Russia - threadbanned users in OP

At the risk of seeming like I view the world with rose tinted glasses, I think that the negative spin on the US Congressional machinations is wrong, and that there is clearly a deal to be done and it is within sight.

I have said several times before, and repeat it, that the US populace losing interest in Ukraine doesn't make it harder for the vote to go through; it actually makes it easier, because when the debate comes up, the border security and immigration reform issues will be the main controversy, Israel the second, and even though the lions share of the money is currently earmarked for Ukraine, this is the least controversial of the three issues so will probably take the least airtime.

Although Russian propaganda pushes the narrative that the number of people who think the US is spending too much on Ukraine is increasing, and it is significantly increasing, what is ignored by them is that the people who think that the same amount or even more support for Ukraine is still the majority when the two are put together, and that thinking there should be less spending on Ukraine does not mean thinking that there should be no spending on Ukraine.

Further, it is important to remember that the ask of $60bn for 2024 would, if delivered, be the largest yearly support for Ukraine so far. Up to October, 2023 they have given $68.9 to Ukraine, so in one year they would be giving 87% of what they had given over the last year and three quarters, or approximately 50% more per month next year than over the first 21 months of the conflict.

I suspect that they will not get the $60bn ask. Instead, the Republicans will reduce it dramatically and call it a win. I would expect the amount to be somewhere between $20 and $40bn, that is to say any less than $20bn will be very disappointing, and over $40bn will be a massive boost for Ukraine.

However, a much more significant factor is that as people lose interest in the details of what is given to Ukraine, the US could change how they describe the monetary value of the donated equipment. A big factor in cost is a contribution to development costs, which are usually shared between the US Defense Dept and the private companies, and economies of scale. Thus, the sticker price for a GMLRs rocket for export can be $200k, but they can be sold in bulk to the US Army for $100k. The book value of these rockets will often decrease depending on when they were made - a GMLRs that was made in 2013 is now 10 years old and might have cost $75k at the time.

Lets say that the US decides to give 100 GMLRs rockets to Ukraine and then orders 100 replacements to be made. If they want to highlight how valuable their donation to Ukraine is, they can say that this is worth $20m - that is to say that if, say Poland, wanted to buy 100 GMLRs directly from Lockheed Martin that is how much it would cost them. But equally, the amount actually paid by the U.S. Treasury is $10m to buy them at the reduced army rates. Moreover, if they were based on book value it could be as low as $7.5m.

If the President of the US wants to talk about how big a contribution they are making, the $20m sounds great. The Congress might, however, account for this as $10m because that is how much money goes out of the coffers to increase the production. And the Pentagon's own internal audit might say "hold on, we have given $7.5m worth of old stocks to Ukraine". This is not a new problem, but it is often left out of the discussion on Ukraine. The Pentagon often fails its audits, partially, I suspect, for this reason:

But it also explains the "accounting error" of $6bn earlier this year:

And this is the complexity of one of the more basic items of military aid. Take the M39 variant ATACMs. Not only are these weapons old and some of which are of shorter range than the more modern ones, but they were slated for either repurposing or destruction as they contained cluster munitions. The cost of storage and destruction of old cluster munitions is huge. Based on an average of $1m per tonne of cluster munitions destroyed safely in the decade up to 2009, it can cost the US about half as much to store and make safe these weapons as it does to make modern versions of same. So, you could, if you had a mind to, donate 10 M39 Block 1 ATACMs to Ukraine that are slated for destruction at a cost of minus $5m.

So looked at in the round, I can't see the U.S. Congress passing the full $60m, but nor can I see them giving nothing to Ukraine in 2024. Most likely, through a combination of a reduced voted figure and maybe some clever accounting, we will see a similar level of military aid to Ukraine in 2024 as we did in 2022 and 2023, if not an even greater level of military aid on the ground (if not in accounted monetary terms).