was never enough to match any tonnage target. It took huge resources just to keep the fifty-odd that were out at any time going. Each sub had the equivalent of two crews, one at sea, one training and it took up huge amounts of manpower, factory space, raw materials, armaments and so on, just to sustain them at a rate to cover attrition.
Allied defensive measures were getting better all the time but they were far from perfect. Asdic was often fooled by false returns and it was unusable within a convoy; the radar was primitive and often failed and didn't gain respect until it became centimetric; the escort ships were often dreadful sea-going vessels, the corvettes in particular, leaving the crews unfit for duty; the merchant ships were often dreadfully unfit for the Atlantic by virtue of being slow, aging, poorly armed and their crews were treated shabbily by the owners and the Military. Quite simply, it was a miracle that they managed to beat the U-boat at all.
regards
Stovepipe

Tony EH

gbee wrote: »

But, whilst exaggerated, and whilst they did reach their targets, was it German insufficiency that whose targets were not bet at the required frequency or indeed could have been met at all, leaving aside counter measures that everyone says was ineffective anyway?

Simply put, there were never enough U Boats at sea at any one time and the tonnage goals were far too great.

*as Stovepipe has said.

It was an incredible ask.

But U boat counter measures weren't ineffective at all. ASDIC may have been confused within a convoy, but after a U Boat fired its torps it immediately had to go under and ASDIC came into play there. Plus, other countermeasures proved very successful, such as radar and HUFF-DUFF.

The early parts of the war saw some advantages for the U Boats, such as night surface attacks. But those advantages were short lived.

By 1941, the top U Boat commanders were at the bottom of the ocean or captured and huge individual scores would ever be very high again. I'm excluding Topp here.

By 1942 the Battle of the Atlantic was well and truly over, despite some good returns for the U Boats on occasion, there really was only one outcome.