Philosophy and Science

Son Goku

Is The Goal of Scientific Research to Achieve Truth?
Except in special cases, most scientific researchers would agree that their results are only approximately true. Nevertheless, to make sense of this, philosophers need adopt no special concept such as "approximate truth." Instead, it suffices to say that the researchers' goal is to achieve truth, but they achieve this goal only approximately, or only to some approximation.

Other philosophers believe it's a mistake to say the researchers' goal is to achieve truth. These 'scientific anti-realists' recommend saying that research in, for example, physics, economics, and meteorology, aims only for usefulness. When they aren't overtly identifying truth with usefulness, the instrumentalists Peirce, James and Schlick take this anti-realist route, as does Kuhn. They would say atomic theory isn't true or false but rather is useful for predicting outcomes of experiments and for explaining current data. Giere recommends saying science aims for the best available 'representation', in the same sense that maps are representations of the landscape. Maps aren't true; rather, they fit to a better or worse degree. Similarly, scientific theories are designed to fit the world. Scientists should not aim to create true theories; they should aim to construct theories whose models are representations of the world.

What do people make of this statement of science?
I'd disagree with quite a bit of it, but I'm not going to start a thread with an opinion.
I'll state it later after others have posted.

Sapien

My opinion is divided.

On the one hand this piece fails to graps the most rudimentary elements of the epistemology of science and the realities of the scientific process, and leads me to wish to riffle through it with derisive scrutiny for the good and vindication of my discipline.

On the other hand, I think that the scientific process is sufficiently robust that there exists no need whatsoever for scientists to consider epistemology.

A philosopher declaring to a physicist: "Scientists should not aim to create true theories; they should aim to construct theories whose models are representations of the world." would meet with the response: "Whatever is the difference? I like your new microwave oven, by the way!"

In conclusion: meh.

DadaKopf

Without knowing much about philosophy of science, I've always been attracted to the instrumentalist point of view, but I only know about this through Putnam. I find it in-keeping with other similar views espoused by critical theorists like Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer.

I think the universe is so complex, and the human mind so limited, that an instrumental account seems the most practical approach. Science seems to me to be about creating models that work for the purposes of solving solutions that we deem important. But perhaps the problem isn't whether science can ever attain 'truth', the problem is what we mean by 'truth'. Is it a metaphysical condition, or a contingent coherence of ideas that work and/or are kept in place by particular social relations? I'd go for the latter understanding.

I also think it's important to draw a line between the natural and social sciences. Social sciences should never be treated as natural sciences.

But I'd like to hear more from the original poster.

Playboy

Sapien wrote:

. A philosopher declaring to a physicist: "Scientists should not aim to create true theories; they should aim to construct theories whose models are representations of the world." would meet with the response: "Whatever is the difference? I like your new microwave oven, by the way!"

In conclusion: meh.

I still think you are missing the point. Microwave ovens dont matter. :eek:

Playboy

DadaKopf wrote:

But perhaps the problem isn't whether science can ever attain 'truth', the problem is what we mean by 'truth'. Is it a metaphysical condition, or a contingent coherence of ideas that work and/or are kept in place by particular social relations? I'd go for the latter understanding

I think the posted article is going for the former.

SkepticOne

Maps aren't true; rather, they fit to a better or worse degree. Similarly, scientific theories are designed to fit the world. Scientists should not aim to create true theories; they should aim to construct theories whose models are representations of the world.

I think the map analogy is good.

The quotation above suggests that the word 'true' is inappropriate. I'm not sure this is the case. We could certainly talk about a map not being true if we wished and people would know what we were talking about. True would just be equivalent to accurate in the case of a map.

Of course, the accuracy of a map (or other model) raises the question of the purpose of that map. For what purpose is the map accurate? A map of the London Underground does not require accurate distances but the order and interchange of stations and lines must be preserved. This is where, imo, social relations comes in.

