The Soviets could have beaten the Germans without help

realweirdo

I hear this a lot and to be honest it's not really supported by history.

The view of some is the Soviets if left to their own devices, would have eventuallly defeated the Germans.

No western or southern front, no lend lease or none of that. Just a straight fight between the Germans and the Soviets.

My own view is it would have been a long drawn out conflict, but the Germans would have eventually won.

long range shooter

realweirdo wrote: »

I hear this a lot and to be honest it's not really supported by history.

The view of some is the Soviets if left to their own devices, would have eventuallly defeated the Germans.

No western or southern front, no lend lease or none of that. Just a straight fight between the Germans and the Soviets.

My own view is it would have been a long drawn out conflict, but the Germans would have eventually won.

The Germans got off to a strong start in the first six months with relatively few casualties. If they had continued at that pace, they would have won the war. In 1942, the casualty rates of about 2 to 1 represented a rough equilibrium, of Soviet vs. Axis forces. After that, the Soviet loss rate, approaching 1 to 1, was less than their preponderance of manpower, which is why they ultimately won.
In 1941, the Germans had the advantages of surprise, preparedness, superior tactical doctrine. In 1942, the Germans had lost the first two advantages, but their superior doctrine made the difference. By 1943, the Soviet forces had caught up, in some cases overtaken the Germans in quality of equipment, and doctrine,
(Only the effect of being on the defensive allowed the Germans to inflict losses as slightly greater than a 1-1 rate.)

Example: The Soviets start with 10 million men against 5 million for the Germans. Each army inflicts 1 million casualties on the other. The "ratio of losses" (per the question) is 1 to 1, but the Germans have a 2 to 1 advantage in combat effectiveness because they inflicted the same 1 million casualties using half as many men. If the ratio of Soviet to German losses were 1.25 million to 1.00 million (slightly more than 1 to 1), the ratio of German to Soviet combat effectiveness would be 2.50 to 1, in line with DePuy's calculations.

Jawgap

the Germans could have beaten the Soviets militarily - as Napoleon did at Borodino, but also as Napoleon found out winning on the battlefield and actually defeating the Russians (Soviets) are two completely different things.

DazMarz

By the time the Western Allies opened up the second front in France, the Soviets were already pushing the Germans back everywhere. The Battle of Stalingrad had been won by the Soviets, the Siege of Leningrad lifted, the Battle of Moscow won and the Soviets were in the processes of liberating much of the territory the Germans had invaded in 1941-43. The tide had already swung in the Soviets favour long before the Allied invasion at Normandy.

Even the Allied landings in Italy were ineffectual and had no great bearing on the overall outcome of the war.

Without lease, yes, it would have been more difficult for the Soviets, but even without a second front in France, the Soviets would have kept pushing and pushing. The western Allies dithered and delayed the second front for too long. Had the Normandy landings been made in 1943, they would have had a bigger bearing.

The Soviets were under no illusions about German intentions; they knew what the Germans intended once they got their hands on the Soviet Union. Death for all Slavs and Jews in Eastern Europe to create Lebensraum for the new, ascendant German race that was Hitler's dream. Unlike in France or Denmark or Norway, where the native peoples were not systematically exterminated, the same could not be said for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The mistreatment of Soviet prisoners by the Germans was horrifying. The Soviets knew that twice in the first stages of the 20th Century that Germany had invaded Russia. The Russians wanted to prevent this from ever happening again. By the time the Germans' failures at Stalingrad, Leningrad and Moscow rolled around, the Soviets were no longer happy with merely reclaiming what the Germans had taken. They wanted to ensure that Germany would never again invade their homeland. They would not rest until Germany and her allies lay broken before them.

By the crudest possible metric, the Soviets had a huge advantage over the Germans in one crucial area; sheer population. In 1939, Nazi Germany had approximately 70 million people. The Soviet Union had approximately 195 million people. No matter what, the Soviets would always have enough people to outlast the Germans. The Soviets lost anywhere between 27 and 35 million people in the War. And still had a huge numerical advantage over any other nation in the war. Put another way, no matter how much the Germans cut into the USSR, there would always be Soviets there to take up arms and fight against the Germans.

As someone said, it is one thing to invade Russia. It is another thing to defeat it. The Germans also missed a huge opportunity in Ukraine and Belarus. These peoples had been hugely mistreated by Stalin in the purges of the 1920's and 30's. They had no love for the Soviet system or for Stalin. However, instead of tapping into this resentment and using it to their advantage, the Germans were even more brutal than the Soviets had been. A minority of Ukrainians did enter into Waffen-SS divisions, but for the most part, these populations were brutalised and destroyed by the Germans. Thus, despite not being supportive of the Soviet system, these people had little choice in the face of annihilation but to take up arms against the Germans. The partisan forces in these regions inflicted heavy losses on the Germans, but at great cost. Villages and towns were razed to the ground by the SS and estimates of over a million partisans and civilians were murdered by the Germans.

Once the Germans had been defeated at Stalingrad, Leningrad, Moscow and decisively at Kursk, the tide would only go in one direction. Once the Soviets began their long, bloody push westwards, they would not stop until they had smashed the Germans and until the Fascist movement lay in ruins. The cost for them not to do so was too great; had the Soviets made a peace pact with the Germans after repelling them from Soviet territory, how long would it be before the Germans had licked their wounds sufficiently to give it another go? The Soviets knew that the only way to preserve their country's security was to eliminate the threat altogether.

