Abortion Discussion, Part Trois

recedite

aloyisious wrote: »

Re personhood being related to the concept of the soul: I doubt if that would enter the thoughts of the average thinker about personhood, more likely that the thoughts (nowadays) would more probably be about personhood of the unborn/fetus being a legal construct for the physical entity.

Yes, that is another significant change. In the past people agonised over the ETA of the soul, and where it would reside after its arrival. Head or heart, or somewhere else. Nowadays all that stuff seems foolish to us. Yet we struggle to find a replacement "big moment" for the start of personhood.
Some think conception is it, some think birth, but neither are really defining moments. IMO eventually we will just accept that the spark of life is present continuously down through the generations, and a new personhood is something that develops very gradually and incrementally with the developing embryo/foetus/infant.

aloyisious

recedite wrote: »

I think penal is a different and unrelated word to penance. Penal and penalties are a secular concept of punishment.
Penance and penitential acts are some kind of religious punishment/guilt trip.

It is noteworthy that historically the religious assigned a lesser penance to killing the unborn, compared to the born, which implies a lesser right to life of the unborn.

That last bit surprised me,but then again, that was in times where the concepts of life-value were different. Various (lexicon) sources make the link through penalty, which is linked to penance. It's true that penance is/was a religious ecclesiastical concept which seems, after the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire, to become part of the common law, it being the origin of statute law and its penalties.

aloyisious

recedite wrote: »

Yes, that is another significant change. In the past people agonised over the ETA of the soul, and where it would reside after its arrival. Head or heart, or somewhere else. Nowadays all that stuff seems foolish to us. Yet we struggle to find a replacement "big moment" for the start of personhood.
Some think conception is it, some think birth, but neither are really defining moments. IMO eventually we will just accept that the spark of life is present continuously down through the generations, and a new personhood is something that develops very gradually and incrementally with the developing embryo/foetus/infant.

It leads to me wondering if the concept of the soul and it's journey has changed entirely in the RC church, seeing as how Limbo was consigned to history.

Add-on: I regret that I'm getting sleepy so I'm going to close down for the night....

Peregrinus

recedite wrote: »

I think penal is a different and unrelated word to penance. Penal and penalties are a secular concept of punishment.
Penance and penitential acts are some kind of religious punishment/guilt trip.

It is noteworthy that historically the religious assigned a lesser penance to killing the unborn, compared to the born, which implies a lesser right to life of the unborn.

I take your point, but I think you're being a bit anachronistic here, reading attitudes to "rights" into historic stances on abortion. "Rights" are a modern concept, and pre-modern attitudes to crime/punishment, whether religious or secular, weren't based on any concept of "rights". In particular condemnation of abortion wasn't based on any understanding that the unborn entity had a "right" to life.

Christian thinking about this was rooted in a holistic attitude which held that the value of something lay not just in what that thing was, but in what it could be, or could become; in its potential. (They got this from the Greeks.) Thus condemnation of abortion was based not on the view that the unborn entity was a little person; but on the view that it could and should become a person, and acting to prevent it becoming a person was wrong. (This was also the basis for condemning contraception; it acted to prevent a potentially fruitful, creative act from being actually fruitful and creative. And it was the basis for condemning infanticide, which was accepted and practised in the Roman world.)

Peregrinus

recedite wrote: »

Yes, that is another significant change. In the past people agonised over the ETA of the soul, and where it would reside after its arrival. Head or heart, or somewhere else. Nowadays all that stuff seems foolish to us. Yet we struggle to find a replacement "big moment" for the start of personhood.
Some think conception is it, some think birth, but neither are really defining moments. IMO eventually we will just accept that the spark of life is present continuously down through the generations, and a new personhood is something that develops very gradually and incrementally with the developing embryo/foetus/infant.

Well, we don't have to accept that, because it depends on what you mean by "personhood", which is a surprisingly rubbery concept.

If you think personhood is defined by actually possessing a particular set of characteristics then, yes, personhood develops over time, and we can meaningfully speak of this, um, individual as being more or less of a person (or as having more or less personhood) than that individual.

But that fairly soon takes you to a place where anybody under the age of about 25 is not a full person (because their distinctively human characteristics and capacities are not yet fully developed) and some people - e.g. those with a disability of some kind - will never be full persons. And that lead you into all kinds of potentially dark places; if the currently limited personhood of an unborn child allows it to be killed, where does that leave others with currently limited (or indeed permenantly limited) personhood? If you're going to draw a line between abortion (permissible) and, say, euthenasia of those with chromosomal disorders (not permissible) you can't point to "personhood" as your basis for doing so; you have to find some other basis for distinguishing the cases, and suddenly the transcendent moral significance of personhood turns out not to be so transcendent after all; what really determines whether you can kill or not is not personhood, but something else.