DadaKopf

A Baudrillard book begins with a decription of a famous Luis Borges short story:

A king asks his cartographers to produce a map of his kingdom, of everything he rules over. They come back to him with a map, the size of a table. The king says it's not detailed enough so the cartographers go off, survey the kingdom, come back to the king with a more detailed, larger map. Same problem, the king says it's not detailed enough. Eventually the cartographers come back to him with a map exactly the same size as his kingdom, a 1:1 two-dimensional representation of the king's territory.

Baudrillard uses this story to claim that the original territory has been lost and has been replaced by the cartographic representation.

It's an amusing entry point to thinking about the problem of whether science - scientism - makes the same mistake, and how to avoid it.

SkepticOne

DadaKopf wrote:

Baudrillard uses this story to claim that the original territory has been lost and has been replaced by the cartographic representation.

It's an amusing entry point to thinking about the problem of whether science - scientism - makes the same mistake, and how to avoid it.

Could you illucidate this idea a bit. I thought Baudrillards point referred more to mass media and the way the general population no longer tends to distinguish between representations and reality. I would have thought that science is one of the few areas where contact with objective reality is essential.

DadaKopf

Depends on your viewpoint. You could argue that, as various critical theorists have, scientism has imposed on the world models of the world that have, in varying ways over time, come to replace the "real world" by imposing simplistic representations of reality that have wreaked untold damage to the world.

KnowItAll

Reminds me of gravity. Scientists know how to measure it and how it will effect objects at certain distances at certain speeds etc but nobody knows how it works.

DadaKopf

If you were a radical empiricist (like Bas van Frassen), you'd reject absolutely the notion that we could ever work out a theory of how gravity works because it's beyond our ability to perceive what it is. We only get sense data about gravity and light indirectly, by its effect on perceivable objects. We can only infer their existence. But to explain what their are, rather than describing and predicting with some accuracy, their effects on perceivable sense data, through the creation of models is, according to radical empiricists, impossible.

KnowItAll

I don't think the goal of science (at least the likes of those companies/people who fund scientific research) is to achieve truth but by trying to achieve the truth more things are discovered and people like to feel as though they have achieved something.

nesf

Just reiterating other people's points here:

Science doesn't claim truth in the philosophical sense. It just claims to have a logical model that is an accurate approximation of reality. How you want to interpret said models is a very individual thing.

Scientists look at them as predictions or logical explanations and when they find instances that the model fails to work, they try to either patch up the model or find a new one.

The other extreme is the media who take every new study as gospel.

The other problem comes from lay people who have "faith" in science. I mean faith in that they just accept the "word of science" as dogma and don't understand what context or proof is behind the word. Science is the religion of the 21st century and all that.


Science is a model based on reality that seeks to explain the phenomena that surround us. From why things fall to why people in the same family might share eye colour or facial features. And by explaining them in a logical manner, science hopes to predict them for the most part.

It doesn't work this way in practice though. For instance there are plenty of phenomena that we can predict but we can't yet explain. This is where the division between theoretical and experimental science occurs (it's not a clean divide or anything). Both arms are needed in science. Both play catch up to each other. Theorists can be found trying to explain the data the experimentalists have produced and the experimentalists can be found trying to find data that a theoretician has predicted to exist.

Do they search for truth? I don't think that's the right question to be asking tbh. They are searching for an explanation of the world/universe around us. There is no truth involved really, science is just trying to increase our understanding of our reality. Or at least, if not understanding, improve our logical explanation that we use to describe it.

Truth is best left to the wholly abstract. Reality has a nasty habit of not conforming to the concept of absolute true and false.

DadaKopf

Do they search for truth? I don't think that's the right question to be asking tbh. They are searching for an explanation of the world/universe around us. There is no truth involved really, science is just trying to increase our understanding of our reality. Or at least, if not understanding, improve our logical explanation that we use to describe it.