Could the Soviets have done this without the Allies landing in Normandy and Italy? In my opinion, without question. It would just have taken them longer. By the winter of 1946, I would hazard that the Soviets would have conquered all of Germany and Austria, the remaining Nazis being driven into France and Italy. And the Soviets hot on their heels, ploughing through France to Paris.

Tinfoil hat on: The Western Allies only invaded France when it became apparent that the Soviets were winning decisively. They wanted to ensure that the Western European nations did not fall to the Soviets, so acted too late to truly influence the ultimate outcome of the war (Germany's defeat) but entered to ensure that the Soviets would not get all of Germany and thus Western Europe.

Tinfoil hat off...

I truly believe that the Soviets would have defeated the Germans eventually, without western intervention. It would have taken longer (the Germans would have been able to concentrate all their efforts on the Soviets with no western front to deal with), but ultimately the manpower, productive power, pure patriotism, fear of annihilation and hatred of the fascist invaders would have seen the Soviets prevail. The Germans' only hope had lain in victories at Moscow and Stalingrad. They failed.

Even if the Germans had captured Moscow, captured Stalingrad and thus the Baku oilfields and had razed Leningrad to the ground (as per Hitler's orders), the fact that over one hundred million Soviets and a huge amount of production lay behind the Caucuses and the Urals and out of German reach meant that the Soviets would have been far from beaten. In fact, it would have degenerated into something of a Vietnam/Afghanistan situation; an endless, forever-war of attrition with neither side able to crack the other. This would have led to a huge drain on Germany's manpower and resources and left them open to attack again.

All in all, the idea of the Germans invading the Soviet Union was a folly that was never going to be winnable, but could easily have been made easier for them had tactics been tweaked, the invasion started earlier and several objectives that failed been achieved.

Whatever about anything else, one thing must never be forgotten: the sacrifice and heroism of the people of the Soviet Union in the Second World War was breathtaking. No other nation did more to defeat the Nazis than the Soviets did. The losses they suffered, in materiel and manpower, was enormous. The Soviets faced dozens of German divisions, dwarfing the amount of resistance that other Allies faced. While many media outlets paint D-Day as the decisive battle of World War II, the reality is that Stalingrad and other battles in the Soviet Union had a much bigger role in the ultimate defeat of Nazism.

Jawgap

@dazmarz you make a lot of good points, but all the victories you mentioned were achieved with significant Allied (and particularly US) help.

The trucks etc they provided were crucial. But the 400g of Spam they put in each Soviet soldier's belly each day was critical.

On their own they could easily have avoided being defeated but they needed significant Allied materiel help to go on the strategic offensive.

Also while they prosecuted the critical land offensive they made no contribution to the strategic air effort - which raises a question as to whether they could have gone on the offensive if the Germans had been free to send the greater portion of their air forces to the east.

As regards Italy, the landings were strategically insignificant, but it still tied up 20+ divisions. Also by late 1944 there were about 250 heavy flak guns along the whole of the Eastern Front, while in Italy there were over 2,200 - nearly 1,400 of which were drawn from the Eastern Front over the course of the year.

Reekwind

The war was fundamentally lost by Germany in 1941. The failure to defeat the USSR consigned the third Reich to a long war: exactly the sort of conflict that it had sought to avoid. Once the Soviets survived that initial onslaught then they were always capable, even drawing solely on their own resources, of outproducing the Nazis.

In this key phase of the war Western aid was of little note. The decisive battles around Moscow were fought almost exclusively with Soviet weapons. It would take another year for materials to be available in significant numbers. That's not to say that every little didn't help but that the Soviets had more or less broken the back of the Nazi invasion before Western material really began to count.

The big benefit of course was enabling the Soviets to cement their success in '43. The advance across Europe would have been impossible, for example, without the availability of US jeeps and trucks. So without Lend Lease I'd predict that the Soviets would still win but it would have been a much longer and protracted affair.

Other fronts in the West were distractions to the Germans but I wouldn't consider them key. Siphoning resources off from the East is well and good but largely academic when it comes to winning the war post-Stalingrad.

DazMarz wrote: »

By the crudest possible metric, the Soviets had a huge advantage over the Germans in one crucial area; sheer population. In 1939, Nazi Germany had approximately 70 million people. The Soviet Union had approximately 195 million people. No matter what, the Soviets would always have enough people to outlast the Germans. The Soviets lost anywhere between 27 and 35 million people in the War. And still had a huge numerical advantage over any other nation in the war. Put another way, no matter how much the Germans cut into the USSR, there would always be Soviets there to take up arms and fight against the Germans.

Hmmm. Keep in mind that the losses of '41 were truly staggering. After Barbarossa it wasn't until late '43 (IIRC) that the Soviets came to enjoy a numerical superiority along the front. And by the closing stages of the war the Red Army was plagued by severe manpower shortages. Even a country the size of the USSR couldn't easily shrug off losses of 20-30m

As someone said, it is one thing to invade Russia. It is another thing to defeat it. The Germans also missed a huge opportunity in Ukraine and Belarus. These peoples had been hugely mistreated by Stalin in the purges of the 1920's and 30's. They had no love for the Soviet system or for Stalin. However, instead of tapping into this resentment and using it to their advantage, the Germans were even more brutal than the Soviets had been

That's because the Nazis had the same objective as the Soviets: the maximum extraction of resources at the minimum expense. Which invariably translated into brutal coercion. The Nazis then added a racial hierarchy and their typical overbearing arrogance to the mix.

