Stalins plans prior to entering the war

Shout Dust

What were Stalins plans before his country was eventually dragged into the war? I've read conflicting accounts, some that he thought he could enter the axis with Germany and Italy, and was shocked Hitler had betrayed him. Others say his plan was to build his strength, let the fascists and capitalists fight and weaken each other before crushing both. Others said he entered into the non-aggression pact with Germany with both sides knowing they would eventually come to blows, just not so soon, and others that he wanted to avoid war altogether and hoped to stay out of any potential conflict.

Are there any good books on his true thoughts and motivations prior to the war?

boomchicawawa

Hi, this isn't my area of expertise but I read that he had ignored warnings from the British that the Germans were going to attack, leaving me with the idea that he was not obviously rearming for war, although he was astute to realise that the fight between the two clashing idiologies would happen some day I'm sure

I'd recommend that you have a look at the 'Axis History Forum' of which I'm a member, they have members there who really know their stuff and are experts in all the many layers and interests of WW2 from both the Axis and Allied sides. They do not promote Holocaust denial or tolerate 'fan boy' posts, and they insist on sourced quotes for most opinions, do you can rely on the info given. You will get a good recommendation for books to read there also. Hope to see you there soon !

Manach

Stalin's plans were at time contradictory. He was interested in territorial expansion eg Finland, Baltics etc. At other times he was interested in an alliance with the Germans, as per his hosting of high level talks and supply of raw materials to Germany up to the day of the invasion. Best guess, he took an opportunistic view, and likely thought the pre-Invasion built-up of Axis forces was a bargaining position.

Manic Moran

Finland wasn't so much territorial expansion as much as he wanted a buffer zone with Germany. When the Finnish refused permission to let him station troops on their soil to provide a little maneuver room in the defense of St Petersburg, he took the ground by force.

The supply of raw materials was simply a case of buying time. Stalin knew damned well that the Germans were going to attack him, but he also knew that his military was in no particular shape to stop them either. As a result, no matter what the cost, he ensured that the deliveries to Germany were on time and to the levels required.

Manach

That is not the case - based on my reading of recent works including biographies on Mannerheim and Von Mainsten,. The account of the Soviet demands on Finland were territorial in nature as per their diplomatic meetings with the Finns and the strategic surprise sprung on the Soviets was genuine. Soviet officers who did raised the issue prior to the invasion were disciplined

Tony EH

Stalin was a great believer in exporting his brand of Communism and certainly wasn't averse to moving into other countries by force, or threat of force as evidenced by Russia’s aggressive moves before her war with Germany and her allies.

There were many in Germany and in other parts of Europe who were of a firm belief that Russia was intent on expansion westwards and her actions before 1941 were seen as proof of that. Hitler certainly believed that Russia and Communism was the greatest threat to Europe and that played a huge part in his political outlook and his own aggressive moves.

But, he wasn't alone in thinking that way. Before the outbreak of war in 1939, most European countries believed that Russia was an entity that was intent on expansion, if not by military means, then certainly by political mechanisations. Communist parties in Britain, France, Belgium and other nations were viewed with great suspicion and files were kept on their members by the ruling elite of the day.

It was Communism and not Nazism that was viewed as the most serious threat to the stability of Europe by the governments and ruling classes of western Europe, many of whom had more in common with Hitler's political ideals than they did with Stalin.

But while the "icebreaker" position is shunned by many today, at the time, Russia's moves to revitalise their military, their aggressive moves into the Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, their unprovoked war with Finland AND their attack on Poland was all evidence that Stalin was not content to remain within his own country's borders.

Her pact with Germany suited her as well as with the elimination of Poland, it created a common border on land that wasn't Russian, which many in the west viewed as an eventual frontline. However, it was Germany who would benefit the most from this common border, at least at the beginning.

