Germanwings A320 Crash

punisher5112

I would suggest two door operation and only enough room for one at a time.

Also with all warnings and plane showing flying too low should great system take over once plane is in full working order and not a plans fault obviously.

Tea 1000

Irish Steve wrote: »

2 people on the flight deck at all times might be the answer, but as has been commented, a cabin crew member won't have the knowledge or skills to prevent the pilot taking inappropriate action, so somehow, we have to have a way to ensure that the absent pilot can get back in again to at least attempt to undo what's been done, and my suggestion of the twin switch safeguard was an attempt to open up discussion of that very tricky can of worms and provide that safeguard without compromising the essential facility to have a secure barrier to the cabin for all other circumstances.

They don't need that knowledge. They only need to know what button allows the other pilot back into the cockpit.

Calibos

By the sounds of it, even if the door unlocked after the time delay it might have been too late. What about a code only known to the flight crew that instructs the autopilot to take the plane to a cruising altitude holding pattern which at least buys much more time till the fuel runs out for the door to be broken down or the person 'talked down'?

Cianmcliam

Maybe they should have a 'break glass' box inside the cockpit near the door, that way any crew member could be in the cockpit and quickly release the door if the pilot flying has gone rogue without having to know where the button is or struggle to lock/unlock it. One quick thump is all that would be needed.

Irish Steve

Tea 1000 wrote: »

They don't need that knowledge. They only need to know what button allows the other pilot back into the cockpit.

I think you misunderstood what I'm suggesting. The second switch is also IN the cockpit, and would have to be operated by the second person at the same time to put a lock out into place. So, if there's a pilot and a CCM on the flight deck, and the pilot gets it into his head to put the aircraft into the ground, the CCM could decline to enforce the lock out, which would allow the second pilot to get back in to the flight deck using the emergency code. If an "incident" occurred during the time when one crew member is out of the flight deck, then both members on the flight deck activate their switch, and the door remains secure. The second switch would be placed in a position where one person on their own would be physically unable to reach both at the same time.

Yes, it doesn't solve the problem of the CCM that has malicious intent, but the present system doesn't prevent that same CCM from gaining access to the flight deck, as has been mentioned, at some point, the fact that 99.9 many time recurring % can be trusted has to be figured into the equation.

In relation to the possible banning of an airline, I've never said that I would favour it, but it's the sort of response I would fear from politicians in a knee jerk mode given the manner in which we've seen them operating over the last 20 years. Blair and the WMD in Iraq comes to mind. I would be the first to admit that I don't have an answer to the increasing number of extreme fundamentalists that are emerging in many countries, but I have concerns that the political systems, especially in "western" countries, are not dealing with the issues well.

For me, the fundamental issue that's significant at the moment is that the changes brought in to prevent a repeat of the 9/11 events have been shown to have a flaw in their operation, which is the one that allowed this event, one unbalanced crew member on their own on the flight deck has the ability to exclude the only other person on the aircraft that can prevent the first from completing their plan. It's already becoming clear that the regulators plan to insist on 2 people being on the flight deck at all times, but that doesn't completely solve the problem, in that if the one pilot does start to perform inappropriately, the CCM has to then find a way to over ride what has already happened, which may not be easy, the 2 switch concept means that the aberrant pilot has to get the agreement of the CCM to put the door into total lock out, and in the absence of a clear indication of a threat from outside the door, that's not going to happen. The external over ride will then work, and the second pilot will be able to get back in. Yes, it's more involved that just a second person on the flight deck, but it means that the CCM does not have to try and change what the aberrant crew member has done, they only have to decline to operate the lock out.

Bottom line for me is that I don't want to ever again read about an aberrant crew member being able to crash a serviceable aircraft because the other crew member couldn't get back into to the flight deck. There have been 2 such events in the last couple of years, that's enough to call for an in depth review of how the door concept works.

dodzy

Steve, I have followed your posts with great interest. And I feel you summed it up perfectly when you said that you could put a plane into a pretty much irretrievable situation within 5 secs. All the other stuff in relation to locks and CCMs taking the jumpseats and whatnot really goes out the window when you take that startling fact into account.

Peppa Pig

Vuzuggu wrote: »

Has it been confirmed his sick note was due to depression?

Don't think it's been confirmed either way.
According to The New York Times he was being treated for vision problems.

They also say that anti-depressants were found in his house.

Irish Steve

German media are also carrying reports of vision issues, they are suggesting that the problem is a detached retina issue, and if that is the case, flying is very much not a good idea, due to the regular pressure changes.

That said, too much of what's hitting the media at the moment is ink looking for paper, with no real clear evidence to back it up, and the crash investigation scenario seems to have been swallowed up by the criminal investigation side of things, and the 2 are not necessarily compatible.

bk

dodzy wrote: »

Steve, I have followed your posts with great interest. And I feel you summed it up perfectly when you said that you could put a plane into a pretty much irretrievable situation within 5 secs. All the other stuff in relation to locks and CCMs taking the jumpseats and whatnot really goes out the window when you take that startling fact into account.

But the question is, is that actually true?

Can you actually put a modern aircraft with fly by wire flight control systems into a irretrievable situation within 5 secs?

Sure you might put it into a dangerous situation, but the question I have is could you put it into a situation where if another pilot regains access to the cockpit, that they couldn't reverse it?

Also given this situation, I'm sure future flight control systems will be designed to make it harder to do. Of course that will take many years to implement, but it will likely happen.

Calina

I think if there's a mountain in the way, you can certainly limit options effectively if you choose your moment carefully.

seamus

bk wrote: »

Can you actually put a modern aircraft with fly by wire flight control systems into a irretrievable situation within 5 secs?

Potentially, yes. Large commercial aircraft don't manouver quickly, so pick your spot and your actions and there's a good chance it could take several minutes for another pilot (or even the autopilot) to recover it. That several minutes could be long enough to hit the ground.