I'm increasingly of the view that personhood isn't a terribly helpful concept to employ in this debate (no matter which side you're on). I suspect people (on both sides) employ and define the term in an attempt to defend and rationalise the moral instincts they feel. But even if that worked (and I don't think it does, consistently) it doesn't solve any arguments, because the concept is so flexible. The understanding of personhood that you produce to support the view you wish to argue for is not one that I will accept, if I am arguing for a different view.

nozzferrahhtoo

I think I would agree and disagree with the above in different measures. I think personhood IS a useful measure to use when discussing the morality of abortion. But what you are discussing above is relative levels of personhood. And I wholly agree that that is a dark road to go down, and forces one to start questioning why, for example, the entire cast of the special olympics should have equal rights to anyone else and so on and so forth.

However with abortion, the vast near totality of abortions by choice happen in or before week 12, and certainly by week 16. At THESE stages of fetal development we are not talking about levels of personhood, but the complete abscence of it, and any of the currently known pre-requisites of consciousness or sentience AT ALL.

The analogy I often use is to radio waves. If Consciousness and Sentience are made analagous to radio waves, then at weeks 12-16 of gestation we are looking not just at a stage when the radio tower is not broadcasting any radio waves....... the tower itself has not even been built yet!

I myself therefore operate under the moral axiom that when an entity lacks ANY AND ALL faculty of sentience and consciousness then it is a moral non-entity to me. If at any stage it has that faculty in any measure, or we strongly suspect it does, then it should be afforded the equal rights that typifies it's species.

Therefore the fetus at 12 weeks to me is the moral equivalent of a rock or a table leg. Somewhat later in the developmental process however it becomes the moral equivalent to me of any human being be they "whole", mentally incapacitated, in a coma, asleep, or any other form the faculty of sentience and consciousness takes. And so I am not limited by the "trap" of wondering if "currently or permanently limited" instances of human consciousness should be afforded the same rights as any other.

Of course that is my moral position in "ideal". In PRACTICE however it might be otherwise. If I was escaping a burning building for example and I knew I could save one of two children....... an entirely healthy and "normal" 5 year old, or a mentally reduced or incapacitated 5 year old......... then "all things being equal" I am reaching for the former every time. But not because I think either has more of a "right to life" than the other, but more because of emotional biases I hold towards the capacity and potentials the former has to appreciate and experience and respond in life.

aloyisious

Peregrinus wrote: »

I take your point, but I think you're being a bit anachronistic here, reading attitudes to "rights" into historic stances on abortion. "Rights" are a modern concept, and pre-modern attitudes to crime/punishment, whether religious or secular, weren't based on any concept of "rights". In particular condemnation of abortion wasn't based on any understanding that the unborn entity had a "right" to life.

Christian thinking about this was rooted in a holistic attitude which held that the value of something lay not just in what that thing was, but in what it could be, or could become; in its potential. (They got this from the Greeks.) Thus condemnation of abortion was based not on the view that the unborn entity was a little person; but on the view that it could and should become a person, and acting to prevent it becoming a person was wrong. (This was also the basis for condemning contraception; it acted to prevent a potentially fruitful, creative act from being actually fruitful and creative. And it was the basis for condemning infanticide, which was accepted and practised in the Roman world.)

As in, using modern wording, what the born thought was the potential future of the unborn and to destroy that potential future was the offence, and not the actual killing.

Absolam

aloyisious wrote: »

Maybe I'm picking up this parenthesized part of your's above on crime and sentence wrongly (Though it apears to me that argument claims an infant also does not have the same quality of personhood that other born persons enjoy, if it's mother can be convicted of infanticide rather than murder for intentionally causing it's death) it does seem to conflict with this other parenthesized part of yours (So... someone might (intentionally) kill a person and be charged with an offence other than murder, because there are offences that better fit the act and circumstances) whereby you recognize act and circumstances apply.

Well, the first is an observation that if one argues quality of personhood is actually a factor in sentencing, current legislation would imply an infant does not have the same quality of personhood that other born persons enjoy since the sentence for ending it's life is lesser, whereas the second notes that there are a number of offenses which involve killing people which carry distinctly different sentences.

aloyisious wrote: »

The same considerations apparent in your 2nd above and elsewhere in your full post were probably also in the minds of those who wrote and set the act into law, and also any DPP who used it instead of murder when deciding on an appropriate charge; let the punishment fit the crime etc....

