Scientific possibility of an afterlife? ...of somesort

Zubeneschamali

smacl wrote: »

both subjectively and objectively nothing has happened.

But see, this is just the neuron-replacement example again. Something really has happened, you just concealed it. In your example, it is clear what happened. You used an overdose of anaesthetic to kill someone.

To show that this is true, repeat your experiment, but don't kill either body. They both wake up. Now shoot one in the head. Do you still think nothing happened?

Now, will the new me think it is the old me? Yes, sure. Will I be able to prove I'm the original? In this theoretical example, no. Congrats, you have created another being with my memories. But I am not content to be shot because there is another being that thinks it's me - I exist, and it has a separate existence.

Maybe (given the population of the world) there is already a person out there right now who is exactly like me. Who cares? They are not me.

Zubeneschamali

Zillah wrote: »

The copy is as much me as I am.

What happens when you punch the copy on the nose? Does your nose hurt?

You can argue that one of your noses hurts, but in fact there are two "you"s, and I am talking to the one that threw the punch, and that ones nose doesn't hurt at all. And if the other one dies, so what? And if I die, how does it help me to know that my duplicate is still running around?

Zillah

Zubeneschamali wrote: »

What happens when you punch the copy on the nose? Does your nose hurt?

You can argue that one of your noses hurts, but in fact there are two "you"s, and I am talking to the one that threw the punch, and that ones nose doesn't hurt at all. And if the other one dies, so what? And if I die, how does it help me to know that my duplicate is still running around?

Because the duplicate is you.

Zubeneschamali

Zillah wrote: »

Because the duplicate is you.

I have a duplicate of you right here. I'm punching it. Does your nose hurt?

Zillah

Zubeneschamali wrote: »

I have a duplicate of you right here. I'm punching it. Does your nose hurt?

No, because it's the other me.

You really don't seem to be getting it.

smacl

Zubeneschamali wrote: »

But see, this is just the neuron-replacement example again. Something really has happened, you just concealed it. In your example, it is clear what happened. You used an overdose of anaesthetic to kill someone.

Maybe not. Subjective awareness may be no more than a state of mind. If that is the case, death while unconscious in the previous scenario is no more of an issue than falling asleep and waking somewhere else.

To show that this is true, repeat your experiment, but don't kill either body. They both wake up. Now shoot one in the head. Do you still think nothing happened?

Now, will the new me think it is the old me? Yes, sure. Will I be able to prove I'm the original? In this theoretical example, no. Congrats, you have created another being with my memories. But I am not content to be shot because there is another being that thinks it's me - I exist, and it has a separate existence.

Different scenario, in that the traumatic bit is there being two of you and witnessing the violent death of your other self, and of course dying violently. You care about the death because you're still treating it as final, but if the mind is revived elsewhere it cease to be an issue.

Maybe (given the population of the world) there is already a person out there right now who is exactly like me. Who cares? They are not me.

I rather doubt it. My guess is you're the one and only you.

smacl

Zubeneschamali wrote: »

What happens when you punch the copy on the nose? Does your nose hurt?

As soon as you have two conscious copies of yourself, they immediately start to diverge and hence become distinct entities, as illustrated by the fact that you(mk1) has already started picking a fight with you(mk2).

Pherekydes

Zubeneschamali wrote: »

I have a duplicate of you right here. I'm punching it. Does your nose hurt?

Aaagh, it's the beginning of World War Z!

Akrasia

Zubeneschamali wrote: »

If I make a software copy of myself and let it loose in a computer, it makes no actual difference to me at all. If I die, I'm just dead, and this software thingie is still running about in a computer, who cares?

Back to the future scenario. If you could go into the future and give your future self the winning lottery numbers, would you be talking to 'me' or someone else? would you be murdering the future self that would have otherwise existed?

Our consciousness exists in the moment. Our memories link us to the past and our hopes link us to the future, but we are momentary beings who die every time we lose consciousness and are re-born whenever we wake up.