So I don't believe that there was an "opportunity" in the occupied lands. At least not without fundamentally altering the nature of the Nazi regime and, indeed, the whole purpose of their war of conquest.

BlaasForRafa

Reekwind wrote: »

Other fronts in the West were distractions to the Germans but I wouldn't consider them key. Siphoning resources off from the East is well and good but largely academic when it comes to winning the war post-Stalingrad.

I think you greatly underestimate the resources moved to fend off the western allies, most importantly the move of the bulk of the jagdwaffe from the eastern front to defence of the reich duty against the american day bomber offensive. In 1942 about 70% of the Jagdwaffe was ranged against the soviets, in 1944 that was down to less than 40%.

And even with only parts of 4 jagdgeschwader the germans cut a fearful swathe through the soviet air force. German ground attack units were able to operate on the eastern front (including stuka units) in a way that would be absolutely impossible against the western allies. Imagine if the Germans had had another 700 fighters on the eastern front in 1944 it could have decimated soviet tactical air support and forced at least a stalemate.

Reekwind

BlaasForRafa wrote: »

I think you greatly underestimate the resources moved to fend off the western allies, most importantly the move of the bulk of the jagdwaffe from the eastern front to defence of the reich duty against the american day bomber offensive. In 1942 about 70% of the Jagdwaffe was ranged against the soviets, in 1944 that was down to less than 40%.

And those planes would have been useful* in the East. But by mid-1943 they weren't going to change the course of the war. That was decided first at Moscow and then Stalingrad. Following the latter the only question is at when the Soviets win.

Which was my point: the unhelpful transfer of men and materials to the West largely occurred post-Stalingrad, ie when the war in the East had already been lost.

*Note the word 'useful'. They would have helped but 700 planes (and fighters at that) making a difference to the fate of the entire front? No. The twenty division stuck in Italy would have been of far more use

Jawgap

Reekwind wrote: »

And those planes would have been useful* in the East. But by mid-1943 they weren't going to change the course of the war. That was decided first at Moscow and then Stalingrad. Following the latter the only question is at when the Soviets win.

Which was my point: the unhelpful transfer of men and materials to the West largely occurred post-Stalingrad, ie when the war in the East had already been lost.

*Note the word 'useful'. They would have helped but 700 planes (and fighters at that) making a difference to the fate of the entire front? No. The twenty division stuck in Italy would have been of far more use

The Germans could never have defeated the Soviets - they could, potentially, have forced the USSR to come to terms, but no doubt that would only have amounted to a cessation of hostilities for a limited period.

The point about the 700 a/c implies something quite significant - that the CBO was not in full swing. If the Germans could have afforded to redeploy 700 a/c to the east then that implies no CBO, which implies more fuel being available, largely unhindered transport and transit and less disruption to production.

So, to return to the point of the thread, is it possible that the Soviets, could have stopped, then reversed the German advance before going on the offensive themselves to defeat a Germany not suffering under the weight of aerial bombardment, without Allied help?

My opinion would be that yes they could have halted the Germans, and scored some local reverses, but without Allied help there's no way they could have gone over on to the offensive, even if they had saved Stalingrad (which they probably would have).

Elmer Blooker

realweirdo wrote: »

I hear this a lot and to be honest it's not really supported by history.

The view of some is the Soviets if left to their own devices, would have eventuallly defeated the Germans.

No western or southern front, no lend lease or none of that. Just a straight fight between the Germans and the Soviets.

My own view is it would have been a long drawn out conflict, but the Germans would have eventually won.

Yes, it would have been a longer drawn out conflict but the Germans could never have won it, they didn't have the morale which the Russians did after Stalingrad.
The ordinary German conscripts (as opposed to the die hard indoctrinated Nazis) didn't even know what they doing in Russia or what they were fighting for. They marched into Russia to save Germany from Bolshevism but doubts crept in very quickly - how could such a primitive country with no roads and a population living in hovels be a threat to Germany? That's what the ones with a reasonable education thought. Watch any WW2 movie (from a German angle) and there's always the ordinary soldiers who just want to survive and go home and the despised nazis among them who they hate even more than the Russian enemy.

Reekwind

Jawgap wrote: »

My opinion would be that yes they could have halted the Germans, and scored some local reverses, but without Allied help there's no way they could have gone over on to the offensive, even if they had saved Stalingrad (which they probably would have).

Yet the Soviets proved capable to inflicting crushing defeats like Stalingrad largely without Western aid. I don't mean to belittle the assistance (and industrial support in '42 was useful) but it wasn't until post-Stalingrad that the Lend Lease programme really began to kick in. For example, at the beginning of 1943 (according to this site) just over 5% of Red Army trucks were US made.

Now obviously there would be nothing like the 24 hour advance across Poland but, even with no distractions in the West, the Wehrmacht couldn't sustain many Stalingrads or Bagrations without cracking. They might hold more territory than they did historically but in a war of material or attrition with the USSR there could only ever be one victor. That basic equation hadn't changed since summer '41.

So I would see the Soviets winning (or at least the Germans losing) but in a less decisive manner than historically, maybe taking an additional few years.

Jawgap

Reekwind wrote: »

Yet the Soviets proved capable to inflicting crushing defeats like Stalingrad largely without Western aid. I don't mean to belittle the assistance (and industrial support in '42 was useful) but it wasn't until post-Stalingrad that the Lend Lease programme really began to kick in. For example, at the beginning of 1943 (according to this site) just over 5% of Red Army trucks were US made.