Also given this situation, I'm sure future flight control systems will be designed to make it harder to do. Of course that will take many years to implement, but it will likely happen.

This already exists to a certain extent, but it's more to detect and correct accidental inputs rather than override the pilot's input. This is why the A320 would have auto-corrected an excessively steep descent, but did not contradict the instruction to descend.

If you think about it technically modern technology makes it functionally simple to discover what the minimum FL should be over a mountain range and refuse an instruction to descend to 30m. But there's an "I can't let you do that Dave" aspect about it. For all sorts of reasons we have a need at some stage to say that the pilot has absolute control of the aircraft regardless of what the autopilot says or does.

Irish Steve

Wasn't actually me that said it could be done in 5 seconds, that came from others, and we already know that an Airbus that wasn't flying (it was stalled) still took a number of minutes before it hit the ocean (AF447), and that was in a degraded mode due to technical failures, so the normal protections had been disabled.

An aircraft at FL380 can stay in the air for quite some period of time even with the engines shut down, but I've never worked out the exact timing, suffice to say that if the captain had been able to get past the door, he would have had sufficient time to recover as long as he could get access to the controls, and the engines had not been shut down, which it appears from the limited data that we have was the case, the engines were still producing power throughout the descent.

You're right, the modern jet can (as we've seen ) be crashed, but it's not quite as easy as some would make it out to be. For obvious reasons, it would be better not to go into great detail of how to upset or disable an aircraft, a couple of minutes closing down systems and switching certain sub systems off will significantly increase the time required to recover, as will shutting down the engines, but in this case, the aircraft was in a controlled descent, and not exceeding normal flight parameters or disabled in any way, the worst part of this event is that the aircraft did exactly what the co pilot had commanded it to do.

In the case of AF447, the total elapsed time of the (stalled) descent was just over 4 minutes, which is where my issue with the 5 minute lock out on the door is coming from, it's too long, Had the captain of the Germanwings flight got back in at (say) 4 minutes into the 8 of that descent, he would have had no problem recovering the aircraft, and even considerably later, as long as there was no intervention from the co pilot, it was recoverable. Regrettably, the copilot was confident that he was not going to be interrupted, so he didn't do anything other than put the aircraft into a fatal descent, if he had expected the captain to get back in, then yes, there are other things he could have done that would have made the recovery time much longer, and possibly longer than was available, but as we've been discussing, aircraft have to be designed on the basis that the crew are going to operate it correctly, and not deliberately try to crash it.

That said, I anticipate that there will be a very serious and in depth review of the way that some of the automation operates, but changes in something so close to the core of the aircraft will not be made quickly or cheaply, the work to make any changes would take a lot of time, and even more time to then certify before being rolled out to the active fleet.

jmayo

bk wrote: »

But the question is, is that actually true?

Can you actually put a modern aircraft with fly by wire flight control systems into a irretrievable situation within 5 secs?

Sure you might put it into a dangerous situation, but the question I have is could you put it into a situation where if another pilot regains access to the cockpit, that they couldn't reverse it?

Also given this situation, I'm sure future flight control systems will be designed to make it harder to do. Of course that will take many years to implement, but it will likely happen.

I presume the nearer you are to the ground the worse the situation and even if possible to reverse the flight configuration there might not be time.

Perhaps someone can answer if the electronic flight control systems can all be switched off in any modern aircraft.

Bob24

jmayo wrote: »

Perhaps someone can answer if the electronic flight control systems can all be switched off in any modern aircraft.

The question is: in extreme scenarios do we trust humans or machines more?

If you are preventing the pilot from overriding flight controls systems because they think there is something wrong with how they behave, you are basically saying his judgement is not as good as the machine's and should not be the one used in last resort.

Maybe we will reach that stage one day, but I don't think we have yet?

bk

jmayo wrote: »

I presume the nearer you are to the ground the worse the situation and even if possible to reverse the flight configuration there might not be time.

Yes and that actually happened in 1982 with Japan Airlines Flight 350. The pilot put the engines in reverse while landing.

However my understanding is both pilots are required to be present during take-off and landing, it is only during cruising that one will leave to use the toilet etc.

In the above incident, the co-pilot and flight engineer tackled him and attempted to correct the mistake, they were partly successful, but the aircraft still crashed and 24 people died.

Another possible fail safe that we might see in future is that in order to turn off the various flight control systems and disable the aircraft in the ways being described here, that the systems will require a code entered by both pilots.

That still allows for a level of control to the pilots in an emergency, but makes it more difficult for one suicidal pilot to carry out this action. A relatively simple compromise.

smurfjed

but it's not quite as easy as some would make it out to be

Strangely enough, the people who FLY jets say that it is quite easy, the people who DONT fly jets say that its hard.

Who do you believe?

But right now we are focused on this one case, so what do we do when the next crash happens and the next and the next.... And while we are on the subject that pilots are only humans, when are we going to see laws forcing airlines to have rested non fatigued crews?

If you are preventing the pilot from overriding flight controls systems because they think there is something wrong with how they behave, you are basically saying his judgement is not as good as the machine's and should not be the one used in last resort.

Do you think that the A320 logic would have permitted the aircraft to land in the Hudson?

smurfjed

The pilot put the engines in reverse while landing.

In a DC8 if i remember correctly, can't be done in modern aircraft.

amen

Strangely enough, the people who FLY jets say that it is quite easy

I don't fly at all and I would think it is very easy. Turn of the AuotPilot.

Nose straight down. Those inside the plane will be experiencing negative/positive gs. It would be very hard for another pilot to make it to the door, unlock the door, strap in and recover.

Say you are 38,000 feet( 7.5 miles to make it easy), travelling at A320 cruise speed of 454 kts(522 miles per hour) then it would take approx 1 minute for the plane to hit the ground.