That's if you subscribe to the instrumentalist point of view. Again, it depends what you mean by 'truth'. Is the belief that scientific methodology has the ability to acess the noumenal world is still a belief in truth? As you say, science attempts to "increase our understanding of our reality". That sounds positivist to me - science can lead us to total knowledge, except when you say "our reality" - whose reality? What reality? Social reality?

Reality has a nasty habit of not conforming to the concept of absolute true and false.

That's why the true should be considered contingent and changeable, based in logical coherence of forms of life (or to avoid connotations with Wittgenstein), the life-world, not as cosmically immanent binary categories.

nesf

DadaKopf wrote:

That's if you subscribe to the instrumentalist point of view. Again, it depends what you mean by 'truth'. Is the belief that scientific methodology has the ability to acess the noumenal world is still a belief in truth?

My thoughts on this are that science has to assume that it has access to the noumenal world and could be viewed in a sense as an axiom if one is looking at this from the point of view of the researcher/scientist.

Although, as I've heard many times from lecturers of physics and maths, sometimes reading the philosophy of science makes one question whether there is any point to it.

I'd argue that one has to assume and therefore believe that scientific methodology has the ability to access the noumenal world, if one wishes the luxury of taking scientific results at face value.

Then, it could be argued that science is, in a sense, self contained. It is both validated and invalidated by the scientific method. So it could be argued that science is "true" within the framework of the method. This could then resolve the argument into a simplier one where only the scientific method is being looked at rather than the entire scope of scientific endevour. At least, I would consider this a simpler and more straightforward argument. It stops people claiming that the accuracy of results proves the method etc.

Though, tbh, I think you're already doing this

DadaKopf wrote:

As you say, science attempts to "increase our understanding of our reality". That sounds positivist to me - science can lead us to total knowledge, except when you say "our reality" - whose reality? What reality? Social reality?

Edit: I'm defining positivist as being:

positivist - someone who emphasizes observable facts and excludes metaphysical speculation about origins or ultimate causes

This kind of ties into the above. A positivist point of view is, imho, the natural stance to take from within science. Science, and I'm talking about hard science here not social, has it's foundations in observable fact. Yes a logical framework is built around these facts in order to explain them or to draw predictions, but without the basis in observable and quantifiable fact it is no longer science in the strict sense of the word.

There is a very clear and strong division in science between theories and models that are supported by "data" and those that aren't. The one's that aren't are purely theoretical and their validity is a moot point until data decides it for us. A theory has little meaning until there is some support for it in data. Testing these theories through experiment and observation is the bread and butter of science. The scientific method requires theories to be both testable and falsable. Thus why Freud's theories are not considered science in the strict sense. None of his work could be tested with a chance of failure.

For the purposes of this argument, I'm ignoring the social sciences. They are not science's for the purpose of this argument since they don't strictly adhere to scientific principles but are quite "loose". I'm not saying that they are not worthwhile or that they are lesser fields. I'm just saying they aren't sciences for the purposes of this argument.


When I said our reality I was referring to one of the requirement in science for experiments to be reproduceable. i.e. that results could be reproduced by different people in different locations at different times. It's an assumption of the idea of a shared reality. Science, strictly, is not interested in reality as observed by a single individual but reality as observed by people in general.

DadaKopf wrote:

That's why the true should be considered contingent and changeable, based in logical coherence of forms of life (or to avoid connotations with Wittgenstein), the life-world, not as cosmically immanent binary categories.

I agree with you completely. Wittgenstein's thoughts on this are really interesting. Have only recently started browsing through copies of Investigations and Tractica and while it's not mind blowing, I am finding myself questioning a lot of assumptions I've made upto now.

Son Goku

KnowItAll wrote:

Reminds me of gravity. Scientists know how to measure it and how it will effect objects at certain distances at certain speeds etc but nobody knows how it works.

Until 1915, when Einstein formulated General Relativity.
Now it is just a question of why the warpage of space couples to mass.

