What can happen to someone install a webcam on the sly?

Privacy Bill is not relevant.

This is actionable under a number of differing mechanisms including the ECHR Act 2003:

Cogley v. R.T.E. [2005] 2 I.L.R.M. 529. That case concerned an intended broadcast of a programme in relation to the operation of a nursing home known as Leas Cross Nursing Home. Two sets of proceedings were brought against RTE seeking to prevent the broadcast of the programme. The plaintiff in the first set of proceedings was a Director of Nursing at the nursing hone and the plaintiffs in the second set of proceedings were the owners and occupiers of the nursing home. Using a concealed camera, a worker filmed the operation of the nursing home over a two week period. The plaintiffs in the second proceedings based their application primarily on the allegation that the use of a secret camera was a breach of the right to privacy of the plaintiffs and the patients at the nursing home and constituted trespass. In considering the extent of the constitutional right to privacy as set out in Kennedy v. Ireland, Clarke J. noted at p. 90:-

“However, it is also clear from Kennedy v. Ireland [1987] I.R. 587 that the right to privacy is not an unqualified right but is subject to the constitutional rights of others and to the requirements of public order, public morality and the common good. It should also be noted that the express recognition of an obligation to respect the privacy of others contained in the Broadcasting Acts 1960 to 1976 referred to above is also not unqualified in that it places an obligation on the Broadcasting authority not to ‘unreasonably encroach’ on the privacy of an individual. Thus it is clear that while persons such as the plaintiffs have a constitutional right to privacy and an arguable entitlement to ensure that the Broadcasting Authority does not unreasonably interfere with their privacy in the course of making and broadcasting programmes, those rights are not unqualified. It is, therefore, necessary to address how the right of privacy may be balanced against other competing rights and, in particular, how an assessment of the situation in respect of such competing rights should be made at an interlocutory stage such as this.”

Clarke J. went on to comment as follows:

“A useful starting point for the purposes of this case seems to me to be to distinguish between a right of privacy in the underlying information whose disclosure it is sought. to prevent, on the one hand. and, on the other hand, the situation where a right to privacy which does not extend to that underlying information but it is contented that the methods by which the information has been obtained amount to a breach of privacy.
There are certain matters which are entirely private to an individual and where it may validly be contended that no proper basis for their disclosure either to third parties or to the public generally exists. There may be other circumstances where the individual concerned might not, having regard to competing factors which may be involved, such as the public interest, be able to maintain that the information must always be kept private but may make a complaint in relation to the manner in which the information was obtained.
It seems to me the different considerations apply most particularly at an interlocutory stage, dependant on which of the above elements of the right to privacy is involved.”

Ultimately in that case the court went on to refuse the interlocutory relief sought. Clarke J. did comment (at p. 93) that the plaintiffs had at least made out an arguable case to the effect that the circumstances in which the filming occurred may amount, prima facie, to a trespass and breach of privacy. However, he went on to hold that the mere fact that information may arguably have been obtained in breach of an individual’s rights is not of itself necessarily decisive. He pointed out the importance of weighing in the balance any public interest issues which arise and given that he was dealing with an interlocutory application, the extent to which damages may be an adequate remedy.

M. v. Drury referred to above that because the plaintiffs in those cases failed to obtain the interlocutory relief sought, and bearing in mind that there has not been a decision arising out of a full trial of a claim for damages for breach of privacy against a private person or entity, that no such right exists.

Cogley v. R.T.E. are the following principles:-

(1) There is a Constitutional right to privacy.
(2) The right to privacy is not an unqualified right.
(3) The right to privacy may have to be balanced against other competing rights or interests.
(4) The right to privacy may be derived from the nature of the information at issue - that is, matters which are entirely private to an individual and which it may be validly contended that there is no proper basis for the disclosure either to third parties or to the public generally.
(5) There may be circumstances in which an individual may not be able to maintain that the information concerned must always be kept private, having regard to the competing interests which may be involved but may make complaint in relation to the manner in which the information was obtained.
(6) The right to sue for damages for breach of the constitutional right to privacy is not confined to actions against the State or State bodies or institutions.

Two comments:

1. Recovery against the state as you cite above is one thing, against a private party is an entirely different matter;

2. I accept the point on Section 9.

Herrity is a recent one on phone tapping which is interesting, but its not Computer Misuse.

Actually, there are tighter laws in the UK on such matters such as RIPA and also the 2007 Criminal Justice Act properly criminalises such activity.

I am less interested in the Constitutional tort issue.

Read Herrity v MGN - Interesting given Dunne J methodology of construing the Legislation as against the constitutional right etc.