If you have brain surgery to remove a tumour in the knowledge that it may have cause personality changes, you are essentially sacrificing your 'me' so that a different version of 'me' might have a future.

Zubeneschamali

smacl wrote: »

Different scenario, in that the traumatic bit is there being two of you and witnessing the violent death of your other self, and of course dying violently.

No, the only difference is that in one case I know what has happened, and in the other what happened has been concealed. In both cases you duplicated me and then killed one of "me"s.

Zubeneschamali

smacl wrote: »

As soon as you have two conscious copies of yourself, they immediately start to diverge and hence become distinct entities, as illustrated by the fact that you(mk1) has already started picking a fight with you(mk2).

Exactly - and neither one has access to the others internal mental states or feelings. They are not the same indiividual, each one is an "I".

So telling I1 that I2 will live on is not any kind of afterlife for I1, if I1 is to die.

Zubeneschamali

Zillah wrote: »

You really don't seem to be getting it.

I get what you are saying, it's just that you are wrong.

For example: you and I may both be software simulations of some real person right now. There may be a million billion copies of both of us running in identical computers, a million billion lifetimes after the original Zilah and Zube died in the non-simulated outside world.

But I am just this one person, this one instance. The existence of a million billion other identical "me"s does not affect this "me". Conjure up another one in front of me, and then shoot it, I don't feel a thing, because that is what "I" and "Me" means, that's what identity is. And when I die, a million billion identical copies living on does not count as an afterlife.

smacl

Zubeneschamali wrote: »

Exactly - and neither one has access to the others internal mental states or feelings. They are not the same indiividual, each one is an "I".

Maybe examine what you're saying there. The fact that you can potentially have two copies of you doesn't mean there should be two copies of you, any more than the Catholic church right to life / every sperm is sacred line of reasoning.

The two entities are only different after revival when they start to diverge, they're identical in every way up until that point. Killing one off prior to that simply stops there being two. One is the same as the other, and the death of one while unconscious is exactly the same as not reviving the other.

So telling I1 that I2 will live on is not any kind of afterlife for I1, if I1 is to die.

For that to be true would demand the existence of our self outside of the physical body, i.e. a soul / life force / etc... I don't buy it. If the mind is contained within the brain, so is the entire self. Anything else is a belief in the supernatural.

As for the I1 vs I2 argument, this essentially boils down to different possible futures based on present actions and happens continuously.

wd42

Read this a few years back, some interesting ideas and some really really out there ideas. Good crack though. Written by Marcus Chown
A limousine among popular-science vehicles ... Superb. -- Guardian, January 27, 2007

Can't post links but google

The Never-Ending Days of Being Dead: Dispatches from the Front Line of Science [Paperback]
Marcus Chown (Author)

sbsquarepants

Zubeneschamali wrote: »

If I make a software copy of myself and let it loose in a computer, it makes no actual difference to me at all. If I die, I'm just dead, and this software thingie is still running about in a computer, who cares?

The copy presumably, if you want to survive so does he.

Zillah wrote: »

I think this is mostly a failure of your imagination.

Seems to be alright

Zubeneschamali wrote: »

No, it really isn't. I understand that the copy would initially think that it is me. There would be two beings that think they are me.

But the copy would be wrong.

.

It wouldn't. You'd both be right in thinking you were you.
This was covered in an excellent documentary I seen a while back. It works out fine the original you would still get to make sweet warp speed space lurve to the hot counsellor, the copy merely gets to live in a cave and draw pictures of her.

Zubeneschamali

smacl wrote: »

For that to be true would demand the existence of our self outside of the physical body, i.e. a soul / life force / etc... I don't buy it. If the mind is contained within the brain, so is the entire self. Anything else is a belief in the supernatural.

Sure, so when you have two separate but identical brains, you have two separate but identical selves, two separate minds. And both of them can truthfully point at the other and say "I exist, and I am not him".