If you mean that different crimes involving killing people should have different penalties then I'd imagine, yes, lawmakers have thought that through, though I would think that the DPP in choosing which crime to prosecute probably relies more on which best fits the evidence.

aloyisious wrote: »

BTW, I missed the part where some-one argued that an INFANT had less personhood than another person, causing you to include the infanticide act and an offence triable under it.

That's ok, that wasn't what caused me to include it in my point; I included it because it illustrates the fact that one may intentionally kill a person without the crime being murder.

aloyisious wrote: »

Re your thoughts on equality of personhood, it seems it's a centuries old debate with differing opinions (as usual with humans). This wikipedia link might be enlightening as it includes the ecclesiastical courts. The whole is titled Beginning of human personhood and it's respective (Christian) Para is titled Fetal personhood in law.....

It wasn't me who said anything about equality of personhood I'm afraid, but I'd agree the Christian position on the subject is well developed.

aloyisious

Absolam wrote: »

That's ok, that wasn't what caused me to include it in my point; I included it because it illustrates the fact that one may intentionally kill a person without the crime being murder

Re the above, I've been aware, career-wise, of that fact for well nigh on 50 years now, through a state career.

I'd have to research on whether personhood, in the context you've mentioned it in this thread, has any relevance or has ever been a factor on sentencing in court here in Ireland.

Absolam

nozzferrahhtoo wrote: »

I think I would agree and disagree with the above in different measures. I think personhood IS a useful measure to use when discussing the morality of abortion. But what you are discussing above is relative levels of personhood. And I wholly agree that that is a dark road to go down, and forces one to start questioning why, for example, the entire cast of the special olympics should have equal rights to anyone else and so on and so forth. However with abortion, the vast near totality of abortions by choice happen in or before week 12, and certainly by week 16. At THESE stages of fetal development we are not talking about levels of personhood, but the complete abscence of it, and any of the currently known pre-requisites of consciousness or sentience AT ALL.

On the other hand, I would be dubious that there are, or ought to be, levels of personhood, or any reason to think that consciousness or sentience might have any relevance to the concept. Which would incline me to agree with Peregrinus; the concept would generally seem to be employed in a way that will fall into line with preconceived positions rather than determine them.

Absolam

aloyisious wrote: »

Re the above, I've been aware, career-wise, of that fact for well nigh on 50 years now, through a state career. I'd have to research on whether personhood, in the context you've mentioned it in this thread, has any relevance or has ever been a factor on sentencing in court here in Ireland.

Well, you did ask.... Anyways, I very much doubt personhood has ever had any relevance or has ever been a factor in Court sentencing here, at least with regard to the intentional killing of a human being, so it will be interesting to see what you come up with.

aloyisious

Absolam wrote: »

Well, you did ask.... Anyways, I very much doubt personhood has ever had any relevance or has ever been a factor in Court sentencing here, at least with regard to the intentional killing of a human being, so it will be interesting to see what you come up with.

Good idea, we can do research on it, separately, and one of us post his for a start, say 2 weeks time and the O/P would see it and post his later the same day. What say you?

Absolam

aloyisious wrote: »

Good idea, we can do research on it, separately, and one of us post his for a start, say 2 weeks time and the O/P would see it and post his later the same day. What say you?

I'd say I don't think personhood has ever had any relevance or has ever been a factor in Court sentencing here, at least with regard to the intentional killing of a human being. But if you produce information to the contrary, I'll happily review it.

recedite

nozzferrahhtoo wrote: »

Therefore the fetus at 12 weeks to me is the moral equivalent of a rock or a table leg. Somewhat later in the developmental process however it becomes the moral equivalent to me of any human being be they "whole", mentally incapacitated, in a coma, asleep, or any other form the faculty of sentience and consciousness takes. And so I am not limited by the "trap" of wondering if "currently or permanently limited" instances of human consciousness should be afforded the same rights as any other.

Well, you may have avoided one ethical pitfall, but you fall into another. This very binary approach means that every human foetus younger than a particular stage gets 0% human rights, but after the particular magic moment they are then afforded 100% human rights.
That can't be ethically right, even if you could identify the exact moment. Its the equivalent of ancient Greeks trying to identify the exact moment the soul enters the body.

IMO the "sliding scale" method of affording human rights seems preferable. Or at least having various "bands". But the only way to avoid going down the dark road of classifying some sentient people as lesser persons is to set the bands quite low. Hence a very early stage foetus would fall into the lowest band, as would a virtually brain dead adult, or somebody permanently in a coma (assuming here it was medically possible to know the coma was permanent).
In such cases an inconvenience caused to living persons on whom these entities depend would be enough to tip the balance against their right to life. Further up the chain (measurable as x number of weeks in a foetus) it would require more than mere inconvenience.