It's also no secret that Stalin was very happy with the situation in Europe post 1938, after Britain's about face regarding Poland and the unrest that followed. The confusing situation and subsequent declaration of war on Germany by Britain and France was greatly welcomed many within Communist party circles, who were quite happy to see the major nations of western Europe beating the crap out of each other, while they sat back and observed and there are a lot of people who believe that Stalin was waiting for Germany to become sufficiently weak from a war with the western powers. The most common scenario that European powers had in mind was a rerun of WWI, which would have seen chaos ensue in the west for the second time in 20 years.

But nobody would have placed any bets on the speed with which the German armed forces sweep all before them.

As for being "shocked" by Germany's attack in June 1941, I believe that the shock was by the timing and not the actual event. The non-aggression pact between Germany and Russia, put into effect to break her obligations to Britain and France, shocked people more. But most political minds knew that it was going to be a very fragile and tenuous alignment at best and a mere postponing of ideological clash or outright war at worst. When Germany launched Barbarossa, it was seen as a situation returning to normal in many ways and the state of affairs "righting" itself. There were many who were quite OK with Hitler's war on Russia too, especially in America, despite the rhetoric that was officially sanctioned.

Great post Tony.

I believe that Stalin knew that it would come to war with Germany eventually but he never thought in a million years it would be as soon as it was. Stalin was happy to build up his industry and his war machine. Hitler sensed this and he took his chance earlier then he probably wanted to as he realized it would have been a lot more difficult 4-5 years down the line which was the case. Most people that don't have an interest in history don't seem to realize just how close Germany were to winning their war with Russia. How different the world would be it's impossible to contemplate.

meathstevie

Going by what happened in the Spanish Civil war and the strategy applied in communist take overs elsewhere during the Cold War I think you'd be on fairly safe ground if you believe that Stalin's idea would have been to let the Germans, French and British slaughter each other and grab the remains.

As I said, similar tactics have been applied by so called socialists in Asia and Africa as well after colonianal conflicts, sit back, let someone else do the hard work and once the occupying forces had left and the real combattants were pummeled senseless organise the coup and hang on to power at all costs. A prime example and living fossil of that particular carry on is Robert Mugabe.

Reekwind

Tony EH wrote: »

Stalin was a great believer in exporting his brand of Communism and certainly wasn't averse to moving into other countries by force, or threat of force as evidenced by Russia’s aggressive moves before her war with Germany and her allies

Hmmm? I assume that this is a reference to the Soviet annexation of lands offered to her on a platter? In which case I'd very much characterise this as an opportunistic attempt to recreate the border of the pre-revolution Russian state, rather than any ideological crusade.

The reality is that, contrary to 'Red Scare' fears of contemporary diplomats, Stalin's gaze was turned almost exclusively inwards. He assumed that a confrontation would eventually come but, having rejected Trotsky's thesis as to the necessity of ever expanding revolution, was in absolutely no hurry to export revolution. The USSR could, he was convinced, survive in a capitalist world.

His actions pre- and post-war bear this out. Take the neutering (and eventual winding up of) the Comintern, the half-hearted and deeply self-serving intervention in Spain, the diplomacy with the West (arguably cumulating in the infamous percentages deal) and the refusal to intervene in Greece. These are not the actions of an idealogue

So I'd portray Stalin as an opportunist looking for territorial expansion in the lands of the former Russian Empire but always careful not to overplay his hand.

It's also no secret that Stalin was very happy with the situation in Europe post 1938, after Britain's about face regarding Poland and the unrest that followed.

Be careful here. I don't disagree with the fundamental thesis (ie Stalin expecting a repeat of WWI) but let's not forget that Moscow spent the better part of a decade trying to piece together an anti-Hitler alliance and that negotiations with the Allies were ongoing up to the summer of 1939. It was the failure of the latter (and particularly Britain's willingness to engage) that damned the 'collective security' policy that Litvinov had been flogging around Europe

Stalin was unlikely to have been gutted by the outcome of 1939's negotiations but that only came to pass after his original policy of alliance with the West had floundered

Shout Dust wrote:

Others say his plan was to build his strength, let the fascists and capitalists fight and weaken each other before crushing both

