Ukraine (Mod Note & Threadbanned Users in OP)

I will take your opportunity to review what I said from before the war started and see if my opinions have changed:

My primary view - i.e. that threatening invasion was the high point for Putin and that any actual invasion, no matter how it went, would put him in a worse position is still my view, but with a few additional factors. I did not anticipate the level of unanimity amongst NATO members nor the level to which the UN would condemn Russia. The international response has been far greater than I had expected. It has also filtered through to broad sections of society who had previously shown little interest in Ukranian affairs. I definitely did not even countenance the possibility of Sweden and Finland joining NATO.

In relation to Donbas, although I didn't specifically address the tactical situation in point 1 above, I thought it would have been so obvious that Russia would take over Donbas in a week or so that I didn't even consider it worthy of mentioning. I got that one completely wrong of course - three months in and the only significant settlement in Donbas that has fallen to the Russians is Mariupol, which they substantially destroyed in the process. I seriously underestimated the Ukrainian army's ability to hold the line here.

In terms of the attack on Kyiv I stand by my views at 2. above that they could try to take the capital but they would find it very difficult. I didn't realise quite how badly they would fare logistically in this front, but the 40km line of tanks was a real sign of weakness. It's also laughable that Russia is now trying to pretend that this was a feint or a way to hold up the Ukrainian forces. If that was genuinely their plan, they would have achieved it more effectively and without so many casualties by either remaining poised at the Belarus/Ukraine border (thus typing up Ukranian troops in anticipation of a further front opening up) or by means of limited incursions into easily defensible positions. These are the traditional methods of carrying out a blocking operation. Sending large amounts of troops to try to capture built up areas and threatening to assassinate the president is such an incompetent way of doing it that it is not capable of belief. Russia have shown themselves to be incompetent, but not that incompetent. It is clear that they are lying to save face regarding the Kyiv front.

On point 3., again while I didn't state it I thought it was fairly clear that the Russians should be able to take up to the Dniper without too much difficulty militarily, and the problem they would have is holding that territory. If and when they manage to achieve this in 2 or 3 years time at this rate, I will reassess my view as to whether they have the capacity to hold the area in the face of strong Ukrainian insurgency.

On 4., I have somewhat modified my views. I suspected that only part of the Russian army had meanginfully modernised, whereas it seems that almost all of the Russian army is still stuck in the past, albeit much smaller and better paid. They still have command and control issues, an utter lack of modern communications, I don't think it's accurate to say that they have logistical problems because that would imply that they have any logistics at all, and their morale is still that of a conscript army, even if they are technically contract soldiers.

In terms of the tanks and Javelins, I perhaps underestimated the Ukrainians on this front and they have been massively successful. Ordinarily Russia would now be using the firm soil of the summer to conduct flanking maneuvers, but they have lost an awful lot of tanks and IFV/APCs. Those vehicles they have left are not worth risking against a Ukranian Territorial force which has shown itself to be more than capable of small unit anti-tank tactics. The Ukrainian comms and command is superb due to what has been described as an Uber for anti tank units, and I would imagine that they will be offering this technology to other countries before long.

On the airforce, I expected them to be a bit better. I had assumed they would carry out a successful SEAD operation, but they were only partially successful. To be fair to them, they are relying on the old Soviet doctrine that the air force is intended for support of the army and for defence against aerial attacks. They were not intended to achieve air superiority over a large enemy territory. And as for the Navy, well they have always been neglected and, whether the Moskva sank due to a neptune getting through the defences or because of a fire on boards, it is clear that they are not up to snuff.

Obviously I was completely wrong about Putin being very smart and wanting to prolong the state of uncertainty that he had created to obtain concessions. I fully accept I was wrong on that front, and I also thought it might have been possible that he would have got concessions (although it is somewhat speculative to say that he would have).

As for Ukraine asking for more weapons, so are Russia. They've been asking China for assistance and they are also trying to bring old tanks back into service. This is perfectly normal for a prolonged conflict. Indeed, the Soviet Union was asking for help from the other Allies right up to 1945, so there is nothing wrong with that. I'm also not sure that it is accurate to say that 10s of billions of military aid has already been given. Certainly several billion have been given to date. But I'm not sure that the 40 odd billion USD promised in the lend lease bill have manifested in Ukraine as of yet.

Your argument isn't really logical. It's inductive reasoning based on the idea that the Russians can't make mistakes. That is to say, when you are presented with the fact that the Russians could not have succeeded in taking Kyiv, your conclusion is that they must have intended to fail. You haven't considered the far more likely analysis, which is that they seriously underestimated the Ukrainians and believed that they could take Kyiv with minimal resistance. Putin said himself of his "special military operation" that "Its goal is to protect people who have been subjected to abuse and genocide by the regime in Kyiv for eight years". Now, you could I suppose say that this was also part of the feint, but it seems obvious that his plan was regieme change in Kyiv.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/24/putins-speech-declaring-war-on-ukraine-translated-excerpts

The reason why they did not take Kyiv is that they would not have been capable of doing so while keeping the Russian army intact. They might have destroyed a large part of it, but they would have destroyed their army in the process. And they are incapable of holding it.

Reports were that they were running out of precision bombs which were capable of being used without GPS (which they were blocked from). Have they gotten more of these or established their own GPS network since then that I haven't heard?

Regarding conventional explosives i.e. dumb bombs, they have loads of these. It is the primary reason why their attacks are so savage - they are indiscriminately blanket bombing areas because they lack the ability to carry out precision strikes on military targets.

Both Ukraine and Russia withdrew heavy equipment from the area in accordance with Minsk II. They are taking their time and they are advancing, there is no doubt about that. But, and it's a big but, this is primarily because they have shown themselves incapable of advancing any faster without causing serious problems for themselves. They are advancing a few kilometers a day and calling it victory. At this rate, it would take them a year to reach the Dniper. And that is assuming that they do proceed at that pace and the Ukrainians dont carry out any counteroffensives or hold them up on some fronts, as they routinely do.

The Russian doctrine seems to be similar to the Soviet one in WWII. Attack on multiple fronts and, whereever you succeed, concentrate there. So when you hear of them succeeding in one area, you don't hear about the other areas where their attacks failed.

I don't know what the basis of you suggesting that the Ukrainians don't know how to fight this kind of war comes from. Considering that they are outnumbered on paper by a factor of at least 3 or 4 to 1 and sometimes 10 to 1, it is obvious that the Ukrainians are punching above their weight and Russia are punching below theirs, except that when Russia is 3 times the size, they still have the advantage.

To borrow a phrase, the Russian strategy is to send wave after wave of their troops and bombs until they advance. Not a particularly skillful strategy, but it is currently working for them, after 3 months of heavy losses.