Now obviously there would be nothing like the 24 hour advance across Poland but, even with no distractions in the West, the Wehrmacht couldn't sustain many Stalingrads or Bagrations without cracking. They might hold more territory than they did historically but in a war of material or attrition with the USSR there could only ever be one victor. That basic equation hadn't changed since summer '41.

So I would see the Soviets winning (or at least the Germans losing) but in a less decisive manner than historically, maybe taking an additional few years.

I think it depemds how you define 'western aid' - the fact the Allies were fighting and threatening large sections of the Reich (at least in the Germans' minds) meant less troops, resources etc for the Eastern Front.

I would agree that the Soviets could have held Stalingrad, but there is no way they could have moved over on to the offensive without significant Allied aid in all its forms.

Plus in terms of equations, the following may be illustrative. Germany's GDP in 1939 was $384 billion (at 1990 prices) - it rose to $412 billion by 1942 and was $437 billion in 1994 before collapsing to $310 billion in 1945.

Meanwhile in the same period, the USSR's started at $366 billion in 1939 and overtook Germany's in 1940 registering $417 billion (as opposed to $387 billion), before falling back to $359 billion in 1941, $274 billion in 1942, $305 billion in 1943, $362 billion in 1944 and $343 in 1945.

The difference become starker if you add the GDP from the conquered territories into Germany's GDP - for example in 1942, occupied USSR is estimated to have contributed a further $134 billion to the Axis GDP pot of $1,552 billion.

The fact the USSR was spared having to mount both a strategic air and naval campaign helped immensely, leaving them to focus on fighting the critical land campaign of the War.

Tzar Chasm

Could the USSR have made the same sort of impact on German production that the allied bombing campaign managed?

in a straight up Nazi Germany v the USSR fight, ie western europe conquered and subdued, terms with britain , a memorandum of understanding with the americas and the japanese not playing sillybuggers, I couldnt see the soviets winning

the germans were hamstrung in production, towards the end of the war thet were leaps and bounds ahead of everyone else technologically but massivly behind in production

if they only had the ussr campaign, therefore dealing with the KV1 & t32 in initial battles and developing the tiger more quickly, and the pressing need for a long range jet bomber to strike over the urals. Couple this with their infrastructure not beig destroyed and yu have a formidable adversary.

In this scenario germany might be in wit a shout of victory,


So, in a rambling conclusion, without bomber command the soviets would have been fcuked

Tony EH

realweirdo wrote: »

I hear this a lot and to be honest it's not really supported by history.

The view of some is the Soviets if left to their own devices, would have eventuallly defeated the Germans.

No western or southern front, no lend lease or none of that. Just a straight fight between the Germans and the Soviets.

My own view is it would have been a long drawn out conflict, but the Germans would have eventually won.

No.

The best the Germans could have hoped fro would have been an uneasy truce.

There's just no way that the Germans have a winning scenario. 80% of Wehrmacht casualties occurred on the eastern front. Even its small to medium battles generally dwarf anything in its western counterpart.

Put bluntly, even though her GDP was greater than Russia's until 1944, they simply didn't have the manpower or the equipment necessary to defeat the Soviets.

Tony EH

BlaasForRafa wrote: »

I think you greatly underestimate the resources moved to fend off the western allies, most importantly the move of the bulk of the jagdwaffe from the eastern front to defence of the reich duty against the american day bomber offensive. In 1942 about 70% of the Jagdwaffe was ranged against the soviets, in 1944 that was down to less than 40%.

And even with only parts of 4 jagdgeschwader the germans cut a fearful swathe through the soviet air force. German ground attack units were able to operate on the eastern front (including stuka units) in a way that would be absolutely impossible against the western allies. Imagine if the Germans had had another 700 fighters on the eastern front in 1944 it could have decimated soviet tactical air support and forced at least a stalemate.

However, by 1943 the war was effectively over for the Germans and it wouldn't have taken just German fighters to turn that tide.

Once Kursk had happened, there was ONLY one way for the Germans. It would have taken longer, but it still would have happened.

The only way the Germans have a winner is if they outweigh the Russians in 1941. They didn't and wouldn't have even with resources allocated to the west.

It would have been a longer war, but there's no win for the Germans.

Tony EH

Tzar Chasm wrote: »

Could the USSR have made the same sort of impact on German production that the allied bombing campaign managed?

There was no real impact on German production by the allied bombing campaign though. German production actually went up in at the height of bombing during 1944!

The RAF night bombing campaign was particularly useless in this regard. Simply tipping thousands of tons of bombs on a city centre may have been great for killing people, but it didn't do much to damage German production.

When the allies targeting priority changed to Germany's synthetic oil production, that was when a truly significant dent was made. But, by the that switch was made Germany's future was certain.

Reekwind

Jawgap wrote:

I think it depemds how you define 'western aid' - the fact the Allies were fighting and threatening large sections of the Reich (at least in the Germans' minds) meant less troops, resources etc for the Eastern Front.

German army commitments to Western Europe in '42 and early '43 consisted of a few old men building sandcastles in France. I exaggerate horrendously, of course, but still maintain that it wasn't until mid-1943 that you see major transfers of aerial and land assets to the West. Until that point the Nazi war machine was bent towards the East, with Africa as the only major distraction. And while that latter theatre is worth noting, the minimum resources were devoted to Western Europe until mid-1943.

