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The Soviets could have beaten the Germans without help
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I know I said I'd stay out of it, but this begs a reply.
If the scenario is a straight German / USSR conflict with the British, the US etc remaining non-aligned, then surely Germany could have maintained its pre-War pattern of imports and continued to.....- Rely on its traditional pre-War sources of POL products - the United States, Venezuela, the Dutch East Indies, and Mexico (as well as the USSR & Romania)
- Continued, unhindered, to have expanded their synthetic fuel and hydrogenation plant construction programme
Pre-war US consumption alone was over 1 billion barrels - they could easily have met German demands for more, given that German peace time demands were only 44 million barrels.
BTW, of that 44 million barrels (1938 consumption estimate) - imports from overseas accounted for 28 million barrels (64%) - only 3.8 million barrels (9%) were imported overland from European sources and of that 2.8 million barrels came from Romania (6%) - Romania was not a historically important supplier of POL to Germany and only became so when the British and, latterly, the US navies began their blockade, does that not fall under the category of 'help'?
Royal Dutch Shell was the largest transporter of POL products during the 1930s. At the outset of the War they had a fleet of over 2.3 million tons and in 1938 they transported over 25.5 million tons (not barrels) of POL products - given their location, in a straight Germany / USSR conflict who do you think they'd be more minded to do business with?
The above all depends on how the world's oil producing nations view Germany's attack on Russia though, doesn't it?
If Germany is pursuing her racial policies in the east as she did historically, then it's very difficult to see other nations simply ignoring such issues and continuing to supply her with the fuel to do that. In fact, once reports of Einsatzgruppen activities, etc, reach international news agencies, the would probably be strict embargoes placed upon Germany and she could find herself in an even worse position than she was in real life.
However, on the converse side, they may be happy to fuel her crusade against Russia, a country that was considered a European pariah, more so than Germany in the 30's.
But, in the end, who knows. In a fantasy scenario such as the one we're discussing, anything is up for grabs really.0 -
Out of interest, how would they have re-laid track - or more precisely where would they have got the track to relay from?
The Allies delivered 622,100 tonnes of rail line to the USSR - while the Soviets produced less than a 10% of that (48,990) - if they had to build their own railways where would they have got the steel, the sleepers and the ties - Lend Lease provided over 140,000 tonnes of joints and splice bars; 80,000 tonnes of switching gear; and, 30,000 tonnes of ties......it takes more than time and manpower to build and operate a railway.
The track is already there. It's just a narrower gauge and only by a few inches. I'm not saying it would have been an easy job, far from it. But, it certainly wouldn't have been impossible and something that couldn't be overcome.
More than likely the Russians would have retooled the rolling stock and supplemented the captured materiel they already had on hand.
Again, it may slow down the Russian advance. But it doesn't eliminate it completely.0 -
Okay, I think there's a lot of circling around here so I'm just going to lay out why I think the Soviets would have won. If people don't agree with the points then fine, there's been enough roundabouts discussion at this point:
- By the time Lend Lease shipments began to arrive in any real numbers (mid-1943) the Germans had lost the war. They'd been driven back from Moscow, smashed at Stalingrad and lost the initiative along the front Kursk. If the Soviets were capable of inflicting these big set-piece defeats on the Germans without Allied support then they could continue to do so in future.
- What will have changed is the ability of the Soviets to exploit these victories - there would be no 24 hour advance across Poland, for example. That doesn't rule out grand sweeping advances (the Soviet logistics network was always in better shape than, say, that of the Germans in '41 and '42) but it's safe to say that their advance would take longer. But I see I see absolutely no reason why a lack of trucks would prevent an advance at all.
- In a long war the Nazis were always at a disadvantage. Their economy was held together by sellotape, constantly staggering from crisis to crisis, and they were being decisively out-produced by the Soviets (hence the massive imbalance in firepower and armour by the end of the war). The longer the war goes on then the larger this gap in material grows and the more acute the crisis in the Nazi economy becomes. According the Tooze, the latter was simply not sustainable.