ProfessorPlum

smurfjed wrote: »

Strangely enough, the people who FLY jets say that it is quite easy, the people who DONT fly jets say that its hard.

Who do you believe?

You took the words right out of my head! Funny that.

Anyway, I would have thought pushing the fire buttons on both engines and then turning off a few well chosen computers (which I'm not going to go into here) should do the job nicely. Even if the other person in the cockpit managed to haul the suicidal pilot off the controls (on which at this stage he will probably be commanding full down, or just to spice things up may even have gone inverted at this stage) it's going to be very difficult for anyone to get back into the cockpit and recover the situation. Well, obviously not recover, at best you have a very poor glider with f all instrumentation at this point.

It's not a question of 'reconfiguring' anything. when all you want to do is disable, it's a far less nuanced procedure.

But more importantly. If we've got to the point of there being a determined suicidal pilot at the controls, the horse has already bolted. Long gone.
The worst thing we can do it start introducing measures which are going to introduce further risks to the operation every other day, on the off chance that the 'one in a million' type event will happen.

Let's concentrate on efforts to keep suicidal pilots off the flight deck in the first place.

Bob24

smurfjed wrote: »

Do you think that the A320 logic would have permitted the aircraft to land in the Hudson?

Definitely not and that is what I am saying. I doubt at this stage anyone is ready to make the machine the decision maker of last resort - and preventing the pilot from overriding automated flying systems doesn't seem like a realistic option.

Irish Steve

In the airbus family. there are effectively 3 levels of control.

Everything working, there are a wide range of protections to prevent stalling, excessive angle of attack, and overbanking, and that is the normal mode of operation.

The next level down, which can happen if certain systems or devices fail, (AF447 being one classic example) the aircraft goes into direct law, where the side stick still operates, but the protections are no longer in place, so it can be stalled, or over banked, and the controls are not "computer smoothed" in the same way, so the aircraft is more difficult to fly.

There is a further mode of degradation that will only happen in the event of a widespread power and systems failure across multiple areas of the aircraft, called manual reversion. In this mode, the sidestick become an ornament that does nothing, but even then, the aircraft can still be flown, with considerable difficulty, and it can be landed, albeit that the choice of landing runway will be limited, due to the limitations of control available, you'll need a runway that's in to wind, or close, has visual flying conditions, and is long, as in manual reversion, turning has to be done using a mixture of different engine power and the rudders, and climb and descent is controlled by using the pitch trim and the power setting, so it is possible to get the aircraft to still go roughly in the right direction required, but changes to that direction cannot be made quickly as would normally be the case.

So yes, even if all the flight control computers are disabled by some freak incident, it can still be flown, but you'd be looking to get it on the ground as soon as possible, and the landing might not be up to your usual "greaser" standard.

I'd have to go digging to be sure, I think there have been a couple of incidents where an Airbus has gone into manual reversion in flight, but the crew have been able to shut down and restart the critical systems which then allowed a recovery to at least direct law if not full flight mode, but I'm not 100% certain on that.

Where you would be in very deep problems is if the electronics fail, and you also lose the (3) hydraulic systems, as that would leave you with insufficient control to be able to control things. The only way such catastrophic damage is going to happen would be something unthinkable like a mid air collision or a missile strike, that didn't do enough damage to destroy the aircraft.

I don't have enough in depth knowledge on the later Boeing FBW aircraft to be able to say what the position with them would be, but I'd be surprised if there isn't something similar, and with the yoke control system rather than the sidesticks, I'd expect some form of linkage to still be usable.

The modern generations of jets are intrinsically very safe, the FBW systems have a good track record, there have been some strange events that only fully come to light during accident investigations, but even though I've done a lot of very detailed research into the FBW systems on Airbus, I don't have concerns about flying (as SLF now) in them.

bk

smurfjed wrote: »

In a DC8 if i remember correctly, can't be done in modern aircraft.

Yes, which is sort of my point.

Certain dangerous actions that no reason to allow them to exist have been specifically engineered out of modern aircraft.

Perhaps certain potentially dangerous actions, like disabling flight control systems need to be present for emergency situations, but I can certainly see them being changed in future so that they require both pilots input to do.

I know that will take many years to implement. But you can be certain that such ideas are now at the top of the minds of the engineers at Boeing and Airbus.

You certainly won't be able to eliminate all danger, but you can certainly reduce the likeliness of it. Actions like this is the whole reason flying is one of the safest forms of transport.

Frankly having two people in the cockpit at all times is a simple, no brainer.

It would not only help with this situation (going from 100% certainty of death to probably better then 50-50), but it is also a good idea for other reasons:

- If the pilot does have a medical emergency, the second person will notice much quicker and can get help. With the pilot in the cockpit on his/her own, they could be having a heart attack for a few minutes before the other pilot returns from the toilet.

- The second person controls access to the door. Before opening the door, they use the spy hole to check that there are no passengers near the door or a potential terrorist forcing another member of crew to open it. A pilot on his own in the cabin can't do this. BTW this is actually the reason for this rule in the US and I'm shocked that it wasn't in force in Europe for this reason too.

I also really like Irish Steves idea of both people in the cockpit having to over-ride the emergency access code.

Add to that idea, an emergency door un-lock button next to the door in the cockpit and on the pilots consoles, would make it very difficult for a suicidal pilot to get up and disable the pilot/flight attendant before they opened the door and call for help.

Make this button turn on alarms in the cabin, so that the rest of the crew can come to assist.

Of course that won't help with the scenario where one of the crew is a terrorist and is helping other terrorists onboard, but it is no worse then what we currently have today.

Deep Thought

Its very sad all round really

I am not a flying expert., but I do software / systems validation and the path I see is electronic verification of inputs by a second source and not just verbal.

ProfessorPlum

Irish Steve wrote: »

In the airbus family. there are effectively 3 levels of control.