Plus in terms of equations, the following may be illustrative. Germany's GDP in 1939 was $384 billion (at 1990 prices) - it rose to $412 billion by 1942 and was $437 billion in 1994 before collapsing to $310 billion in 1945.

Meanwhile in the same period, the USSR's started at $366 billion in 1939 and overtook Germany's in 1940 registering $417 billion (as opposed to $387 billion), before falling back to $359 billion in 1941, $274 billion in 1942, $305 billion in 1943, $362 billion in 1944 and $343 in 1945.

The difference become starker if you add the GDP from the conquered territories into Germany's GDP - for example in 1942, occupied USSR is estimated to have contributed a further $134 billion to the Axis GDP pot of $1,552 billion.

Which illustrates the problem with using bald GDP as an indicator. The reality is that the Soviets were immensely more successful in turning its economic base into material for war. To quote Mark Harrison, "overall Soviet production outweighed that of Germany in virtually every item"; he presents the table below that shows (even in the dark days of 1942) the Soviets enjoyed a decisive advantage in production.



Now the reasons for this are interesting but, for the purpose of this discussion, it's simply worth noting that it wasn't until 1944 (when the Soviets deliberately began to cool their economy and ease production) that Germany began to reach parity in the production stakes.

GDP becomes even more misleading when you considered the occupied territories. Germany didn't simply add, say, France's domestic product to its economy; it could only extract a small percentage of the surplus wealth available. This was typically in the form of forced labour and raw materials - factory productivity in armaments industries in France/Czechoslovakia remained notoriously low. Contrast with the ability of the Soviets to maximise their economic output over their vast territory.

Jawgap

I'm familiar with Mark Harrison's work and it's of a high standard.

A couple of points to consider though.....

First, after you've made your guns, bombs, ammunition etc how are you going to transport them? The US provided not only significant amount of trucks but also over 1,000 locomotives to transport men and materiel around.

Second, when you get the tanks and a/c to where they are needed, various HQs need to co-ordinate to get them into action etc - the 36,000 radio sets the US sent out no doubt helped with that.

Third, people have to be fed - over 50% of the Soviets tinned food supplies came from the US.

And that was just Lend-Lease. There were other programmes the USSR were allowed to avail of both before and after the initiation of Barbarossa.

During the Winter War for example, the USSR was sold (admittedly not given) over 1,500 million litres of aviation fuel - the good stuff too at 99/100 octane.

They were able to outproduce the Germans in things like guns etc because a certain proportion of the more complicated manufacturing process such as those involving locos, was carried out by the Allies.

And even if that wasn't enough - I'd suggest the Pacific War waged by the British / Commonwealth forces and the US was conclusively of incalculable assistance to the USSR, despite their early victories against Japan in Siberia - it certainly prevented the Japanese from going back for round #2.

Jawgap

Tony EH wrote: »

There was no real impact on German production by the allied bombing campaign though. German production actually went up in at the height of bombing during 1944!

The RAF night bombing campaign was particularly useless in this regard. Simply tipping thousands of tons of bombs on a city centre may have been great for killing people, but it didn't do much to damage German production.

When the allies targeting priority changed to Germany's synthetic oil production, that was when a truly significant dent was made. But, by the that switch was made Germany's future was certain.

Some German production went up - usually at the expense of other areas. Also, generally speaking as the War progressed the Germans rationalised and focused on fewer models of equipment that were generally easier produce even if the armed forces didn't want them - this let them produce quantitatively more materiel, often at the expense of quality.

The 'trajectory' of improvement was well set before the war and established during the war and was based on labour and capital rationalisation. The question is whether the production gains seen by the Germans would have been dramatic or of a different nature if they were not under pressure from the bombing.

Compare the rate of efficiency gains experienced by the US and UK with Germany and you get some idea of the type of impact bombing had.

In respect of German production, ammunition was a constant problem, as was steel - steel output was constantly switched between different production streams depending on which area was in crisis.

Same with coke and coal production.

Food and grain production also suffered significantly - it wasn't that they weren't producing enough, the problem was in terms of transporting the stuff from the farm to the processing facilities and to where it was needed was a persistent problem

Tony EH

Jawgap wrote: »

Some German production went up - usually at the expense of other areas. Also, generally speaking as the War progressed the Germans rationalised and focused on fewer models of equipment that were generally easier produce even if the armed forces didn't want them - this let them produce quantitatively more materiel, often at the expense of quality.

The 'trajectory' of improvement was well set before the war and established during the war and was based on labour and capital rationalisation. The question is whether the production gains seen by the Germans would have been dramatic or of a different nature if they were not under pressure from the bombing.

Compare the rate of efficiency gains experienced by the US and UK with Germany and you get some idea of the type of impact bombing had.

In respect of German production, ammunition was a constant problem, as was steel - steel output was constantly switched between different production streams depending on which area was in crisis.

Same with coke and coal production.

Food and grain production also suffered significantly - it wasn't that they weren't producing enough, the problem was in terms of transporting the stuff from the farm to the processing facilities and to where it was needed was a persistent problem

The strategic bombing survey, after the war, concluded that bombing had little impact on German production, despite the huge resources that were being poured into it. Allied strategic bombing was, according to John Galbraith was "costly failure". It simply didn't make the impact that was claimed and had no real effect on the Germans ability to wage war.