Nope. Even if we assume that it's a straight Nazi/Soviet war then you'd have to explain how Germany continued to pay for its imports. It was having serious trouble with its balance of trade payments in peacetime, expecting this to be resolved during war is... unlikely.If the scenario is a straight German / USSR conflict with the British, the US etc remaining non-aligned, then surely Germany could have maintained its pre-War pattern of imports and continued to.....
From the Nazi perspective the big benefit of war was that it allowed the Reich to cut through the Gordian knot of ramping up a war economy in peacetime through the implementation of a tribute economy. The key economic benefits conquering half of Europe was both the immediate seizure of stockpiles and the use of bilateral clearing agreements that were highly skewed towards Germany. In short, the Nazi war economy was sustained by mass exploitation and was not (without releasing significant capacity from the war effort to the export industries) geared towards maintaining the trade surpluses needed to purchase from abroad. Hence, autarky.
If fact, if we take a scenario in which the Nazis somehow do not conquer Western or Southeast Europe (ie, a simple Nazi/Soviet war) then I'd struggle to see how the German economy would last more than a year or two of war. The historical economy was sustained by the mass exploitation of Europe and only lasted as long as it did because of its military victories allowed for such pillaging. Hence the initial Franco-British plan: blockade the Nazis in Germany and wait until her economy collapses. The economics of that theory was sound.
Synthetic fuel production maxed out at 6.5m tons in 1943. Even if we allow for uninterpreted expansion of the industry, it's hard to see that increasing massively. After all, the real constraint there was the massive capital cost of the facilities. Increasing production potential during the war years would require even more expenditure of previous capital in the late 1930s, to the detraction of the rearmaments drive.Continued, unhindered, to have expanded their synthetic fuel and hydrogenation plant construction programme
The monopolising of Romanian oil by Germany was a product of the Nazi threats that took Romania into the Axis. The Allies were only a factor insofar as the end to external imports focused Berlin's mind on securing their one accessible source of oil. If, for whatever reason, the Romanians had refused the Oelpakt then Germany would simply have taken the oil by force.Romania was not a historically important supplier of POL to Germany and only became so when the British and, latterly, the US navies began their blockade, does that not fall under the category of 'help'?0 - By the time Lend Lease shipments began to arrive in any real numbers (mid-1943) the Germans had lost the war. They'd been driven back from Moscow, smashed at Stalingrad and lost the initiative along the front Kursk. If the Soviets were capable of inflicting these big set-piece defeats on the Germans without Allied support then they could continue to do so in future.
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The above all depends on how the world's oil producing nations view Germany's attack on Russia though, doesn't it?
If Germany is pursuing her racial policies in the east as she did historically, then it's very difficult to see other nations simply ignoring such issues and continuing to supply her with the fuel to do that. In fact, once reports of Einsatzgruppen activities, etc, reach international news agencies, the would probably be strict embargoes placed upon Germany and she could find herself in an even worse position than she was in real life.
However, on the converse side, they may be happy to fuel her crusade against Russia, a country that was considered a European pariah, more so than Germany in the 30's.
But, in the end, who knows. In a fantasy scenario such as the one we're discussing, anything is up for grabs really.
Hence my 'non-aligned' qualifier in the original post.The track is already there. It's just a narrower gauge and only by a few inches. I'm not saying it would have been an easy job, far from it. But, it certainly wouldn't have been impossible and something that couldn't be overcome.
More than likely the Russians would have retooled the rolling stock and supplemented the captured materiel they already had on hand.
Again, it may slow down the Russian advance. But it doesn't eliminate it completely.
Germany and Poland used standard gauge rail lines (1435mm) and the Soviets continued to use the Czarist era's wide gauge lines (1528mm).
As a result, an advancing German army needed 'only' to narrow the gauge (move one track inboard) to allow their rolling stock to operate.
A Soviet Army moving west that wants to use the line has to broaden the gauge (move a track outboard) - that requires new sleepers and also relaying the track bed.
