Advertisement
If you have a new account but are having problems posting or verifying your account, please email us on hello@boards.ie for help. Thanks :)
Hello all! Please ensure that you are posting a new thread or question in the appropriate forum. The Feedback forum is overwhelmed with questions that are having to be moved elsewhere. If you need help to verify your account contact hello@boards.ie

Ransomware & HSE

Options
19091929496

Comments

  • Registered Users Posts: 3,337 ✭✭✭Wombatman


    Would be very interested in the when and the how......

    "He said two consultants reports are underway into the hack, and they will be published “shortly”. A Garda investigation, he said, has established when and how the network was compromised, he told Fianna Fáil senator Gerry Horkan."

    https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/hse-was-in-uniquely-vulnerable-position-at-time-of-cyberattack-smyth-1.4680803



  • Registered Users Posts: 35,072 ✭✭✭✭Hotblack Desiato


    Doubt they'll be published without a lot of redaction

    © 1982 Sinclair Research Ltd



  • Registered Users Posts: 1,317 ✭✭✭thebourke


    they ever announce how the attack go it?



  • Posts: 11,614 ✭✭✭✭ [Deleted User]


    I heard it was a phishing attack. May or may not be true.





  • e

    It heard the specific inside track of it from a trusted friend whose job is close to the source, so to speak. It went very like this:

    In a hospital, the name of which was disclosed to me, an extremely tired and overworked frontline graduate medical worker, between tending to unwell patients, was tasked to go through an absolute mountain of emails which had accumulated in the inbox. With a mind mainly on sick patients ringing bells, in seemingly legit looking email (say) no 25 they clicked a link to accept some supply or other that was expected from some legit company, without hovering over the sender address to double-check. Login details were supplied over the link, and that was it.

    No matter how smart or canny one believes oneself to be it can happen if somebody is both very tired & distracted & expected to respond to a large number of things without delay, especially if the phishing email in a way to look immediately identical to legit company. Everybody should get a little education in playing around with source code and making a fake version just to demonstrate how fecking easy it is, if only to make people sit up, take note and be that bit more alert.

    Even then humans take occasional short cuts and lose focus when expedience appears to be demanded under duress. Even the best driver will very occasionally fail to indicate ahead of making a turn, and same with checking email senders, particularly when the fake is well executed or as Joe Duffy would put it whether valid or not “…a very sophisticated scam”. I got caught out not long ago right in the middle of travelling in a jeep up a steep bare rock mountain when I clicked on a fake link. I had felt under time constraint, and was not paying full attention. It’s the human factor at play here.



  • Advertisement
  • Registered Users Posts: 69,023 ✭✭✭✭L1011


    The likelyhood that they know exactly when the credentials leaked is close to nil. They may not even know which credentials leaked.



  • Posts: 11,614 ✭✭✭✭ [Deleted User]


    Thats pretty much the story I heard.

    I do phishing tests as part of my job, and have in the past created a phish that would trick most people. I did a very good Bank of ireland themed one a few years ago and 95% of the people who opened the email clicked the link and provided their credentials. So I absolutely appreciate it can be hard for users.



  • Registered Users Posts: 35,072 ✭✭✭✭Hotblack Desiato


    It shouldn't matter that much if they got an end user's credentials - but apparently it did. Who gives the keys of the castle to end users?

    © 1982 Sinclair Research Ltd



  • Registered Users Posts: 69,023 ✭✭✭✭L1011


    Get a bog standard users credentials and find the one machine that had to be given local admin on for some obscure old software (endemic in the medical sector); or if the OS is old/unpatched, use an elevation exploit.

    Can end up happening far too easily. Particularly in a large environment with lots of old kit, lots of old apps - and then add in whatever jury-rigged remote access / remote desktop style stuff was thrown together in March 2020.

    I think I'm only just about done making sure that anything dodgy I threw together back then is replaced with something sensible; and even then I was ridiculously lucky that I replaced the edge firewall and VPN setup (to something with modern, loggable, controllable VPN support) as a scheduled replacement at the end of February 2020.



  • Registered Users Posts: 3,078 ✭✭✭salonfire


    Is there any 2FA in place for logging into HSE Systems? Surely this should have been in place by now.



  • Advertisement


  • I have a few fake Bank of Ireland portals on my phone, so to speak. I asked a relative what they thought of the new Bank of Ireland login screen. She uses AIB so only occasionally would see BOI, who happened to have recently changed their screen appearance. I showed her a screenshot of the old legit screen and my makey-uppy one that claimed “we are making some site changes”, she said “oh the new one is much better, is the other one of your practice fakes?”

    Public education is what’s needed as a starting point. Ok, Baz is obliging BOI for a tidy little return. Claire Byrne could devour a segment on her TV show where she gets a complete newbie who had undergone no more than an hour’s tuition, to fake a website live on air, with a minimum of prompting, just to demonstrate that this is within anybody’s grasp to be able to do. Not that I recommend enabling would-be fakers, but they will just find out how to do it anyway, with ease.

    Tubridy could set up a slot on the Late Late, but there’s no journalistic wherewithal there. Pat Kenny or Gay Byrne would do something like that were they around these days. Goodness knows Gaybo showed us all exactly how to unroll a rubber before ever there was You Tube.

    I hate to say it, and I don’t give credit to the protagonist Duffster himself, but after BOI was featured extensively on Liveline they upped their game immensely. As with Covid, as with everything, public education is paramount and people will take stuff on board that’s communicated effectively. By default people are in stupid mode until they have to be otherwise.





  • They know, the poor individual at “ground zero” could identify the the point when it happened, shortly after it happened, one of those “OMG I don’t believe I just did that” moments. It was far from a stupid person who clicked the link, just a tired and overworked one.