But by this measure, the very liberal abortion regime proposed recently by the Citizens Assembly would be seen as traveling down a very dark road indeed.

aloyisious

Absolam wrote: »

I'd say I don't think personhood has ever had any relevance or has ever been a factor in Court sentencing here, at least with regard to the intentional killing of a human being. But if you produce information to the contrary, I'll happily review it.

That's what I expected,

Absolam

aloyisious wrote: »

That's what I expected,

Well, of course, you hardly expected I'd research your speculation for you, even though you asked.

aloyisious

Absolam wrote: »

Well, of course, you hardly expected I'd research your speculation for you, even though you asked.

Even though I know I'm probably wasting my time replying to you in hope of a fact-based response, perhaps you might review my posts and then copy and paste here exactly word for word where I asked you to research any speculation at all for me. I doubt that you will find - given that it never existed at all at any time - that particular ask by me anywhere and expect that you will come up with some alteration of fact to cover your claim.

Absolam

recedite wrote: »

IMO the "sliding scale" method of affording human rights seems preferable. Or at least having various "bands". But the only way to avoid going down the dark road of classifying some sentient people as lesser persons is to set the bands quite low. Hence a very early stage foetus would fall into the lowest band, as would a virtually brain dead adult, or somebody permanently in a coma (assuming here it was medically possible to know the coma was permanent).

I'm more inclined to the idea that if we ascribe human rights to people on the basis that they are human rights, then they most sensibly should be ascribed to everyone. So, everyone should have a right to life, to bodily integrity, to self determination, to marry, to vote, to ownership of property, whatever we decide are human rights, equally and in the same degree. To my mind, human rights are as much indicative of the aspirations of a society as they are measures of it's achievements in affording dignity to it's own people and promoting those ideals amongst others, and it surely should be our aspiration to provide the greatest breadth of such freedoms to the greatest number of people we can.

Proceeding from the basis that everyone by virtue of being a human being possesses the human rights our society affords, there are obviously times in the course of everyone's existence when they are not in a position to exercise those rights; a child does not have the capacity to engage in a marriage, a coma victim cannot make medical decisions, a dementia sufferer cannot manage their financial affairs, and so on. Recognising this, and that rights shouldn't simply not exist because one cannot exercise them, we place those rights and their exercise in the persons best interests, variously in the hands of their guardians, executors, or their State (nominally people we as a society deem trustworthy to act in that persons interests rather than their own), until such time as they can exercise them on their own behalf or they as a person no longer exist. That seems to me a more holistic view of human rights which allows the greatest potential for individual freedoms and self determination within a society, and does not exclude members of that society from the benefits of simply being human in the way that setting bars to rights based on consciousness, sentience, 'special needs', location, affluence, gender, skin colour, or on the basis of their mental state or physical ability or any other arbitrary condition.

Absolam

aloyisious wrote: »

Even though I know I'm probably wasting my time replying to you in hope of a fact-based response, perhaps you might review my posts and then copy and paste here exactly word for word where I asked you to research any speculation at all for me. I doubt that you will find - given that it never existed at all at any time - that particular ask by me anywhere and expect that you will come up with some alteration of fact to cover your claim.

Since you asked;

aloyisious wrote: »

Good idea, we can do research on it, separately, and one of us post his for a start, say 2 weeks time and the O/P would see it and post his later the same day. What say you?

But if you don't mind, I don't intend going any further down a rabbit hole of who said what and when; it's all on the thread already. Which is not to say I'm not, as I am always, happy to discuss anything relevant to the topics at hand that I've actually posted.

nozzferrahhtoo

recedite wrote: »

That can't be ethically right, even if you could identify the exact moment. Its the equivalent of ancient Greeks trying to identify the exact moment the soul enters the body.

Why "cant" it be ethically right? You assereted it can not but I am not seeing WHY it can not. If an entity, whatever it be, lacks any and ALL elements of the faculty of consciousness and sentience....... then on what basis should be we affording it rights or moral/ethical concern?

I readily admit we do not have the current capability to identify "the exact moment" when this stuff comes online however. Thankfully we do not need to. For the purposes of the abortion debate we only need identify stages when we can say with as much certainty as humanly possible that it has NOT come on line.

A useful analogy here is rainbows. We can pretty clearly point at a part of the rainbow and say "red" and another part and say "orange". We can not so easily point to any part of the rainbow and say HERE is exactly where it stops being red and starts being orange.

Not being able to identify this biological transitionary point does not stop us identifying pretty clearly points on either side of it. And that is all that is really ethically required for abortion. The VAST, near TOTAL majority of abortions by choice happen in or before week 12, and certainly week 16. We are talking well over 90% here.

And at THOSE stages we are very much capable of saying "This is red not orange" and so the "pitfall" you appear to think you have identified in my post is simply not there.

