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Abortion Discussion
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Bannasidhe wrote: »'Lesser of two evils' - is the rape foetus so evil it has no 'right to life'?
Unless you use your intestines to change nappies, continually do this for months and then excrete them out in large bundles (some cutting may be required) I fail to see how that is a relevant comparison... or perhaps you think being pregnant for 9 months is really only as onerous as disposing of a packet of poo.
Carrying a baby around for nine months is about the same for a woman as changing a nappy is for a guy, don'tchaknow?0 -
@Absolom: Re your quote at 1435, page 440... No. Because the fact that it may have affected their decision, does not mean that it was effective in it's purpose.
And, since you appear to be in danger of conflating the two;
The injunction we were discussing when I said "The injunction was issued; it did not have an effect" was the injunction to prevent X from travelling.
The injunction we were discussing when I said "the injunction may have influenced their decision" was the injunction to prevent X from obtaining an abortion in another jurisdiction.unquote...
I wondered about the injunction/s, so "googled" on it. There was only one injunction granted to Harry Whelehan. This time-line of the events explains.
December 1991: A 14-year-old girl is raped by a man known to her and her family. She becomes pregnant and it is later discovered that the teenager was being sexually abused by the same man for the previous two years. Court judgements subsequently call him an “evil and depraved” man.
27 January 1992: The teenager and her parents are made aware of the pregnancy after seeking the assistance of a doctor.
30 January 1992: The rape is reported to the Gardaí and investigations begin.
4 February 1992: The victim and her parents decide to travel to the UK to undergo an abortion. The family informed the Gardaí of their decision and asked whether the foetus could be tested after it was aborted to provide proof of the paternity of the accused in the rape case. The Gardaí then asked the Director of Public Prosecutions whether such evidence would be admissible in court. The DPP liaised with the Attorney General Harry Whelehan.
6 February 1992: The defendant and her parents travelled to England and arrangements were made for an abortion to take place in London. On the same date, the Attorney General obtained an interim injunction stopping the teenager and her parents from leaving the country or arranging the termination of the pregnancy. Once they were informed of the injunction the family returned to Ireland.
The AG’s order was based on Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution, more specifically on the 1983 amendment that puts the right of the unborn child’s right to life on an equal footing of the mother’s right to life.
2012 Link for info:https://www.google.ie/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCUQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.thejournal.ie%2Ftwenty-years-on-a-timeline-of-the-x-case-347359-Feb2012%2F&ei=xh0bVNrgBqef7Ab584DQDw&usg=AFQjCNFw7OCt0v4g5Wp-HfHnfIwDEYw2sQ
The following link is for info only, as a 2014 update from The Journal.ie, same source as the one above... https://www.google.ie/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCwQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.thejournal.ie%2Fabortion-1631314-Aug2014%2F&ei=xh0bVNrgBqef7Ab584DQDw&usg=AFQjCNG87oa6I5-Z30cjGr6hG3PmS_95Bg
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Edit: having read the judgement of Justice Costello below, I am glad that times have changed, His dismissing the expert evidence of the Clinical Psychologist, then his order of restraint, my mind boggles as to how he envisaged the girl was to be "restrained" from leaving Ireland for a period of nine months. It definitely gives freedom to imagine that the girl was seen as merely a vessel for the fetus for nine months by Justice Costello, giving rise to the authenticity of claims by lazygal and others here that that is still how some people in Ireland see pregnant girls and women.
10 February 1992: The first injunction only lasted until this date but a hearing of the action was tried before Justice Costello over two days – 10 and 11 February. During the trial the judge heard how the girl at the centre of the case told her mother that she wanted to throw herself down a flight of stairs and while in London contemplated throwing herself under a train. A clinical psychologist determined that there was a risk of suicide as she expressed a desire to end her life to “solve matters”.
17 February 1992: After reserving his judgement for a week, Justice Costello ordered that the right to life of the unborn child should not be interfered with and said that the defendant must be restrained from leaving Ireland for a period of nine months. Although he did accept that the defendant was suicidal, he said the risk was not sufficient to override the right to life of the unborn.0 -
Lazygals' terrible point was because the woman's body was being used then she should have say whether the baby lives or dies. This is as ridiculous as man saying I don't have to use my body o change a nappy if I don't want.If pregnancy is at all comparable to changing nappies, how could terminating one, thereby killing the fetus, ever be the lesser of two evils? In a single post you have completely contradicted yourself.