This is sort of my opinion on the issue, as said in another thread:

Physics is a human construct, but I think that continual experimentation shows that unless the stars and atoms themselves decided to agree with our mathematical models for the laugh, then it is a approximate description of physical reality.

In a sense, I think the view I quoted at the top of the page is way too Popperian and frankly, a philosophers view on science, which tends to be very much at the level of Newtonian Physics.

I'll expand more on what I mean, but I just want to look at people's opinions a bit more.
(I'm also limiting what I discuss to physics, because it's my strength, I wouldn't know enough biology to do it justice.)

SkepticOne

My opinion of the quoted piece is that it is just a brief summary of a couple of broad positions on science's relation to truth (or 'truth'). What is missing is either some argument one way or the other, some third position or some attempt at a synthesis of the two positions.

I would agree that these are two possible ways of looking at things. I don't know how accurately the views of Schlick, Kuhn and others are represented here but I assume they are reasonably correct.

DadaKopf

nesf wrote:

My thoughts on this are that science has to assume that it has access to the noumenal world and could be viewed in a sense as an axiom if one is looking at this from the point of view of the researcher/scientist.

Strangely, I thought about this just before I saw your post! I tend to see many philosophical issues as insoluble paradoxes where we simply have no choice but to assume things in the pursuit of knowledge and meaning. Maybe Camus had too much of an influence on my thinking - he had a lot to say about the necessity of tragedy in human life.

On a similar theme, I think you're right about science. We have to go around thinking science can tell us things, but we also have to keep reminding ourselves that science is severely limited. Natural scientists know this. The general public doesn't. And many social scientists can be even more hardline about the methodology.

Positivism

I take positivism to mean the belief that science can, firstly, attain total, true knowledge of the world via quantification and experimentation, and secondly, the application of scientific knowledge means the world can only get better. Positivist rationalisation probably had its heyday in the 1950s, was 'invented' in the late 1700s (the Enlightenment), and still wreaks havoc today (think of the mistakes made by the IMF's economism).

With respect to the first point, I think it's tough in the social world to sustain the paradox of scientific knowledge. The reasons for this are not scientific, they're social, political. Inevitably, science acquires an aura.

I'm also not saying that science should be scrapped, or that science can't make things more knowable, or make the world better. But it's socially embedded.

I'm also wary of defending science on the basis of its "internal coherence". The defence of science can often be tautologous: "Our findings are correct because all the components we included in our study prove what we wanted to prove". This may be less so with experimental science, I suppose, but the Frankfurt School's critique of scientific inquiry - instrumental rationality - still resounds for me, because defending science this way makes it possible to ignore the social effects of scientific discourse and activity. More importantly, it's contradictory because it systematically ignores non-quantifiable or troublesome data.

When I referred to coherence in relation to Wittgenstein, I really meant the whole context.

nesf

DadaKopf wrote:

Strangely, I thought about this just before I saw your post! I tend to see many philosophical issues as insoluble paradoxes where we simply have no choice but to assume things in the pursuit of knowledge and meaning. Maybe Camus had too much of an influence on my thinking - he had a lot to say about the necessity of tragedy in human life.

Great minds and all that..

Science, like maths, is built on assumptions. Damn good assumptions. But we can't prove them. The more philosophically inclined scientists will worry about it and give it thought and time but the majority of them will just believe. Belief is a very powerful thing. Even in science.

DadaKopf wrote:

On a similar theme, I think you're right about science. We have to go around thinking science can tell us things, but we also have to keep reminding ourselves that science is severely limited. Natural scientists know this. The general public doesn't. And many social scientists can be even more hardline about the methodology.

Agreed. Anyone trained at any level in science should know this. If they don't then they haven't grasped the basics yet. It is however, for some, a painful truth to grasp. Religions don't have limits....

There is plenty that isn't measureable and isn't quanitifiable. But that is exactly what science is not concerned with. The public, and some misguided scientists, seem to believe that if something doesn't fall within the bounds of science then it isn't true.