It is precisely because there is no supernatural mind that you can say that the copy is not the original. We had Zube1, we made Zube2, then we killed Zube1. No supernatural baton of identity passed between them.

sbsquarepants

Zubeneschamali wrote: »

Sure, so when you have two separate but identical brains, you have two separate but identical selves, two separate minds. And both of them can truthfully point at the other and say "I exist, and I am not him".

It is precisely because there is no supernatural mind that you can say that the copy is not the original. We had Zube1, we made Zube2, then we killed Zube1. No supernatural baton of identity passed between them.

You seem to be contradicting yourself, if there is no supernatural baton of identity - then what makes zube2 different? What makes you you? What makes him him? Why are you not both the same?

I don't believe there is any supernatural element to it, but that is precisely why the copy is as much you as you are.

smacl

Zubeneschamali wrote: »

Sure, so when you have two separate but identical brains, you have two separate but identical selves, two separate minds. And both of them can truthfully point at the other and say "I exist, and I am not him".

Only if you bring them both to life at the same time.

It is precisely because there is no supernatural mind that you can say that the copy is not the original. We had Zube1, we made Zube2, then we killed Zube1. No supernatural baton of identity passed between them.

If the conscious mind equates to a state in a brain, which we can exactly copy, the two copies are identical, much like downloading two copies of an MP3 from the internet. Your subjective self doesn't exist beyond the brain hosting it, and is simply a state in that brain. If we suspend progression of that state, e.g. by rendering you unconscious and then killing the host brain, and restore the last concious state to a new brain, you have not subjectively died.

tldr; What do you think death is? What do you think you are?

Zubeneschamali

sbsquarepants wrote: »

I don't believe there is any supernatural element to it, but that is precisely why the copy is as much you as you are.

Two brains => two minds, unless there is some supernatural connection.

There is no more magical identity between me and another mind generated by a copy of my brain than there is between me and a mind generated by a slightly different brain. It's a brain, a physical thing, it generates its own mind.

It is created identical to my brain, but it is physically separate, so it generates a physically separate mind, the very definition of a separate identity. And from the instant it generates its mind, it has its separate consciousness and experience, to which I have no more access than you or anyone else does.

It is its own "I", and I remain me, unless you kill me, of course. As noted earlier, it is easy to confuse us or hide the facts from us if you have no moral compunctions on drugging and killing people.

Zubeneschamali

smacl wrote: »

If the conscious mind equates to a state in a brain, which we can exactly copy, the two copies are identical, much like downloading two copies of an MP3 from the internet.

But there is a difference between saying "I ran a diff, and these two files are the same", and saying "There is only one file".

Two files, running on two MP3 players, are distinct. I can stop one, and the other plays. I can destroy one, and the other survives.

What you are saying is that there is only one file. No: the fact that the mind is a state in a brain means that if you physically copy the brain, you have the original mind and another mind which is a copy of it. You do not have one mind. If you destroy the original, you have a copy. You do not have the original, which was a process running on a particular physical brain. It is gone.

Call Me Jimmy

nagirrac wrote: »

By definition, by making the above statement, you are subscribing to monism. Specifically material monism which holds that all mental activities can be reduced to the physical (thus also known as physicalism). All monist and dualist positions have problems, which simply demonstrates we have an incomplete understanding of reality. You can drive large holes through all positions on mind/body based on the available evidence.

The simple layperson's language I try and use is that humans are biological machines, with an incredibly complex neural network brain/nervous system, and information processing "software" that runs on the brain/nervous system. IMO we know a fair bit about the former although there are still huge gaps, a rapidly increasing knowledge base on the brain/nervous system hardware, and fcuk all about the latter. How people whose brains have shut down to the level of the brain stem can recover and have full cognitive ability restored and memories, etc. is completely beyond me.