Sadly, there are many would rather kill the fetus than change that fetus's nappy a few weeks later.Can you conceive of any circumstances under which a reasonable person would agree to kill a baby rather than change its nappy?0 -
No, it's only as ridiculous as a man not wanting to change a nappy if you think either that the two things (nappy changing and pregnancy) are directly comparable, or else you think that they aren't comparable, but that for a man to change a nappy is equivalent to a woman carrying and giving birth to a baby.Tim Robbins wrote: »Lazygals' terrible point was because the woman's body was being used then she should have say whether the baby lives or dies. This is as ridiculous as man saying I don't have to use my body o change a nappy if I don't want.
Both of which are clearly nonsense. Whose health or life could ever be damaged by nappy changing?
i don't even understand what you're saying. Do you think women have abortions because they don't want to change nappies?Tim Robbins wrote: »Sadly, there are many would rather kill the fetus than change that fetus's nappy a few weeks later.
As a matter of interest, do you actually know any women? In real life, I mean.
Only it doesn't sound like you do, going by the mad things you seem to think about them.0 -
Sorry your wrong.No, it's only as ridiculous as a man not wanting to change a nappy if you think either that the two things (nappy changing and pregnancy) are directly comparable, or else you think that they aren't comparable, but that for a man to change a nappy is equivalent to a woman carrying and giving birth to a baby.
Both of which are clearly nonsense. Whose health or life could ever be damaged by nappy changing?
If "use my body" is valid excuse not to let something else live.
Well then, I don't have to "use my body" to change my baby's nappy where the baby exists because of me is just as valid I don't have to "use my body" to let a fetus grow where the fetus exists because of me.
I have refuted the "use my body" crap using the Socratic method. Perhaps, you should look it up.0 -
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Tim Robbins wrote: »Sorry your wrong.
If "use my body" is valid excuse not to let something else live.
Well then, I don't have to "use my body" to change my baby's nappy where the baby exists because of me is just as valid I don't have to "use my body" to let a fetus grow where the fetus exists because of me.
I have refuted the "use my body" crap using the Socratic method. Perhaps, you should look it up.
If your objection to abortion is based on the right to life trump card you can't then say "oh but that doesn't count if the fetus got there through rape" - that makes no sense. The fetus didn't commit any crime, why should it lose any of its "rights"?
In fact - how are they rights if someone else can take them away from you any time they decide you aren't entitled to them, and through no fault of your own?0 -
I answered that already - twice. It is the lesser of two evils.If your objection to abortion is based on the right to life trump card you can't then say "oh but that doesn't count if the fetus got there through rape" - that makes no sense. The fetus didn't commit any crime, why should it lose any of its "rights"?
Didn't get that tongue twister.In fact - how are they rights if someone else can take them away from you any time they decide you aren't entitled to them, and through no fault of your own?0 -
Tim Robbins wrote: »Sorry your wrong.
If "use my body" is valid excuse not to let something else live.
Well then, I don't have to "use my body" to change my baby's nappy where the baby exists because of me is just as valid I don't have to "use my body" to let a fetus grow where the fetus exists because of me.
I have refuted the "use my body" crap using the Socratic method. Perhaps, you should look it up.
I'm really struggling to understand how pregnancy and changing nappies are comparable. If you didn't change your child's nappy could someone else do it instead?0 -
I'm really struggling to understand how pregnancy and changing nappies are comparable. If you didn't change your child's nappy could someone else do it instead?
I have used my body to change thousands of nappies. Some of which were worn by children I hardly knew but such was life as a community worker in the East End of London. All races, all colours, all genders, all religions (maybe not Shinto...) yet not once have I used my body to carry a child for someone else. Nor would I. I carried my own child and that **** hurts. A. Lot.