Everything working, there are a wide range of protections to prevent stalling, excessive angle of attack, and overbanking, and that is the normal mode of operation.

The next level down, which can happen if certain systems or devices fail, (AF447 being one classic example) the aircraft goes into direct law, where the side stick still operates, but the protections are no longer in place, so it can be stalled, or over banked, and the controls are not "computer smoothed" in the same way, so the aircraft is more difficult to fly.

There is a further mode of degradation that will only happen in the event of a widespread power and systems failure across multiple areas of the aircraft, called manual reversion. In this mode, the sidestick become an ornament that does nothing, but even then, the aircraft can still be flown, with considerable difficulty, and it can be landed, albeit that the choice of landing runway will be limited, due to the limitations of control available, you'll need a runway that's in to wind, or close, has visual flying conditions, and is long, as in manual reversion, turning has to be done using a mixture of different engine power and the rudders, and climb and descent is controlled by using the pitch trim and the power setting, so it is possible to get the aircraft to still go roughly in the right direction required, but changes to that direction cannot be made quickly as would normally be the case.

So yes, even if all the flight control computers are disabled by some freak incident, it can still be flown, but you'd be looking to get it on the ground as soon as possible, and the landing might not be up to your usual "greaser" standard.

I'd have to go digging to be sure, I think there have been a couple of incidents where an Airbus has gone into manual reversion in flight, but the crew have been able to shut down and restart the critical systems which then allowed a recovery to at least direct law if not full flight mode, but I'm not 100% certain on that.

Where you would be in very deep problems is if the electronics fail, and you also lose the (3) hydraulic systems, as that would leave you with insufficient control to be able to control things. The only way such catastrophic damage is going to happen would be something unthinkable like a mid air collision or a missile strike, that didn't do enough damage to destroy the aircraft.

I don't have enough in depth knowledge on the later Boeing FBW aircraft to be able to say what the position with them would be, but I'd be surprised if there isn't something similar, and with the yoke control system rather than the sidesticks, I'd expect some form of linkage to still be usable.

The modern generations of jets are intrinsically very safe, the FBW systems have a good track record, there have been some strange events that only fully come to light during accident investigations, but even though I've done a lot of very detailed research into the FBW systems on Airbus, I don't have concerns about flying (as SLF now) in them.

I'm beginning to wonder just how much you do know about simulators, or it most of it is just being plucked off the net.

Anybody who has ever flown a FBW airbus (even just in the sim) will know that your above info is somewhat lacking, to put it mildly.

The three control laws are normal, alternate, and direct. There is a further level of degradation - 'back up' (your manual reversion) which would be extremely unlikely and was never intended to be used to complete the flight, just to manage the situation temporarily while systems are restored by the pilots.

By far the most common degraded control law that will be encountered is alternate law (which itself can be either of two alternate law modes - one with more protections intact than the other), which is why it is somewhat curious that you haven't mentioned it at all. Some double failures will cause the aircraft to revert to alternate law.

Direct law is again very rare. Most triple failures will cause the aircraft to go into direct law. It's worth remembering that the triple failure that has caused the aircraft to be in direct law will likely be much more of an issue for the pilots than the aircraft's handling characteristics. Some failures which cause alternate law will default to direct law once the gear is put down.

On your last point, a failure that causes back up mode will never be recovered to full 'normal' control law. In fact, IIRC, even if the aircraft only degrades as far as alternate law, it is impossible to recover to normal law, even if the situation that caused alternate law (e.g. dual hydraulic failure) is recovered.


Edit: Apologies to anyone who finds all that mind numbingly boring, but it's always important to correct errors when posted as factual information.

tharmor

Cianmcliam wrote:

Maybe they should have a 'break glass' box inside the cockpit near the door, that way any crew member could be in the cockpit and quickly release the door if the pilot flying has gone rogue without having to know where the button is or struggle to lock/unlock it. One quick thump is all that would be needed.

And terrorists as well !!

bk

tharmor wrote: »

And terrorists as well !!

I think you misunderstood what Cianmcliam is suggesting.

A large emergency unlock button would be inside the cockpit, not in the cabin.

This button would be operated by either of the people in the cockpit (one of the pilots or flight attendants) in case of emergency. Think of it like an emergency exit door that can only be operated from the inside.

This is to make it easy for one of the crew to unlock the door and call for help if the pilot tries to attack them.

If you are suggesting that a crew member who was themselves a terrorist, to unlock the door and leave other terrorists in, well that is completely possible today and this wouldn't change it at all.

Calina

Being honest, all of these scenarios are starting to sound complicated and in an emergency, complicated is bad.

bk

Calina wrote: »

Being honest, all of these scenarios are starting to sound complicated and in an emergency, complicated is bad.

Well there certainly isn't anything complicated about having two people in the cockpit at all times (and other benefits too) and a simple emergency exit button on the door.

A dual person lock system would add a little bit of complexity in a situation where there really are terrorists trying to access the cockpit. But I think it would be worth it.

It really is only complicated to explain it, it is actually a very simple system.

smurfjed

On your last point, a failure that causes back up mode will never be recovered to full 'normal' control law. In fact, IIRC, even if the aircraft only degrades as far as alternate law, it is impossible to recover to normal law, even if the situation that caused alternate law (e.g. dual hydraulic failure) is recovered.

The only FBW Boeings are the 777/787. For the 777, it will go from Normal, Secondary and then Direct, but it will also go back to Normal once the problem is rectified. But its worth bearing in mind that the Boeing FBW is extremely basic compared to the Airbus philosophy.

I don't have enough in depth knowledge on the later Boeing FBW aircraft to be able to say what the position with them would be, but I'd be surprised if there isn't something similar, and with the yoke control system rather than the sidesticks, I'd expect some form of linkage to still be usable.