[just talkin' here] would it make you think that that the cumulative information differences between cells are held in each cell and that it can be 'decompressed' or extrapolated out? [/just talkin' here]

^^^^ didn't realise we had already got to this

nagirrac

smacl wrote: »

For that to be true would demand the existence of our self outside of the physical body, i.e. a soul / life force / etc... I don't buy it. If the mind is contained within the brain, so is the entire self. Anything else is a belief in the supernatural.

I think it is reasonably safe to assert at this stage that what the religious concept of "soul" really boils down to the awareness aspects of mind.

The challenge is all this discussion on "self" is that regardless of philosophical position on the subject, the reality is that for all positions the self is illusionary and this is being borne out by the evidence. Obviously the Eastern religions believe this already, but most modern day neuroscientists would say that this sense of self we have is either an epiphenomenon of the brain (an accidental by product of brain activity) or an evolved mechanism to do with survival. In other words the sense of self we experience is in itself a survival mechanism that gets selected. This is more true for the material monist and reductionist position than any other philosophical position.

From personal experience I know from meditation that the sense of self can be completely eliminated from consciousness. It is a truly terrifying experience when it first occurs, you are fully conscious but have no sense of self whatsoever, no memories, completely stuck in a moment where you are fully aware but not aware of yourself. Getting back to your sense of self from there after the first experience is very welcome:)

This is also perfectly consistent with reported experiences like NDEs, OBEs, etc. where the sense of self is completely lost. However, it is replaced by a much stranger sense of everything being connected, where one goes from being an individual to being part of a broader whole.

To my mind this completely supports the idea that if we could make an exact copy to the level of every atom of a person, then the experiences that new person would have would be identical. Their emotions, feelings, etc. would all be the same, but perhaps their sense of self would be different, or non existent? The zombie problem.

nagirrac

Call Me Jimmy wrote: »

[just talkin' here] would it make you think that that the cumulative information differences between cells are held in each cell and that it can be 'decompressed' or extrapolated out? [/just talkin' here]

I don't know. Where information is stored and how it is stored is truly not well understood. There were experiments ran on salamanders I think where various parts of their brains were removed that were thought to do with memory but they still retained learned abilities they should have lost. There are cases of people who had severe brain damage who retained capabilities that based on what we know should have been lost. One hypothesis is that there is some form of information storage and communication within cells and between cells that we have not uncovered yet. A guy called Popp did some interesting research on biophotons which sounded promising when I read it a long time ago.

smacl

nagirrac wrote: »

From personal experience I know from meditation that the sense of self can be completely eliminated from consciousness. It is a truly terrifying experience when it first occurs, you are fully conscious but have no sense of self whatsoever, no memories, completely stuck in a moment where you are fully aware but not aware of yourself. Getting back to your sense of self from there after the first experience is very welcome:)

To a degree, in taoist practice of taiji that's pretty much what you're trying to achieve. i.e. that the most significant part of experience is the moment, and the self, past and future are distractions to be avoided. At the same time this is led by the mind. What becomes apparent is that is that one needs to reconsider the relationship of mind and body, and how they link up. For me, practises like tui shou really define connections between mind, body, and the larger environment they exist it.

This is also perfectly consistent with reported experiences like NDEs, OBEs, etc. where the sense of self is completely lost. However, it is replaced by a much stranger sense of everything being connected, where one goes from being an individual to being part of a broader whole.

To my mind this completely supports the idea that if we could make an exact copy to the level of every atom of a person, then the experiences that new person would have would be identical. Their emotions, feelings, etc. would all be the same, but perhaps their sense of self would be different, or non existent? The zombie problem.

I don't think there is a zombie problem, insofar as I think that at a personal level I can grasp the connection between the limits of the body and the limits of the mind, which are both part of the same whole. At a guess, the nearest correlation to monism would be dialectical, but that's doubtless because I carry certain Taoist biases.

recedite

nagirrac wrote: »

To my mind this completely supports the idea that if we could make an exact copy to the level of every atom of a person, then the experiences that new person would have would be identical.