If this is any arguments, evidence, data or reasoning on offer upon which to afford a 12 week old fetus moral and ethical concern.... I am certainly not seeing it on this thread. Contrary to nonsense claims about my biases, from users who are consistently only capable of ignoring my positions in favor of falsely imagining my biases on my behalf.......... all I have done with this issue is sit down and identify what the elements are upon which we mediate moral and ethical concern.......... and then simply noticed that the fetus at 12/16 weeks not just slightly but ENTIRELY lacks everything I identified on that list.

Absolam

nozzferrahhtoo wrote: »

Why "cant" it be ethically right? You assereted it can not but I am not seeing WHY it can not. If an entity, whatever it be, lacks any and ALL elements of the faculty of consciousness and sentience....... then on what basis should be we affording it rights or moral/ethical concern?

Is there a particular reason you feel consciousness and sentience should be gateway conditions for human rights? It's not as if they're peculiar to humans; pretty much all animals are conscious and sentient, but they obviously don't qualify. You said earlier that a human being lacking these attributes later in life doesn't 'trap' you into wondering if "currently or permanently limited" instances of human consciousness should be afforded the same rights as any other, though not whether, lacking any and ALL elements of the faculty of consciousness and sentience you feel there would be a basis for affording them rights. Or why you're not arguing, having fulfilled your conditions, all conscious and sentient entities should have human rights?

nozzferrahhtoo wrote: »

I readily admit we do not have the current capability to identify "the exact moment" when this stuff comes online however. Thankfully we do not need to. For the purposes of the abortion debate we only need identify stages when we can say with as much certainty as humanly possible that it has NOT come on line.

Only if we accept that consciousness and sentience are exclusively linked to humanity, and therefore requisite to establishing human rights, a position which would be difficult, if not manifestly impossible, to justify. If they're not, it would seem to be simply an artificial barrier created to withhold from some humans what others would prefer they didn't have, particularly so if it's simply not applied when it might 'trap' the withholder into an equal application they simply don't like.

aloyisious

Human sentience and consciousness is surely an indicator or point at which human rights could become applicable. It's how one makes a personal decision on when to say a human entity is due an initial application of the rights mentioned, or even for that argument when the rights can be withdrawn.

For example, turning off the life support machine keeping a born human entity's body alive while it's brain is dead is an acceptance in itself that that deed (due to the entity no longer having consciousness or sentience) would not be depriving it of human rights, or it would not be permissible in law. Following on from that, if it is accepted as a fact that a born human entity without sentience or consciousness has no human rights, then the same must surely apply to any human entity in a similar (non-sentient lacking consciousness) state, even if the differences are that the human entity is unborn and in a woman's womb and not on a bed attached to a life support machine.

Human rights are generally applicable to the sentient conscious human entity. Just saying human rights must apply to a fetus as it is a human entity because one feels it is right is not an actuality. Human rights are (IMO) for sentient and conscious human entities alone. A point to note is that the rights increase in number in law as the entity's capabilities increase with age.

I agree with Absolam in his description of human rights application being an artificial barrier. Being thought-through implements of human law with limitations of application to humans, they certainly are.

Absolam seems to have as his opinion that the lack of sentience or consciousness in the human entity should not affect the application of human rights to it. An inference can be taken from that that the rights application could be made when the sperm enters and binds with the female egg as that is when some people believe conception(the creation of a human being) starts. It leaves me wondering if he includes all the rights given humans in his opinion.

I disagree with that argument, believing that any such application must be made later in the formation stages of the human entity, when sentience and consciousness become a fact of life, as it were.

I do not know if Recedite holds exactly the same opinion as Absolam with regard to human rights and human unborn entities.

Absolam

aloyisious wrote: »

Human sentience and consciousness is surely an indicator or point at which human rights could become applicable. It's how one makes a personal decision on when to say a human entity is due an initial application of the rights mentioned, or even for that argument when the rights can be withdrawn.

Surely doesn't seem like an actual reason though; it sounds like an assumption, the kind of assumption used for depriving others of rights based on gender, race, or sexual orientation, which were all surely the right thing to do at the time. Why would one be sure sentience and consciousness have anything to do with when humans can be allowed to have human rights? Or even the notion that there ought to be points when humans can or can't have human rights....

aloyisious wrote: »

For example, turning off the life support machine keeping a born human entity's body alive while it's brain is dead is an acceptance in itself that that deed (due to the entity no longer having consciousness or sentience) would not be depriving it of human rights, or it would not be permissible in law.