The assumption of pretty much all Europe prior to the war - and this explains a lot about appeasement - was that Britain/France and Germany would fight each other to a standstill in a long war before one of them collapsed. Out of the ashes, as with 1917/18, would emerge social strife, revolution and years of turmoil

So there was no grand plan for Soviet tanks to sweep down to the Bay of Biscay but there was that shared assumption that another war would see the collapse of the West and the rise of a new generation of communist state

Deleted User wrote:

Most people that don't have an interest in history don't seem to realize just how close Germany were to winning their war with Russia

I'd suggest the opposite. Most people who have an interest in the war tend to realise just how fanciful the German objectives were (the AA Line? Good luck) and just how desperate the overall Nazi strategic situation was. For all the Soviet 'backs to the wall' effort in Winter 1941, Barbarossa was a failure and Typhoon came no where close to taking Moscow (Guderian couldn't take Tula, never mind approach the capital). And that was the last chance to win it

AllthingsCP

Deleted User wrote: »

Great post Tony.

I believe that Stalin knew that it would come to war with Germany eventually but he never thought in a million years it would be as soon as it was. Stalin was happy to build up his industry and his war machine. Hitler sensed this and he took his chance earlier then he probably wanted to as he realized it would have been a lot more difficult 4-5 years down the line which was the case. Most people that don't have an interest in history don't seem to realize just how close Germany were to winning their war with Russia. How different the world would be it's impossible to contemplate.

I don't think Germany was close to winning a war with Russia, Defeating a Government is one thing, Defeating a Nation its terrain and its weather is another, It was a huge error on the German side to attack USSR when it did, A war on one front is hard a war on ever-front is nearly impossible to win.

Russia had firmly crushed japan on the Manchurian-Mongolian frontier one week before before the outbreak of the war in Europe, The undeclared war raged from May to September 1939 embroiling over 100,000 troops and 1,000 tanks and aircraft. Some 30,000-50,000 men were killed and wounded. In the climactic battle.

8th Italian Army by 26 January 1943 had really only the Tridentina Division and even it was not fully operational by February 1943 the Italian Army in Russia from frostbitten and critically illness was only a paper Division and eventually did not exist. Italian 8th Army lost was huge in Russia nearly 90,000 dead and 5,000 missing 34,474 wounded and frostbitten.

USSR Crushed the Axis minor country's, which left a drained Eastern front that seem to engulf manpower resources and money also a force of 3 million German soldier hungry demoralized that could have been a better use in Northern Italy or Western or Northern Europe.

Also the Attack on USSR was not in the lines of a grand Strategy but more of a political move to obtain land for future race of Germany, The German Army was a perfect fighting force in land combat, But when Hitler took charged and demanded that the Nazi party ideas where to overcome his High Command plans of actions and advise from his top Generals that's when the problem arose.

Reekwind

AllthingsCP wrote: »

The German Army was a perfect fighting force in land combat, But when Hitler took charged and demanded that the Nazi party ideas where to overcome his High Command plans of actions and advise from his top Generals that's when the problem arose.

With the caveat that if it hadn't been for Hitler then the Wehrmacht would still have been fighting its way through northern France in 1941

Baked.noodle

Interesting presentation by Dr. Michael Parenti on what he believes is the real causes of World War II. It is well delivered and very illuminating. Definitely worth half an hour.

Balaclava1991

Hitler was always going to go to war with Soviet Russia which he believed was the nest of the Jewish Bolsheviks.
The central tenet of Nazis was that Germany and the Aryan race were destined to dominate the continent with subhumans either exterminated or reduced to slavery.
Nazi Germany was eventually going to go to war with the Soviets.
Stalin wanted most of all to survive as leader of the Soviet Union while world revolution was not really his priority.
If the opportunity presented itself he would grab what territory he could - he grabbed Eastern Poland, the Baltic states, Bessarabia and invaded Finland between 1939-1941.
By the end of the war he was in a race with the Western Allies to grab as much of Germany and Europe as he could.