Only for that instant that the copy was first made, then the experiences would diverge. Because of randomness. Random events happening, even at a sub-atomic level.
But I can kinda see the point; it wouldn't matter which of the two "you" were, or thought you were. You wouldn't know which one was the "original".

By the same token, if both selfs died during the transfer process, it wouldn't really matter either, from your point of view, because having lost all conciousness yourself, you no longer care.

recedite

smacl wrote: »

I don't think there is a zombie problem..

I still prefer to keep an axe under my bed, just in case...

nagirrac

smacl wrote: »

I don't think there is a zombie problem, insofar as I think that at a personal level I can grasp the connection between the limits of the body and the limits of the mind, which are both part of the same whole. At a guess, the nearest correlation to monism would be dialectical, but that's doubtless because I carry certain Taoist biases.

I think I understand the limits of the body well enough having tested them a good few times:), but not so sure about the mind. It does seem the body is ruled fairly rigorously until it goes out of control, but the mind seems to have literally no limits. Genius is a bit of a baffling thing, along with what are called "idiot" savants. Are zombies logically possible? Are they logically coherent? I would say yes to both.

nagirrac

recedite wrote: »

But I can kinda see the point; it wouldn't matter which of the two "you" were, or thought you were. You wouldn't know which one was the "original".

Do we even know that over time anyway? Not so much minute to minute where there is consistency, but over longer timeframes. Did you ever look back at something you wrote years ago and have a "who the fuk wrote that" moment?

recedite wrote: »

By the same token, if both selfs died during the transfer process, it wouldn't really matter either, from your point of view, because having lost all conciousness yourself, you no longer care.

But what if there's no "self". But you don't lose consciousness.

trancemuzic

"been there done that " always resonated with me

keane2097

smacl wrote: »

Maybe not. Subjective awareness may be no more than a state of mind. If that is the case, death while unconscious in the previous scenario is no more of an issue than falling asleep and waking somewhere else..

shane9689

didnt expect my thread to turn into such an interesting debate.....
its hard to tell exactly who is right here, zilla or zube, because i feel they both hold valid points to an extent...also i think i experienced that sense of having no sense of "self" before....i went unconscious once and when i woke everything was blurry and i had no sense of anything, no memories, no name, nothing really but a feeling of confusion. also everything was still blurry after regaining consciousness but i could still hear properly. Put thins into perspective slightly, in that i realised its possible to exist without necessarily being conscious self. it took afew seconds to realise who i was and where i was, but for a brief moment i had totally lost a sense of self (probably due to the lack of oxygen going to my brain at the time)

sbsquarepants

Zubeneschamali wrote: »

Two brains => two minds, unless there is some supernatural connection.

There is no more magical identity between me and another mind generated by a copy of my brain than there is between me and a mind generated by a slightly different brain. It's a brain, a physical thing, it generates its own mind.

It is created identical to my brain, but it is physically separate, so it generates a physically separate mind, the very definition of a separate identity. And from the instant it generates its mind, it has its separate consciousness and experience, to which I have no more access than you or anyone else does.

It is its own "I", and I remain me, unless you kill me, of course. As noted earlier, it is easy to confuse us or hide the facts from us if you have no moral compunctions on drugging and killing people.

I'm not suggesting you'd have any sort of magical supernatural connection, although in theory I suppose some sort of experience sharing could be implanted so that you could feel what he does and so on, but that's just clouding the issue right now.
My point is that everything that makes you "you", also makes him "you" - in reality the only claim you'd have to being the real you is that you got there first - which is fairly tenuous to say the least. Your family and friends couldn't tell you apart, any secret anybody could ask you to weed out the real you would be pointless, you're dog wouldn't bark at him - he would be you by any standard except your own internal sense of self - the exact same sense of self shared by your copy, and therefore he would say the very same thing - he's the real one and you're the copy - he'd be both as right and as wrong as you are.

nozzferrahhtoo

nagirrac wrote: »

The materialist reductionist position, which is the predominant position by far in neuroscience today, claims that all conscious experience is caused by, and not just correlates to, neural activity.