Science is a tool, if you will, and as a tool it has a specific job and purpose. Yes you can use it for other tasks but it doesn't function as well because it was never designed to be used that way.

However. The bounds around science are not fixed and are by their nature mutable. Science is constantly improving it's approach and is always finding new methods which allow new things to be measured. Along with finding new things to be measured in the first place.

DadaKopf wrote:

I take positivism to mean the belief that science can, firstly, attain total, true knowledge of the world via quantification and experimentation, and secondly, the application of scientific knowledge means the world can only get better. Positivist rationalisation probably had its heyday in the 1950s, was 'invented' in the late 1700s (the Enlightenment), and still wreaks havoc today (think of the mistakes made by the IMF's economism).

I think the key issue is the misinterpretation of this belief. A goal of science could be total knowledge. But it is no where near there at the moment. Maybe some day. A belief that we might get there but no certainty that it will occur is defendable. But the media public and some confused scientists seem to think that science already achieves total true knowledge.

A very large difference.

Dadakopf wrote:

With respect to the first point, I think it's tough in the social world to sustain the paradox of scientific knowledge. The reasons for this are not scientific, they're social, political. Inevitably, science acquires an aura.

I'm also not saying that science should be scrapped, or that science can't make things more knowable, or make the world better. But it's socially embedded.

I'm not 100% sure exactly what you're saying here. Are you arguing that science is not a seperate entity to humanity but only a product? If you are, I agree completely

DadKopf wrote:

I'm also wary of defending science on the basis of its "internal coherence". The defence of science can often be tautologous: "Our findings are correct because all the components we included in our study prove what we wanted to prove". This may be less so with experimental science, I suppose, but the Frankfurt School's critique of scientific inquiry - instrumental rationality - still resounds for me, because defending science this way makes it possible to ignore the social effects of scientific discourse and activity. More importantly, it's contradictory because it systematically ignores non-quantifiable or troublesome data.

Experimental study is indeed quite different. Experimental study is as interested in finding those troublesome data points as it is fitting the data to theory. There is far more experimental work done than the theorists can explain. It really isn't hard to find things that our theories don't account for, if you know how to look. That's the whole point to experimentation. Testing theories is a crucial part of science.

Also, no scientific theory is "perfect". There is nearly always some data out there that doesn't fit into them. But we're not looking for just perfect fits here. We're looking for useful theories. They don't necessarily have to fit perfectly.

DadaKopf wrote:

When I referred to coherence in relation to Wittgenstein, I really meant the whole context.

I unfortunately haven't read enough of him to grasp that tbh. Also I don't have the training yet.... Going to rectify that though

DadaKopf

I'm not 100% sure exactly what you're saying here. Are you arguing that science is not a seperate entity to humanity but only a product?

As you said, science is a tool. As a tool, it's invented by humans. It's a product of human activity in life-worlds. So, yes, that's what I'm saying.

Well, glad we got this all sorted out. Think I'll retire...

I unfortunately haven't read enough of him to grasp that tbh. Also I don't have the training yet.... Going to rectify that though

Not fully up to speed on Witty myself, even though I sat through 6 months of lectures on the guy. He's tough. Not even that Jarman film explained things for me!

nesf

DadaKopf wrote:

Not fully up to speed on Witty myself, even though I sat through 6 months of lectures on the guy. He's tough. Not even that Jarman film explained things for me!

I've no idea of what lectures lay before me... (starting a degree in philosphy/economics in Sept )

DadaKopf

Ahhh, where? UCD?

nesf

DadaKopf wrote:

Ahhh, where? UCD?

UCC.

KnowItAll

KnowItAll wrote:

Reminds me of gravity. Scientists know how to measure it and how it will effect objects at certain distances at certain speeds etc but nobody knows how it works

Son Goku wrote:

Until 1915, when Einstein formulated General Relativity.
Now it is just a question of why the warpage of space couples to mass.