I'm not sure allowing someone to die is quite the same as killing someone, or that it actually deprives them of their rights. Allowing someone to finish dying is what happens when doctors decide to discontinue somatic support; it's only done when there is no possibility of their recovering and living without that somatic support (in stark contrast to a foetus who absent intervention will eventually breathe, eat, think, procreate, all of their own volition), which is why the decision is made by professionals, and how it's permissible in law. I don't think anyone has ever presented a legal argument that the law does not prevent turning life support off on someone because they no longer have rights due to not being conscious or sentient.

aloyisious wrote: »

Following on from that, if it is accepted as a fact that a born human entity without sentience or consciousness has no human rights, then the same must surely apply to any human entity in a similar (non-sentient lacking consciousness) state, even if the differences are that the human entity is unborn and in a woman's womb and not on a bed attached to a life support machine.

The alternative follow on then, is if in fact a non sentient or conscious human is not deprived of rights at all when an empowered professional determines it is in that humans best interests to allow nature to take it's course, shouldn't the same be said of a human in a similar state; nature should be allowed to take it's course and the human be born, conscious and sentient, live it's life etc, until it is not in the (medically, keeping it simple) best interests of that human.

aloyisious wrote: »

Human rights are generally applicable to the sentient conscious human entity. Just saying human rights must apply to a fetus as it is a human entity because one feels it is right is not an actuality. Human rights are (IMO) for sentient and conscious human entities alone. A point to note is that the rights increase in number in law as the entity's capabilities increase with age.

Well, human entities are generally sentient and conscious, so let's not confuse correlation with causation. Obviously the significant right to the conversation, the right to life, actually does generally apply (obviously) to a non sentient non conscious human entity currently. That someone might want to deprive them of that right on the basis that they are not yet conscious or sentient immediately begs the question why those criteria ought to be applied to their right; if it's your opinion that they should be (since they manifestly are not) for sentient and conscious human entities alone, the why to that assertion immediately looms large.

aloyisious wrote: »

I disagree with that argument, believing that any such application must be made later in the formation stages of the human entity, when sentience and consciousness become a fact of life, as it were.

Which kind of brings us back to the first point; what would the basis for your belief that sentience and consciousness are criteria for applying human rights to a human be, and does it follow that when a human at other points in their life possesses neither sentience or consciousness we should by the same token treat them as having no rights?

aloyisious

Absolam wrote: »

Surely doesn't seem like an actual reason though; it sounds like an assumption, the kind of assumption used for depriving others of rights based on gender, race, or sexual orientation, which were all surely the right thing to do at the time. Why would one be sure sentience and consciousness have anything to do with when humans can be allowed to have human rights? Or even the notion that there ought to be points when humans can or can't have human rights....
I'm not sure allowing someone to die is quite the same as killing someone, or that it actually deprives them of their rights. Allowing someone to finish dying is what happens when doctors decide to discontinue somatic support; it's only done when there is no possibility of their recovering and living without that somatic support (in stark contrast to a foetus who absent intervention will eventually breathe, eat, think, procreate, all of their own volition), which is why the decision is made by professionals, and how it's permissible in law. I don't think anyone has ever presented a legal argument that the law does not prevent turning life support off on someone because they no longer have rights due to not being conscious or sentient.
The alternative follow on then, is if in fact a non sentient or conscious human is not deprived of rights at all when an empowered professional determines it is in that humans best interests to allow nature to take it's course, shouldn't the same be said of a human in a similar state; nature should be allowed to take it's course and the human be born, conscious and sentient, live it's life etc, until it is not in the (medically, keeping it simple) best interests of that human.
Well, human entities are generally sentient and conscious, so let's not confuse correlation with causation. Obviously the significant right to the conversation, the right to life, actually does generally apply (obviously) to a non sentient non conscious human entity currently. That someone might want to deprive them of that right on the basis that they are not yet conscious or sentient immediately begs the question why those criteria ought to be applied to their right; if it's your opinion that they should be (since they manifestly are not) for sentient and conscious human entities alone, the why to that assertion immediately looms large.
What would the basis for your belief that sentience and consciousness are criteria for applying human rights to a human be? And does it follow that when a human at other points in their life possesses neither sentience or consciousness we should treat them as having no rights?

So the questions remain. Do you believe that fetus are sentient and conscious entities at all times? Do you believe that, whether or not they are such,
they should have human rights? What is the basis for your assumption that fetus have any right to human rights from the start of their pre-sentient non-conscious existence? Are you even arguing that they do have such a right at any point at all?

As for your (in stark contrast to a foetus who absent intervention will eventually breathe, eat, think, procreate, all of their own volition) what is the intervention you think could affect the fetus future that you outlined above? Are you thinking of a specific human intervention there?