And are you aware of any arguments, evidence, data or reasoning that suggests a divide between these things and so builds another "position" on the question? Something, perhaps, a bit more substantive than trotting out a woman who can speak a language that no one knows how she learnt?

nagirrac wrote: »

If you find this unbelievable, then you have to consider some other position such as some form of dualism or dual aspect monism.

Seems you might be trying to attempt an argument from emotion here. It is not that people will find it unbelievable. It is that they might find it strongly distasteful. And their distaste will fuel your agenda to have them subscribe to otherwise entirely unsubstantiated nonsense on the subject.

nagirrac wrote: »

All monist and dualist positions have problems

Nice. A sentence that attempts to put the two things on equal footing. That would be like me attempting to justify racism by saying "Racism like all isms, has its problems".

The problem of ONE is that it has not explained or answered all of our questions. The problem of the OTHER is that it is not just slightly but ENTIRELY unsubstantiated in any way whatsoever.

The equivalence you attempt to construct by putting them in a sentence like this is entirely false and contrived.

nagirrac wrote: »

You can drive large holes through all positions on mind/body based on the available evidence.

Not if the position, like yours, is already a "hole" with no evidence. How does one put a hole in a hole?

nagirrac wrote: »

Just as it is impossible to explain certain aspects of mind emerging from physical matter

Why is it impossible? I recognise there are things we have not explained at this time. Questions we have not answered. But other than the fact that some open questions are open questions..... how can you justify declaring answering them to be impossible? Just because you want it to be so? Or have you any actual arguments to support this assertion?

nagirrac wrote: »

mental or informational attributes (like spin).

Please explain how "spin" is a "mental" attribute?

sbsquarepants

nozzferrahhtoo wrote: »

How does one put a hole in a hole?

An truly existential dilemma if ever I heard one:)

Zubeneschamali

sbsquarepants wrote: »

My point is that everything that makes you "you", also makes him "you"

When you say "everything that makes me me", you are not actually including everything that makes me me. We are completely seperate physical systems which do not share even a single atom.

What you are saying is 'Everything important that makes me "me" etc.'

But you have skipped a step, deciding what's important.

And your assertion that it is tenuous to assert that I'm the real me because I was here first is just asserting your conclusion. I am quite confident that if the law would recognize a copy as human (and I think it should) that it would absolutely assert that the original me remains legally me, and the copy is a new individual.

smacl

Zubeneschamali wrote: »

When you say "everything that makes me me", you are not actually including everything that makes me me. We are completely seperate physical systems which do not share even a single atom.

What you are saying is 'Everything important that makes me "me" etc.'

But you have skipped a step, deciding what's important.

And your assertion that it is tenuous to assert that I'm the real me because I was here first is just asserting your conclusion. I am quite confident that if the law would recognize a copy as human (and I think it should) that it would absolutely assert that the original me remains legally me, and the copy is a new individual.

Yet if you we're both woken up at the same time, neither of you would know which was the real you. Both would assert it was their self, both would be equally right if they were entirely identical.

Reminds me of the old spitting image sketch where all the bits removed from Michael Jackson over the years through plastic surgery got re-assembled and claimed to be the real Michael Jackson.

recedite

Zubeneschamali wrote: »

I am quite confident that if the law would recognize a copy as human (and I think it should) that it would absolutely assert that the original me remains legally me, and the copy is a new individual.

The law would have to rely on the evidence of an independent observer to make this assertion. But what if, just for the laugh, the third person who was supervising this copying procedure blindfolded themselves, and then juggled the beds around. Now there is no observer, only uncertainty. Maybe there is no "original"; its like a schrodinger's cat situation.
If they are both the same, neither can really be called the original, because there is no observer to call it.

Zubeneschamali

smacl wrote: »

Yet if you we're both woken up at the same time, neither of you would know which was the real you. Both would assert it was their self, both would be equally right if they were entirely identical.