Sorry, I worded it wrong. I didn't mean to say nobody knows how it works. I ment to say nobody knows why it works as it do.

My brain dosn't functions properly at night

SkepticOne

DadaKopf wrote:

As you said, science is a tool. As a tool, it's invented by humans. It's a product of human activity in life-worlds. So, yes, that's what I'm saying.

It is a tool for finding out about the objective world. Of course it need not be limited to humans. We don't know about beings on other planets but potentially they exist and could be capable of scientific discovery. We can't therefore base our understanding of what science is simply by observing humans; we need to look at the underlying logic of science. This, I would say, is the superiority of Popper's view as opposed to, say, Kuhn's since Kuhn's seems to rely on contingent facts about human psychology and sociology.

<Edit: I'm not saying Popper is correct either >

democrates

I've observed scientific dogma before and it is almost as unsettling as religious dogma. I'm glad to read this discussion and though much of it involves areas I've not studied, I've tried to harvest what I can so I can share the findings with others.

Recently I've been arguing that our only loyalty can be to the search for truth, but not truth itself, because the truth we hold often changes. Typically I add the 'proof' that once it was scientifically 'true' that the earth was flat, and the atom indivisible.

I'd like to improve on that and hope you can help me.

Here's what I've got so far : "Science is the search for absolute truth, but it's discoveries can only be taken as possibly true, because ..."

I don't know how to finish that sentance in a way that's easy for ordinary people to understand, and maybe it's not the best approach in the first place. I'm guessing there's a choice quote out there already.

Can anyone help?

Sapien

democrates wrote:

I've observed scientific dogma before and it is almost as unsettling as religious dogma.

If "scientific dogma" does exist, it is among those who are not scientists and who do not understand science. More often than not it is a meaningless charge levelled by those who have taken it upon themselves to disparage the scientific community based on nothing more than adolescent pseudo-intellectualism and embarrassing amateurish misconceptions, if not undiluted ignorance.

nesf

Sapien wrote:

If "scientific dogma" does exist, it is among those who are not scientists and who do not understand science. More often than not it is a meaningless charge levelled by those who have taken it upon themselves to disparage the scientific community based on nothing more than adolescent pseudo-intellectualism and embarrassing amateurish misconceptions, if not undiluted ignorance.

Unfortunately you find it in the odd scientist too.

democrates

Sapien:

If "scientific dogma" does exist, it is among those who are not scientists and who do not understand science. More often than not it is a meaningless charge levelled by those who have taken it upon themselves to disparage the scientific community based on nothing more than adolescent pseudo-intellectualism and embarrassing amateurish misconceptions, if not undiluted ignorance.

Interesting, can you give us more information so that we can share your certainty on these points?

Sapien

democrates wrote:

Interesting, can you give us more information so that we can share your certainty on these points?

I can direct you to undertake the study of science at a reputable university as your only possibility of fully understanding the scientific process and its fundamental dissimilarity to religious dogma.

democrates

Sapien:

I can direct you to undertake the study of science at a reputable university as your only possibility of fully understanding the scientific process and its fundamental dissimilarity to religious dogma.

I'm guessing I'd have to study something else in order to 'fully understand' religious dogma too, but then I'm not planning to take that route anyway.

Ordinary people can grasp that scientists have changed their mind about the atom being indivisible and about many other 'scientific facts'. It doesn't take a full understanding of science to make this observation about the limitations of science and scientists.

As for my opening comment

I've observed scientific dogma before and it is almost as unsettling as religious dogma.

I like your position (correct me if I've mis-interpreted) that by definition science is not dogma, and agree with nesf that lay people and the media are the main dogmatists.

But as for Sapiens extreme position that no scientist engages in scientific dogma, history is littered with examples of the scientific establishment mounting fierce and clearly emotional attacks on those who propose new theories which have subsequently been tested and become accepted. Why would they do that, even destroying careers in some cases instead of simply applying the scientific method?