Also, you don't explain how "More than likely the Russians would have retooled the rolling stock...." - loco yards and sheds are complicated facilities and the machine tools, forges etc are considerable bits of kit - where would they have got them from?0 -
Okay, I think there's a lot of circling around here so I'm just going to lay out why I think the Soviets would have won. If people don't agree with the points then fine, there's been enough roundabouts discussion at this point:
- By the time Lend Lease shipments began to arrive in any real numbers (mid-1943) the Germans had lost the war. They'd been driven back from Moscow, smashed at Stalingrad and lost the initiative along the front Kursk. If the Soviets were capable of inflicting these big set-piece defeats on the Germans without Allied support then they could continue to do so in future.
- What will have changed is the ability of the Soviets to exploit these victories - there would be no 24 hour advance across Poland, for example. That doesn't rule out grand sweeping advances (the Soviet logistics network was always in better shape than, say, that of the Germans in '41 and '42) but it's safe to say that their advance would take longer. But I see I see absolutely no reason why a lack of trucks would prevent an advance at all.
- In a long war the Nazis were always at a disadvantage. Their economy was held together by sellotape, constantly staggering from crisis to crisis, and they were being decisively out-produced by the Soviets (hence the massive imbalance in firepower and armour by the end of the war). The longer the war goes on then the larger this gap in material grows and the more acute the crisis in the Nazi economy becomes. According the Tooze, the latter was simply not sustainable.
Numbers aren't the issue.
Lend Lease material was a small component of what was provided, but things like refinery plants, crackers, graphite electrodes for furnaces, tinned pork etc were critically important to avoiding defeat in the first instance and setting the conditions for victory in the second.
To give you an example, Lend Lease provided three complete, modern refineries, an aviation lubricant plant, and two desalting and dehydration plants (for 'sweetening' the oil and making it easier to refine).
The cracking equipment delivered under Lend Lease enabled the USSR to increase its output of highoctane aviation fuel from 110,000 metric tons in 1941 to a maximum of 1.67 millionmetric tons in 1944.
The lubricants that made it possible for the Soviets to continue to operate in the winter while the German engines sat idly by were developed by Standard Oil of New Jersey who then went on to develop new aviation lubricants suitable for cold weather. All this technical know-how was passed on to the Soviets.
Jersey Standard also, at the behest of the US Government, shared its research on specific corrosion, gumming, and other cold-weather problems with the Soviets
Another US oil company - Socony-Vacuum - supplied technical data, refinery and plant designs, and pilot manufacturing plants for the production of high-octane aviation fuel, lubricants, alcohol additives, and synthetic rubber.
In the case of avgas, the yanks developed the process to produce avgas with an isooctane level of 100 in industrial quantities. In 1939, both USAAF and the RAF were using it.
The corresponding German method, was much more complex, cumbersome, and expensive and it took until 1945 the German Air Force had fuel equal to that developed by the Allies.
In value terms, the refining equipment provided made up about 0.33% of the total Lend Lease deliveries, but the technological impact on the Soviet ability to make war was significant.
It might have been Soviet men and machines that won the war, but it was US know-how that made them go vroom.....Nope. Even if we assume that it's a straight Nazi/Soviet war then you'd have to explain how Germany continued to pay for its imports. It was having serious trouble with its balance of trade payments in peacetime, expecting this to be resolved during war is... unlikely.
The same the Soviet Union paid for its imports from the US during the Winter War.......international trade is not, with some notable exceptions, carried out on a cash and carry basis.
As I mentioned earlier, assuming the US etc are non-aligned and ambivalent, then the situation favours the Germans avoiding an ultimate defeat in the form of an unconditional surrender.From the Nazi perspective the big benefit of war was that it allowed the Reich to cut through the Gordian knot of ramping up a war economy in peacetime through the implementation of a tribute economy. The key economic benefits conquering half of Europe was both the immediate seizure of stockpiles and the use of bilateral clearing agreements that were highly skewed towards Germany. In short, the Nazi war economy was sustained by mass exploitation and was not (without releasing significant capacity from the war effort to the export industries) geared towards maintaining the trade surpluses needed to purchase from abroad. Hence, autarky.
If fact, if we take a scenario in which the Nazis somehow do not conquer Western or Southeast Europe (ie, a simple Nazi/Soviet war) then I'd struggle to see how the German economy would last more than a year or two of war. The historical economy was sustained by the mass exploitation of Europe and only lasted as long as it did because of its military victories allowed for such pillaging. Hence the initial Franco-British plan: blockade the Nazis in Germany and wait until her economy collapses. The economics of that theory was sound.