But if you beat me over the head hard enough, I might not remember I'm me, and you'd have ask someone else who I am, or check other evidence, like looking in my wallet.

The fact that the copy doesn't know its a copy doesn't mean it's me.

sbsquarepants

Zubeneschamali wrote: »

When you say "everything that makes me me", you are not actually including everything that makes me me. We are completely seperate physical systems which do not share even a single atom.

What you are saying is 'Everything important that makes me "me" etc.'

But you have skipped a step, deciding what's important.

And your assertion that it is tenuous to assert that I'm the real me because I was here first is just asserting your conclusion. I am quite confident that if the law would recognize a copy as human (and I think it should) that it would absolutely assert that the original me remains legally me, and the copy is a new individual.

It's like the ship of theseus paradox (or triggers sweeping brush, to drag it down to my level:D) You start off with a nice new boat, over the years this and that breaks, parts wear out and are replaced until eventually you reach a point where you have replaced every single piece of the boat - is it then a different boat, or is it the same boat?
He doesn't share a single atom, so he can't be you. But 50 year old you probably doesn't share a single atom with 40 year old you, who in turn probably doesn't share a single atom with 30 year old you and so on. Is 50 year old you therefore not really you?
What is "you" is it merely a collection of ever changing atoms? What happens when all those atoms have been replaced? Are you still the same you, or are you someone else?
I don't have an answer by the way, I just have a strong sense that your answer is too simplisitic to be right. Legally maybe, but not absolutely. I mean legally some plants are illegal - mother nature doesn't seem to care, human laws come and go, fundamental laws of nature tend to be less fickle.

smacl

Zubeneschamali wrote: »

The fact that the copy doesn't know its a copy doesn't mean it's me.

But then you equally well don't know you're not a copy, because you both know exactly the same things. Subjectively, there's no difference. Objectively, there's no difference. So what exactly is the difference?

Zubeneschamali

sbsquarepants wrote: »

I don't have an answer by the way, I just have a strong sense that your answer is too simplisitic to be right.

Yeah, and this perfect copy thing is always going to be entirely theoretical, anyhow, it isn't physically possible.

The more realistic scenario is where a "sufficiently" accurate simulation of my mind wakes up in a virtual reality, for some hand-wavy value of "sufficiently".

I'm even less likely to grant that this AI is me than the perfect copy version.

Zubeneschamali

smacl wrote: »

But then you equally well don't know you're not a copy, because you both know exactly the same things. Subjectively, there's no difference. Objectively, there's no difference. So what exactly is the difference?

Well, I do know that I sat down in the "input" bit of the machine, and look, I'm still there. You have to do some jiggery pokery with knocking me out and moving us both to hospital or something to break that chain of evidence. Then I don't know, but you do, and you have to cheat some more. Finally, you end up with nobody knowing the truth.

But that does not deny the reality that one collection of atoms entered, and that collection still exists along with a copy. Equally, if you bash me over the head, I could lose my memory of who I am. It doesn't mean I'm not me.

smacl

Zubeneschamali wrote: »

It doesn't mean I'm not me.

Of course not. But it does mean that other you is also you.

The whole thing with which atoms were used to make which copy is neither here nor there, it's analogous to saying the essence of a good book is the paper it is printed on. The essential you is the mind, not the flesh that's hosting it.

Zubeneschamali

smacl wrote: »

Of course not. But it does mean that other you is also you.

No, it really doesn't, and repeating it over again doesn't make it so.

We can agree that we both initially think we are me, and that it may be impossible for us to figure out which is which if the setup is done so that that is true.

But I can personally guarantee that within a minute or so of talking to each other, we'll know that only one of us can possibly be the real me, that a cruel trick has been played on the other one, and that whoever is responsible is in Trouble.

sbsquarepants

Zubeneschamali wrote: »

Yeah, and this perfect copy thing is always going to be entirely theoretical, anyhow, it isn't physically possible.
.