Yep, if all else fails, there are still cables to the stabiliser and some spoilers, but not the rudder which I'm assuming is due to a wheel to rudder cross tie.

smurfjed

bk.... I would hazard a guess that the chances of this happening again are quite slim, however, no one is willing to start talking about crew fatigue!

goingnowhere

bk wrote: »

I think you misunderstood what Cianmcliam is suggesting.

A large emergency unlock button would be inside the cockpit, not in the cabin.

The big handle on the door already covers that, also two catches to release the escape panel

Irish Steve

ProfessorPlum wrote: »

I'm beginning to wonder just how much you do know about simulators, or it most of it is just being plucked off the net.

I will admit that I have forgotten quite a bit of the finer details of the exact sequence of events, it was nearly 20 years ago that I spent close on 2 and a half years producing a very complex A320 based simulation system that was used for flight deck research by British Aerospace in Bristol.

Simulator knowledge, well.... I wasn't doing type ratings, but over a 4 year period, I legally logged and had signed off (as Pu/t, with instructors or training captains) close on 200 hours in a range of level D simulators that included BAC1-11, L1011 Tristar, MD 83, DC10, A320, B737-2, B737-3, B747-2. B747-4. B757. B767. B777 and Concorde. so yes I do know a bit about simulators, and I've not mentioned a significant number of GA simulators like Citation Gulfstream and Lear Jet that were also part of my professional work at that time. And to add to those times, I spent probably another 200 hours (Pre 9/11) on the jump seats of a wide range of aircraft that were operating commercial services in a number of European countries, so I am well versed in exactly what goes on (good and bad) at the sharp end of commercial aviation

The number of (unlogged) hours in the generic A320 simulator ran into several hundred as part of the proving and training that was necessary to validate the product before they started the in depth research, and I had my own generic MD83 based simulator here that was used for proof of concept, as well as being used by Aer Lingus for an event in Dublin Castle, and a number of other aviation related events across Europe.

In order to produce an acceptable level of authenticity, (A320 flight crews operated the BAE sim to produce the experimental data) we had to spend a lot of time in a 320 sim, and in research in the documentation and information about those simulators, AND the aircraft, that is normally not seen by anyone other than the certification inspectors.

My apologies if my memories of over 15 years ago, and my somewhat simplified explanation of the underlying concept of Fly By wire offends your sense of correctness. I wasn't aware that I had to produce forum responses that are suitable to pass the type rating ground exams, or pass the EASA ATPL exams, this is a general forum about aviation, NOT the definitive forum on exactly how an airline expects their crew to interpret their SOP and MCC procedures.

I will guarantee you that 20 years ago, I had a lot more knowledge about certain aspects of the operation of the A320 FBW than the pilots that were operating it, as we had to produce code to run on the PC based computers that drove the simulation in such a way that their operation was absolutely faithful to the way in which the A320 operated, as there was no way that BAE could buy the relevant modules from Airbus in the way that the simulator manufacturers do, the research budget wasn't large enough to allow that luxury.

So, to sum up, my simulator knowledge, while somewhat rusty now, is NOT being sucked off the Internet.

You fly Airbus, I am very happy that your level of knowledge seems to be somewhat more comprehensive than that demonstrated by the people that were in charge of the flight deck of AF447, their glaring lack of understanding of certain aspects of the way their aircraft operated was what killed all on board, and while I may now not be directly involved in the sharp end of aviation, I am VERY motivated to try and ensure that the sort of ignorance that caused the 447 event is never again allowed to kill people, and in the same vein, I don't think it is unreasonable for me to have very strong feelings and opinions about the competence and capability of the people that I depend on to correctly operate the aircraft that I travel in as a passenger.

The Germanwings event is every bit as significant as the 9/11 events, in that it crosses a line that many had thought uncrossable, and now that the genie is out of the bottle, it is not going to be put back in again any time soon, and that WILL have yet more consequences for the people that are currently operating at the sharp end of the aviation industry.

Simply because I'm tired of being attacked by you in particular, to save you the pain, I'm going to put you on my ignore list shortly, as it's clear that you are determined to not respect my opinions, so I'd rather not have to see yours any longer, I've tried to be civil to you, but it hasn't been reciprocated, so rather than get into strife with the moderators, I will take the easy way out of what's becoming an increasingly unpleasant confrontation.

mickdw

Irish Steve wrote: »

I will admit that I have forgotten quite a bit of the finer details of the exact sequence of events, it was nearly 20 years ago that I spent close on 2 and a half years producing a very complex A320 based simulation system that was used for flight deck research by British Aerospace in Bristol.

Simulator knowledge, well.... I wasn't doing type ratings, but over a 4 year period, I legally logged and had signed off (as Pu/t, with instructors or training captains) close on 200 hours in a range of level D simulators that included BAC1-11, L1011 Tristar, MD 83, DC10, A320, B737-2, B737-3, B747-2. B747-4. B757. B767. B777 and Concorde. so yes I do know a bit about simulators, and I've not mentioned a significant number of GA simulators like Citation Gulfstream and Lear Jet that were also part of my professional work at that time. And to add to those times, I spent probably another 200 hours (Pre 9/11) on the jump seats of a wide range of aircraft that were operating commercial services in a number of European countries, so I am well versed in exactly what goes on (good and bad) at the sharp end of commercial aviation

The number of (unlogged) hours in the generic A320 simulator ran into several hundred as part of the proving and training that was necessary to validate the product before they started the in depth research, and I had my own generic MD83 based simulator here that was used for proof of concept, as well as being used by Aer Lingus for an event in Dublin Castle, and a number of other aviation related events across Europe.

In order to produce an acceptable level of authenticity, (A320 flight crews operated the BAE sim to produce the experimental data) we had to spend a lot of time in a 320 sim, and in research in the documentation and information about those simulators, AND the aircraft, that is normally not seen by anyone other than the certification inspectors.