I wouldn't disagree with that and as I stated earlier - the eviction of the Germans from the USSR was a given without Lend Lease (although it would have taken longer) - what I'm driving at is that the USSR could not have achieved an unconditional surrender on its own.
And if you've read Tooze you'll know that the occupied territories became a drag on the Reich, not a net source of economic resources.Synthetic fuel production maxed out at 6.5m tons in 1943. Even if we allow for uninterpreted expansion of the industry, it's hard to see that increasing massively. After all, the real constraint there was the massive capital cost of the facilities. Increasing production potential during the war years would require even more expenditure of previous capital in the late 1930s, to the detraction of the rearmaments drive.
The reason it maxed out is because they built no new plants after 1939 (cancelling rather than completing the construction programme), because they fell victim to the short-war mentality, and by the time Speer realised the error (in 1942) the steel and manpower were needed elsewhere and they couldn't have re-started construction........if the Allies weren't blockading them would they have needed to re-start construction? I don't think so.The monopolising of Romanian oil by Germany was a product of the Nazi threats that took Romania into the Axis. The Allies were only a factor insofar as the end to external imports focused Berlin's mind on securing their one accessible source of oil. If, for whatever reason, the Romanians had refused the Oelpakt then Germany would simply have taken the oil by force.
I don't disagree with that, but without the Allied blockade there would have been no need to expand the supply coming in from Romania, or to make oil an imperative of Barbarossa.0 - By the time Lend Lease shipments began to arrive in any real numbers (mid-1943) the Germans had lost the war. They'd been driven back from Moscow, smashed at Stalingrad and lost the initiative along the front Kursk. If the Soviets were capable of inflicting these big set-piece defeats on the Germans without Allied support then they could continue to do so in future.
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Hence my 'non-aligned' qualifier in the original post.
It's still difficult to believe that countries would simply ignore atrocity reports coming out of Russia though and carry on exports regardless. Especially the US.Germany and Poland used standard gauge rail lines (1435mm) and the Soviets continued to use the Czarist era's wide gauge lines (1528mm).
As a result, an advancing German army needed 'only' to narrow the gauge (move one track inboard) to allow their rolling stock to operate.
A Soviet Army moving west that wants to use the line has to broaden the gauge (move a track outboard) - that requires new sleepers and also relaying the track bed.
Again...not an impossible task. A time consuming one, but not that makes the Russians give up and go home.Also, you don't explain how "More than likely the Russians would have retooled the rolling stock...." - loco yards and sheds are complicated facilities and the machine tools, forges etc are considerable bits of kit - where would they have got them from?
Are you saying that the Russians hadn't got these? How did they manage to build tens of thousands of rolling stock in the first place. Russia's railway system was second only to the US.
Let's say that that they don't prepare for the narrow gauge eventuality, for some reason and that trains have to stop somewhere in Poland. As far as I know the 5ft Russian gauge extends into areas of Poland too.
So, what happens? They just stop? Give up? Call it a day?
It's a problem. But not an insurmountable one. At best, it slows down the Russian advance. It doesn't completely stop it and make them go in the opposite direction.
Sorry, I just don't see that happening.0 -
It's still difficult to believe that countries would simply ignore atrocity reports coming out of Russia though and carry on exports regardless. Especially the US.
You'd like to think they wouldn't.Again...not an impossible task. A time consuming one, but not that makes the Russians give up and go home.
I never suggested it would make the Soviets turn on their heels, or even leave them vulnerable to attack, only that it;s another factor that would likely have led to a settling of the front in Poland and led to a stalemate.Are you saying that the Russians hadn't got these? How did they manage to build tens of thousands of rolling stock in the first place. Russia's railway system was second only to the US.
They did, but thousands of kilometers to the east, behind the Urals. And in terms of railway length they had lots, but it's density that matters.....density gives you redundancy.