Not now, but maybe at some point in the future. Plenty of impossible things from 100 years ago are positively mundane occurrences now.

Zubeneschamali

sbsquarepants wrote: »

Not now, but maybe at some point in the future. Plenty of impossible things from 100 years ago are positively mundane occurrences now.

Heisenberg's uncertainty principle dates from 1926, so it's nearly that old already, and still looks solid.

sbsquarepants

Yea, but who says you need to be that exact, do you mean down to the level of the placement of each electron? Seems way over precise to me.

nagirrac

sbsquarepants wrote: »

He doesn't share a single atom, so he can't be you. But 50 year old you probably doesn't share a single atom with 40 year old you, who in turn probably doesn't share a single atom with 30 year old you and so on. Is 50 year old you therefore not really you?
What is "you" is it merely a collection of ever changing atoms? What happens when all those atoms have been replaced? Are you still the same you, or are you someone else?

While I generally agree with your point, the belief that all human cells are replaced every x number of months / years is a bit of an urban myth. As far as I understand the current science on the subject, the functionality of cells is what determines how often they are replaced, so for example stomach lining cells are replaced every few days, skin cells every few weeks, muscles and such can be a decade, but most importantly for this discussion some brain cells are replaced, but others are never replaced, again depending on their function. I think it is cautiously reasonable to assume that the brain cells that have to do with the experience of who we are, regardless of whether this is in any way related to truth, stick around throughout our lives and are not replaced.

Something of great interest to me is how information is stored in the brain. While this is not well understood, we have the example of DNA to draw on as far as how vast amounts of information can be stored in nature. I recall reading, and apologize for not having a source readily at hand, that one teaspoon of DNA contains roughly the same information as would fit on 1 trillion CDs. It is quite amazing that one set of DNA molecules from one of your cells contains all the information to make another exact copy of you, physically at least;). What this clone would subjectively experience, if anything, is an interesting question.

The reason I mentioned particle spin in an earlier post is this property of particles could be related to how information is stored in the smallest entities we currently know of and can observe and measure. Spin as it relates to particle physics is not the spin we are aware of from classical physics, like all aspects of the subatomic world it exists in discrete rather than continuous values. Again, sorry for no source, but I recall reading that an electron under certain conditions can have up to 2,500 possible spin states (again, this has nothing to do with spinning or rotation that we think of classically). All this ramble leads me to conclude very tentatively that the brain operates as a kind of quantum computer.

Zubeneschamali

sbsquarepants wrote: »

Yea, but who says you need to be that exact, do you mean down to the level of the placement of each electron?

You may be thinking exclusion principle. The uncertainty principle affects whole atoms and therefor molecules, not just electrons.

Nobody knows if atomic level interactions are important in the brain, but I'm inclined to doubt it. Folks like Roger Penrose have suggested that some brain structures may be small enough for quantum effects to be important, and therefore magical (or something like that, I was busy rolling my eyes).

nagirrac

Zubeneschamali wrote: »

Nobody knows if atomic level interactions are important in the brain, but I'm inclined to doubt it. Folks like Roger Penrose have suggested that some brain structures may be small enough for quantum effects to be important, and therefore magical (or something like that, I was busy rolling my eyes).

While Penrose is in a minority of scientists who attribute consciousness to quantum effects, to describe his hypothesis as "magical" is quite unfair to this brilliant man (who is also an atheist btw, and supposedly atheists do not believe in anything magical:)). While his Orch-OR proposal is still relatively in its infancy, the actual evidence to support it is building and some of the strongest objections to it have been found to be false e.g that quantum effects cannot be observed at room temperature, recent experiments involving photosynthesis and the magnetic field detection mechanism that birds exhibit debunk that idea.

I agree though that it is an area of science that is not understood, so it's too early for any strong claims. As Feynmann wrote on his infamous blackboard "if I can't create it, I do not understand it".