Could it be that scientific reputation is sometimes so strongly bound to particular theories and data that the scientific method itself gets pushed into the background and what we are left with is dogma? Freud springs to mind, even a powerful ego can be a puppet of the id, and scientists are not magically immune. I don't see that as disparaging, they're just human, that's all.

From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method

The scientific method does not aim to give an ultimate answer. Its iterative and recursive nature implies that it will never come to an end, so any answer it gives is provisional. Hence it cannot prove or verify anything in a strong sense. However, if a theory passed many experimental tests without being disproved, it is considered superior to any theory that has not yet been put to a test.

I know wikipedia is not a substitute for scientific papers, so if the above quote is wrong feel free to enlighten.

Again, all I'm asking for is a few words that can communicate to ordinary people the relationship between science and truth so that they do not fall into scientific dogma, including a warning on the use of the word truth if that is deemed necessary. Maybe I ask too much and in the absence of a better proposal should just leave it at "Even clever people can be wrong".

Sapien

Your piece from Wikipedia says it as well as anyone could. It is impossible to become a scientist without this fact about the nature of the scientific process being indelibly etched into one's mind. Scientific training in any discipline effectively involves being brought through the sequence of ideas that have lead to current theories in a more or less chronological way. The replacement of theories with more sophisticated iterations punctuates the course of learning with such regularity that it becomes second nature to expect it. It is difficult to appreciate this without having undergone training oneself.

I appreciate your point about professional reputations being linked to the acceptance of theories, but this fact does not affect the integrity of the scientific process. A scientist will defend his position through logic, mathematics, and assessment of the evidence. Theories do not become sacrosanct and may always be challenged. In fact, progress depends on successful challenges occurring as frequently as possible. Similarly, new ideas must be challenged and old ones defended - or else unfit theories will be adopted too readily. This is how the system works - it is robust and effective.

If you are genuinely interested in becoming a watchdog of epistemological integrity, then become a scientist. If you choose to remain a layman - then defer to those who are in a position to comment intelligently. Certainly, refrain from facile observations about the divisibility of the atom, and scientist "changing their minds". The term "scientific fact" has never, and will never be used by an actual scientist. Any who have previously been a scientist, upon deploying the term, are automatically stripped of their recognition. We have ways of telling.

democrates

I think we're agreed on the integrity of the scientific method itself sapien.

If you are genuinely interested in becoming a watchdog of epistemological integrity, then become a scientist. If you choose to remain a layman - then defer to those who are in a position to comment intelligently. Certainly, refrain from facile observations about the divisibility of the atom, and scientist "changing their minds". The term "scientific fact" has never, and will never be used by an actual scientist. Any who have previously been a scientist, upon deploying the term, are automatically stripped of their recognition. We have ways of telling.

Please note I put the term 'scientific fact' in quotes, a standard method of indicating the term is in use but is disputed, so we are agreed on that.

Again all I was asking for was a few words from those who are posessed of some deeper knowledge and understanding, and started by saying much of the thread covered areas I had not studied, so clearly I have shown some deference.

My purpose as I said in the first post is to steer ordinary people away from dogma when the opportunity arises, do you accept that one doesn't have to be a scientist in order to say "even clever people can be wrong"? I wouldn't expect anyone to defer to anyone else on that point.

I'm a bit surprised that you assume a lay person is not in a position to comment intelligently upon science. I'm not suggesting that lay theories or results should be elevated to the same level as those produced by scientisits, we depend upon scientists to earn their keep and apply the scientific method, supporting or refuting hypotheses. We probably share a concern at the field of medicine being besieged by alternative medicine practicioners some of whom seem to be little more than witchdoctors for example.