My apologies if my memories of over 15 years ago, and my somewhat simplified explanation of the underlying concept of Fly By wire offends your sense of correctness. I wasn't aware that I had to produce forum responses that are suitable to pass the type rating ground exams, or pass the EASA ATPL exams, this is a general forum about aviation, NOT the definitive forum on exactly how an airline expects their crew to interpret their SOP and MCC procedures.

I will guarantee you that 20 years ago, I had a lot more knowledge about certain aspects of the operation of the A320 FBW than the pilots that were operating it, as we had to produce code to run on the PC based computers that drove the simulation in such a way that their operation was absolutely faithful to the way in which the A320 operated, as there was no way that BAE could buy the relevant modules from Airbus in the way that the simulator manufacturers do, the research budget wasn't large enough to allow that luxury.

So, to sum up, my simulator knowledge, while somewhat rusty now, is NOT being sucked off the Internet.

You fly Airbus, I am very happy that your level of knowledge seems to be somewhat more comprehensive than that demonstrated by the people that were in charge of the flight deck of AF447, their glaring lack of understanding of certain aspects of the way their aircraft operated was what killed all on board, and while I may now not be directly involved in the sharp end of aviation, I am VERY motivated to try and ensure that the sort of ignorance that caused the 447 event is never again allowed to kill people, and in the same vein, I don't think it is unreasonable for me to have very strong feelings and opinions about the competence and capability of the people that I depend on to correctly operate the aircraft that I travel in as a passenger.

The Germanwings event is every bit as significant as the 9/11 events, in that it crosses a line that many had thought uncrossable, and now that the genie is out of the bottle, it is not going to be put back in again any time soon, and that WILL have yet more consequences for the people that are currently operating at the sharp end of the aviation industry.

Simply because I'm tired of being attacked by you in particular, to save you the pain, I'm going to put you on my ignore list shortly, as it's clear that you are determined to not respect my opinions, so I'd rather not have to see yours any longer, I've tried to be civil to you, but it hasn't been reciprocated, so rather than get into strife with the moderators, I will take the easy way out of what's becoming an increasingly unpleasant confrontation.

Sounds like incredibly interesting work you were involved with 20 years ago.

ProfessorPlum

Irish Steve wrote: »

I will admit that I have forgotten quite a bit of the finer details of the exact sequence of events, it was nearly 20 years ago that I spent close on 2 and a half years producing a very complex A320 based simulation system that was used for flight deck research by British Aerospace in Bristol.

Simulator knowledge, well.... I wasn't doing type ratings, but over a 4 year period, I legally logged and had signed off (as Pu/t, with instructors or training captains) close on 200 hours in a range of level D simulators that included BAC1-11, L1011 Tristar, MD 83, DC10, A320, B737-2, B737-3, B747-2. B747-4. B757. B767. B777 and Concorde. so yes I do know a bit about simulators, and I've not mentioned a significant number of GA simulators like Citation Gulfstream and Lear Jet that were also part of my professional work at that time. And to add to those times, I spent probably another 200 hours (Pre 9/11) on the jump seats of a wide range of aircraft that were operating commercial services in a number of European countries, so I am well versed in exactly what goes on (good and bad) at the sharp end of commercial aviation

The number of (unlogged) hours in the generic A320 simulator ran into several hundred as part of the proving and training that was necessary to validate the product before they started the in depth research, and I had my own generic MD83 based simulator here that was used for proof of concept, as well as being used by Aer Lingus for an event in Dublin Castle, and a number of other aviation related events across Europe.

In order to produce an acceptable level of authenticity, (A320 flight crews operated the BAE sim to produce the experimental data) we had to spend a lot of time in a 320 sim, and in research in the documentation and information about those simulators, AND the aircraft, that is normally not seen by anyone other than the certification inspectors.

My apologies if my memories of over 15 years ago, and my somewhat simplified explanation of the underlying concept of Fly By wire offends your sense of correctness. I wasn't aware that I had to produce forum responses that are suitable to pass the type rating ground exams, or pass the EASA ATPL exams, this is a general forum about aviation, NOT the definitive forum on exactly how an airline expects their crew to interpret their SOP and MCC procedures.

I will guarantee you that 20 years ago, I had a lot more knowledge about certain aspects of the operation of the A320 FBW than the pilots that were operating it, as we had to produce code to run on the PC based computers that drove the simulation in such a way that their operation was absolutely faithful to the way in which the A320 operated, as there was no way that BAE could buy the relevant modules from Airbus in the way that the simulator manufacturers do, the research budget wasn't large enough to allow that luxury.

So, to sum up, my simulator knowledge, while somewhat rusty now, is NOT being sucked off the Internet.

You fly Airbus, I am very happy that your level of knowledge seems to be somewhat more comprehensive than that demonstrated by the people that were in charge of the flight deck of AF447, their glaring lack of understanding of certain aspects of the way their aircraft operated was what killed all on board, and while I may now not be directly involved in the sharp end of aviation, I am VERY motivated to try and ensure that the sort of ignorance that caused the 447 event is never again allowed to kill people, and in the same vein, I don't think it is unreasonable for me to have very strong feelings and opinions about the competence and capability of the people that I depend on to correctly operate the aircraft that I travel in as a passenger.

The Germanwings event is every bit as significant as the 9/11 events, in that it crosses a line that many had thought uncrossable, and now that the genie is out of the bottle, it is not going to be put back in again any time soon, and that WILL have yet more consequences for the people that are currently operating at the sharp end of the aviation industry.

Simply because I'm tired of being attacked by you in particular, to save you the pain, I'm going to put you on my ignore list shortly, as it's clear that you are determined to not respect my opinions, so I'd rather not have to see yours any longer, I've tried to be civil to you, but it hasn't been reciprocated, so rather than get into strife with the moderators, I will take the easy way out of what's becoming an increasingly unpleasant confrontation.