No effing way would I go through that for someone else. Not even for a large sum of money. I will change a nappy for free. For any child that requires it. I can hold my breathe during the rough stuff.
If Tim thinks the two are comparable he must be incredibly squeamish and never, ever, ever, encountered a pregnant woman.0 -
If she wanted to have the abortion she had no need to challenge it either; she simply had to stay where she was and have it.Zubeneschamali wrote: »If she wanted to do what the injunction said - not have the abortion - she had no reason to challenge the injunction.
The fact that she challenged the injuction does not require that it logically follow her will was to have the abortion; she could have willed to have an abortion without challenging the injunction, and she could have challenged the injunction without willing to have the abortion.Zubeneschamali wrote: »She did challenge it, so her will was to have the abortion. Instead of doing what she willed, she complied.
No, you've constructed a logically flawed argument that leads you to conclude that she complied with the injunction against her will. Which is an entirely different thing from knowing.Zubeneschamali wrote: »So, she complied with the injunction against her will. We know this for a fact, despite all your inane hairsplitting.
Hang on, of course she wanted to come home, or the AG caused her to return from England against her will? Those two seem to be somewhat at odds with each other.Zubeneschamali wrote: »She lived here! Of course she wanted to come home.
Could that be because you don't actually know what she wanted, and you're trying to ascribe motivations to back up whichever point you're making at the time?
I'm not asking; since neither X nor her parents have said why they didn't do just that, there's no way you can know why they did as they did, so what point would there be in asking you?Zubeneschamali wrote: »If you are asking (clumsily) why she didn't have the abortion and then come back, that is not generally a good way to treat High Court injunctions. As you said yourself earlier: having broken any of these injunctions she could indeed have been charged with contempt after the fact.
Interesting. You're saying a statement is necessarily factual if a Supreme Court Judge agrees with it?Zubeneschamali wrote: »I don't think it is a trivial matter, either, but it is a matter of fact, and I am right. Supreme Court judge McCarthy agrees with me:The short answer, in the instant case, is that the order was effective; it may well be that others will be less responsible than the family involved here but that would not, of itself, be a ground for not making the order.
So you can agree that what Hederman said (and you so kindly quoted) is also fact?
It has not been argued that the words "having regard to the equal right of life of the mother" should be construed more widely than preserving the life of the mother and should be construed to be wide enough to include a situation where the best expert opinion is to the effect that the continuance of the pregnancy would be to make the mother a physical wreck. I do not think the word "life" in this context is to be construed any differently from the word "life" in the earlier part of the same Article though the State would be obliged to do all it reasonably possibly can to take steps to prevent anybody becoming a physical or a mental wreck, short of taking innocent life to achieve it. Fortunately the Court does not have to decide this matter now but has to decide the matter in the context of a threat of suicide. Suicide threats can be contained. The duration of the pregnancy is a matter of months and it should not be impossible to guard the girl against self-destruction and preserve the life of the unborn child at the same time. The choice is between the certain death of the unborn life and a feared substantial danger of death but no degree of certainty of the mother by way of self-destruction.
That's quite a reversal of your position, considering you earlier said it gave you 'the willies'.
If however, you feel that a Supreme Court Judges opinion simply lends some weight to your own opinion, I'd agree it does, without raising your opinion to the level of fact.0 -
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Sorry if you find it confusing.aloyisious wrote: »Confuscation?
From the Supreme Court Record:aloyisious wrote: »@Absolom: Re your quote at 1435, page 440...
I wondered about the injunction/s, so "googled" on it. There was only one injunction granted to Harry Whelehan. This time-line of the events explains.
"On the next day the Attorney General obtained interim injunctions in the High Court restraining the girl and her parents from interfering with the right to life of the unborn; restraining the same defendants from leaving the jurisdiction for nine months; and restraining them from procuring or arranging an abortion within or outside the jurisdiction."
I'd draw your attention to the use of the word injunctions in the record, and the fact that the sentence contains three different requirements separated by semi-colons.
The account of the High Court proceedings goes on to specify that:
"The summons in which the young expectant mother was joined as the first defendant and her parents as second and third defendants claimed the following orders:”
(a) An order restraining the defendants their servants or agents or anyone having knowledge of the order from interfering with the right to life of the unborn as contained in Article 40, s. 3, sub-s. 3 of the Constitution of Ireland on such terms as to this honourable court shall seem meet and just.