At the outset of Barbarossa, the USSR had only four major east-west running trunk lines (compared to Germany's 7). The Soviet lines connected the western border regions of the Soviet Union (including the recently annexed regions of Poland and the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) with Soviet rear areas:- Niemen river to Leningrad (double track)
- Bug river to Orsha to Moscow (double track)
- Bug river to Kremenchug to the Donets basin (double track)
- San river to Odessa (double track)
The four above named trunk-lines were intersected by only six major north-south running trunk lines:- Koeningsberg to Kremenchug (double track)
- Riga to Orsha to Kharkov to the Donets basin (double track)
- Odessa to Orsha to Leningrad (double track)
- Sevastopol to Kharkov to Moscow to Archanglesk (double track)
- Leningrad to Moscow to the Donets to the Caucasus (double track)
- Leningrad to Moscow to the Caucasus (double track)
There was a single line of double-track from Leningrad to Murmansk and from Moscow and Leningrad, a double-track line went further east into Siberia and on to Vladivostok. I don't think any of it was electrified and the locos they used suffered from poor coal and 'bad' water.
Signalling was poor, and the system suffered from neglect - some of the tracks had not been replaced since the Csar's time, and a lot of railway bridges were 'temporary' structures still in place from WW1.Let's say that that they don't prepare for the narrow gauge eventuality, for some reason and that trains have to stop somewhere in Poland. As far as I know the 5ft Russian gauge extends into areas of Poland too.
So, what happens? They just stop? Give up? Call it a day?
It's a problem. But not an insurmountable one. At best, it slows down the Russian advance. It doesn't completely stop it and make them go in the opposite direction.
Sorry, I just don't see that happening.
Again, I never suggested it would - it contributes to the offensive running out of steam and bogging down. Presumably then there'd be a period of regrouping before one or other side relaunches their offensive, but the in the scenario under discussion perhaps they reach an 'accommodation' and, as I said earlier, poor old Poland still gets shafted.
To reiterate another point I made earlier - in my view, the forcing of an unconditional surrender on Germany required the efforts of all 'three' Allies - take the contribution of any one (or two) of them away and it would have been impossible to do anything more than return the Reich to its 1939 borders and contain it there.0 -
But why would they just stop? That doesn't make any sense either. It's not as if a Russian advance hadn't become bogged down before.
I just cannot see the Red Army of 1945 simply stopping and not bothering to try and overcome they issues they would face re: mobility in Germany. Especially when they weren't that impossible to overcome.
Likewise, I don't see them settling for Germany's best hope then either, not after what had gone on for previous 4 years of war between the two nations.
The problem with the stalemate scenario, and I have said previously that this is the best that Germany could wish for, is that it relies in the Russians giving up at some point and calling it a day one way or another.
I simply can't see that. Not in 1945. The Russians don't reach Berlin in Spring, but they'll still get there eventually.0 -
But why would they just stop? That doesn't make any sense either. It's not as if a Russian advance hadn't become bogged down before.
I just cannot see the Red Army of 1945 simply stopping and not bothering to try and overcome they issues they would face re: mobility in Germany. Especially when they weren't that impossible to overcome.
Likewise, I don't see them settling for Germany's best hope then either, not after what had gone on for previous 4 years of war between the two nations.
The problem with the stalemate scenario, and I have said previously that this is the best that Germany could wish for, is that it relies in the Russians giving up at some point and calling it a day one way or another.
I simply can't see that. Not in 1945. The Russians don't reach Berlin in Spring, but they'll still get there eventually.
They stop for the same reasons most armies stop - they are fought to a standstill.
Every offensive, once it is launched, loses energy and momentum. The hope of the attacker is that they will have achieved their objectives before they run out of men, materiel and morale.
Defence is the superior form of warfare and the advantages of terrain, weather, etc tend to militarily favour the defender - the rain does not fall equally on the battlefield.
In the conventional 'maths' of the battlefield it's generally accepted that an attacker, to succeed, must generally achieve a 3:1 superiority in manpower over the defender. If you want to pursue the formulaic approach such as this - a qualitative technological disadvantage requires a numerical superiority of 4:1 to be achieved if the technological advantage is to be over come - combine those and you get to see how the Germans could have fought a slow defensive battle back across Europe.