The issue is that the control laws you described are not the finer details - they are fundamental to the Fly by Wire philosophy, and so it would make me suspicious that you are not as knowledgeable as you might like to think you are. Btw, nobody is expecting anybody on the forum to post type rating standard answers - but you put yourself up as the self styled expert, so you hold yourself to a higher standard.

In any case, I respect others opinions. But this is an open forum, and so you can expect, like every other poster, to have those opinions challenged. I know that many posters are probably unhappy that I have 'dared' to challenge you, for instance.

And be assured, that when you or anyone else posts information as fact, which is in reality false, as you have done on this and other threads, I will challenge that. Whether you choose to ignore me or not.

Irish Steve

mickdw wrote: »

Sounds like incredibly interesting work you were involved with 20 years ago.

It was, I spent a lot of time all around Europe doing a wide range of simulator based projects, it was the direction I ended up going in after Saddam killed my original plan to go into professional flying.

I never thought I'd end up doing some of the things I did, and it was an amazing few years, made much more enjoyable by the absence of the restrictions that have come in since 9/11, and by the somewhat more relaxed environment that was the norm in those times. Some of the projects were incredibly basic, the first being a simple Flight simulator 4 based project that was used by Aer Lingus to do the MCC (multi crew cooperation) training that had become essential in the aftermath of the Kegworth crash, they had a group of 20 new cadets fresh back from Vero Beach who hadn't done MCC, and they didn't have a simulator at Dublin that was suitable, they had no instructors for the 1-11 or the 737-200 that were still there at that time, and their 737-300 was too busy to divert on to non type rated work. It was also then used at the Young Scientist show, I still have the copy from the half page photo in the Irish Times (broadsheet in those days) of President Mary Robinson flying "my" device on a short scenario that we had set up for the event, we spent 4 days pushing huge numbers of students through the device, they got just under 2 minutes in each seat, they observed from the right hand seat, and moved to the left hand seat and flew it themselves. In a year of cutbacks and generally negative media comment, the PR people at Aer Lingus were over the moon with the coverage they got for the "Ballsbridge" simulator.

There were other projects that got more complex, the BAE one being one of them, and I was also involved with a similar DC10 project in Denver. 9/11 hit us hard, the PC based simulator market died overnight due to the stigma of the use of Microsoft Flight sim by some of the 9/11 people. Even now, PC based solutions are not popular, despite the fact that they could have provided huge advantages to recurrent training scenarios, at much lower cost than level D devices. While I've stayed involved with aviation in several areas, I've not had the same levels of involvement or interest that were there in those years, so in recent times, I've been more involved in remote control models than in full size aircraft.

So yes, I'm getting rusty in some areas, the lack of regular involvement and anno domini (wrong side of 60 now) are both part of that, but I won't apologise for being very aggressive about some of the issues that I see happening in some areas, as I see some of the cutbacks that have come from the cost reductions of the last years as being dangerous in the medium to long term, the lack of skills of the AF447 crew being the most glaring example.

Active pilots can't speak out too much about such issues, as it could adversely affect their employment situation, so it's important that people who see the changes that have happened are prepared to speak out when those changes are having an adverse effect on the quality of the industry, there's been a few veiled comments in this thread about crew duty hours and rest periods, which is another sensitive area, albeit probably not directly related to the Germanwings event.

I digress, we really need to get back to the specifics of the thread, we've wandered some into several areas of controversy. It's time to stop, and ensure that the focus of the thread is on what caused the co pilot to take the devastating actions he did, and how we ensure that no pilot in future can do the same sort of thing to another innocent group of people.

Safehands

smurfjed wrote: »

bk.... I would hazard a guess that the chances of this happening again are quite slim, however, no one is willing to start talking about crew fatigue!

I know that all the Irish and British aircraft are as well maintained and safe as they could be and I have zero concerns flying with any of them. We are hearing a lot about this crew fatigue thing right now. I understand that the contract pilot scheme is currently used by many airlines. Is this type of scheme ideal or does it produce more stressed out pilots?

John C

The Staatsanwalt Düsseldorf made an announcement.
I was watching it on German television. Here is what I recall.

Crash of flight 4U 9525 in the French Alps

The prosecution Dusseldorf under the aegis of experienced department heads and supported by several colleagues has evaluated the evidence secured to date.

In addition, many witnesses from his personal and professional life have been interviewed. Please understand that the prosecutor cannot and does not want to engage in speculation about the motivation of the deceased co-pilot. The investigating authorities must stick exclusively to the facts. Based on the secured documents and files the following preliminary assessment can be made.

The results of examination of evidence previously reported in press reports of this inquiry are still valid. In particular, there is still a lack of both a provable announcement of doing such a deed as well as [a lack of] a revealed admission of doing this deed.

Likewise, no specific circumstances from his close personal and family environment or in his workplace that can provide sustainable information about a possible motive have become known.

The pertinent medical documentation does not so far point to any organic disease. Several years ago the co-pilot - before obtaining a pilot licence - was for an extended period with a noted suicidical tendency in psychotherapy. Thereafter and up to last, additional doctor visits with sick leave certificates took place, whereby no suicidal tendency or aggression to others was attested.

smurfjed

was for an extended period with a noted suicidical tendency in psychotherapy.

How on earth was he ever allowed to fly an airliner!

As for I_S and PP... both of you make excellent points, I really look forward to reading them as they have lead me down some very interesting paths of research, and given me to opportunity to learn new things about the aircraft which I'm about to fly. But you have to accept that you are looking at this from totally different directions. Please keep it going

TheChizler

smurfjed wrote: »

How on earth was he ever allowed to fly an airliner!