(b) An order restraining the first defendant from leaving the jurisdiction of this honourable court or the second and third defendants, their servants or agents or anyone having knowledge of the said order from assisting the first defendant to leave the aforesaid jurisdiction for a period of nine months from the date hereof or such other period as may be specified by this honourable court.
(c) An order restraining the first defendant her servants or agents or anyone having knowledge of the said order from procuring or arranging a termination of pregnancy or abortion whether within or without the jurisdiction of the honourable court."
So, we have a specific account of the three orders made. I'd suggest the Supreme Court account may be a more reliable source than that of thejournal.ie.
In fairness, it didn't take terribly long for 'times' to change, since the Supreme Court discharged his injunctions quite quickly afterwards.aloyisious wrote: »Edit: having read the judgement of Justice Costello below, I am glad that times have changed, <...> Although he did accept that the defendant was suicidal, he said the risk was not sufficient to override the right to life of the unborn.0 -
you haven't explained why in the case of rape but not for any of a multitude of other reasons.Tim Robbins wrote: »I answered that already - twice. It is the lesser of two evils.
Look, you are the one who compares pregnancy to changing a nappy. I think that's crazy, like comparing my headache to your cancer and calling you selfish for not paying enough attention to my problems. After all, they're both health issues.
But nappy-changing were like pregnancy, then it's not possible to also make the argument that sometimes it can be so horrible as to merit killing what you say is a child with rights to life. Those two arguments each have merit, but not as part of the same argument.
That you refuse to see the complete contradiction inherent in your views is not my problem, you can repeat them as often as you like, you still won't make any sense.
Let me paraphrase then. It is in the nature of "rights" to be independent of other people. Otherwise they aren't rights.Tim Robbins wrote: »Didn't get that tongue twister.0 -
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No, you've constructed a logically flawed argument that leads you to conclude that she complied with the injunction against her will. Which is an entirely different thing from knowing.
You could be a brain in a jar connected to a computer feeding you lies about the real world. This is a logical possibility immune to refutation. The X case never happened. There are no actual human beings. Pregnancy is a complete invention, along with abortion, human rights and Supreme courts.
But in the ordinary meaning of the word "know", I know that isn't true.
And since we all know that you know the facts of the X case as well as I do, and that you are just wittering on for the sake of pretending to yourself that you never lose an argument, I will stop here, and allow you to have the last million words on the subject.0 -
Tim Robbins wrote: »I think you should try and understand the Socratic method first.
I just used it there.
You can't reveal a contradiction in logic if the other person disputes your summation of their argument.
Your position is that body autonomy cannot be used to justify abortion because it cannot be used to justify killing a baby to avoid changing it's nappy. For your position to be a true reflection of the initial premise, we need to agree that pregnancy and nappy changing are comparable. I don't agree.0 -
Tim Robbins wrote: »I think you should try and understand the Socratic method first.
Or maybe you could just explain what you mean, in your own words.0 -
Sorry if you find it confusing.
From the Supreme Court Record:
"On the next day the Attorney General obtained interim injunctions in the High Court restraining the girl and her parents from interfering with the right to life of the unborn; restraining the same defendants from leaving the jurisdiction for nine months; and restraining them from procuring or arranging an abortion within or outside the jurisdiction."
I'd draw your attention to the use of the word injunctions in the record, and the fact that the sentence contains three different requirements separated by semi-colons.
The account of the High Court proceedings goes on to specify that:
"The summons in which the young expectant mother was joined as the first defendant and her parents as second and third defendants claimed the following orders:”
(a) An order restraining the defendants their servants or agents or anyone having knowledge of the order from interfering with the right to life of the unborn as contained in Article 40, s. 3, sub-s. 3 of the Constitution of Ireland on such terms as to this honourable court shall seem meet and just.
(b) An order restraining the first defendant from leaving the jurisdiction of this honourable court or the second and third defendants, their servants or agents or anyone having knowledge of the said order from assisting the first defendant to leave the aforesaid jurisdiction for a period of nine months from the date hereof or such other period as may be specified by this honourable court.
