The Irish protocol.

In the event Judge Colton upheld the legality of the Protocol, while conceding it superseded Article 6 of the Act of Union (the part that talks of 'equal privileges' in the UK). Of course the Act of Union, as NI Unionists often seem to me to forget, refers to "Ireland", not "Northern Ireland". The failure to correct this must call into question how much of it remains applicable and how much of it has lapsed, given the South's departure from the UK in 1921, and particularly since the 1931 Statute of Westminster, under which the UK gave up any notion of Westminster still having the power to legislate for countries with Dominion Status like the Irish Free State (later the Republic of Ireland).

Having said that, the Protocol is not going to work unless the UK implements it. The options are:

• The EU to wait out Boris Johnson in the hope of a Labour government at the next General Election, or a smaller Tory majority, or a hung parliament bringing the UK back into line on implementing the Protocol. On the basis of recent polls I think a Hung Parliament is possible but perhaps a smaller Tory majority is more likely.
• Renegotiating the text of the Protocol. I don't think the EU is prepared to do this at the moment. Some argue that the EU renegotiated the original NI Protocol during the Brexit transition period and this is true. But what it renegotiated was the UK Wide Backstop, which would have avoided new checks in the Irish Sea. The UK wide backstop in turn replaced the original NI Backstop, which was close to the current NI Protocol. Ironically, Johnson brought down May out of opposition to an arrangement that would have avoided the Irish Sea customs checks, negotiated checks in the Irish Sea ports, and is now trying to renegotiate the latter and in my opinion is actively campaigning for the anti Protocol side ahead of the NI Assembly elections. In particular, Frost hinting at redefining "consent" for the Protocol beyond the definition in the Withdrawal Agreement (of a simple majority in the Assembly) suggests further demands for renegotiations may be coming, or that the UK may unilaterally replace it with a cross-community consent that they know is not there.
• Keeping the Protocol in place but interpreting it more flexibly. I think the removal of Phil Hogan over Golfgate meant the EU Trade Representative that replaced him was perhaps less acquainted with the potential pitfalls of a hardline interpretation of the Protocol, particularly as a former Agriculture Commissioner in the context of the SPS issue. While supporting the Protocol, I am not impressed with the rigidities in interpreting for example the restrictions on bringing pets from GB into NI, or the Irish Department of Agriculture suggesting dogs may be put down if they haven't received the rabies vaccine. But the balance of blame rests with the UK in my opinion for signing up to something they appear to have no intention of implementing.
• An SPS agreement to free up agrifood trade, which has emerged as the most important bottleneck in terms of disruption. However it must also be noted that the DUP returned £5 million to the British government that was supposed to address this problem. Their opposition to the Protocol seems more ideological than practical.