The Germans were simply outproduced regardless of whether the allies were bombing targets in Germany (and Europe) or not.

Also, many areas of German production went up in 1944. One of the reasons for this was because the Germans only went to full war production in 1942/43. Before that, a large number of factories were on single shift and there weren't a lot of women involved in production. German factories were also very rigid in the production output and often dedication to producing one or two types of items. In late 1943, the were forced to diversify.

You're just wrong, they WEREN'T actually producing enough and when they did up the production amount, bombing had little real effect.

Tony EH

Jawgap wrote: »

I'm familiar with Mark Harrison's work and it's of a high standard.

A couple of points to consider though.....

First, after you've made your guns, bombs, ammunition etc how are you going to transport them? The US provided not only significant amount of trucks but also over 1,000 locomotives to transport men and materiel around.

Second, when you get the tanks and a/c to where they are needed, various HQs need to co-ordinate to get them into action etc - the 36,000 radio sets the US sent out no doubt helped with that.

Third, people have to be fed - over 50% of the Soviets tinned food supplies came from the US.

And that was just Lend-Lease. There were other programmes the USSR were allowed to avail of both before and after the initiation of Barbarossa.

During the Winter War for example, the USSR was sold (admittedly not given) over 1,500 million litres of aviation fuel - the good stuff too at 99/100 octane.

They were able to outproduce the Germans in things like guns etc because a certain proportion of the more complicated manufacturing process such as those involving locos, was carried out by the Allies.

And even if that wasn't enough - I'd suggest the Pacific War waged by the British / Commonwealth forces and the US was conclusively of incalculable assistance to the USSR, despite their early victories against Japan in Siberia - it certainly prevented the Japanese from going back for round #2.

Lend lease helped, but it was no way decisive and any historian worth his salt will say the same. At it's absolute most, and this is being very generous, Lend Lease constituted about 15% of everything the Soviets used in the war. The most important being the trucks that were supplied by the US.

However, it's not like the Soviets built no trucks.

The Studebakers allowed Russia to focus even MORE domestic production on tanks. But even without a single US truck involved on the Russian front, the Soviets STILL out produced everyone in tanks by a huge margin.

The Uralmash zovod alone produced over 35,000 T-34's.

However, by the time Lend Lease had a real effect on the Russian offensives, the Russians had already won the war.

As has been pointed out already, the Russians won their initial and crucial victories over the Germans in 1941 - 42 and 43, using Russian equipment in the main.

By 1943, the war was over for the Germans and whether Lend Lease was involved or not, the effect was still going to be same.

When people "big up" lend lease, they always make the same mistake and assume that the Russians couldn't produce the same type of goods. They could. But importing foreign goods allowed to build overwhelming amounts of direct war goods.

As Richard Overy says battles that win wars are won with three main items...men, tanks and tactical aircraft and in bracket, the Russians had the Germans defeated completely.

Jawgap

Tony EH wrote: »

The strategic bombing survey, after the war, concluded that bombing had little impact on German production, despite the huge resources that were being poured into it. Allied strategic bombing was, according to John Galbraith was "costly failure". It simply didn't make the impact that was claimed and had no real effect on the Germans ability to wage war.

The Germans were simply outproduced regardless of whether the allies were bombing targets in Germany (and Europe) or not.

Also, many areas of German production went up in 1944. One of the reasons for this was because the Germans only went to full war production in 1942/43. Before that, a large number of factories were on single shift and there weren't a lot of women involved in production. German factories were also very rigid in the production output and often dedication to producing one or two types of items. In late 1943, the were forced to diversify.

You're just wrong, they WEREN'T actually producing enough and when they did up the production amount, bombing had little real effect.

Would that be the same US Strategic Bombing Survey that concluded (in D'Olier's Chairman's Over-All Report)....

"Allied airpower was decisive in the war in Western Europe. Hindsight inevitably suggests that it might have been employed differently or better in some respects. Nevertheless, it was decisive. In the air, its victory was complete. At sea, its contribution, combined with naval power, brought an end to the enemy’s greatest naval threat—the U-boat; on land, it helped turn the tide overwhelmingly in favor of Allied ground forces. It's power and superiority made possible the success of the invasion. It brought the economy which sustained the enemy’s armed forces to virtual collapse....

By the way, I don't agree with that conclusion, or at least the 'decisive' bit.

The USSBS is highly contested and riven with politics - see Gian Gentile, "How Effective is Strategic Bombing?: Lessons Learned From World War II to Kosovo (World of War)" and McIsaac's history of the USSBS......

I'd be with Gentile in agreeing that too many cite the USSBS as a primary source, when it is, at best a secondary source, that interprets the past.

Galbraith was one member of a board set up by the Air Force to write a report that would in Muir Fairchild's words "set the theoretical foundations for post-war air theory." He was also disgusted by area bombing and certainly saw that as wasteful.

However, in respect of so-called 'precision bombing' he (along with Paul Nitze) believed "...the AAF had been most effective when it directed its bombers against basic industries such as electric power, transportation and oil production."

His Economic Division acknowledged the impact of air power on production, indirectly through attacks on oil and transportation - he was critical of how air power was used and argued it could have achieved more if better directed, but he didn't deny the fundamental conclusion that it had been effective.

Finally, the conclusion quoted above came from the Chairman's 'Over-All' Report which Galbraith helped write. In the 'Summary Report' which he also co-authored, the following is written...