(c) An order restraining the first defendant her servants or agents or anyone having knowledge of the said order from procuring or arranging a termination of pregnancy or abortion whether within or without the jurisdiction of the honourable court."
So, we have a specific account of the three orders made. I'd suggest the Supreme Court account may be a more reliable source than that of thejournal.ie.
In fairness, it didn't take terribly long for 'times' to change, since the Supreme Court discharged his injunctions quite quickly afterwards.
Ta for the above court records. I now know that's a source to get info from. It also explains one part of the journal.ie report which used the words "first injunction" before the two-day court hearing 10/11 Feb '92. I thought that was an editorial error. It is good to see that, at least in his rulings made from his understanding of Irish law, the Supreme Court found Justice Costello to be wrong.
I'll have to check and see if the changes in Irish law since 1992 changed the remit of the High Court to issue rulings which, in it's opinion, have effect in areas outside the jurisdiction of the honourable court (injunction No 3). I imagine that at least it would have to have some courtesy and regard for the foreign territory's judicial independence before trying to enforce it's orders on foreign territory medical clinics.0 -
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http://www.broadsheet.ie/2014/09/19/im-no-witch-im-a-catholic/An anti-abortion protester accused of behaving like a witch told a Belfast court: “I’m no witch, I’m a Catholic”.
Bernadette Smyth, who leads the anti-abortion group Precious Life, was replying to a prosecution lawyer.
Mrs Smyth, of Suffolk Street, Ballymena, County Antrim, denies harassing Marie Stopes clinic director Dawn Purvis.
The lawyer suggested she had laughed at Ms Purvis in a “cackling, jeering, mocking way, in a witch’s manner.”
Ms Smyth replied: “I can’t agree with this court that I’m a witch. I’m a Catholic.”
The case concerns two incidents involving the accused that happened outside the Marie Stopes Clinic, Great Victoria Street, Belfast, in January and February.
The case continues.
This women previous won a golden cleric award Irish Catholic Of The Year Award back in 2013 - http://www.preciouslife.com/news/72/director-of-precious-life-bernadette-smyth-honoured-in-list-of-top-catholics-for-2013/0 -
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http://www.broadsheet.ie/2014/09/19/im-no-witch-im-a-catholic/
This women previous won a golden cleric award Irish Catholic Of The Year Award back in 2013 - http://www.preciouslife.com/news/72/director-of-precious-life-bernadette-smyth-honoured-in-list-of-top-catholics-for-2013/
Down with that sort of thing![/cliche]0 -
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I think you missed the points I made.
1) What's the logic in limiting it to residents?
2) How do you imagine Britain obtains evidence of crimes committed abroad to be prosecuted in the jurisdiction? The same standard of proof pertains in those cases as those of crimes committed within the jurisdiction.
I understand that Britain has sections within its laws which simply say that if a resident of the UK commits something that would be a crime in the UK, then for the purposes of the Act, they are (since 'he is' implies that it only applies to men, an interesting construction) considered as having committed it within the UK. That means the same standard of evidence is required to prosecute the crime as if it had occurred in Britain. Which will, believe it or not, often require international cooperation to obtain, and that makes cooperation very relevant.
Britain may assert its' right to prosecute its citizens who commit fgm in any country (just as Ireland might assert its' right to prosecute its citizens who commit the destruction of unborn human life in any country) , but the inability to obtain enough evidence to secure a conviction might be a factor in the fact than in the eleven years that it has been an offence for British citizens to carry out or procure FGM abroad, even in countries where the practice is legal, no one has been successfully prosecuted for doing so.
You might even be led to wonder if the British law is practicable.
I've no doubt that asserting our right is as simple, as you say, as making the statement. Enforcing that assertion is what I believe is not practicable, as would appear to be the situation in the case of the British law. And that's when Britain does have the cooperation of various international bodies.
You don't think the feelings of the Irish population ought to be considered before legislation is put in place and prosecutions are attempted? It would seem to be a necessary step in determining if it's practicable..