Because he passed his medical and wasn't knowingly deemed a threat to himself or others? Seriously, you can't hold a bad period in someone's life against them forever unless there's compelling evidence to indicate that it's relevant.

John C

smurfjed wrote: »

How on earth was he ever allowed to fly an airliner!

As for I_S and PP... both of you make excellent points, I really look forward to reading them as they have lead me down some very interesting paths of research, and given me to opportunity to learn new things about the aircraft which I'm about to fly. But you have to accept that you are looking at this from totally different directions. Please keep it going

An airline spokesperson says
"Über die medizinische Vorgeschichte des Co-Piloten liegen uns keine Erkenntnisse vor.“
We have no information about the case history of the co pilot.

She has also repeated an earlier standpoint:
"Die Entscheidung, ob jemand flugtauglich ist, ist Sache der vom Luftfahrtbundesamt zertifizierten Flieger-Ärzte. Wenn diese den Test des Kandidaten als ‚bestanden‘ einstufen, dann gilt derjenige als flugtauglich."

The decision, if a person is fit to fly, is that of the aeromedical examiner of the German federal aviation authority (Luftfahrtbundesamt). When they assess the examinaton of the candidate as 'passed', then that person is 'fit to fly'.

dogmatix

Interesting article on Slate.com about the "rule of two" solution to such incidents as Germanwings crash.

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2015/03/how_to_prevent_the_next_germanwings_disaster_all_airlines_should_adopt_the.html

sully2010

TheChizler wrote: »

Because he passed his medical and wasn't knowingly deemed a threat to himself or others? Seriously, you can't hold a bad period in someone's life against them forever unless there's compelling evidence to indicate that it's relevant.

I think there is a fundamental problem in that he was depressed, suicidal possibly suffering from a psychosomatic eye issue and the airline never knew about this. There are certain jobs, ones who are in control of 100's of people where there should be an obligation for doctors to report serious issues which may endanger peoples lives to their employers.

Pilots should not be at the controls of 100's of people if they have mental health issues, even if they are being treated. What if they forget their medication and have an adverse reaction? There is a whole list of things that could happen to them.

The fact he suffered mental health issues during his training should have meant he was kept under close scrutiny and as Germanwings said he slipped under their safety net. You could argue that they let him by not monitoring what should have set off alarm bells earlier. I may be wrong in saying this but I would say there are a lot of airlines out there who would not employ someone who was developing these issues during training. Its not discriminatory against people with mental health issues, as said some jobs are just not suited to people with these issues.

TheChizler

sully2010 wrote: »

I think there is a fundamental problem in that he was depressed, suicidal possibly suffering from a psychosomatic eye issue and the airline never knew about this. There are certain jobs, ones who are in control of 100's of people where there should be an obligation for doctors to report serious issues which may endanger peoples lives to their employers.

This was well before he became a pilot though.

sully2010

TheChizler wrote: »

This was well before he became a pilot though.

What do you mean? He was depressed, suicidal and possibly suffering from a psychosomatic eye problem in the weeks leading up to the crash. It seems it was a common theme throughout his life according to reports as is the case with many people suffering these issues.

TheChizler

sully2010 wrote: »

What do you mean? He was depressed, suicidal and possibly suffering from a psychosomatic eye problem in the weeks leading up to the crash. It seems it was a common theme throughout his life according to reports as is the case with many people suffering these issues.

Based on the facts we have, he was treated for suicidal thoughts before he became a pilot. I'm not aware of any more evidence.

sully2010

TheChizler wrote: »

Based on the facts we have, he was treated for suicidal thoughts before he became a pilot. I'm not aware of any more evidence.

Well I'm not going to go quoting news articles because yes they are not fact as yet, but some(German papers) are saying he was visiting suicide websites in the weeks leading up to the crash. He could have become suicidal because he was so fearful that his career would be over due to what he thought was a career ending eye condition.

What is fact is a lot of medications including anti depressants and other psychiatric medications were found in his apartment.

bk

Shockingly it looks like almost exactly the same type of incident happened just two years ago in Africa:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LAM_Mozambique_Airlines_Flight_470

On 21 December 2013, the Mozambican Civil Aviation Institute (Instituto Moçambicano de Aviação Civil, IACM) head João Abreu presented the preliminary investigation report, according to which Captain Herminio dos Santos Fernandes had a "clear intention" to crash the jet and manually changed its autopilot settings.[14] The plane's intended altitude was reportedly changed three times from 38,000 feet (11,582 m) to 592 feet (180 m), the latter being below ground level, and the speed was manually adjusted as well.[15] The cockpit voice recorder captured several alarms going off during the descent, as well as repeated loud bangs on the door from the co-pilot, who was locked out of the cockpit until shortly before the crash

Almost a carbon copy of this incident! Unfortunately probably because it happened in Africa, it didn't get the media attention. Had it done so, I'm sure the two people in the cockpit rule might have already been implemented and this Germanwings incident might have been avoided.

smurfjed

I'm sure the two people in the cockpit rule might have already been implemented

Wouldn't it make more sense to make sure that people with mental health issues didn't get into he cockpit in the first place?

smurfjed

There is a further mode of degradation that will only happen in the event of a widespread power and systems failure across multiple areas of the aircraft, called manual reversion. In this mode, the sidestick become an ornament that does nothing

Chatted with 2 ex A330/A340 First Officers today, while they understood the concept of manual reversion, they said that it isn't mentioned in the Airbus FCOM, also they said that the sidestick still controlled the roll using the yellow hydraulic system, so they aren't just an ornament. Pitch was controlled through the trim.

As for AF447, well the authorities have now mandated high altitude upset recovery training, so it would appear they believe that the training associated with high altitude operations was below the required levels. So this takes some of the blame away from the two first officers.

smurfjed

OSI... how about mental health issues associated with suicidal tendencies ?

Or if you don't agree, tell me what is an acceptable level of mental health for airline pilots ?