Every step West the Soviets took brought them closer to Germany, but also brought them closer to terrain, weather, transport networks, airfields etc that favoured the Germans - I'd suggest that sooner or later in that type of slow grind (instead of the dash that happened) the Germans would have halted the Soviets (outside the USSR but before the German borders).......
EDIT: I wouldn't see the Red Army stopping out of choice - I'm suggesting that they'd have to be fought to a standstill.0 -
Was the likes of cracking technology helpful? Of course. Was it a precondition of victory? I don't in any way believe so. They allowed the Soviets to divert more resources towards the front but I don't see how anyone can argue that it was US technology that drove the Soviet economy when the latter had survived the disruption of '41 and was firing on all cylinders in '42.Lend Lease material was a small component of what was provided, but things like refinery plants, crackers, graphite electrodes for furnaces, tinned pork etc were critically important to avoiding defeat in the first instance and setting the conditions for victory in the second.
So the Soviets would have had a less effective cracking process. I'm really struggling to recognise the importance of that in the wider picture.
I'm not following. Until Lend Lease (which was, as its name suggests, provided on the basis of interest free loans) the Soviet Union purchased all its imports in foreign currency. Ditto Nazi Germany. To do so both required reserves of foreign cash, which were generated through exports. Hence the importance of the struggle for both nations during the 1930s to manage their balance their payments.The same the Soviet Union paid for its imports from the US during the Winter War.......international trade is not, with some notable exceptions, carried out on a cash and carry basis.
There is no way that the Nazis could have achieved that without diverting significant resources away from the war economy. Which leads to the question: how would the Nazis pay for their oil imports?
It was both. The Reich would have collapsed if it were not for the grain, labour and oil provided by its conquered territories. In doing so it ran up an absolutely massive trading deficit with the rest of Europe. Again, there is no way that Germany could have afforded these vital resources via the market. (It barely managed to keep the economy going in peacetime.)And if you've read Tooze you'll know that the occupied territories became a drag on the Reich, not a net source of economic resources.
You're missing the point: if they began reinvesting in 1942 then this capacity wouldn't come online until the 1945, at the earliest. And even then that assumes that the historical steel crisis hasn't occurred. There was no short-term solution for expanding synthetic fuel production.The reason it maxed out is because they built no new plants after 1939 (cancelling rather than completing the construction programme), because they fell victim to the short-war mentality, and by the time Speer realised the error (in 1942) the steel and manpower were needed elsewhere and they couldn't have re-started construction........if the Allies weren't blockading them would they have needed to re-start construction? I don't think so.
And why would it remain a stalemate? How does the mounting Soviet advantage in material fail to make an impact? How does the Reich continue to soak up devastating defeats (which, if the front reaches Poland, is what Hitler's strategy would have entailed)? How does the Nazi economy somehow last another 4-5 years?I never suggested it would make the Soviets turn on their heels, or even leave them vulnerable to attack, only that it;s another factor that would likely have led to a settling of the front in Poland and led to a stalemate.
Basically: if the Nazis are fighting in Poland then they've lost. Simple as.
And on subject of railways, the Soviets had essentially rebuilt the system from near-scratch following the Civil War, massively expanded its capacity during the industrialisation drive and then coped admirably (with Western aid) in the damage caused by admiration. I think it's safe to say that they knew a thing or two about rail networks.0 -
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Every army experiences standstill in their offensives at some point. It doesn't mean that they do nothing and just give up. The Red Army itself had been stopped on numerous occasions before.EDIT: I wouldn't see the Red Army stopping out of choice - I'm suggesting that they'd have to be fought to a standstill.
It just doesn't make any sense whatsoever that they would simply forget about everything at that point, just because there's some obstacles in their way.
By the time the Russians are getting into Germany, everything is on their side, including time itself. They can afford to wait and overcome whatever is in their way.
The point still stands, as far as I can see. It's a slower advance, but it's still an advance.
Honestly, though, I think this discussion has run it's course. We actually agree on more than we disagree here, I think, but this point is just going to round and round. You think that Germany couldn't have beaten Russia and I think Russia would eventually have beaten Germany completely.0 -
Ah lads, come on.....