Absolam

aloyisious wrote: »

So the questions remain. Do you believe that fetus are sentient and conscious entities at all times? Do you believe that, whether or not they are such,
they should have human rights? What is the basis for your assumption that fetus have any right to human rights from the start of their pre-sentient non-conscious existence? Are you even arguing that they do have such a right at any point at all?

Those don't seem to be questions that remain at all, they seem entirely new? Nor do they appear to address any of what you have just quoted (which does include questions that I put to you).

aloyisious wrote: »

As for your (in stark contrast to a foetus who absent intervention will eventually breathe, eat, think, procreate, all of their own volition) what is the intervention you think could affect the fetus future that you outlined above? Are you thinking of a specific human intervention there?

Well, if you step it through, what interventions do you believe there are which would prevent a foetus from eventually breathing, eating, thinking, and procreating, of their own volition? And given the context of the statement, what corresponding interventions do you believe there are which would cause a person on somatic support to eventually breathe, eat, think, and procreate, of their own volition? My own feeling is that in the first case we have abortion, but in the second, nothing. Which demonstrates the lack of correllation between purposefully terminating the nascent life of a person in the womb and allowing the life of a person on somatic support to end.

aloyisious

Absolam wrote: »

Those don't seem to be questions that remain at all, they seem entirely new? Nor do they appear to address any of what you have just quoted (which does include questions that I put to you).
Well, if you step it through, what interventions do you believe there are which would prevent a foetus from eventually breathing, eating, thinking, and procreating, of their own volition? And given the context of the statement, what corresponding interventions do you believe there are which would cause a person on somatic support to eventually breathe, eat, think, and procreate, of their own volition? My own feeling is that in the first case we have abortion, but in the second, nothing. Which demonstrates the lack of correllation between purposefully terminating the nascent life of a person in the womb and allowing the life of a person on somatic support to end.

Your careful attempt to avoid answering the specifics in my first four questions by use of a "question" is rather obvious and non sequitur-ish. Those four questions remain unanswered by you.

Re your reply on intervention in the case of a fetus in a woman's womb you meant, abortion, thank's. I had wondered if you might include nature or mischance along with the last, and notice their absence in your observations.

Re your question on intervention, given the context in which I used the brain-dead and the fetus in the womb; that of sentience and consciousness being absent from both, I'm a bit surprised at you bringing up (no pun intended) the chances of the brain-dead getting an intervention (seeing as I had not mentioned that entity in my last) and your answering the question yourself: so I see that question as non sequitur-ish as well.

Absolam

aloyisious wrote: »

Your careful attempt to avoid answering the specifics in my first four questions by use of a "question" is rather obvious and non sequitur-ish. Those four questions remain unanswered by you.

Well, my question certainly follows from the questions you quoted... so reasonably sequiturish.

aloyisious wrote: »

Re your reply on intervention in the case of a fetus in a woman's womb you meant, abortion, thank's. I had wondered if you might include nature or mischance along with the last, and notice their absence in your observations.

Personally, I would not consider either nature or mischance to be capable of intervention, which I would say is an act of agency. If we allow they are, do you think either makes a difference to the point?

aloyisious wrote: »

Re your question on intervention, given the context in which I used the brain-dead and the fetus in the womb; that of sentience and consciousness being absent from both, I'm a bit surprised at you bringing up (no pun intended) the chances of the brain-dead getting an intervention (seeing as I had not mentioned that entity in my last) and your answering the question yourself: so I see that question as non sequitur-ish as well.

It seems to follow reasonably well to me, though I admit I never brought up the chance of the brain dead getting an intervention so perhaps you just took it up wrong. So, to try and drag us a little back towards the topic, I'll put it thus; if you feel you can draw legal parallels between the destruction of unborn human life and the withdrawal of somatic support on the basis of consciousness and sentience as you have above, why is there no evidence in law or jurisprudence that these parallels exist? And do you see no distinction between choosing to kill someone who will otherwise inevitably live, and choosing to allow someone to die who is already inevitably dying?

nozzferrahhtoo

aloyisious wrote: »

Human sentience and consciousness is surely an indicator or point at which human rights could become applicable.

Indeed! That would be my position too. Though certain posters only replying to and reading PART of my posts might have missed that. For example in an earlier post I wrote:

I myself therefore operate under the moral axiom that when an entity lacks ANY AND ALL faculty of sentience and consciousness then it is a moral non-entity to me. If at any stage it has that faculty in any measure, or we strongly suspect it does, then it should be afforded the equal rights that typifies it's species.

Any other species which have a level of sentience would indeed therefore also fall under my conditions as deserving rights. But not HUMAN rights, as they are not humans. Something at least one person appears to have missed.