I'd suggest that less (though possibly not substantially less, after all, it's estimated that 20,000 British women are at risk of fgm every year) women would dare go abroad for abortions, and pro abortion advocates would have another argument to make. Whether the majority would be so horrified as to insist the law be changed; maybe, but then, all it would take is excluding ffa from the legislation as it's enacted to remove that potential. Since we're enacting legislation anyway, as I previously said, we could simply legislate to have abortion in the case of ffa available in the jurisdiction.
Well, let me see. Article 3 of the Constitution does define the limits of Irish jurisdiction, and they don't extend as far as other countries.
Your example of the 1976 Criminal Jurisdiction Act is a particularly suitable one give your arguments above; the Supreme Court specifically stated in that instance that Ireland is a sovereign State and that its national parliament has full power to legislate with extraterritorial effect in accordance with the accepted principles of international law, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3 of the Constitution which state that "the laws enacted by that parliament shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws of Saorstát Éireann and the like extra-territorial effect."
So, should legislation to prosecute the deliberate destruction of unborn human life outside the area and extent of Ireland (the State) be found to not be in accordance with the principles of international law (and I'd be very interested in your thoughts on whether it would), then it would fall foul of Article 3, unless we had a Constitutional Amendment. Which is why I think it might be necessary.
Not really... I just checked how we went about asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction despite the Constitutional restriction on previous occasions. Since I was trying to figure out if Lazygals proposition to prevent women from travelling aboard to have abortions, and to determine if women entering the country have ever had an abortion, was practicable, it seemed like the sensible thing to do.
So the gist of all that (as far as it is possible to ascertain!) is that because a particular Irish law can't be applied to all the citizens of the world, there is no point in Ireland doing anything other than pretending it is applying that law to Irish citizens?
I would suggest that if your problem is that a law can't be applied then the current law should equally be removed - there is no reason to continue the pretence that some mysterious right to travel for women takes priority over the fetus' right to life, even though the right to health for women doesn't.
This is a law that prevents no-one with money and in good health from having an abortion, and deliberately so, since that was the question at the time of the referendum, as a result of the X case. Whereas women with no money, and/or a sudden emergency in their health that prevents travel are prevented from having an abortion, unless their lives are clearly in danger, but hoping that they are not so much in danger that they actually die. As we saw just a couple of years ago in Galway.
Either we apply the law or we get rid of it. And in this case, any Irish woman with money can circumvent the 8th amendment. Which makes more of a mockery of it than trying to apply it would!0 -
Ms Smyth replied: “I can’t agree with this court that I’m a witch. I’m a Catholic.”
This is almost slapstick.0 -
An anti-abortion protester accused of behaving like a witch told a Belfast court: “I’m no witch, I’m a Catholic”.
Well she may be a devout Catholic but her religious beliefs have nothing whatsover to do with her position on abortion. And the same goes for 99.99% of Irish "pro-lifers"...0 -
The guidelines for application of the Protection of life during pregnancy Act have at last been published.
http://health.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Guidance-Document-Final-September-2014.pdf
I'd be interested in any comments anyone has about them.
One thing that strikes me is section 3.1.1.b, about the risk to life from physical illness, which specifies that the risk to life is real and "can only be averted by termination of pregnancy" (in bold in the Act).
That seems to eliminate any illness where the risk of death is real but where there may be other, less effective treatments which might work. Would these all have to be tried first before deciding that a termination was the only treatment left? That's how it looks to me.
(I probably wouldn't have been so cynical if it hadn't been for how that poor woman was messed around earlier this year. Now it seems to me they are capable of anything.)0 -
Would these all have to be tried first before deciding that a termination was the only treatment left?
Yes, I think FG were quite clear that they were implementing the most restrictive thing possible which was legal per the X case judgement. This agrees with the "leave the woman a physical and mental wreck if necessary" Hederman minority view in the X case.
And Creighton & co. still quit the party over it. Unbelievable in this day and age.0 -
If there was a part you found particularly difficult to understand I'd be happy to go through it with you in more detail? I did break it down in response to the specific points you yourself made....So the gist of all that (as far as it is possible to ascertain!) is that because a particular Irish law can't be applied to all the citizens of the world, there is no point in Ireland doing anything other than pretending it is applying that law to Irish citizens?