Cracking technology was / is needed to manufacture high octane (90+) petrol.
The Soviet rail network, while long was not dense. It was not constructed to the same standards as European rail networks - for example, German and most western rail bed construction methods contained a multi-tiered rock and gravel foundations - Soviet rails were almost always sitting only on a bed of sand covered occasionally with rocks to minimise the dust clouds - rock was only available in limited quantities in the western USSR.
the majority of the Soviet rail ties were made of untreated pine - this limited the weight capacity of the track (38kg/m for Soviet lines vs. 49kg/m in Germany).
Soviet rail ties were also placed further apart - approximately 1,440 ties per km in the Soviet Union vs. 1,500 ties per km in Estonia, 1,600 ties per km in Germany and 2,000 ties per km in the United States - further compromising the network's capacity.
Soviet rails were attached to the tie with plain 'spikes' whereas other countries used an angled washer/base plate and screw type tie-downs. Angled base plates allow one to increase load factors and rail speeds.
Hence the reason for all the track, ties and switch gear they sourced under Lend Lease, I referenced earlier.
......and defeat and victory are contestable concepts. The USSR might regard fighting in Poland as 'victory' but it doesn't follow that the Germans would regard that as defeat - the situation would carry different political meanings for the respective combatants.0 -
I was going to wade in with my opinion, but there seems to be a weight of information for both sides, any links or books for all this information, for looking up? out of personal interest.0
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You could do worse than start here........
http://perspectivesofthepast.com/europe-in-the-era-of-the-world-wars/the-significance-of-the-allied-lend-lease-program-and-soviet-victory-during-the-second-world-war/0 -
There's quite a bit.
If it's the eastern front in general you want to look at, you could do worse than check out Glantz' stuff. Beware, he can be tough going. 'Barbarossa Derailed' is very good for an insight to why the German invasion failed and 'After Stalingrad' is good for a view on Russia's advances up until Kharkov.
The best book I read regarding the air war over Russia is 'Stopped at Stalingrad' Joel Hayward. Or, if you get hold of copies, the 'Black Cross/Red Star' series of "coffee table books" are generally excellent too.0 -
I still don't see it, Jawgap. You're painting a picture in which, sometime in '45:
- OKH has to hold a line from Poland to the Black Sea after being forced backwards in a series of bloody battles. It is considerably weaker than it was in '43; in terms of a historical comparison it probably has more men and less guns (see below point).
- The German economy is starved of grain, oil and labour. It can only purchase the first two from abroad by effectively demobilising a large chunk of its war economy to produce export goods. This only exacerbates the labour and fuel shortages and means that actual arms production is less than historic levels.
- The Red Army is weaker than it was historically but still has a commanding advantage in men and material.
Now my question is why this is not a recipe for an imminent German defeat? There are two scenarios here: either the Soviets mass enough firepower to force a breakthrough somewhere along the long front or the German economy eventually buckles from the strain of the war. Neither would be a surprise. Aviation fuel or not, I just don't see why this would remain a stalemate.
In terms of economics, Tooze's Wages of Destruction is the definitive account of the Nazi economy. Hitler's Empire by Mazower is also well worth a read. Mark Harrison has written some good academic papers (largely available online) on the Soviet wartime economy.I was going to wade in with my opinion, but there seems to be a weight of information for both sides, any links or books for all this information, for looking up? out of personal interest.
For bone dry military operational histories, I agree that you can't beat Glantz. And for a very high-level introduction to the Front, Bellamy's Absolute War is a good place to start.0 - OKH has to hold a line from Poland to the Black Sea after being forced backwards in a series of bloody battles. It is considerably weaker than it was in '43; in terms of a historical comparison it probably has more men and less guns (see below point).
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Hence my suggestion that the Vistula would be the area where the front would likely stabilise, especially as the river extends to the Carpathians. The terrain, I would submit, is eminently defensible, especially by a force with the capacity to improvise the way the Germans could.