So there is an interesting but entirely off topic discussion as to the concept of, say, animal rights. I think Animals deserve rights conceptually, but FUNCTIONALLY "Animal Rights" is actually a subset of "Human Rights"

What I mean by that is while we think animal's deserve rights, we FUNCTIONALLY construct them as what HUMANS have, or do not have, the right to do with them, or to them. For example, while we might talk about how animal's should not be tortured, we generally mean BY HUMANS. Animals torture each other all the time in the world. We do not stand up against or for their rights in THAT case.

So to repeat, this is why I am not falling into any of the "traps" that recedite fears I may have. I have suggested that we mediate moral and ethical concern based on any given entities (human or otherwise) faculty of sentience and consciousness.

If there is some other mediation point, I certainly am not seeing it being argued coherently, if at all. The best I generally get is people simply saying over and over "but it is ALIVE!" or "But it's DNA is Human!". Then one has to wonder if our technology ever reaches the point where a human consciousness could be trasferred into a toaster-like box unit on a desk top, should it be considered to have rights at all? A toaster can neither said to be alive, or have DNA....... but it would clearly (or as clearly as it can be, given I can not even "prove" I myself am sentient) be conscious and sentient. So if we are giving it rights on that basis, or affording it moral and ethical concern......... then what has "alive" or "DNA" got to do with this stuff?

Other than that, as we have seen, we just get people presuming in sequential posts to invent biases on my behalf in order to ignore the argument by pretending FALSELY that the argument is invented to conform to pre-determined conclusions.

So an entity entirely lacking that faculty........ not having it but in some reduced or diminished capacity....... but entirely lacking it ALTOGETHER........... is one I am not seeing any argument on this thread for giving moral and ethical concern. And the fetus in the 12-16 weeks window by which just about ALL abortions by choice are performed......... seems to be lacking it entirely in any form.

And that is why I have absolutely no moral or ethical objection to allowing people to choose abortion, for pretty much ANY reason they wish to choose it, in periods like the first 12 or 16 weeks of gestation. I am simply not seeing any arguments as to why it should be considered morally or ethically problematic. And the people flinging out fantasy of biases that are not there, are likely just projecting the fact their own position is the one suffering from such biases.

looksee

Post by Absolam

Originally Posted by aloyisious
Even though I know I'm probably wasting my time replying to you in hope of a fact-based response, perhaps you might review my posts and then copy and paste here exactly word for word where I asked you to research any speculation at all for me. I doubt that you will find - given that it never existed at all at any time - that particular ask by me anywhere and expect that you will come up with some alteration of fact to cover your claim.

Since you asked;

Originally Posted by aloyisious
Good idea, we can do research on it, separately, and one of us post his for a start, say 2 weeks time and the O/P would see it and post his later the same day. What say you?

But if you don't mind, I don't intend going any further down a rabbit hole of who said what and when; it's all on the thread already. Which is not to say I'm not, as I am always, happy to discuss anything relevant to the topics at hand that I've actually posted.

Mod: While this particular rabbit hole has become very tedious and somewhat pointless, I cannot see that your quote of aloyisious in any way shows that he asked you to do any research at all for him. It is of course pedantic to point this out, but since you are an authority on pedantry and exploring rabbit holes, it has to be assumed that you can accept it in return. Now please move on.
__________________

recedite

nozzferrahhtoo wrote: »

...I have absolutely no moral or ethical objection to allowing people to choose abortion, for pretty much ANY reason they wish to choose it, in periods like the first 12 or 16 weeks of gestation...

Lets suppose for the sake of this discussion that human sentience and consciousness is not present at that stage. Your proposal is still only half a policy; only one side of the coin.
If you allow unrestricted abortion up to 16 weeks, do you then refuse all abortions after 16 weeks? Previously you said that you would assign either zero human rights, or full human rights, but nothing in between. This was the ethical pitfall I referred to. What is your position on abortions after 16 weeks? Is it the same as murder? Maybe you avoid facing that pitfall by having no position at all, but that would be unacceptable in a real life legislative situation.

nozzferrahhtoo wrote: »

If there is some other mediation point, I certainly am not seeing it being argued coherently, if at all.

Using a measurement of "human sentience and consciousness" as a prerequisite for granting human rights is a good baseline, but "human potential" might be another, albeit lesser, factor. Any healthy foetus has its own independent genetic material, giving it the potential for its own independent human life. This is distinct from say, a cheek cell, or a sperm cell of one of its parents.
You may say you don't care about "potential" but imagine the following hypothetical scenario;
There are two subjects; a 15 year old boy and an 95 year old man. One of them is going to be killed, and you have to decide which.

If you chose to save the 15 year old, what rationale did you use?
You placed a value on human potential; the unlived life still ahead of him.