Allied air power was decisive in the war in Western Europe. Hindsight inevitably suggests that it might have been employed differently or better in some respects. Nevertheless, it was decisive

Tony EH

If you don't agree with, then why use it?

This will go round and round, if we're going to use contradiction for the sake of it Jawgap.

The problem with the strategic bombing argument is that it's polluted with politics, I agree fully with you there.

However, you'll still find that historians that have done their homework on the subject are less than appreciative of its effects than those people who are politically motivated to say it was "decisive".

Richard Overy (him again) wrote an excellent book on it last year, which has disappeared from my collection :mad:. In it, his conclusions are very damning on the failure/success ratio of the allied bombing of Europe.

It's quite a dry read, be warned if you're going to take a look, but well worth the time of anyone interested in the bombing war, or the war as a whole.

Jawgap

Tony EH wrote: »

Lend lease helped, but it was no way decisive and any historian worth his salt will say the same. At it's absolute most, and this is being very generous, Lend Lease constituted about 15% of everything the Soviets used in the war. The most important being the trucks that were supplied by the US.

However, it's not like the Soviets built no trucks.

The Studebakers allowed Russia to focus even MORE domestic production on tanks. But even without a single US truck involved on the Russian front, the Soviets STILL out produced everyone in tanks by a huge margin.

The Uralmash zovod alone produced over 35,000 T-34's.

However, by the time Lend Lease had a real effect on the Russian offensives, the Russians had already won the war.

As has been pointed out already, the Russians won their initial and crucial victories over the Germans in 1941 - 42 and 43, using Russian equipment in the main.

By 1943, the war was over for the Germans and whether Lend Lease was involved or not, the effect was still going to be same.

When people "big up", they always make the same mistake and assume that the Russians couldn't produce the same type of goods. They could. But importing foreign goods allowed to build overwhelming amounts of direct war goods.

As Richard Overy says battles that win wars are won with three main items...men, tanks and tactical aircraft and in bracket, the Russians had the Germans defeated completely.

It is nonsense to repeat the figure of four per cent of Soviet wartime production and disingenuous to disparage western aid - a feature evident in Soviet literature and one criticized even by Khrushchev.

"Lend-Lease and the Soviet War Effort" - Author(s): Roger Munting
Source: Journal of Contemporary History,

And here's a quite from the sixth (and concluding) volume of the then official Soviet history of the Great Patriotic War, completed in 1965. It noted that Allied deliveries

were not inconsequential, especially the supply to troops and the
rear of automotive transport, fuels and lubricants (from the USA and
Britain 401,400 automobiles and 2,599,000 tons of oil products)......

.....During the war years 489,900 artillery pieces of all calibres, 136,800 aircraft and 102,500 tanks and self-propelled guns were delivered by Soviet industry. From the USA and Britain during the same period 9,600 artillery pieces, 18,700 aircraft and 10,800 tanks were received. . . .

British-supplied tanks made up in the region of 30 to 40 percent of the heavy and medium tank strength of Soviet forces before Moscow at the
beginning of December 1941, and that they made up a significant proportion
of such vehicles available as reinforcements at this critical juncture.

British Lend-Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941–June
1942 - Alexander Hill - The Journal of Military History, (quoting from Biriukov, Tanki—frontu! pp 84 and 89)

By the way - interestingly 'Studebaker' became Russian slang for excellent!

Tony EH

I don't think anybody is saying that Lend Lease was inconsequential. But, the idea that it won the war for the Russians is laughable to say the least.

As said before, it was helpful, but certainly not decisive.

mrsoundie

You have forgotten the one thing in the Soviets favour, Hitler. As long as he was in charge, it was always going to going in one direction.

Just reading D-Day by Anthony Beavor, there is a part of it about assassinating Hitler and everyone realised he was doing a better job if he was alive. The man just was mad, completely.

Jawgap

Tony EH wrote: »

If you don't agree with, then why use it?

Because in history there are no absolutes and because the general area of interest to me is the effectiveness (or otherwise) of air bombardment - plus I've just submitted a paper discussing the methods used by the USSBS when determining effectiveness.

Just because I don't agree with part of one conclusion, doesn't mean the other 200 volumes are useless.

Tony EH wrote: »

This will go round and round, if we're going to use contradiction for the sake of it Jawgap.

The problem with the strategic bombing argument is that it's polluted with politics, I agree fully with you there.

However, you'll still find that historians that have done their homework on the subject are less than appreciative of its effects than those people who are politically motivated to say it was "decisive".

Richard Overy (him again) wrote an excellent book on it last year, which has disappeared from my collection :mad:. In it, his conclusions are very damning on the failure/success ratio of the allied bombing of Europe.

It's quite a dry read, be warned if you're going to take a look, but well worth the time of anyone interested in the bombing war, or the war as a whole.

I think you'll find 'historians that have done their homework' appreciate the area is wide open to interpretation.

The Overy book you are thinking off is "the Bombing War" - I have a copy here - it's sitting on my desk on top of Solly Zuckerman's autobiography and beneath Van Creveld's "Age of Air Power," Lindqvist's "A History of Bombing and Badoli's "Bombing States and Peoples."

His new one - "The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War Over Europe 1940-1945" is not bad, but I prefer Dietmar Suss' "Death from the Skies: How the British and Germans Survived Bombing in World War II."