Looking at the combat power of the Reich in the face of the combined weight of all the Allies, suggests a re-focusing of all that power to the east (their actual forces would no doubt have been configured differently as the 'evolutionary' influences would have been different) would be sufficient to blunt and halt the Red Army, especially as they would have been operating at the end of extended lines of communication, without the technological benefits conferred through Lend Lease.0 -
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As early as 1941 Fritz Todt was telling Hitler to end the war in the East.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/70-years-ago-december-1941-turning-point-of-world-war-ii/28059
Also suggests that Hitler had nothing to loose when he declared war on the US because it might get Japan to attack RussiaThe well-informed Vatican, for example, initially very enthusiastic about Hitler’s “crusade” against the Soviet homeland of “godless” Bolshevism and confident that the Soviets would collapse immediately, started to express grave concerns about the situation in the east in late summer 1941; by mid-October, it was to come to the conclusion that Germany would lose the war.[27] Likewise in mid-October, the Swiss secret services reported that “the Germans can no longer win the war”; that conclusion was based on information gathered in Sweden from statements by visiting German officers.[28] By late November, a defeatism of sorts had started to infect the higher ranks of the Wehrmacht and of the Nazi Party. Even as they were urging their troops forward towards Moscow, some generals opined that it would be preferable to make peace overtures and wind down the war without achieving the great victory that had seemed so certain at the start of Operation Barbarossa. And shortly before the end of November, Armament Minister Fritz Todt asked Hitler to find a diplomatic way out of the war, since purely militarily as well as industrially it was as good as lost.[29]0 -
The shock of Soviet resistance was a real kick in the arse for the Germans. The first 6 months of the war in the east was hard fought, despite the massive gains and huge POW count that the Wehrmacht accrued. The popular image of the German Army waltzing through Russia isn't correct and they paid for every foot of ground taken.
There were many minds who thought that Hitler had floundered in the snow around Moscow and that a defeat, or at least a lack of victory, was a real future possibility.
IMO, it almost definitely crossed Hitler's mind and even though a de facto sea war had already existed between Germany and the US, you're correct, his declaration of war on the US had a lot to do with trying to get Japan involved in his "eastern adventure", or even simply declare war. Although, I suspect that he knew it was a long shot.0 -
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The relationship between Japan and Russia was kinda interesting.
Japan invaded the Aleutian Islands, but didn't attack the ships heading to Russia. 41.7% of the total went this route. In Russian ships. None of it was military equipment. But kinda academic since you can make tanks in tractor factories.
But still. Japan controlled Korea so Vladivostok was within easy reach
via http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/23169/Pacific-Russian-convoys-instead-of-Atlantic0 -
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I don't think anybody is saying that Lend Lease was inconsequential. But, the idea that it won the war for the Russians is laughable to say the least.
As said before, it was helpful, but certainly not decisive.
Tony, it might interest you to know that senior Soviet figures such as Stalin and Marshal Zhukov were blunt in their assessment of the significance of American lend lease aid in the victory over Nazi Germany. Zhukov for example, stated in an interview with Konstantin Simonov in 1963 that the Red Army could not have continued the war without American aid. Stalin for his part freely admitted (in private of course) that without lend lease the Soviets would have been defeated by the Germans.Do you not find that at all significant? Are Stalin and Zhukov mistaken?0 -
Yes.0
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A chilling article from 2004 on what might have happened if Overlord had been unsuccessful.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3732417.stm0 -
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Oddly enough the Russians left Finland and the Danish Island of Bornholm, and parts of Norway.political analyst wrote: »A chilling article from 2004 on what might have happened if Overlord had been unsuccessful.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3732417.stm0 -
Capt'n Midnight wrote: »Oddly enough the Russians left Finland and the Danish Island of Bornholm, and parts of Norway.
But the Soviets (that's the right word for them, not "Russians", because, in the Red Army, there were also Ukrainians, Byellorussians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks etc) were not in control of most of Denmark and Norway).
Stalin was a mass-murdering tyrant but, unlike Hitler, he adhered to the dividing line agreed at Yalta, because the Western Allies withdrew from the German state of Saxony and Czechoslovakia. He would have had no reason to stop if the British and the Americans hadn't been successful in Normandy.0
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