The gist is that in line with the principle that a law that cannot be enforced should not be enacted (practicability), which is a fairly common one and can be found in many jurisdictions (just as MrPudding also pointed out) introducing legislation that purported to assert Irelands universal jurisdiction over the deliberate destruction of unborn human life (either for citizens or anyone committing the crime) would not result in a practicable law, just as it appears has been the case with the legislation introduced by Britain for universal jurisdiction over fgm (even restricted as it was to it's own citizens) which you provided as a workable example of how it could be done.
So, no, going by the UK's example it's quite clear there's no point in pretending we are applying a law to just our citizens, it's clear there's no point in pretending we could apply such laws at all except in such exceptionally limited circumstances as to be a legal nonsense.
But the current legislation does appear to be practicable? Unless you have some evidence that it cannot be (or is not being) applied?I would suggest that if your problem is that a law can't be applied then the current law should equally be removed - there is no reason to continue the pretence that some mysterious right to travel for women takes priority over the fetus' right to life, even though the right to health for women doesn't.
I'm sorry, but I don't recall the question at the time of the referenda being about money or good health? I suspect you may be trying to colour the events with your own agenda there...This is a law that prevents no-one with money and in good health from having an abortion, and deliberately so, since that was the question at the time of the referendum, as a result of the X case.
Actually, everyone in Ireland (citizens and otherwise) is prevented from having an abortion, regardless of how much money they have, unless their life is at risk. We just cannot, as we discussed, prevent them from having an abortion when they are not in Ireland.Whereas women with no money, and/or a sudden emergency in their health that prevents travel are prevented from having an abortion, unless their lives are clearly in danger, but hoping that they are not so much in danger that they actually die. As we saw just a couple of years ago in Galway.
Oh, we should apply the law. We just shouldn't imagine we can apply a similar one in other countries.Either we apply the law or we get rid of it. And in this case, any Irish woman with money can circumvent the 8th amendment. Which makes more of a mockery of it than trying to apply it would!0 -
This: “Once certification [for termination] has taken place a pregnant woman has a right to a termination of pregnancy as soon as it can be arranged. The ++clinicians responsible for her care will need to use their clinical judgement as to the most appropriate procedure to be carried out, in cognisance of the constitutional protection afforded to the unborn, ie a medical or surgical termination or an early delivery by induction or Caesarean section,” it reads. “Following certification, if the pregnancy is approaching viability, it is recommended that a multi-disciplinary discussion takes place to ascertain the most appropriate clinical management of the case.” might offer a clue as to how the clinicians might proceed.
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/abortion-guidelines-provide-for-induction-or-caesarean-section-1.1935578. Para on Changed Emphasis refers. In it, four different ways are mentioned. It's page 31 of the document link in volchitsa's post. It does differentiate between a medical or surgical termination or an early delivery by induction or Caesarean section, which might be seen to infer that an early delivery by induction or a caesarean are not terminations. Health warning: don't hold your breath. I was left with the distinct feeling that the "Y" case caesarean delivery was seen as a termination. That word, and what procedure it may be interpreted to mean, seem's to be key to any (future) clinician decision.
The Irish Times article mention's an earlier version of the document (which it has seen and printed as part of the report) and lists differences in the wording used in both documents on page 31.0 -
So it is enough that a law is applied, in your view? To be quite clear, are you saying that a law which appears to have meant that a suicidal woman who asked for a termination at 8 weeks ended up at 24 weeks getting a more or less forced Caesarean section, meaning that there is now a baby which has an 80% risk of being severely disabled is a satisfactory law if it is shown to have been applied correctly? Does the actual outcome of a law not have some importance too when evaluating it?But the current legislation does appear to be practicable? Unless you have some evidence that it cannot be (or is not being) applied?
Because it seems to me that going by its outcome, then if the law was applied correctly, it is a disastrous law, and if it wasn't, then it is still a disastrous law.