  • Registered Users Posts: 3,337 ✭✭✭Wombatman


    I doubt anything happened shortly after the initial breach. To pull off an attack on that scale they were probably lurking around the network for at least a week. That scale of spread, encryption and extrusion would take a while combined with clever planning and covering tracks.










  • No doubt at all they were lurking and phishing many times over before they found their exploit. Only took one click to do it, though. I’m thinking of my own place of work some years back: there were constant emails where we had to click to make various orders from. At work I wasn’t sitting at a computer all day, I had absolutely tons of tasks to do, practical, online, supervisory, interfacing with public and a lot had to be done on the spot as required.

    People who have to multitask are at greatest risk of exploit, they don’t have the leisure of considering each move carefully on the screen, as most moves are made off the screen. In other words, too busy doing their core job.





  • I also think it would be particularly helpful to have an add-on / app that would pull the (by-default) hidden full sender email address and place on front of the email content, whereby the user is prompted to look at it and click to proceed looking at the content of the email. I believe this might possibly be effective, except that people would be one irritated just as they are with the EU consent pop-up on websites.



  • Registered Users Posts: 29,114 ✭✭✭✭AndrewJRenko


    It might work for a week, then people would just click anything to get into their message.



  • Registered Users Posts: 35,072 ✭✭✭✭Hotblack Desiato


    Trivial to fake the sender field on an email.

    © 1982 Sinclair Research Ltd



  • Registered Users Posts: 35,072 ✭✭✭✭Hotblack Desiato




  • Registered Users Posts: 11,245 ✭✭✭✭Furze99


    From what is being reported, this is scandalous. Infiltrated two full months before the system was locked down? Flags of concern raised by IT personnel in some parts of the HSE, nothing done? The system was & is a basket case. Heads surely have to roll. But will they, does anyone in the public service at a senior in this country ever take responsibility.



  • Advertisement
  • Registered Users Posts: 68,317 ✭✭✭✭seamus


    Heads will really only roll if it can be shown that senior management knew they were exposed but refused to do anything about it.

    There's always a certain amount of plausible deniability - you don't know what you don't know. So they might hide behind, "we didn't know things were so bad, but we're going to fix it now".

    In my experience though, even if people don't know the ins and outs of IT security, big gaps in security coverage will usually raise red flags for a number of people who will try to escalate the issue up the chain and advise investment in it.

    In other words, there is at least one person in that organisation who has been asked more than once to provide a dedicated budget to improve security, but has refused it or deferred it.

    The report notes that the lack of a CISO is very unusual, very immature, for an organisation with 100k employees. It would be very unusual for a company with 1,000 employees. There is no way, none whatsoever, that the lack of this person was never flagged to the HSE leadership.

    It is plain as day to anyone who works in technology, that the issue of IT security in the HSE has been a foghorn sounding continuously through the organisation for years, but has been ignored by the senior team.

    But like I say, I guarantee it'll be, "Lessons are being learned, you can't know what you don't know" nonsense.



  • Registered Users Posts: 7,256 ✭✭✭plodder


    Paul Reid on News at one discussing it



  • Registered Users Posts: 516 ✭✭✭BattleCorp1


    I can't see heads rolling seeing as it's the public service. Don't you know that it's never people at fault, it's a SYSTEMS FAILURE.



  • Registered Users Posts: 11,245 ✭✭✭✭Furze99


    Heard that - he thinks there's great 'learnings' in the report and that the HSE were insistent on getting a full independent report and are going to own it.

    Not really good enough.



  • Registered Users Posts: 1,317 ✭✭✭thebourke




  • Registered Users Posts: 4,527 ✭✭✭tobefrank321


    Despite many years of HSE screwups, its unlikely any heads will roll.

    If someone from the HSE burnt down the new National Childrens Hospital, the worst that would happen is they get moved sideways or even promoted.

    When there is no accountability, you will continue to get costly clusterf*cks.



  • Registered Users Posts: 5,001 ✭✭✭Xander10


    Isn't the first lesson for all office workers, don't open attachments from unknown sources?



  • Registered Users Posts: 4,527 ✭✭✭tobefrank321


    This was coming for years, they had plenty of notice and plenty of time to prepare. The HSE and similar organisations which deal with highly sensitive and critical personal information are prime targets for ransom attacks unfortunately.

    A large number of PCs in the health service are Windows 7 or older, with very little security updates support.

    I'd bet a large number of people working in the HSE do not have cyber security training or do at least one course a year on it which is the bare minimum.

    If the HSE was a very cyber secure organisation and still fell foul, fair enough. But it sounds like they had and have an extremely lax approach to cyber security and sooner or later it was going to bite them.



  • Registered Users Posts: 1,876 ✭✭✭bokale


    Just out if interest why do they release these reports? Is it not helpful to hackers wanting to attack again?



  • Advertisement
  • Registered Users Posts: 2,415 ✭✭✭BluePlanet


    "During the recovery process in the days following the ransomware attack it became apparent that disaster recovery (DR) arrangements for IT systems were ad hoc and inconsistent. With the Attacker able to corrupt some primary data stores for disaster recovery, there was a requirement to identify secondary stores and attempt to recover from them. A workstream was initiated to attempt to locate them and test the viability of recovery. Were systems to have been recovered using this method, they would have been recovered to different points in time that backups were available for, and there was no confidence in the completeness (or in some cases tested viability) of recovery solutions. As a result, when the decryption key became available from the Attacker, the decision was made to abandon work to recover from backups, and instead recover systems from their production environment, using the decryption capability provided by the Attacker. It cannot be confidently asserted that all health services would have been able to recover in a timely manner (or even at all) without the provision of the decryption key by the Attacker."

    So basically the HSE didn't have a Disaster Recovery process in place, and were unable to recover from backups. Any IT Director should fall on their sword over that.



Advertisement