The scientific method requires creativity, both in formulating hypotheses and designing tests. Taking Paul Churchlands view of the brain as a neuro-computational matrix that solves problems by matching patterns, the more patterns you have the more problems you can solve. Collecting patterns does not require deference, so what if the source is not a scientist?

Again I'm not suggesting that scientists defer to lay people outright, but I think it's reasonable to expect them to keep an open mind in keeping with the scientific method.

I think I gave you the wrong impression when I said that much of the preceding thread involved areas I haven't studied. By this I meant I hadn't gone through the system to degree level or beyond in the disciplines, not that I somehow avoided all such knowledge or understanding. I studied Chemistry, Biology, and Physics for the leaving cert, did more physics in college along with electronics, have read many books, watched many documentaries, and had many discussions about science and philosophy with a physicist among others over the years. I'm not trying to start a credentials contest which I'd lose, I'm a lay person, but that label doesn't mean zero scientific knowledge either.

If you add to the mix the capacity for reason and personal experience (years of collecting patterns that represent the world and solving problems in my case), it's reasonable to expect that a lay person can be capable of making an intelligent comment about science, or any other discipline for that matter. Without going to the extreme of assuming they are always right, I think it would be less than scientific to assume the other extreme, that they are always wrong.

Can you accept that it is possible for a scientist to benefit in their work from listening to a lay person, and that to do so does not contravene the scientific method?

ISAW

Son Goku wrote:

What do people make of this statement of science?
I'd disagree with quite a bit of it, but I'm not going to start a thread with an opinion.
I'll state it later after others have posted.

Is The Goal of Scientific Research to Achieve Truth?

Assumption here that there is an absolute truth. Odd considering the constructivist slant at the end.

Except in special cases, most scientific researchers would agree that their results are only approximately true.

Same assumption. and wholly different to saying that science uses error bars in an empirical measurement. furthermore no evidence is presented for the opinion about what most scientists agree. Again seem to smell of the social constructivist school. Whether most scientists agree on something does not necesarrily make it true! Most of them agreed that the Earth did not move.

Nevertheless, to make sense of this, philosophers need adopt no special concept such as "approximate truth."

But I just pointed to the fact that what "apporximate" or "absolute" truth are assumed and ill defined. Also who has said that scientists need have a concept of approximate truth? Where is the evidence for that?

Instead, it suffices to say that the researchers' goal is to achieve truth, but they achieve this goal only approximately, or only to some approximation.

It does not suffice at all. the commentary began with a sweeping statement about an ill defined comment. It goes on to make bold claims about scientists with no evidence.
Well now it is suggested that "achieving truth" and "doing science" are analogous. But "measuring things within error constraints" is not necessarily the same as "approximate truth". The nature of a "fact" changes over time. sometimes through social negotiation but also through development of theory paradigm shifts and other influences.

Other philosophers believe it's a mistake to say the researchers' goal is to achieve truth. These 'scientific anti-realists' recommend saying that research in, for example, physics, economics, and meteorology, aims only for usefulness.

If it works it works. Don't knock utilitarianism! Science however has an uncanny knack of development over time which points out where something doesnt work and a need to develop theory.

When they aren't overtly identifying truth with usefulness, the instrumentalists Peirce, James and Schlick take this anti-realist route, as does Kuhn. They would say atomic theory isn't true or false but rather is useful for predicting outcomes of experiments and for explaining current data. Giere recommends saying science aims for the best available 'representation', in the same sense that maps are representations of the landscape. Maps aren't true; rather, they fit to a better or worse degree. Similarly, scientific theories are designed to fit the world. Scientists should not aim to create true theories; they should aim to construct theories whose models are representations of the world.

Sounds like an arch consrtuctivist. The problem I have with Constructivism in my personal construct is that I hate it! But like Berkley's philosophy about the existance of God it is impossible to disprove. But I believe that while some facts are socially constructed reality is NOT! Yes we may "see" things differently but there is something really out there.
Okay our map of it is not the territory and we all have different maps but that does not mean the territory does not exist!