You are being dishonest if you are claiming that the referendum over travel was not about travelling for an abortion.I'm sorry, but I don't recall the question at the time of the referenda being about money or good health? I suspect you may be trying to colour the events with your own agenda there...
Actually, everyone in Ireland (citizens and otherwise) is prevented from having an abortion, regardless of how much money they have, unless their life is at risk. We just cannot, as we discussed, prevent them from having an abortion when they are not in Ireland.
Oh, we should apply the law. We just shouldn't imagine we can apply a similar one in other countries.
But even if it weren't, it would still be problematic to have an amendment to protect unborn human life with the following priorities of rights:
1) travel
2) protection of the pregnant woman's life but not health
2B) protection of unborn life
3) protection of the pregnant woman's health
So how are we applying the law when we are clearly circumventing the constitution, by definition the most crucial part of the nation's law, by putting a right to travel for abortion above the right to life of the unborn.
Unless you think that the Irish people really believed that the right to travel, but not the right to own a house or have a job or any other secondary "right" really is more important than the right to life of someone, whether born or unborn. I don't believe that for a second. We all knew what we were voting about.0 -
For a law to be practicable, it is enough that the law should be capable of being put into practice and doing what it is supposed to.So it is enough that a law is applied, in your view?
To be even clearer, there's nothing in what you've said that (even it were a full and accurate rendition of the facts) shows the law is not practicable. In fact, given that the woman informed the relevant people of her problems when she was 23 weeks pregnant, they acted remarkably quickly; the only substantial delay took place when she when on hunger strike because she wanted the child killed rather than delivered. Which means so far, the law is considerably more practicable than many people, including myself, thought it would be.To be quite clear, are you saying that a law which appears to have meant that a suicidal woman who asked for a termination at 8 weeks <...> is a satisfactory law if it is shown to have been applied correctly?
Which part of the legal process that occured do you think was disastrous, or is it just that a live child resulted that you think is disastrous?Because it seems to me that going by its outcome, then if the law was applied correctly, it is a disastrous law, and if it wasn't, then it is still a disastrous law.
I said it wasn't about money or good health, which is what you said the question was at the time. It's dishonest to pretend I might have been claiming something I didn't mention.You are being dishonest if you are claiming that the referendum over travel was not about travelling for an abortion.
I don't think anyone is proposing that we should amend the constitution to do that?But even if it weren't, it would still be problematic to have an amendment to protect unborn human life with the following priorities of rights:
1) travel
2) protection of the pregnant woman's life but not health
2B) protection of unborn life
3) protection of the pregnant woman's health
Well, I don't believe we are circumventing the Constitution. To save the argument though, the Supreme Court rules on whether a law is Constitutional or not. If you think the law is circumventing the Constitution, you surely think someone else would have noticed it and endeavored to bring it before the Supreme Court at some point in the last 22 years?So how are we applying the law when we are clearly circumventing the constitution, by definition the most crucial part of the nation's law, by putting a right to travel for abortion above the right to life of the unborn.
Well, I don't know about 'secondary' rights, but I'm sure the right to travel is not more important than the right to life. Yet, for all the reasons that have been discussed in the hundreds of pages of this thread, that does not mean that someone's right to travel can be restricted in case they might kill someone in another jurisdiction. Or even because they might kill something.Unless you think that the Irish people really believed that the right to travel, but not the right to own a house or have a job or any other secondary "right" really is more important than the right to life of someone, whether born or unborn.0 -
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Well, I don't know about 'secondary' rights, but I'm sure the right to travel is not more important than the right to life. Yet, for all the reasons that have been discussed in the hundreds of pages of this thread, that does not mean that someone's right to travel can be restricted in case they might kill someone in another jurisdiction. Or even because they might kill something.
The presumption of innocence. plus I was thinking that there's definitely an Irish position of not presuming to know what the reason is behind a pregnant girl or woman travelling abroad, and of not assuming or saying that she might have the intent to have a medical procedure while abroad that would be in contravention of article 40.3, plausible-deniability cover's all. The reason can be because people don't give a damn any more, don't care to inquire, or believe that it is none of their business, or wish for the time of squinting windows to be gone forever.0
This discussion has been closed.
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