Incidentally, if you are going to hang your coat on Overy, it's interesting to note how his views have altered over the years in respect of air power and bombing. His early editions of "The Air War" stand in contrast to his current conclusions.

I like to think that I'm one of those "historians that have done their homework"

Jawgap

Tony EH wrote: »

I don't think anybody is saying that Lend Lease was inconsequential. But, the idea that it won the war for the Russians is laughable to say the least.

As said before, it was helpful, but certainly not decisive.

Yes, I am one of the ones not saying it (Lend-Lease) won the war for the Soviets - but it was aid and it did help significantly during the critical phase when they were moving on to the offensive. Set in the context of the whole war it looks minimal (which it probably was) but that misses the significant detail of what was provided and when.

there was no way the Soviets could have been defeated but equally there is no way they could have won and fought the critical land campaign without significant Allied aid in the form of the CBO, naval operations, the Pacific War, the Med, North Western Europe etc etc.

All those helped and therefore they were aid because either they drew German resources (even modest amounts) away from the East (in the case of NWE or the Med) or they spared the Soviets from having to generate activity of a type or in a theatre they otherwise would have been obliged to - strategic bombardment, naval operations, etc.

Tony EH

Jawgap wrote: »

Because in history there are no absolutes and because the general area of interest to me is the effectiveness (or otherwise) of air bombardment - plus I've just submitted a paper discussing the methods used by the USSBS when determining effectiveness.

Just because I don't agree with part of one conclusion, doesn't mean the other 200 volumes are useless.

I think you'll find 'historians that have done their homework' appreciate the area is wide open to interpretation.

The Overy book you are thinking off is "the Bombing War" - I have a copy here - it's sitting on my desk on top of Solly Zuckerman's autobiography and beneath Van Creveld's "Age of Air Power," Lindqvist's "A History of Bombing and Badoli's "Bombing States and Peoples."

His new one - "The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War Over Europe 1940-1945" is not bad, but I prefer Dietmar Suss' "Death from the Skies: How the British and Germans Survived Bombing in World War II."

Incidentally, if you are going to hang your coat on Overy, it's interesting to note how his views have altered over the years in respect of air power and bombing. His early editions of "The Air War" stand in contrast to his current conclusions.

I like to think that I'm one of those "historians that have done their homework"

I haven't read his earlier 'The Air War', but yes his views on Bomber Command, at least, have changed a little over time. Not radically, but they have altered.

I prefer to view this as a good thing however and something other historians should find themselves doing more often.

Yes, the Overy book is 'The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945'.

By the way, I prefer not to hang any coats on anybody. It's generally a bad course of action.

Anyhow, as I said before, the bombing war is absolutely polluted with people writing on the subject from a political point of view. In fact, that can be said of the entire war. It's very difficult to differentiate real factual information from politically motivated screed.

Stovepipe

Hi all,
I'm blessed to be in such august company!!......Russia was, however, not spending it's resources on strategic bombing, nor was it fighting the Japanese. It was fighting on one albeit huge front, unlike the Allies and all of the conquered territories that it had to fight to reclaim were on one front, unlike the Allies, who were fighting a true global war. In effect, Russia's task was simply to go West, reclaim the Baltics, Ukraine, Byelorussia and it's own dominance of the centre, ie, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and hated Poland and the Czechs...........the bombing campaign worked because it crucially destroyed population areas (disrupt the factory workers and you disrupt production), factories, railheads, oil, petrol, V-weapons, tank/artillery/ammunition/U-boat production, airfields as well as tying up defensive manpower and Flak and culling the fighter force and sanitising the bomber force to virtual inutility.German production standards fell to such low standards that tank armour cracked apart when hit and rifles were so badly made that cartridges couldn't be chambered. Luftwaffe pilots began to dread using new-build 109s and 190s and scoured training schools for older 109s to fly. Russia succeeded because the sacrifices of the Allies made it so.
regards
Stovepipe

TerrorFirmer

Production ability wasn't so much the problem as oil supply. Once the allies started hitting that, they really began crippling German military capability in a serious way. Production was actually incredibly strong in 1944, some months for example I'm pretty sure more armoured vehicles were made in a few weeks than were in the entire year of 1942. Most of them were high quality as well, a lot of tank destroyers which were pretty effective in defense.

Of course by 1944, a massively improved supply wasn't going to make much difference. If 'Total War' had been introduced far sooner, it would have made a differrence - German production in 1941 and 1942 was particularly terrible, and not even able to keep pace with losses. But that does tie into the whole notion of a quick, easy blitzkreig victory. After the invasion in 1941, Hitler actually signed an order stepping down production, as bizarre as it sounds. People often talk about recruiting the populations of Ukraine and the baltics, but where would Germany have found the equippment to arm them (at least, effectively)? Their own armies were desperately short of supplies in 1942. War production simply didn't ramp up for anything other than a quick victory until it was already far too late. The Soviet Unions industry was geared towards war production from day one, Germany's wasn't, and wasn't until it was too late.

I don't personally think strategic bombing had a huge effect other than the oil refineries, which was a major blow to Germany, but in terms of production it wasn't exactly decisive seeing as production increased steadily throughout the worst of the bombing campaign, and by the time they switched to the refineries, the war was already lost. Lack of oil to fuel what was being produced was the big problem. The amount of armoured vehicles of all type that had to be abandoned and destroyed by the Germans in late 1944/early 1945 was absolutely staggering. Air superiority on the other hand, played an absolutely crucial role on the Western Front.